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This thesis examines the way the absence of moral consideration of the animal in 
Christian doctrine is evident in Middle English literature. A fundamental difference 
between the theology and literature of the medieval period is literature's capacity to 
present and theorise positions that cannot, for various reasons, be theorised in the 
official discourses provided by commentators and theologians. Patterns of excluding 
the animal from moral consideration by Christianity are instigated with the rejection of 
the ethics of late Neoplatonism. Highlighted by Neoplatonists, and evident in the 
stylistic differences in reading scripture and philosophy, is an early Christian 
ideological predisposition toward purely humanocentric concerns. The disparity 
between a definite Hellenic ethic of the animal and its absence in Christian thought is 
most evident in the contrast between an outward looking Neoplatonic understanding of 
creation, and the closed matrix of scholastic interpretative thought. Influential textual 
representations of the universe require that creation is interpreted through a 
fideistically enclosed system of signs. The individual must have faith before 
approaching knowledge. The animal is placed into a system dominated by the primacy 
of faith in God, which paradoxically produces the predetermined answers supplied by 
Christian doctrine and selective scriptural and doctrinal suppositions. In literary texts, 
the animal provides an obvious method of Christian debate. Contemporary theological 
values~ such as the doctrinal commonplace of comparing man with animal in the 
corporeal context highlights the uncomfortable similarity to, yet prescribes that man 
aspire to distance himself from, the animal. The primacy of man and the importance of 
his salvation, is a doctrine which countermands the theocentric basis of Christian 
theology, in which God is understood as a presence in all his creation. Such conflicting 
perspectives result in animals in medieval literature being used to test theological and 
philosophical parameters, illustrating the inadequacy of sharp theological boundaries, 
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In this thesis, I have followed the academic conventions outlined in the MLA 
Handbook for Writers of Research Papers (51h edition) edited by Joseph Gibaldi (New 
York: The Modem Language Association of America, 1999). The subject matter of 
the thesis has required some considerable dependence upon biblical analogues and 
authorities. In the interests of working within the medieval literary tradition, and with 
textual material contemporary to the period, scriptural citations are extracted from the 
Latin vulgate bible: Biblia Sacra Vulgatce Editionis, Sixti V Pont. Max. iussu 
Recogniti et Clementis VIII (Torino: Marietti, 1959). To use the King James Version 
would have been anachronistic to the period covered by the thesis, though in addition 
the King James Version often varies slightly in sense, and on occasion considerably, 
in substance. In these cases, I have provided citation from both in order to 
demonstrate the differences between the two: The New King James Bible (London: 
Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1985). My use of Saint Thomas Aquinas' Summa 
Theologice is essential to my discussion of the displacetnent of the animal in medieval 
literature, and quotations are taken predominantly from a scholarly Latin edition: 
Summa Theologice, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis S. pii 
Pp. V issu confectum recognita, 5 vols. (Ottawa: 1941-1945). In some instances 
however, reference to the Summa Theologice is complementary to a broader line of 
argun1ent and for the sake of brevity in these cases I have used a modem English 
translation: Summa Theologice: A Concise Translation, edited and translated by 
Timothy McDermott (Texas: Alien Christian Classics, 1991). 
Since completing the initial research relating to canon formation and the exclusion of 
Hellenic ethics from Christian thought in chapter one and its relevant appendixes, a 
significant work has been published which touches on many of these areas, and at 
titnes, maintains a similar thesis- though with a much broader parameter of 
discussion. This edition is Charles Freeman's The Closing of the Western Mind: The 
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Rise of Faith and the Fall of Reason (London: Heinemann, 2002). In the interests of 
transparency, -where my material is similar to his I have drawn attention to the 
correspondence. 
The second chapter of the thesis focuses on Bartholomaeus Anglicus' literal sense 
encyclopaedia De Proprietatibus rerum (On the Properties of Things) compiled 
around the date 1245. While of central importance to the second chapter, this work 
has been invaluable to the thesis as a whole. The DPR is Bartholomaeus' most notable 
manuscript and is the largest and most comprehensive work of its type. It comprises 
the encyclopaedic categorisation of known creation into a Latin compilatio designed 
both for use with the technique of scholastic Lectio, and as a reference text for 
scholarly clerics. I use the 1975 edition On the Properties ofThings a Critical Text: 
John Trevisa 's Translation of De proprietatibus rerum of Bartholomaeus Anglicus, 
edited by M. C. Seymour. John Trevisa's 1398 translation constitutes a prime 
example of a vernacular summa, its conventions arising directly from the Latin 
original, and is the best known and most used by writers in the Middle English 
period. 1 It provides analogues and source material, which have proved invaluable to 
this thesis. In 1897, R. Steel makes the earliest critical claim for its impact, citing 
textual examples which demonstrate its influence through the medieval period and 
into the early modem period including writers such as Shakespeare, Jonson, Spencer, 
Marlowe and Lyly.2 Later Matrod's statement of 1912, that 'without the DPR the 
works of Shakespeare would not have existed', is a notorious overemphasis, 
moderated by Boy er in 1919. Boyer recognises the importance of the DP R but 
delin1its its influence to a source of scientific knowledge for medieval and Elizabethan 
writers, which n1ay provide assistance to scholarship's understanding of 'difficult' 
passages.3 Most recently, D. C. Greetham observes that the DPR deserves its accepted 
1 See Traugott Lawler 'On the Properties of John Trevisa's Major Translations' in Viator 14, p. 268 
ff. 
2 R. Steele, ed., Medieval Lore: an epitome of the science, geography, animal and plant folk-lore 
and myth of the middle age; being classified gleanings from the encyclopedia of Bartholomew Anglicus 
(London: William Morris & Stock, 1893) p. 3. 




sobriquet of' Shakespeare's encyclopaedia. '4 At the time of the compilation of the 
DP R in 1245 limited access to books, as well as their prohibitive cost, prompted the 
assemblage of many such encyclopaedias where a multiple of authorities and points of 
view were pr~sented in a single, easily accessible work or textbook for scholars and 
preachers who had no quicker or easier form of reference. By the late fourteenth and 
early fifteenth century, libraries were still very rare, and encyclopaedia came to be 
prized for the extracts from hundreds of books which they contained, and to which the 
student could not otherwise hope to gain access. Elizabeth Brockhurst less generously 
comments that 'a compilation presented in an orderly fashion offers a short cut to 
knowledge to the lazy-minded, and leads the genuine student on to more serious 
study. ' 5 
Though only briefly, in places I refer to the Patrologia Latina Cursus Completus, 
edited by J. P. Migne, (Paris, 1844 -1864 ); unless otherwise stated citations are 
reproduced from the Patrologia Latina electronic database version, Copyright © 
(Chadwyck- Healey Inc., 1993). 
·I D. C. Greetham, 'The Concept of Nature in Bartholomaeus Anglicus (Fl 1230)' in Journal of the 
Historv o{ldeas, 41 (1980) pp. 663-677. 
5 Bro~khurst. Elizabeth. J., 'Bartholomaeus Anglicus' "De Proprietatibus Rerum"', unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, (University of London, 1952) p. 1. While the earliest Latin manuscript in England is MS. 
Bodlian Ashmore N. 1512 (Nov. 1296) Trevisa's English translation is dated 1398. Still popular in its 
time was Steven Batman's edition. Batman vppon Bartholome his Booke De proprietatibus rerum, 
(London: East, 1582, British Museum). John Hankins' cites Batman's edition as the analogue to 
English medieval and Renaissance thought, providing material on the animal, soul, corporeal senses, 
geometry, and the effect of the humours on the body. See John Hankins, Backgrounds of Shakespeare's 
Thought (London: The Harvester Press, 1978). Trevisa's translation was finally printed in three 
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The medieval intellect was adept at interpreting the animal symbolically, though 
animals in medieval texts and images rarely carry a corresponding range of 
significance from one manuscript to another. While drawing on much current literary 
and historical study of the non-human animal, which tends to focus on its symbolic 
value, this is not the main area of analysis of this thesis. Rather, the thesis posits 
questions about the status of the animal in medieval doctrine and literature; about how 
it should be read theologically, about how the animal is excluded from ethical 
consideration, and how ultimately such questions are examined in medieval literature. 
From the time of Christian canon formation animals are excluded from ethical 
consideration in the official discourses of theology and philosophy, while over-
simplistic doctrinal conceptions of the animal are worked out in medieval literature. 
This is unmistakably evident in a range of texts, from bestiaries and encyclopaedias, 
to chivalric romances where the interrelationship between the human animal and the 
non-human is scrutinised. Working from within the medieval 'commentary' tradition, 
the thesis makes the central point that the difference between theology and literature 
is medieval literature's capacity to present and theorise positions that cannot, for 
various reasons, be theorised in official discourses. 
While it would be too universalising to treat poetic fiction and theological allegory 
collectively under the banner of Christian semiotics, the two must be seen as 
corresponding in many respects. The fictional texts dealt with in the thesis are 
analysed in conjunction with theological and philosophical material in order to 
highlight shared theological values and understandings between the two, and in some 
cases, the material presents notable similarities. Theologians such as Aquinas deal 
with the realm of theology - not fiction - and there is an essential medieval distinction 
between scriptural and poetic modes of interpretation, which I discuss below in 
appropriate contexts. Nevertheless, the gap between the two is often narrow, and such 
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a distinction is one that the poet Robert Henryson, for example, plays with wittily, by 
highlighting the commonplace theological doctrine of comparing man to animal as the 
justification for his use of animal fables. His figurative context combines theology 
and fiction to draw attention to the theologically defined similarity between human 
and animal in the corporeal world, and does so by the use of strategic representations 
of verbal relationships. In doing so, he generates a discourse combining ontological 
hierarchies with man's animal nature. In this respect, the theoretical space between 
theology and fiction can be seen to be of questionable size, especially given 
Augustine's assertions that all words and things may only ever be seen in fictional 
terms, and never truly represent actuality. 
In the theological context, biblical uses of the animal and subsequent exegesis can be 
seen to depend upon the metaphorical correlation between man and animal, and to 
dictate the way that the animal is used in fictional contexts. Secular hermeneutics in 
the Middle Ages retain the idea of relating the individual work to a larger purpose into 
which pattern it meaningfully fits. Between that past reception, however, and 
medieval attempts to understand it, the text will inevitably generate more 
interpretations. Scriptural references to animals often serve to illustrate types of 
humans and character traits, which then become commonplace in medieval poetry. 
One of the most striking examples is the snake, who is seen as both wise (Matt. 10. 
16), while at the same time aggressively hostile (Ps. 91. 13; Matthew 7. 1 0; Luke 11. 
11-12). The snake is compared with, or referred to directly as, the devil (Solomon. 2. 
243: Enoch 69. 6; Job 2. 1; Zechariah 3. 1 - 2) in the Old Testament by Moses (Gen. 
3. 1) and even in the New Testament by Jesus (Matt 4. 1 0). While Plato had already 
described how in the golden age men and beasts spoke the same language and did not 
eat each other6 Saint Paul is keen to associate the cunning of the snake with the 
slippage of meaning in language, further implicating the snake in the doctrine of the 
fall fron1 Eden by equating its split tongue with the bifurcation of speech: 'Timeo 
aut em ne sicut se1pens Hevam seduxit astutia sua, ita corrumpantur sensus vest1y, et 
excidant a simplicitate quae est in Christo' [But I fear, lest somehow, as the serpent 
6 Plato, The Statesman 271 E, in The Sophist and The Statesman, trans. by A. E. Taylor (London: 
Nelson, 1961 ). 
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deceived Eve by his craftiness, so your minds may be corrupted from the simplicity 
that is in Christ] (2 Cor. 11. 3). The snake is an apt example of the way that biblical 
metaphors controlled Christianity's reading of animal types, though the essential 
meaning of a~imals - and of the snake in particular - is particularly difficult to locate. 
This inability to say that a snake stands definitively for one single trait or attribute in 
scripture is due to the type of slippage that we might expect from generalised 
descriptive similes, which depend upon the metamorphic qualities of the animal, and 
the comparisons drawn with Men. The various symbolic values of scriptural animals 
maintain similar currency in fictional contexts, and in turn dictate western attitudes to 
the real animal - especially those kept or produced for food. While dogs, along with 
poisoners, fornicators and murders are excluded from heaven (Rev. 22. 15) and are 
like beggars (Luke 16. 21) eating scraps from tables (Matt. 15. 26- 7; Mark 7. 27-
28) they are likened to pigs who consume anything (Luke 15. 15 - 16; Lev. 11. 7; Isa. 
65. 4, 66. 3, 65. 17). In turn pigs are seen as impure, and an apposite vehicle for 
demons; Jesus drives unclean spirits from the possessed demonic into pigs, who leap 
from a cliff and drown in the sea of Galilee, apparently deserving their fate because of 
their unclean nature: 'exierunt ergo daemonia ab homine, et intraverunt in porcos; et 
impetu abiit grex pe,_- praeceps in stagnum, et suffocatus est' [Then the den1ons went 
out of the man and entered the swine, and the herd ran violently down the steep place 
and into the lake and drowned] (Luke 8. 33; cf, Mark 5. 1 - 20; 2 Peter 2. 22). 
Hebrew dietary laws which forbade the consun1ption of pork have little effect on the 
Christian attitude to its consumption, and despite atternpts to justify such eating 
habits, the practice becomes acceptable at the time of the mergence of Christianity 
with Ron1e. 7 Pigs are also lustful animals, often being compared to women: 'circulus 
aureus in naribus suis mulier pulchra etfatua' [As a ring of gold in a swine's snout, 
so is a lovely woman who lacks discretion] (Prov. 11. 22). Like the snake, the 
diversity of scriptural metaphors and exegesis on animals such as the pig also 
provides unstable analogies and metaphors- they may be a symbol for one thing at 
one n1on1ent, and another the next. These instabilities, which are often contradictory, 
can be seen in the range of meaning bestowed upon the animal in the literary text. But 
7 Various attempts to justify or discredit dietary laws by Christian authorities are cited by Robert M. 
Grant, Early Christians and Animals (London: Routledge, 1999) pp. 13 - 14. 
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medieval literary texts also tackle such truisms about the animal by a literary 
expression, which has the capacity to release and discuss that which has already been 
enclosed. This thesis will demonstrate how questions about the status of the animal 
which are enclosed in authorised texts, are exorcised in fiction. 
In his book The Status of Animals C. W. Hume made a statement suggesting that our 
reading of the animal needs to be more comprehensive: 
It seems to me that if we are to achieve what Locke called '"bottoming" 
[Conduct of the Understanding § 44] we must see our subject against a wider 
background. A mistaken supposition as to the way in which knowledge is got 
has led to a wrong outlook of which a wrong view of the status of animals is 
only one aspect. 8 
Christian thought sits uncomfortably with the idea that the animal is more significant 
than it is given credit for, and the plethora of medieval texts which use the animal or 
explore the idea of man as animal bear testament to an underlying concern with a 
significance over and above doctrinal interpretations, which may indeed be based 
upon 'mistaken supposition'. Medieval literature cannot be understood apart from the 
New Testament context and the early Christian Church. This statetnent, of necessity, 
must also be reversed. The early church seems incomprehensible unless one reads the 
New Testament through medieval literature to understand the exegesis through which 
it has passed. "Pagan' source material as well as scripture was all subject to the 
interpretation of Augustine, Aquinas and others. I have set out to show that the way 
we think of the medieval mind, and understand its view of scripture, sounds 
suspiciously like the interpretation of two men, namely Augustine and Aquinas. 
Subsequently, their interpretations and compilations can be seen to constitute a 
discourse of exclusion. Significantly, Augustine and Aquinas frequently refer to the 
8 C. W. Hume, The Status of animals in the Christian Religion (London: The Universities 
Federation for Animal Welfare, 1957) p. v. 
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biblical dominion of Genesis to justify man's use and abuse of the animal,9 arguing 
that all created things are made for the benefit of man. This hierarchy extends to the 
realm of the intellect, and Aquinas argues that using animals includes seeing them as 
signs: 'in the course of nature the intellectual substance uses all others for its own 
sake ... for the perfection of the intellect, which sees the truth in them as in a 
mirror.' 10 These theological attitudes take their authority from what is understood to 
be the absolute and unchanging scriptural word of God. However, an analysis of the 
word of God which apparently validates a legitimate dominion or material use can be 
seen to be extremely tenuous, pragmatic, and interpretative. The problem is first 
pointed out by the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry, who asks why the creator made 
such a plethora of animals which produce abhorrent reactions in man, who is himself 
an animal often likened to such beasts. Seeing the animal in terms of divine 
providence, as Porphyry observes, presents a problem for Christian exegesis. How can 
everything which is produced in, and generated by nature, be solely to the final end of 
the benefit of man: 
The hog, however [says Chrysippus, his opponent] was produced by nature for 
the purpose of being slaughtered and used for food; and when it suffers this, it 
obtains the end for which it was adapted, and is benefited. But if God 
fashioned animals for the use of men, in what do we use flies, lice, bats, 
beetles, scorpions, and vipers? of which some are odious to the sight, defile 
the touch, are intolerant to the smell, and in their voice dire and unpleasant; 
and others, on the contrary, are destructive to those who meet them. 11 
Porphyry makes a perfectly valid point, not merely about the consumption of the 
anin1al, but about the spurious justifications for the consumption of a limited number 
of animals by questioning the notion that all animals are made to such an end. If 
9 DCD XI. 27; cf, Summa Theologice, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis S. 
pii Pp. V issu confectum recognita, 5 vols., (Ottawa: I94I - I945) I Q 96 I; I Q 96 2; I Q 64 I; 1 Q 65 
3. Hereafter referred to as ST. 
10 Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, cited by Clark. P. A. B. & Andrew Linzey, eds., Political 
Theory and Animal Rights (London: Pluto Press, I990) p. 9. 
11 Porphyry, On Abstinence from Animal Food, trans. by Thomas Taylor, ed. by E. Wynne-Tyson 
(London: Centaur Press Ltd., 1965) 3. 2I, pp. I29- 130. 
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providential design is the precedent, how do we understand the role of the 
'abhorrent'? In this respect the idea of dominion can itself be seen as interpretative 
and it is difficult to accept as anything other than a self-interested exposition of the 
supposed dominion over animals which preoccupies Thomistic thought. Aquinas' 
interpretations of man's place in the corporeal context, as well as the King James 
translation of The Bible, propound the notion that the divine scheme is one in which 
man should have 'dominion' over the animal, and provide the basis for the theological 
debate about the status of the animal up to the present time. The Vulgate, however, 
does not transmit this same sense: 'Et a it: Faciamus hominem ad imagine m et 
similitudinem nostram; et praesit piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli, et bestiis 
universaeque terrae, omnique reptili quod movetur in terra' (Genesis 1. 26). The verb 
praesit denotes guardianship and responsibility for creation. There is no mention of 
imperium, or regnum, or the dominatus or implied dominion of the King James 
Version. 12 Other sources suggest different understandings. Aquinas' use of the word 
praesit when explaining that Genesis gives 'dominion' to man over all things, is also 
qualified by the microcosm I macrocosm correspondence which he is explaining in 
order to illustrate that all things are in a sense contained within man, and it is over 
these things that he has the only absolute authority. 13 In contrast, the number of 
references to scriptural covenants, which confound the idea of a humanocentric 
dominion, is immense, and it is central to my argument that though testaments, 
gospels and injunctions litter Christian scripture, they are ignored, or repressed, or 
misrepresented. 'Aperi os tuum muto, et causis omnium jilium qui pertranseunt', open 
your mouth for the dumb, for all who are appointed to destruction, says the Proverb 
12 There is a much debated dichotomy between the literal sense of the text and subsequent 
interpretations. While Andrew Linzey does not offer a translation he is keen to stress a New Testament, 
Christological interpretation: • If it is true that the power of God is most authentically expressed in the 
form of suffering service then we have to ask ourselves radical questions about how we are to 
understand out own lordship or dominion over nature in general and animals in particular.' Andrew 
Linzey, Animal theology (London: SMC Press Ltd., 1994) p. 54. In the most recent appraisal of 
Christology Christopher Tuckett states that 'the assertion that Jesus was in the form of God may be 
paralleled by the statement that Adam was made in the image [Gk. eikon] of God (Gen. 1: 26). Jesus is 
then said to have not regarded equality with God to be harpagmos (NRSV 'something to be 
exploited').' Christopher Tuckett, Christology and the New Testament: Jesus and His Earliest 
Followers (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001) p. 54. further still Thomas Torrence argues 
that man should play a redemptive role in his relationship with nature, bringing order where 
disharmony threatens with disorder, see Thomas Torrance, Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1981) pp. 129- 130. 
13 I explain this at length below 2. 8, and specifically in relation to Henryson's fables below 3. 4 (e). 
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(31. 8). 'iustitia tua quasi monies Do mine iudicium tuum abyssus multa homines et 
iumenta salvosfacies Domine' (Psalm 35:7 in Vulgate cycle, 36.6 in translation) 
explains that God brings salvation to man and animal alike. God remembers the 
covenant which is between Himself and man and every living creature of all flesh not 
to bring further retribution after the flood: 'et recodobor foederis mei vobis cum, et 
cum omni anima vivente quae carnem vegetal' (Gen: 9. 15). God importantly 
promises a covenant with animals: 'Et percutiam cum eis foedus in die ilia, cum 
bestia agri et cum volucre caeli et cum reptili terrae; et arcum et gladium et helium 
conteram de terra, et dormire eos faciam fiducialiter'; his promise is to the beasts of 
the field, the birds of the air, and the creeping things of the ground to abolish 
slaughter, bring safety, and betroth them to Him forever (Hos. 2. 18). There are no 
demands or condemnations in these lines, but when considered they can be seen to 
modify and challenge doctrine to the point that discounting the animal as morally 
insignificant is incompatible with Christian scriptural principles. The problems of 
translation and interpretation highlight that there is clearly no single or absolute 
reading. But such problems present the end of a thread of an argument which I will 
explore in this thesis: that the real significance of God's covenant and relationship 
with the animal has been either actively dismissed in the interests of promoting 
human interests, or is merely overlooked as irrelevant to Christian thought, and 
presents problems for literary texts. 
The absence of reference to 'covenant' scripture in official discourses and texts 
suggests a selective approach to the understanding of the animal which is also 
inherently political, evident in the predilection for hierarchising structures, and the all 
too convenient allegory imposed on textual material which resists such allegorical 
treatments. A general trend may be observed in the apparent displacement of the 
anin1al to the bottom of a hierarchised structure in Bartholomaeus Anglicus De 
proprietatibus rerum. 14 There are, however, particular examples of discrepancies in 
bestiaries where Aristotle is transparently rewritten in the terms of contemporary 
14 Bartholomaeus Anglicus, On the Properties of Things a Critical Te'Ct: John Trevisa 's translation 
ofDe proprietatibus rerum of Bartholomaeus Anglicus, 2 Vol. ed. by M. C. Seymour (Oxford: Oxford 
Clarendon Press, 1975), hereafter DPR. For a discussion on the' Aristotelian' placement of the animal 
in the text see appendix A. 
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Christian ideals. Francis Klingender has drawn attention to such an instance in the 
DP R, 15 which illustrates how medieval custom and convention is mirrored in a 
socially feudal world of anthropomorphised bees: 
Been Makep amonge hem a kynge and ordeynep among hem common 
people .... [pey] defendeth hym wip ful greet diffens and holdep feire 
and worschipe to perische and be ispilt for here kyng ... but been that 
bep vnboxom to pe kyng woundip hemselve by here owne doom and 
dampnacioune for to dye by the wounde of here owne stenge. 16 
Bees work and defend a king who does not leave the hive, in a model of servitude 
and accepted serfdom to an absolute monarch who is God-like at its top. The king is 
ordained, his subjects want nothing more than to die for him, and any subject who is 
treacherous stings itself to death. But Bartholomaeus' account, which is taken from 
the translator A vicenna' s relation of Aristotle, describes the hive's descending or 
hierarchical version of authority, where action can only result fron1 permission or 
commission from above. 17 This is clearly not just a translation but an ideologically 
dictated appropriatio.n of Aristotle's thought into a medieval version of world order. 
The difference between Aristotle's description and that of A vicenna, can be seen in 
the contrast between Avicenna's hierarchy and Aristotle's lateral or associative 
vision of the hive, where actions are based on the freely chosen activity of a 
collective, and where bees 'readily kill the majority of their leaders ... so that there 
should not be a multiplicity of them to disperse the swarm.' 18 Aristotle observes: 
When a swarm is about to take flight, a monotonous and peculiar hum is 
made for some days ... a few bees fly around the hive. Whether the king is 
15 Klingender, Francis, Animals in Art and Thought: to the End of the lvliddle Ages, ed. by Evelyn 
Antal & John Havthan (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971) p. 356. 
16 DPR 12. 20 & 18. 12 verbatim. 
17 Avicenna, or Husain ibn sina (980- 1036 A. D.) was an Arab physician, translator and 
commentator, and is an authority cited throughout the DP R. 
18 Aristotle, Historia animalium, Loeb Parallel Editions Series Trans., A. L. Peck (London: 
Heinemann Ltd., 1965) 625 a, 10-25. 
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among these has not yet been observed ... if a king who they have 
abandoned accompanies them they destroy him. 19 
As Klingender points out, far from assuming or imposing the idea that the structure 
of the domain is patriarchal, Aristotle records a suspicion based on observation 
which Bartholomaeus' account neglects: 'some people call them "mothers," 
implying that they produce the young. ' 20 Where Aristotle avoids comparison with 
human society, Bartholomaeus' unquestioning compilatio, which draws on the 
authoritative translations of Isidore of Seville, A vicenna and Michael Scott, moves 
the mode from literal observation to a political and social allegory based within a 
Christian hierarchy. Reporting his authorities as though they are literal translations of 
Aristotle, Bartholomaeus may be unaware of this 'built-in' political allegoresis of the 
social organisation of the hive. Such a comparison reveals an instance where the 
scholastic use of textual animal analogues is far from discriminating, and produces 
an account of an apparently natural structure which seems to justify feudal hierarchy. 
In the process, Aristotle's observations are used to redefine the animal in tern1s of 
Christian thought, the anthropomorphised textual world of the bees apparently 
rehearsing the human pattern of idealised social relations which has been imposed 
upon them. 
Augustine's hand is very much in evidence in medieval literature and theological 
attitudes to the animal, though his statements were often made in relation to other 
issues. Gillian Clark points out that Augustine never 'engaged in sustained theological 
argument about the nature of animals and their relationship to God and to humans. He 
made assertions about animals [in the context of] quite different questions. ' 21 My use 
of Augustine in this thesis is based predominantly upon his sign theory, in which 
context literal things and literal words are fallen and 'carnal'. Literal understandings, 
for Augustine, are seen as bestial because like the fallen world their word no longer 
19 Hist 625 b, 5 - 15. 
20 Hist 553 b, I 0- 25. 
21 Gillian Clark, 'The Fathers and the Animals: The Rule of Reason?' in Animals on the 
Agenda: Questions About Animals For Theology and Ethics, ed. by Andrew Linzey & Dorothy 
Yamamoto (Oxford: SCM Press Ltd, 1998) p. 67. 
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contains meaning. But Augustine seems to enforce the notion of the contingency of all 
language- scripture included- when he responds to the dualistic Manichean belief 
that the divine was fragmented and dispersed into creation and should not be 
consumed. Giving a disingenuous justification for meat eating in relation to man's 
dominion, Augustine's explanation of the seventh commandment becomes quite 
literally aporetic, its sense being confused. Yet it is an influential analogue to the 
Christian understanding of human dominance. He states that the biblical injunction 
not to kill, 'Non occides' (Ex. 20. 13) is to be understood as homicidal murder. 
Construing ' "Do not kill" as applying to human beings, that is, other persons and 
oneself. For to kill oneself is to kill a human being' 22 is a puzzling and undecidable 
attempt to evade an unequivocal statement. God's comprehensive injunction is, 
without justification, shifted to the realm of man alone and the explicit demand is 
taken verbum sapienti, as though by its nature the command expresses a need for a 
further, more explicit statement or qualification. Augustine in fact, compromises the 
idea that the Word is unchanging and absolute, by coercing it into the contingent field 
of interpretation and elucidation. In this instance, interpretation has produced a 
selective doctrine presenting a fragmentary understanding of a large body of work, 
equivocating on the unequivocal, and constituting a limited reflection of ontological 
reality. God's Truth, apparent in his commands, is compromised by Augustine's 
commentary. 
Gillian Clark asks why man's dominion is so obvious to a reader like Augustine? She 
follows Augustine's validation for the consumption of meat when he addresses the 
Manicheans, insisting that the eating of meat is authorised by scripture. Yet he feels 
he has to go further and justify it philosophically. He draws attention to the 
irrationality of animals: they are not like us because they lack reason, he says, 
concluding that reason has not been given to animals to have in common with man.23 
Augustine n1akes three assumptions, that animals are inferior because we can tame 
then1 and not then1 us~ that humans are distinctively rational animals and that reason 
22 Saint Augustine, Concerning the City of God against the Pagans, trans. Henry Bettenson, 
Penguin Classics Series (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972) 1. 20, pp. 31 - 32. 
23 Clark op cit., pp. 67- 73. 
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rules over non- reason; and that 'reason' means the intellectual capacity placing 
human beings next to- or indeed like- God, both intellectually and spiritually.24 
Augustine enforces it with a lexicon of negative animal terminology, which though 
meant to reveal divine intentions, is entirely textual and rhetorical. Augustine uses 
bestia, insinuating the aggressive ferocity of the animal, and belua, connoting its 
monstrosity. He does not use animalia (a living creature) which includes human 
beings, but pecus, or cattle, to emphasis the utility of the animal. 25 While other figures 
advised against the consumption of the animal, they are less influential than 
Augustine, whose rhetorical expressions assume and enforce human superiority over 
God's creation and influence the formation of Christian thought. Clement of 
Alexandria dealt with diet from points of view both moral and philosophical. He 
quoted Paul as saying, 'It is good not to eat meat or drink wine' which is shortened 
from Romans 14. 21, to emphasise his Pythagorean agenda. He cites the Stoic 
philosopher Musonius Rufus: 'Meat, though appropriate for wild animals, darkens the 
soul. ' 26 Needless to say, such a position did not influence the way that early 
Christianity defined the animal. 
Philosophical and scriptural texts present a discourse preoccupied with the 
identification and attainment of a system of reading creation. However, they are 
involved not in reflecting creation, but in informing an audience of what creation 
might be and prescribing a system for reading its signs. Middle English texts operate 
within a similarly well- established system and are concerned with the representation 
of established ideas. Their modes of producing alternative realities aim to reflect 
24 This is an essentially Aristotelian understanding: 'the lower animals have no share in happiness, 
being completely incapable of such activity. The life ofthe gods is altogether happy, and that of man 
insofar as it contains something that resembles the divine activity; but none of the lower animals is 
happy, because they have no way of participating in contemplation.' Aristotle, Ethics, in The ethics of 
Aristotle: the Nicomachean ethics, trans. by J. A. K. Thomson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955) 10, 
1178 b. 
25 Clark op cit., p. 68, citing 83 Questions on Various Topics (Corpus Christianorum, series Latina) 
44A: 20. Isidore of Seville's later etymological e.xplicatio is that ' "We call pecus everything that lacks 
human voice and appearance." Properly the name pecus is used of those animals fit for eating, such as 
sheep and pigs; or useful to mankind, such as horses and oxen. There is a difference between pecora 
and pecudes, for "the ancients commonly called all animals pecora," but pecudes only those animals 
that are eaten, as if pecu-edes. But in general every animal is calledpecus from feeding (pascendo)'. 
Isidore of Seville, Etymologies, I2. 1, 5, cited in English translation by Grant I999 op cit., p. I23. 
26 Clement of Alexandria, Tutor 2. 11. I. cited in English translation by Grant I999 ibid., p. 47. 
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creation and facilitate allegorical readings. Medieval justifications for the value of a 
text can be complex. However apparently trivial the text or tale, says Chaucer in his 
'retraction', there is probably a message of some importance. He defers to the 
authority of scripture, saying that all that is written may be read as doctrine. 27 
Amongst other texts 'al that is writen is writen for oure doctrine' appears in the Nun's 
Priest's Tale, being a common modesty topos or excusatio. Helen Cooper observes 
that though Paul meant it to apply to scripture, by the later Middle Ages it was 
'applied as the justification for the study of pagan authors in order to extract the moral 
kernel - by allegorisation if necessary. ' 28 This statement suggests that if the required 
understanding is not evident in a text, allegorisation establishes a meaning which was 
not necessarily there, in order to lead or educate an audience to what it should think. 
In the process pagan authorities are selectively tailored to the canon of Christian 
doctrine to the advancement of Christian ideology. In this process, relevant positions 
are actively excluded from Christian thought. 29 
In order to demonstrate the presence and exclusion of alternative positions, and to 
reveal shifting perspectives on the animal, this thesis begins historically with 
Porphyry's treatise On Abstinence from Animal Food written in the third century after 
the death of Christ. Subsequently, the argument progresses to the twelfth century and 
early scholastic attitudes to animals in the literal sense. While this would seem to be a 
large temporal jump in the development of any argument it serves the purpose of 
illustrating the type of Hellenic thought which is synthesised into Christian theory, 
and the elements that are excluded. But there is also an important contrast between the 
two, characterised on the one hand by the outward looking paradigm of Porphyry's 
launch points to the realm of mind, and on the other hand Bartholomaeus Anglicus' 
encyclopaedia De proprietatibus rerum which offers a closed matrix of interpretative 
thought. In works such as the DP R, the book of creation is read through a fideistically 
enclosed meaning system. Augustine took to heart and amplified the scriptural 
27 Citing 2 Tim. 3. 16; Rom. 6. 17; 1 Cor. 12. 1 - 11. 
28 Helen Cooper, The Structure of the Canterbury Tales (London: Gerald Duck worth & Co. Ltd. 
1983) p. 240. 
29 The most comprehensive discussion on the synthesis of Hellenic philosophy which Christian 
theology is given by Etienne Gilson, in History of Christian Philosophy in the A1iddle Ages (London: 
Sheed and Ward, 1955) esp. pp. 9 - 24. 
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injunction that unless you have faith you will never have understanding: 'si non 
credideritis, non permanebitis' (Isaiah 7.9). When Etienne Gilson states that 'Faith, 
properly speaking, is in the human intellect, but must in a way reside also in things, 
albeit in things as related to the divine intellect' 30 he highlights an approach to 
knowledge first enunciated by Augustine in De magistro, where understanding will 
only be gifted if the enquirer has faith in God before he approach knowledge. 
Paradoxically, the required pre-existent faith strongly suggests the pre-determined 
answers supplied by Christian doctrine, which would in turn seem to dismiss the 
importance of the animal, and marks the interpretative differences between Hellenic 
and scholastic thought. 
Porphyry stands geographically between East and West, 'a Greek speaker who lived 
for a good part of his life at or near Rome. ' 31 He was born in AD 232 or 233. in Tyria, 
Phoenicia and died at Rome in 305. Originally called Malchus, meaning 'King', he 
was persuaded to take the equivalent Greek name Basileus by his tutor, the 
grammarian Longinus (c. 3rd century.), while at Athens. Around AD 260, in 
anticipation of his move to Rome, he was encouraged to take a further derivative of 
his original name a!fd changed it to Porphyry after the purple dye used for imperial 
garments. At the age of thirty he went to Rome, met the Neoplatonic philosopher 
Plotinus, and 'giving up all his former teachers, he devoted hin1self entirely to this 
great master of his philosophy.' 32 After Plotinus' death, Porphyry became the major 
living representative ofNeoplatonism in the later third century. Much of Porphyry's 
work has been destroyed. Existing pieces of his work include his edited collection and 
commentary of Plotinus' Enneads, or ''Nines", so-called because they were sorted 
into chapters of nine sections each by Porphyry; Vita Plotini (the life of Plotinus ), De 
Ahstinentia (The Abstinences), the Eisagoge or 'introduction' to Aristotle's 
categories, Kat a Christianon (Against the Christians), The Life of Pythagoras, History 
q{ Philosophy, De regressu animae (Return of the Soul) and the allegorical 
30 Gilson, Etienne, The Spirit Of Medieval Philosophy: Gifford Lectures, 1931 - 1932. Trans. by A. 
H. C. Downs (Lonqon: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1991) p. 238. 
31 Smith, A., Porphyry's Place in the Neap/atonic Tradition: A Study In Post-Platinic Neoplatonism 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoft, 1974.) p. XV. 
32 Wynne- Tyson op cit., p. 5. 
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interpretation of the cave in the thirteenth book of the Odyssey as a microcosm of the 
cosmos, De antro nymphanum (Cave of the Nymphs). His Letters to his Wife 
Marcella, proffers guidance and suggestions for life's spiritual journey. On Cult 
Images demonstrates the allegorical approach followed by many philosophers and 
writers including the Stoics, Plutarch, Philo of Alexandria, and the Neoplatonists. 
There is no doubt that Porphyry is important. Augustine refers to him as 'the noble 
philosopher', 'the great ethnic philosopher' and ranks him above Plato. Wynne-
Tyson comments that 'Eusebius, his implacable enemy, speaks of Porphyry as "the 
wonderful theologian" and "the great prophet." To Simplicius he was "the most 
learned of philosophers." ,JJ The use of Porphyry's On Abstinence in this thesis serves 
to highlight the manner of his exclusion. Because of his attack on Christianity, 
directed against the Christians of his own day, and the subsequent burning of Against 
the Christians, he seems to stand out as the representative of a diametrically opposed 
position: an opposing Hellenic voice of dissent to Christian ideology. Yet the 
terminology of his Eisagoge, or 'introduction' to Aristotle's categories fixed much of 
the vocabulary for subsequent mediaeval discussions, and contains some of the most 
significant lines in the history of Philosophy. Porphyry would come to be seen, 
initially by Augustine, as a pagan in possession of Christian truth, and profoundly 
important to Christian thought. 
However, it is because Porphyry's work has so much in common with Christianity, 
although initially excluded from being one of its authorities, that he is of interest. 
When he is finally accepted as a legitimate philosophical voice, and an appropriate 
philosopher who con1plements Christian thought, his most complete and 
comprehensive work, On Abstinence from Animal Food, is not integrated into western 
thought with other of his works. It is this factor more than any other, which 
characterises a discursive pattern for the exclusion of animals from moral 
consideration in the Christian paradigm. This thesis begins its analysis at the time of 
early Christianity and Christian canon formation, where patterns of exclusion are most 
vividly and textually evident, and which can be seen to influence the way that 
33 Wynne- Tyson ibid., p. 5. 
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animals, as an obvious method of Christian debate, are understood in Middle English 
texts. Questions apparently satisfactorily resolved by Porphyry about animal status in 
creation, constantly threaten to erupt into medieval narratives and question their 
integrity or test the ideas of the theology of the animal. In addition, it is upon these 
narratives that my argument will find its main point of focus. 
In many respects Porphyry's mode of thought bears striking similarity to Christian 
Philosophy. Augustine discovered in Porphyry's work a divine transcendence and a 
concept of the trinity in Neoplatonism, as St. Ambrose's parallelism did in adapting 
Neoplatonism to Christianity.34 Porphyry's translation of Plotinus' second Ennead 
attacks the current 'Gnostic' Christian apocalyptic hopes, by propounding a non-
dualistic definition of creation, which sounds remarkably similar to that which we 
know as a Christian understanding of the universe: 
the universe is a life organised, effective, complex, all-comprehensive, 
displaying an unfathomable wisdom. How then can anyone [viz., the 
"Gnostics"] deny that it is a clear image, beautifully formed, of the 
intellectual Divinities? No doubt it is a copy, not original; but that is its 
very nature; it cannot be at once a symbol and reality. But to say that it 
is an inadequate copy is false. Nothing has been left out which a 
beautiful representation within the physical order could include. 35 
This focus on the world as a 'copy' demonstrates a central tenet of the perennial 
philosophy that earthly life does not constitute the whole of reality.36 Everything in 
the tnundane world has its more powerful positive original in a divine realm.37 
3
.
1 For a basic though thorough account of Ambrose' Neoplatonism see New Catholic 
Enc:vclopaedia ed. by McGraw & Hill (The Catholic University Of America, 1966) Vol. 2. p. 1043 b., 
hereafter referred to as NC£. 
35 Ennead 2, 9. 8. references to Porphyry's edited version of his master Plotinus' E1meads are taken 
from The En ne ads, trans. by S. Mackenna (Harmondsworth: Penguin Ltd., 1991 ). 
36 The term 'perennial philosophy' is used in the context of Hellenic questions about man's place in 
the cosmos, which was common at all cultures and applied to the enquiry of a range of subjects which 
could be called 'philosophy', providing it was guided by a canon of rationality. 
37 That it could not at once be a symbol and reality would have been contested by medieval 
philosophers, who would have refined their categories to an either, or dependent upon, solution in line 
with the problem to be addressed. 
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Aquinas expresses the same thing in a different paradigm, seeing a non-dualistic 
creation inseparable from God and inseparably good. He interprets creation in the 
literary mode which we might call pedagogical literary criticism. Based on Aristotle 
and Genesis, interpretation progresses from an empirical philosophy at the literal level 
of the text, to the anagogical. In other words, assisted by a Hellenic logic which is 
difficult for him to deny, his hermeneutic reveals the hidden mystical and spiritual 
meaning of The Bible, and what this means in terms of the greater concerns of death, 
judgement and salvation. At each level there is a quidditative approach which asks 
and examines what essence makes a thing what it is. In this example, all levels of 
creation are infused with God's essence. To prove his point Aquinas arrives, 
tropologically, at the scriptural authority upon which figurative interpretation 
depends. It also concludes the progress of his logic by a justification which places his 
discourse in the sequential ordering of the bible itself. In the Summa Theologiae 
Aquinas explains that matter is formless and adaptable to any form, and that God 
planned to create many distinct things so that he could share with them, and they 
reproduce, his goodness. Because no single creature could do this, he produced 
diverse numbers of creatures so that what was lacking in one expression of his 
goodness would be made up by another: God is revealed in his diversity. Aquinas 
explains that, to rule out the idea that things [rerum] came from competing sources of 
good and evil, Origen ( c.l85 - c.254)38 suggested that in the beginning God created all 
creatures equal and with reason, but that inequality arose from free choice: 
lllae igitur rationales creaturae quae ad Deum per liberum arbitrium 
conversae sunt promotae sunt as diversos ordines angelorum pro 
diversitate meritorum. lllae autem quae aversae sunt a deo, sunt 
corporibus alligatae divers is, secundum diversitatem peccati, et hanc 
causam dicit esse creationis et diversitatis corporum. 
38 Origen (c.185- c.254) represents the Alexandrian school of theology, was well know for his 
allegorical reading of scripture, and in particular for his use of Platonism in such readings. Perhaps 
Aquinas assumes that Origen is well-known as he does not state the location of his authority, though it 
is clearly Origen's development of the idea that necessary evil leads to the fulfilment of God's purpose, 
Homilia in Numeros, XIV, 2; in J. P. Migne, Patrologia Graeca, 12. 6770- 678A; 678C- 679A., 
cited in English translation by Alister E. McGrath, ed. The Christian Theology Reader (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996) 3. 6 p. 96. 
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Sed secundum hoc, universitas corporalium creaturum non esset 
propter bonitatem Dei communicandem creaturis, sed ad puniendum 
peccatum. Quod est contra illud quod dictur Gen. 1 31 : "Vidit Deus 
cuncta quae fecerat, et errant valde bona. "39 
All things being equal man's purpose must have been to care for creation. 
Those turning to God, Aquinas explains, were promoted to the ranks of angels 
as they deserve, but those turning away were confined in different material 
bodies according to the extent of their fault. Were this true the bodily universe 
would have been created as a punishment for sin, which contradicts Genesis: 
God saw all the things that he had made and they were very good. 
How can two such similar understandings of creation, the Neoplatonic and the early 
Christian, differ so insolubly on the treatment of that creation? In part the answer lies 
in the vvay creation is interpreted, in fact, from the perspective of the first mysterious 
premise of Christian hermeneutics: in the beginning was the word and the word was 
God. We can either accept Augustine's interpretation of scripture itself as absolute, or 
we can see both as arbitrary productions which are ideologically predisposed to the 
maintenance of hierarchies of dominance and subservience. Because man has logos, 
he can make sense of the world and express it in words. Because animals do not use 
words it is assumed they have incomplete logoi though in Aristotle's thought they do 
have a soul [Gk. psuche, Latin, anima]. Again interpretation depends on the translated 
tern1 z6a: living beings without logos, or in the medieval paradigm commonly 
·irrational creatures. ' 40 
The order of creation is what Porphyry calls God's masterwork of precision: 'And 
since all that exists is as it is by virtue of the divine ordinance, it is impossible that the 
order of creation can be other than what it is; no better order can be conceived for 
it. '41 We may ask, what contribution does Porphyry make to the formation of the 
39 ST 1 Q 47, 2, ad 1. 
-1o Clark op cit., p 77. 
41 Porphyry, Against the Christians: The Literary Remains, ed. and trans. by R. J. Hoffmann 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 74. 
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Christian paradigm? The most available answer, that he has nothing at all to do with 
it, suggests a problem extending to the medieval understanding of God's creation. 
One of the reasons for this is that Porphyry's work was largely removed from sight, 
thereby cens9ring it from transmission and development in the future. Another is that 
his work, the most sophisticated evolution ofNeoplatonism in its pre-Christian form, 
had to compete with the newly realised Christian paradigm which had the power of 
Constantine and his empire as its benefactor. Porphyry produces a vast amount of 
material in the fourth century after the death of Christ. Yet, On Abstinence from 
Animal Food has had no recognition or ensuing hermeneutic. While many of his 
works were well known during his life time, the burning of Porphyry's Against the 
Christians by Constantine and the banning of all other of his works as contra-distinct 
to Christian faith inevitably censored his thought from appreciation. It is only when 
Augustine is influenced by Porphyry, seeing him as a pagan philosopher in possession 
of Christian truth, that Porphyry is subsequently rationalised into the church. His work 
becomes acceptable; but this is contingent upon limited inclusions of his work in 
Christian philosophical thought. The revival of his work was a selective process 
occluding his largest and most complete text,On Abstinence. 
To analyse a consistent body of textual examples of the exclusion and inclusion, 
displacement and placement of animals offers an illuminating historiographical 
corrective, exploring the notion that political power, manifested in the church at its 
beginnings, is a necessarily exclusionary discourse. Others would disagree.42 There 
will be other cogent explanations.43 But an incisive pathology of textual material 
·I:! Harold Bloom asserts that 'The Western Canon, despite the limitless idealism of those who 
would open it up, exists precisely in order to impose limits, to set a standard of measurement that is 
anything but political or moral.' He calls those who might question the Canon or see it as ideologically 
constructed, as 'resenters of the aesthetic value of literature' but then he never says what and why that 
resentment might be of. H. Bloom, The Western Canon: The Books and the School of the Ages (1994: 
Macmillan, 1995) pp. 35 and 518. Alternatively, an absolute I contingent distinction could be made 
between seeing a) the canon as closed, or in Medieval terms, b) seeing the canon as a guiding principle 
which defines high, middle and low styles according to the contingencies of style, mode, genre and 
subject matter to be addressed. 
43 Bloom denies that there is an ideology behind canon formation, while Foucault observes that 
power is comprised of instruments for the formation of recording knowledge (registers and archives), 
methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation, apparatus of control 
and so forth. An aspect of Foucault's critical method is that it locates power outside the conscious or 
intentional decision. He does not ask: who is in power? He asks how power installs itself and produces 
real material effects; where one such effect might be a particular kind of subject who will in turn act as 
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revealing the consistent manifestation of these examples in Middle English literature, 
will enunciate a voice for those not recognised by Christian theology and medieval 
doctrine. 
Turning animals into texts has a long history. This very fact alone reveals, on the level 
of personal experience, a desire to connect with 'nature' and its inhabitants. 
Specifically, the entanglements of personality, reason, experience and the divine are 
measured in the most basic denominator, the material conditions we share with 
animals. The use of fable forms afford personal participation and engagement with 
moral questions. In this sense, animals are morally neutral entities to which we may 
tailor our own measurements. The question is: how do we read this use? The study of 
pre- Renaissance literature and its theory, is somewhat misleadingly termed 
'medieval' for the convenience of classification. In reality, there is a constant process 
of development over several hundred years. Correspondingly, the use of animals as a 
symbolic device in literary debate is rarely treated in the same way by different 
authors at different periods of time. 
Medieval theory of authorship was not homogenous in the sense of 
being uncomplicated and narrowly monolithic; there was a rich 
abundance of kinds, degrees, properties and aspects of authorship to 
describe and relate to not one but several systems of classification. 
Neither was the theory static: it is best defined in terms of basic literary 
assumption, approaches and methods of analysis which altered, 
sometimes considerably, over the centuries and were applied to many 
types of writing for many different purposes.44 
a channel for the flow of power itself Foucault does not look to the 'authors' of power but to the field 
of power. '(my italics]. Bloom states 'I myself would want to argue ... that aesthetic choice has always 
guided every secular aspect of canon formation, but that is a difficult argument to maintain at this time 
when the defence of the literary canon, like the assault against it, had become so heavily politicised. 
Ideological defences of the Western Canon are as pernicious in regard to aesthetic values as the 
onslaughts of attackers who seek to destroy the Canon, or 'open it up', as they proclaim.' Bloom ibid., 
p. 22. 
-l-l A. J. M inn is, A1edieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Latter A1iddle 
Ages (London: Scholar Press, 1986) p. 2. 
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A valid common denominator, then, would seem to be the one thing that all my texts 
have in common - the commentary itself. The use of a body of Middle English texts, 
predominantly concerned with modes of exegesis, will demonstrate a consistent 
epistemology in the thesis, mediated by a strong tradition of hermeneutic explanation. 
Subsequently the collocation of source material and scholastic interpretative strategies 
with later works by writers such as Chaucer, Langland and Henryson, aims to 
demonstrate how boundaries of inclusion, marginalisation and exclusion are inherent 
in a system of thought which makes sense of the world by its enumeration and 
categorisation. At a practical level the application of this argument to a relatively 
narrow base of literary texts should be seen relative to the necessary analysis of 
theoretical material. The theory should be applicable to a large number of medieval 
texts, though in the interests of economy the thesis focuses upon a few. Indeed, while 
all texts become available to certain readings, some illustrate those readings more 
readily. 
My 'exposure' of the conspicuous discrepancy between ideological aspiration and 
reality may not easily compete with established positions. Nevertheless, I am keen to 
observe that certain ideologies are essential to the continuance of a vested interest, 
and accordingly inform a readership of positions to be 'believed', but which have 
been set-up for them by apparent persuasions and conditions of plausibility based 
upon textual representations. This notable position is, of course, that mankind should 
believe that all this world was created for exploitation purely by the human species. It 
is duly- and soberly- observed that no theory is popular which opposes or contradicts 
man this 'right'. But since the result of this belief has brought the world to a condition 
of ecological unbalance and abuse, a historiographical corrective would be justified in 
observing hitherto n1arginalised readings and material, and in suggesting that the 
displacement and marginalisation of the animal from accepted norms is transparently 
a selfish one. It may also advocate the reasonable observations of Porphyry's text as 




PORPHYRY, PHILOSOPHY, AND PATTERNS OF EXCLUDING THE ANIMAL 
'Aperi os tuum muto, et causis omniumfilium qui pertranseunt' 
(Proverbs 31. 8) 
1. 1 Excluding the animal in early Christianity 
In The Archaeology of Knowledge Michel Foucault makes a statement about the way 
we may approach and reappraise received patterns of knowledge. He suggests that 
there is a moment when every original idea becomes a convention; the very process of 
interpreting such conventions in a text has at its centre a tension between the reader, 
and the authoritative truisms of established thought which that text contains. Our 
ability to question such established and approved thought depends upon our ability to 
ascertain, with the best feasible precision, the point of rupture between the apparently 
axiornatic, and the inquiring challenge of a contemporary perspective: 
This intersection [the integration of the new idea from original to traditional] 
does not prevent it from always maintaining a bi-polar analysis of the old and 
new. An analysis that reinvests in the empirical element of history and in each 
of its stages, the problematic of the origin: in every reuvre, in every book, in 
the smallest text, the problem is to rediscover to point of rupture, to establish, 
with the greatest possible precision, the division between the in1plicit density 
of the already - said, a perhaps involuntary fidelity to acquired opinion, the 
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law of discursive fatalities, and the vivacity of creation, the leap into 
irreducible difference. 45 
The concerns enunciated in the Neoplatonic philosopher Porphyry's On Abstinence 
from Animal Food reveal such tensions, between the Neoplatonic ethics of abstinence 
from animal use and abuse, and early Christian attitudes toward the animal. On 
Abstinence presents far-reaching ethical implications for a reappraisal of the status of 
the animal in western thought, not merely in the philosophical position that it 
propounds, but in the very fact that it is excluded from consideration within medieval 
Christian philosophy and theology, and the scholastic literary tradition. The texts of 
my thesis, on one level at least, constitute a broad - ranging discourse. Porphyry 
contests Christian thought, and the Christian allegorical interpretations which displace 
the animal from spiritual and ethical inclusion in its theology. Equally, at the time of 
early Christianity Porphyry represents a censored voice who stands in opposition to 
the authority of the newly state-sponsored Christianity and its use of scripture to its 
own ends, typified by statements such as 'but what I wish, that must be the canon. ' 46 
In the pre-Christian world the nature of the relationship of man to animal exercised 
the n1inds of scientists and philosophers. In her introduction to Thomas Taylor's 
translation of On Abstinence Esme Wynne - Tyson points out that what was evident to 
much of Hellenic thought, became so to West ern thought, though remains 
unacknowledged: 
What was implicit in the ancient mysteries, as well as in the idealistic 
philosophy of the west, became explicit in the nineteenth century with the 
publication of The Origin of Species. Owing chiefly to the lethargy of the 
human mind which dislikes above all things to have to re-think its 
metaphysical position, Darwin's revival of the theory of evolution has done 
45 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. by A. M. Sheridan (London: Tavistock 
Publications Ltd., 1972) p.l42. 
46 Attributed to Constantius 11 at the church council of 355. cited by Charles Freeman, The Closing 
of the Western Mind: The Rise of Faith and the Fall of Reason (London: Heinemann, 2002) p. 181. 
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little or nothing to awaken mankind from that state of somnolence, or 
hypnosis, that Porphyry so well understood.47 
The idea tha.t man may question the way things appear, and in doing so awake to the 
Real from an illusory understanding of the world, is an important tenet ofNeoplatonic 
thought. If man does not transcend the material world, he may be reborn into another 
life, potentially as a beast. However, it is important not to confuse Porphyry's concern 
about an animal ethic with any discussion or fear of the equally Neoplatonic 
preoccupation with metempsychosis, or a 'karmic' rebirth as an animal.48 Rather, 
Porphyry regards a recognised kinship with animals as essential solely on the premise 
that they are endowed with life, having the same principles of life such as feelings, 
memory and industry, as human beings. The only exception, as far as Porphyry is 
concerned, is their lack of speech. He does use the idea of metempsychosis in his 
arguments but discusses it when elucidating on the Enneads, drawing heavily on 
Pythagoreanism. 
Humanity is poised mid- way between gods and beasts and inclines now to 
the one orqer, now to the other; some men grow like to the divine, others to 
the brute, the greatest number stand neutral. ... When the life- principle 
leaves the body it is what it is, what it most intensely lived ... Those that have 
maintained the human level are men once more. Those that have lived wholly 
to becoming animals ... Those who in their pleasures ... have gone their way 
in torpid grossness become mere growing things, for only or mainly, the 
.n Wynne- Tyson op cit, p. 18. 
48 Plato develops this idea in the Phaedrus, arguing that after death the soul may pass to realm of 
the ideas, which it may have done before, and which is why we may innately, or through the process of 
anamnesis or 'recollection' have knowledge of such virtue. Man is a fallen spirit; his aspiration should 
be to recover that memory of himself by means of philosophy, and see the truth which will free him 
from the chains of irrationality that bind him. Porphyry's Neoplatonic understanding of awaking is the 
same as Plato's, as expressed in The Republic, ed., by G. F. R. Ferrari, trans. by Tom Griffith, 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Ideas Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) 4. 581 b. Pythagoras, who provides the doctrine, is an important authority for Porphyry because 
the idea of rebirth into animal forms is a good reason for prohibiting their consumption. The 
importance of earthly, re-embodied immortality of the soul, common to Plato's thought (Rep. 10. 608 d 
- 612), together with the idea espoused in the Phaedrus that only awakening though philosophy may 
release the soul from the world and body at death, is important, though not absolutely central to 
Porphyry's line of argument. 
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vegetative principle was active in them, and such men have been busy be-
treeing themselves. 49 
This Pythagorean doctrine is wholly incompatible with the doctrines of heaven and 
hell in orthodox Christian religion. Plato specifically condemned faith as a means of 
finding truth and the Real, and his influence is clear in Plotinus' stressing of the 
importance of reason as a means to salvation. The Neoplatonic position does not see 
the same binarily opposed factions, rather understanding that reality is a continuum 
which expands outwards from a central source of power, the One or No us, 
determining what is derived from it. This is not a temporal process, but 
metaphysically independent of time, though the lowest degree of reality and power is 
found in matter: 'which has no positive nature in itself, being only definable in 
negation. An individual can, as it were, reverse the process through [a direct] 
identification with the source of power, which Plotinus calls the One. ' 50 The One may 
be attained separately from the realm of the material, though on these terms, is also to 
be sought primarily in the things which It created. For Christianity the binary 
opposites of good and bad are always in the balance, and the human soul may find its 
destination in either transcendent realm of heaven or hell, according to its actions and 
intentions during its time on earth. As will be demonstrated below there is an absolute 
I contingent distinction to be made here, as many commentators see that no evil can 
come from God's pure goodness: rather, evil may be explained as a turning away 
from God. 51 However, unlike the Neoplatonic idea that individual actions may lead to 
release from a cycle of death and rebirth, Christianity promotes the necessity of the 
doctrines of revelation through scripture, salvation through Christ, and illumination by 
God's Grace. Where there is a direct compatibility ofNeoplatonism with Christian 
thought is the emphasis on the ethics of physical actions. Men should aspire to fulfil 
49 Enn 3. 2. Based on the belief that animals have a soul, the vegetarian principle was certainly 
widespread. Robert Grant comments that 'such a vegetarian ideal was found among Orphics in the 
Graeco-Roman world. Plato, Eurpides, and Plutarch agree that the Orphic life included abstinence from 
animal food. Diogenes Laertius, Philostratus, and lamblichus report that Pythagoreans too were 
vegetarians and give various explanations of their diet. Diogenes says they refused to kill or eat animals 
which, like us have souls, but that was only an excuse. Their real goal, he says, was to provide a 
healthy body and a keen mind.' Grant 1999 op cit., p. 12. 
50 D. W. Hamlyn, The Penguin History of Western Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987.) 
pp. 86- 8. 
51 Discussed further See below 2. 6 & 3. 4 (b). 
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the potentially divine in themselves by the cessation of attachment to carnal thoughts 
and actions. The absolute, for Neoplatonism, is in everything, thereby suggesting not 
merely that there is a macrocosm - microcosm relationship between man the cosmos 
' ' 
and the One its creator, but that this correspondence operates in the relationship 
between all created things, which should be treated appropriately and with equal 
consideration. The purification of the inward self in the corporeal or worldly context 
is of primary importance, therefore, for a philosophy which equates inscrutable purity 
in this world, with the next step in the evolutionary process, experiencing divinity in 
the realm of insensibles. 
What Neoplatonism enforces in Christian thought is the idea that all things exist in a 
significant relation to the Prime Cause or creative energy from which they originate. 52 
Where the animal is seen as a fallen utility in Christian thought, the very existence of 
the animal as a being, for Porphyry, must logically be seen as the primary reason for 
abstinence from the consumption, sacrifice, or indifference to animals. Man's affinity 
with his creator and his kinship with all forms of created existence must be 
understood as a spiritual affair in which he is involved. Correspondingly the sacrifice 
of an animal for the purpose of divining from its liver is an absurd empiricism for 
Porphyry because divination can only be motivated by a desire for material wealth. 
Porphyry's criticism of men who become philosophers in order to foresee the 
acquisition of the material, worldly things, places him in absolute ideological 
opposition to the sacrificial divination which he sees as the rehearsal of greed, and an 
anchor chaining n1en to the material. Rather, On Abstinence advocates the incubation 
of a pure life to the man who aspires in this life to liberate himself from the fetters of 
the corporeal world, and elevate his intellect and soul to the contemplation of truly 
existing Being, and to do so by a philosophical reason which divests the individual of 
52 
' ... et Spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas. Di.:ritque De us: Fiat Lzcc Et facta est lzcc.' (Genesis 1. 
2- 3). The sure dispelling of darkness is the essence of all God's gifts. The wind which passes over 
waters is 'the spirit of God' translated from the Greek 'spiro' or 'I breath', in turn translated from the 
Hebrew Ruach, which appertains to the divine breath of God's agency in creation for both animals (lsa 
34. 16) and man (Job 27. 3). Similarly the Greek A.6ycrs or 'Logos' expresses the manifestation of 
God's word, signifying his act of material creation. A.6ycrs is taken from the Hebrew word Dabar 
meaning creative presence or essential creative energy. 
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everything of the mortal nature which he assumes. He must depart from sense and 
imagination, and the irrationality which goes with them. 
On Abstinence clearly exemplifies many ideas which contribute to Roman 
Christianity in its early stages, in particular the developed ontological hierarchies 
evident in Neoplatonic thought. However its main topic, that of the sanctity of all 
animal life and the necessity of abstaining from its consumption, is evidently made to 
be incompatible with organised Christian thought. Though it is not my intention to 
treat On Abstinence as a literary text, Porphyry's philosophical treatise demonstrates 
how a significant philosophical position is actively excluded from Christianity, 
despite the theoretically similar understandings on the status of creation. 
1. 2 Porphyry's On Abstinence from Animal Food 
The beginning of On Abstinence is characterised by the tension between Porphyry's 
Neoplatonic position and that of Christianity. It is addressed to a former disciple, 
Firm us, who became a Christian to recover his liberty to eat flesh and drink wine. 53 In 
book one, which addresses Firmus directly, a range of contemporary philosophical 
positions are discussed, including the Peripatetic, Stoic and Epicurean perspectives on 
the status of the animal in creation. Having argued that the consumption of animal 
flesh arouses the bodily passions and senses, while abstinence allows a persevering 
attention to the intelligibles of philosophy, Porphyry opposes Claudius the 
Neopolitan 's treatise Against Abstinence from Animal Food by arguing that: 
We should therefore abstain, no less than from other things, from certain 
things, from certain food, viz., such as is naturally adapted to excite the 
passive part of our soul, concerning which it will be requisite to consider as 
53 Thomas Taylor draws attention to the fact that Porphyry called the conduct of Firm us 
'illegitimate', flesh-eating being contrary to the laws of 'genuine' philosophy and Platonic First 




follows: There are two functions whose streams irrigate the bond by which the 
soul is bound to the body; and from which the soul being filled as with deadly 
potions, becomes oblivious of the proper objects of her contemplation. These 
fountains are pleasure and pain; of which sense indeed is preparative, and the 
perception which is according to sense, together with the imagination, 
opinions, and recollections which accompany the sense. But from these, the 
passions being excited, and the whole of the irrational nature becoming 
fattened, the soul is drawn downward, and abandons its proper love to true 
Being. As much as possible, therefore, we must separate ourselves from these. 
But the separation must be effected by an avoidance of the passions which 
subsist through the senses and the irrational part. But the senses are employed 
either on objects of the sight, or of the hearing, or of the taste, or the smell, or 
the touch; for sense as it were the metropolis of that foreign colony of passions 
which we contain. 
(Abst. 1. 33). 
Meat, explains Porphyry, fuels 'carnal' passions, firmly attaching the soul to the 
material, through the lusts of the body. The idea of a 'colony' of passions suggests the 
threat of the inscription of chaotic impurities upon a potentially inscrutable self. 
Porphyry's argument against the absorption of another body into one's own is that 
abstinence, in contrast, aids the purification and release of the soul from the material 
conditions of the body. Escaping earthly existence is dependent upon the release of 
the soul from a carnality characterised by death and destruction, which are themselves 
perpetuated by the consumption of the animal, and which are for him conceptual 
opposites to the creative principle of the Prime Cause. Thus Porphyry's assertion is 
that to have this death and destruction on a plate, to face it literally, and to introduce it 
into the body, is to partake of that which is prohibitive and contrary to the release of 
the immaterial soul from its material state. 
In book two Porphyry discusses the origins and reasons for religious sacrifice, and the 
relation between the act of sacrifice and the consumption of flesh. One of Porphyry's 
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most important assertions is that God(s) want, rather than the material offerings of the 
flesh, some measure of sacrifice freely given by the human soul: 
for s~crifice is, as the name implies, something holy. But no one is holy who 
requires the benefit from things which are the property of another ... But soul 
is much more honourable than the vegetable productions of the earth, which it 
is not fit, by sacrificing animals, that we should take away ... For, though all 
things are in reality the property of the Gods, yet plants appear to be our 
property; since we sow and cultivate them, and nourish them by other 
attentions which we pay them. 
(Abst. 2. 12- 13). 
The soul alone, for Porphyry, can offer sacrifice. Nothing material can be given to 
God, because it is all His in the first instance. Forfeiture must be self- sacrifice, or it 
is no sacrifice at all. Nothing may be given to that which is already complete: if it 
could be given it could also be taken away. Additionally, Porphyry states that material 
sacrifices are immaterial to immortal gods, because there is nothing material which is 
not immediately impure to an immaterial nature. The highest and only real sacrifice 
that can be offered are the first fruits of spiritual endeavour: 
It is necessary, therefore, that being conjoined with and assimilated to him, we 
should offer to him, as a sacred sacrifice, the elevation of our intellect which 
offering will be both a hymn and our salvation ... in an impassive 
contemplation of this divinity of the soul the sacrifice to him is effected in 
perfection .... as therefore, the husbandman offers handfuls of the fruits and 
berries which the season first produces; thus also we should offer to the 
divinities the first-fruits of our conceptions of their transcendent excellence, 
giving then1 thanks for the contemplation which they impart to us, and for 
truly nourishing us through the vision of themselves, which they afford us, 
associating with, appearing to, and shining upon us, for our salvation. 
(Abst. 2. 34). 
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As Aquinas, who in the early period of scholasticism sees the defining characteristic 
of all animate flesh as the habitual and addictive need to fulfil uncontrollable bodily 
urges and sexual impulses, or passions [motus in animali],54 Porphyry views as 
obsessive the sacrifice and consumption of flesh. It is the deluded propagation of 
physical passion and lusts, which may become the arbiter of thought, yet have malefic 
effects upon the soul. Understanding that the body is anchored on earth by a 
superficial enjoyment of the material, and that consuming animal flesh constitutes an 
abuse of Being itself, Porphyry advocates abstention from flesh for the sake of the 
animal, as the cessation of destruction of one's self. As an alternative mankind should 
be actively instrumental in creation, endeavouring to be similar to God: 'this is 
affected through an entire liberation from the dominion of the passions, an evolved 
perception of truly existing beings, and a vital tendency towards them.' (Abst. 2. 44). 
Book three of On Abstinence focuses on the notion that the more humane a man is the 
closer he is to divinity. Porphyry refers to Pythagoras when he asserts that if we can 
extend our uniquely human faculty for compassion and understanding to anin1als we 
shall succeed in doing so to our fellow men. The rational deductions of natural law 
may allow man to treat it compassionately, resulting in a communal harmony of man 
with animal as its logical consequence. Understanding that the boundary between 
human and non-human animals could be seen as negligible when both are seen as 
flesh, Pythagoras had propounded a con1prehensive understanding that to establish a 
harmless diet is a moral absolute which makes flesh - eating unthinkable, and guards 
against the cannibalism characteristic of some cultures. Porphyry puts the favourite 
argun1ent of Pythagoras, that 'he who abstains from anything animated ... will be 
n1uch more careful not to injure those of his own species. For he who loves the genus 
will not hate any species of animals.' (Abst. 3. 26). 55 Neither were sacrifice and 
consumption purely academic subjects for Porphyry and his time. In times of 
etnergency as well as a celebratory act of victory, the Scythians practised cannibalism, 
the boundary between animal and hun1an flesh being indistinct to them. In his Kata 
54 'Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi concomitatur aliqua transmutatio cmporis, et nuu·ime 
circa cor, quod est primum principium motus in anima/i' ST, pt l, Q l, A l ad. 
55 This understanding of man's genus as an animal and his relationship to other species is discussed 
at length below, 2. l. 
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Christianon (Against the Christians) Porphyry refers to such 'foul' Scythian practices, 
and draws comparisons with Christian thought and practices when he criticises the 
saying of Jesus that 'unless you eat my flesh and drink my blood, you will have no 
life in yourselves.' 
56 
Porphyry finds the idea depraved, absurd, and out of keeping 
with the tone of other sayings of Christ. It is an important point that Porphyry refutes 
the notion that 'Dixit ergo eis Jesus: Amen, amen dico vobis, nisi manducaveritis 
carnem Filii hominis et biberitis eius sanguinem, non habebitis vitam in vobis', or the 
notion that whoever eats the flesh and drinks my blood of Christ will have eternal life 
(John 6. 54), may be taken in any literal- or carnal- sense, and must neither indicate 
through its symbolism any ontological approval of the consumption of flesh. Porphyry 
is scathing about the Eucharist, not merely as a symbolic gesture or enactment, but 
because the Christians interpret the eucharistic words of Jesus allegorically. In this 
sense, his complaint is that uneducated individuals would not understand the words in 
the spiritual or mystical sense of their meaning: 'No tale designed to fool the simple-
minded is crueller or more deceptive than this myth of the Christians.' (AC p. 50). 
There is a sense too in which the Eucharistic meal n1ay have become popular at Saint 
Paul's instigation. Charles Freeman suggests that Paul's influence may have dictated 
the representations and understandings of the Eucharist: 
He certainly seems to have been responsible for suggesting ways in which 
commitn1ent to the Christian community could be expressed, through the rite 
of baptism, and sustained, through the Eucharist. His first letter to the 
Corinthians insists on the importance of all, whether rich or poor, sharing a 
comtnunal meal at which bread is eaten and wine is drunk in commemoration 
of Christ's death [ 1 Cor. 11: 1 7 - 34]. This letter dates from about AD 55 and 
some scholars suggest that it was Paul who, drawing on what he had heard 
from the Apostles of the Last Supper, established the Eucharist as a repeatable 
ritual. The Gospel writers, writing later than this, of course, may have recast 
56 The fragments of Porphyry's diatribe survive in the extracts of notary Macarius Magnes, and are 
reproduced in Against the Christians: The LiterGIJ' Remains, ed. and trans. by R. J. Hoffmann (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994) p. 49. 
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their own descriptions of the last supper to accord with the existing practice of 
emerging Christian groups. 57 
Freeman highlights the way in which Paul may have influenced the establishment and 
format of eucharistic practices as a way individuals could express their commitment 
to the Christian community. In contrast, Christ's sacrificial act should be seen for 
' 
Porphyry, as a sacrifice of the self for the benefit of all other creation- not at its 
expense. The notion that sacrifice must be a giving of oneself, and not a taking from 
creation, in Porphyry's argument, follows through to his observations that animal 
sacrifice might have had some material validity when agricultural breeding was the 
basis of the prosperity of a market economy and the sacrifice itself a genuine giving-
up of important commodities. In his contemporary Roman world, however, he finds 
such practices cruel, unnecessary, and a self-indulgent vice typifying the violence 
which characterised the public life of Roman society. Current critical appraisals of 
early Christianity tend to see Constantine's sponsorship of the religion as a politically 
expedient act which unifies the western empire under a single religion; in the process 
a plethora of diverse Christian practices are standardised, but done so in line with an 
existing Roman ideology which, as a sacrificing culture, is indifferent to the animal's 
role in creation. 58 
Porphyry finds that sense perceptions, illness, and passions are commonly shared 
between humans and animals, and suggests this to be a physical and moral common 
denominator in an ethical view of the animal. The sensoria of the flesh is the same for 
all, as is the affliction of illness and death (Abst. 2. 43; 3. 7). From this assertion his 
argument progresses from the bodily to the intellect. He makes a distinction between 
'reason' which is 'any such faculty' that man and animal may have alike, and the 
'right reason' of human moral agency (Abst. 3. 1 - 2). Porphyry highlights that there is 
a problem with such a distinction, when he says that not all men have 'right Reason', 
some of them being in a sense 'depraved'. Some animals, in contrast, are n1ore 
acutely sensitive: 'animals whose sensitive powers are more exquisite, are more 
57 Freeman op cit., p. 123. 
58 See Appendix A 'Constantine's sponsorship of Christianity'. 
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prudent.' (Abst. 3. 8).
59 
This idea that the innate reason of the animal constitutes a 
sign of God's-divine plan is central to Christian thought, and I discuss it in detail 
below. Porphyry also finds that in relation to the Prime Cause reason operates in 
different ways. A self- aware human reason should be able to bring about its own 
salvation, though animal reasoning has no moral agency because it has no free- will. 
On these terms animals can, for Porphyry, do no wrong. He also makes an 
observation which will become central to Christian attitudes to the animal as a sign of 
God's order in creation: 'If, however, it be requisite to speak the truth, not only reason 
may plainly be perceived in all animals, but in many of them it is so great as to 
approximate to perfection.' (Abst. 3. 2). The animal, which can perform acts which 
men cannot, is a clear manifestation and sign of the creator, his intention, and the 
perfect design of his creation.60 Indeed, in these terms the objection that animals 
cannot enunciate a rational discourse is challenged by Porphyry in his observation that 
their voiceless nature does not mean that they do not have a discourse in common 
with their creator, which Porphyry calls a discourse of the soul: 
Do [animals] not discursively perceive the manner in which they are inwardly 
affected, before it is vocally enunciated by them? By a discursive perception, 
however, I mean the perception produced by a silent discourse which takes 
place in the soul. 
(Abst. 3. 2). 
In fact the hun1an law of speech offers a language which is incapable of effectively 
representing such a transcendent communion. For Porphyry it is not man alone who is 
in possession of sentient intelligence 'but other animals conformably to the laws 
which they receive from the Gods and nature.' (Abst. 3. 2) A discourse of the soul 
must transcend language because language itself is inadequate to communicate the 
innate, God - given qualities of the soul. It is just as probable that animals have an 
59 Porphyry refers to Aristotle's De anima., 3. 427 b 14 ff. Elsewhere Aristotle states that 'some of 
the animals whose blood is watery have a specially subtle intelligence ... a more mobile faculty of 
sensation. This is why, as I said before, some of the bloodless creatures have a more intelligent soul 
than some of the blooded ones.' Parts 650 b 20- 25. 
60 Discussed at length below chapter three, 3. 2 (b). 
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internal discourse (abstract thought, no matter how limited), as the probability of the 
existence of God who created them, and for Porphyry they are inseparably one and 
the same. 
In an appeal which looks forward to William Langland' s theocentric representation of 
the animal in Piers Plowman Porphyry asks that it be granted, therefore, that animals 
participate in reason to a greater or lesser degree because it cannot be admitted that 
one animal has reason while another does not. 
In good men, likewise, there is not the same equality; for Socrates, Aristotle, 
and Plato, are not similarly good. Nor is there sameness in a conclusion of 
opinions. Hence it does not follow, if we have more intelligence than other 
animals, that on this account they be deprived of intelligence; as neither must 
it be said that partridges do not fly, because hawks fly higher. (Abst. 3. 2) 
For Porphyry Aristotle's natural hierarchy, in which there are different levels of 
intelligence, does not imply that a lower level of intelligence should have less ethical 
validity in the corp9real world. Porphyry's Eisagi5ge, or 'introduction' and 
commentary on Aristotle's Categories, goes to great lengths to affirm their 
philosophical legitimacy, though for once he disagrees with his master Plotinus. 61 
Another work which Porphyry wrote on Aristotle's' Categories, entitled On the Unity 
of Plato's and Aristotle's Philosophy, exists only in fragments. But those fragments 
and the Eisagoge defend the 'categorical doctrine expounded by Aristotle by rejecting 
any claim identifying categories with "genera of Being." ' 62 In the strictest sense 
Porphyry sees that Aristotle's categories apply to the material world, which is why he 
accepts the categories as Aristotle describes them without reduction or modification. 
He sees his master Plotinus' approach as mistakenly applying the categories (in 
Porphyry's view intended to account for the natural world) to the intelligible and 
supernatural realm, and then criticising them as inapplicable. 
61 Evangeliou. C., Aristotle's Categories and Porphyl)', Philosophia Antigua series Vol. 48. 
(London: E. J. Brill, 1988) p. 4. 
62 Evangeliou ibid., pp. 5 - 6. 
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A divine nature, indeed, does not become rational through learning, for there 
never was a time in which he was irrational; but rationality is consubsistent 
with his existence, and he is not prevented from being rational, because he did 
not receive reason through discipline: though, with respect to other animals in 
the same as with respect to men, many things are taught them by nature, and 
some things are imparted by discipline. Brutes, however, learn some things 
from each other, but are taught others, as we have said, by men. They also 
have memory, which is a most principal thing in the resumption of reason and 
prudence. 
(Abst. 3. 1 0). 
This statement pre-empts Augustinian understandings of innate levels of reason, 
though here Porphyry specifically places any hierarchies of reason within a material 
or corporeal context, in line with his understanding of Aristotle's hierarchies. While 
animals have innate reason, man has the ability to increase his reason. Porphyry 
compares man and animal, though he sees the bad qualities in men- which prohibit 
them from performing properly - as being far worse that those in the animal, because 
man has free-will and 1noral agency. In striking similarity to the thought of Augustine, 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus and Langland, Porphyry describes the way that animals 
build nests, have natural sagacity and prudence, know where and how to n1ate in 
exemplary fashion, and preserve a natural justice toward each other in a way that n1an 
does not. He sees this as a clear rationale, strengthening his argument with the 
observation that because we cannot do what they can do, nor understand how they do 
it, does not mean that the divinity is not in some way present to, or in them (Abst. 3. 
11 ).63 If this innate presence is not admitted, man, also an animal in the corporeal 
context, may not be seen to have a subsistence of reason by which he may come to 
know his self, and thus "increase' himself to receive divinity as he is "naturally 
adapted to receive it.' (Abst. 3. 1 0). 
63 See below chapter one, I. 6, and Chapter three, 3. 2 (b). 
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1. 3 Porphyry's exclusion from Christian spiritual and philosophical thought, 
and selective re-introduction. 
It is remarkable that despite the sophistication of Porphyry's argument against the 
utilisation of the animal, it is excluded from Christian thought. This section of the 
thesis demonstrates the importance of Porphyry's thought to Christianity. His 
influence is considerable; commentators seek- out and engage with his work. Yet On 
Abstinence is seen as insignificant, and is ignored. This omission of the work is 
clearly an ideological one; an ethic of the animal is not convenient for early 
Christianity. It compromises humankind's 'right' to act solely with itself and its own 
salvation in mind. And the need for Christianity to survive requires the political 
measure of gaining the sponsorship of the state, and assimilating itself into existing 
cultural practices. 
The middle - Platonists of the first century turned both to monism and a doctrine of 
providence. By the second century the school's major representatives were Albinus 
(Eisagi5ge) and Apuleius (De Platone). By the end of the second century Aristotle's 
teaching on logic and the categories was playing a considerable role among the 
Neoplatonists, though was officially heretical to Christian doctrine. Christians, at this 
point, criticised Aristotelianism as excessively subtle, and forms of Platonism were 
n1ore popularly employed. 64 By the third century, Plotinus and Porphyry come to 
influence a transition of thought from Gnostic dualism to Christian non- dualism. 
Philosophically, Porphyry's greater involvement in the world than his master Plotinus 
is evident by his interest in a universal way of salvation available to and including all 
M For a short period during the life of Plotinus the Emperor Julian (the 'Apostate', 361 - 363) had 
sponsored Neoplatonism as a rival to Christianity, See Hamlyn, op cit., p. 87. 
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men, as well as in his direct conflict with Christianity. 65 The philosophical project of 
Porphyry's treatise Against the Christians was to devalue Christianity by attacking its 
modes of allegorical interpretation in favour of an alternative engagement with a way 
of finding universal salvation for all creation, and can be seen as an intellectual 
reaction against the monotheistic claims of Christian gnosticism. Little is left of 
Porphyry's massive output, making a conclusion hazardous as to the degree of 
influence of his Neoplatonic anti-gnosticism on Christian anti-gnosticism, though it is 
commonly agreed that 'it is possible to trace much of Porphyry's thought from 
authors whom he influenced' 66 and to do so through Augustine in particular. 
Porphyry's writing has more influence than might be expected given the unpopularity 
of Against the Christians both during and after his lifetime. The transmission of his 
writings into major channels of philosophical as well as mystical thought is exciting 
to trace. One contribution in particular was taken very seriously, preoccupying the 
Middle Ages and providing much of its philosophical terminology. Instigated in a 
remark about the status of species in his discussion on Aristotle's Categories the 
Eisagoge stated the problem of 'universals'. It discusses the notions of genus, species, 
difference, property, and accident. At its most basic level the Eisagoge questions how 
we know things in both real and abstract senses. The question is of whether universals 
are things or merely words. For instance, all men belong to the species Man, and 
'man' is a universal term as opposed to 'Porphyry', or 'this n1an', which are words 
referring to an individual. There was one question which grew out of the debate and 
preoccupied philosophers and theologians alike: Does a word like 'species' or 'man' 
truly relate a thing (the view of the realists) or are words abstract conditions and the 
only universals (the position of nominalism)? The three specific questions which 
began the debate, and with which Boethius heads his translation runs thus: 
For example, I shall beg off saying anything about (a) whether genera and 
species are real or are situated in bare thought alone, (b) whether as real they 
are bodies or incorporeals, and (c) whether they are separated or in sensibles 
65 A. Smith, Porphyry's Place in the Neoplatonic Tradition: A Study in Post- Platinic 
Neoplatonism, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoft, 1974) p. XVII. 
66 Smith. ibid.,. p. xv. 
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and have their reality in connection with them. Such business is profound, and 
requires another, greater investigation. '67 
Porphyry raises three important questions of category and about the metaphysical 
status of universals in order to clarify them, though he modestly refuses to answer 
them himself: are our abilities to discriminate between things (genera and species) 
real or abstract? if they are real is their reality material or immaterial? or are they 
situated in thought alone - in which case they must have been subsistent in us before 
we learned through the senses? In his 'Second Commentary' Boethius commented 
upon the above remark of Porphyry, and highlights it as a concern that the status of 
species and genera seems uncertain. As other writers comment upon Boethius' 
observation, these 'predicables' come to fix much of the vocabulary for subsequent 
medieval discussions, containing as they do 'some of the most consequential lines in 
the entire history ofPhilosophy.' 68 P. V. Spade observes how important Porphyry is to 
Christian thought: 
But he cannot be taken by himself. His importance lies in the fact that his 
Isagoge was translated into Latin in the early Middle Ages as the occasion for 
discussing the problem of universals directly and in detail. It was as though 
commentators found his silence intolerable and were irresistibly drawn into 
the very questions Porphyry had declined to discuss. 69 
Boethius concurrently translated Porphyry's Eisagoge and Aristotle's Organon as an 
aid to his interest in logic. He looked back to both Plato and Aristotle to find a 
solution as to whether species or genera, and therefore universals, exist in sensible 
things or whether they exist, as Plato supposed, in separation from bodies. While 
Plato thought universals were real, and that they alone truly exist, Aristotle rejected 
this, analysing individuals as consisting of a form, which makes them the sort of thing 
67 P. V. Spade, (trans. & ed.) Five Texts on the Medieval Problem ofUniversals: Porphyry, 
Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham, (lndianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 1994) 
p. 2. 
68 Spade ibid., p. ix. 
69 Spade ibid., p. xv. 
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that they are (i.e. a man, cow, or dog). These forms are universal for him, and 
intellectual knowledge is based on the mind's power to abstract them from 
individuals, 
70 
thereby inverting Aristotle's premise that only the universal is 
scientifically .knowable by placing the immediate importance upon the particular form 
which will allow a universal to be predicated- a general trend in medieval thought. It 
can be seen that from Porphyry, the problem is transmitted through Boethius to the 
later Middle Ages. The Arabic translator A verroes offers a commentary, Peter 
Abelard 'glosses on Porphyry' in his Logica ingredientibus, Duns Scotus' 'ordinatio' 
has 'Six Questions on Individuation' and William ofOckham's 'Ordinatio' has 'Five 
Questions on Universals. ' 71 On the whole the twelfth century is 'nominalist' in that it 
does not read Porphyry's Eisagoge and Categories as though they are about things 
but, as Roscelin ( 1 045-1120), treated them as a discussion about words. 72 
It is ironic that Porphyry's contribution to Christian thought, and in particular to early 
scholasticism, is of immense importance, yet On Abstinence has no place in that 
thought. Porphyry's literary output in his later years was characteristically both 
Aristotelian and anti-Christian. As noted above his commentary on Aristotle's 
Categories goes to great lengths to affirm their philosophical legitimacy contrary to 
Plotinus' application of the categories to the intelligible and supernatural realm. 
Despite Porphyry's protestations on the point, later commentators such as Aquinas 
maintain that active reason must be capable of illuminating what is abstracted, 
revealing to the mind the nature of the created object, and thus extending the 
70 Boethius' answer, expounded out of deference to Aristotle, was that universals do pertain to the 
real, though talking about them is abstraction from the real: 'universals subsist in sensibles although 
they are understood apart from bodies.' A 'universal' signifies a unity with reference to some plurality. 
Unlike the singular, which cannot be communicated, the universal is by definition something that is 
communicated or communicable to many. This works in three different modes; Essence: which is 
universal when possessed by many individuals. Causality (in causando): a cause is said to be universal 
when it is capable of producing specifically different effects. And thought (in significando): a concept, 
idea or term is said to be universal when it signifies a certain plurality, such as a) representing many 
individual men by a single term or enunciation orb) when predicable in many i.e. the term 'man' is 
univocally applied of many men. 'Most properly, the universals are the five ways in which one term 
can be predicated univocally of another. These logical universals are second intentions that can be 
discussed as such, viz, genus, difference, species, property, and accident, or as applied to a particular 
nature known first as intentionality, e.g. man as species, genus, animal.' NCE Vol. 14 p. 452 c ff. 
71 . 
Spade op cit., pp. 20, 26, 57, 68. 
72 The exception is Abelard who rejects the approach except with regard to species and genera, 
which he does not doubt as correctly describing the structure of the world. Abelard sees the problem as 
philosophical rather than interpretative. 
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categories into the realm of the transcendent. Aquinas' account of the acquisition of 
knowledge and the role of reason makes no claim to pre-existent knowledge in 
general. As an empiricist he thinks all concepts and understandings of things are 
derived from sense perception alone. He is also a moderate realist in regard to the 
problem of universals, believing that 'species' and what we know of the real world is 
sense-derived. Formally speaking while Aristotle's idea of sense- perception seems 
physiological, and Aquinas' focus psychological: they are in fact identical in insisting 
on identifying knower with known, and providing a perspective which would seem to 
privilege the individual. 
1. 4 Neoplatonism and Augustine: who is really left out? 
Porphyry's exclusion from the Christian theological canon has its origins in his attack 
on Christianity, earning him the reputation of being the greatest enemy that the 
Christian religion had. Against the Christians was publicly burnt, first by Constantine 
and then by Theodosius. 73 Constantine, in a letter writen after the first council of 
Nicaea (325) states: 
Porphyry, that enemy of piety, has received a fit reward for his impious 
writings against rei igion, so that he is made infamous to all future titnes, and 
covered with reproach, and his impious writings have been destroyed. 74 
Initially Cons tan tine, and then Theodosius the younger in the edict of 381, ordered the 
abolition of the works of Porphyry and outlawed the use of his work. In the 
introduction to her edition, Wynne - Tyson defends Porphyry in relation to the 
philosophy of On Abstinence: 
73 In another respect too, Theodosius' reign forms a conclusion. It consummates Constantine 's 
religious policy by raising Christianity to the position of the state religion in 381. Henceforth adherence 
to Paganism is a political offence. See E. R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, 
(1953: London: Routledge And Kegan Paul, 1979) p. 22. 
7
_. Wynne- Tyson op cit., p. 6. 
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These were not, as Constantine states "against religion", but against the false 
and inhumane teachings of the establishment of his times. For the 
Neoplatonists, of whom Porphyry and his Master [Plotinus] were the finest 
examples, taught the philosophy of religion in its purest form. 75 
Wynne - Tyson goes on to explain that for Augustine Neoplatonist thought 'scattered 
the darkness of error.' As already observed Porphyry's work in general, though 
initially banned, has a tremendous influence on medieval thought, even if On 
Abstinence does not. Few treatises have survived the burning of Porphyry's books and 
hatred of his enemies, though there is tacit agreement that he was not an enemy of 
Christianity itself, but of the practices and interpretations which grew from it. While 
he advocated and practised a more consistently humane ethic than that taught by the 
church of his day he remained, for some considerable time, an heretical figure. But it 
is in spite of the opposition of the Church to his work, and due to the fact that his 
philosophy is read and commentated upon by Christians such as Boethius and 
Augustine, that Porphyry re-emerges as an important figure. 
Neoplatonism and Greek Patristic theology at the dawn of the fourth century was the 
prevailing philosophy in Christian as well as in pagan circles. Both took as their 
religious ideal a direct apprehension of the Divine Essence, and in his reading of 
Neoplatonic texts Augustine came to see Porphyry as a pagan mystic whose writing 
represented an unambiguous doctrine of spiritual experience, thereby proving him to 
be in possession of Christian Truth. Despite the apparent unpopularity of attributing 
anything to Porphyry in regard to Augustine, 76 Augustine's earliest influence was the 
dominant Neoplatonism, as embodied in Porphyry's Sententiae. A. H. Armstrong 
comtnents that: 
75 Wynne - Tyson ibid. 
76 While theNCE sees Porphyry as a motivating influence behind Christian persecution, and not the 
other way around, the Catholic Philosopher Robert O'Connell delimits Porphyry's credibility to the 
realms of metaphysical logic, paying no attention to The Abstinences. See Robert 0' Connell's 
·rorphyrianism in the Early Augustine' In From Augustine To Eriugena: Essays On Neoplatonism and 
Christianity in Honour of John 0 Meara, ed. by F. X. Martin and 0. S. A. Richmond (Washington: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1991) pp. 131- 133. 
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It does not appear ... that we can account for the tendency, which is so marked 
in the fourth century onwards, to push the negative theology very much into 
the background by simply regarding it as the inevitable result of Porphyrian 
metaphysics or the Christian theological presuppositions that made the 
Porphyrian way of looking at reality attractive to Christians.77 
Armstrong is drawing attention to the fact that as with the Neoplatonism of Plotinus 
and Porphyry, in negative theology the predicates of the world are not seen to apply to 
God, and to make any statement about Him would be to predicate of Him what He is 
not.78 He is subject to none of our language or conceptions, even through his revealed 
names of Father, Son, or Spirit, which are all drawn from human experience. They are 
given us in order to point towards a reality in the Godhead, and in this sense may only 
be known negatively through things that indicate his existence. However, what 
Neoplatonism offered to an understanding of the Godhead which Christianity did not, 
was the idea of apophasis, or the state of psychic integration accomplished by 
suspending all mental words or images of the One, which would so characterise 
Augustine's Logocentric understanding ofillumination.79 Because of this suspension, 
which is seldom if ever complete, one is better able transparently to perceive - and 
precisely respond to -the compelling force and content of immediate experience. 80 
This apparently mystical approach to the divine had considerable influence on 
Augustine, whose reading of 'the noble philosopher' Porphyry, inspired his own 
search for mystical experience. In 386 he read the sentences (sententiae) of Porphyry 
while living at Cassiciacum, documented in the Cassiciacum Dialogues. The 
Dialogues express his Neoplatonic thinking in the direction of a creationist 
metaphysic, in the consideration of being and non-being, as well as in relation to the 
77 Armstrong op cit., 'Apophatic- Kataphatic Tensions', in From Augustine to Eriugen, pp. 11 -
13. 
78 Aquinas recognises this problem as a specifically grammatical one, and supplies an answer, 
which I discuss in detail below, 3. 3 (d). 
79 Discussed below in relation to Augustine's literary theory and interiority, chapter three: 3. 1 (a). 
8° For a discussion ofthe trinal nature of the Nous and the inability to conceptualise as finite the 
infinite One in Neoplatonic thought see Kenneth Guthrie, trans., Porphyry's Launch Points to the 
Realm of Mind: An Introduction to the Neap/atonic Philosophy of Plotinus (Michigan: Phanes Press, 
1988) pp. 7- 14. 
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idea that there were degrees of being. He also read the Enneads· and Porphyry's De 
regressu ani mite (Return of the Soul) which 'removed some on his philosophical 
roadblocks'
81 
in understanding the necessity of asceticism of the body as 'preparation 
for the contemplation of the One, God. ' 82 At a philosophical level Augustine's 
Neoplatonist experience of interiority and transcendence saved him from the 
materialism of a sense dominated imagination which he laments in Confessions. 83 
Theologically, Augustine's discovery of divine transcendence and of a trinity in 
Neoplatonism was attributable to his reading of the Christian Neoplatonic adaptations 
of the man who brought him to conversion, St. Ambrose (c.339- 97).84 The 'soul of 
the world' contains 'in itself the principle of that which is triply indivisible, and being 
naturally self- motive, is adopted to be moved in a beautiful and orderly manner, and 
also to move the body of the world, according to the most excellent reasons.' (ABST 
2. 3 7). The Porphyrian - Platinic concept of a Divine Mover complemented both the 
Christian divinity and the (initially rather confused) concept of the Christian Trinity. 
From Porphyry, Augustine came to see that the highest point (the summa essentia) 
offered absolute repose (requies) and immutability (incommutabilitas), attainable 
through a ceaseless desire to reach the dynamic equilibrium of the One. 85 
Neoplatonism was the purest mysticism understood by mystics of all faiths, but was 
fiercely challenged by orthodox religion, because it threatened the mediating power of 
the church over its congregation. If it was possible for men directly to approach God 
there would be no need for the mediation of the church, and in turn the state who use 
the church to ensure public order on earth; the mysticism ofNeoplatonism, in 
81 M. T. Clark, Augustine (London: Continuum, 2000) p. 6. 
112 M. T. Clark ihid., p. 6 
!!) c 2, 2. 2- 4; c 4, 2. 2; c 8, 12. 29. 
114 Ambrose's adaptation ofthe Neoplatonic trinity is based on Plotinus, Enn. V. 7; Enn. V. 9, 8; 
Enn. V. I, 5; Enn. V. 5. 6: 28- 34 cf, Enn. 11. 4. 5; for a detailed discussion see John M. Dillon, The 
Afiddle Platonists: A Study of Platonism. 80 B. C. to A.D. 220 (London: Duckworth Press, 1977) pp. 
348- 349. 
115 See Brian Stock, Augustine the Reader (London: Harvard University Press, 1996) p. I 0. Porphyry 
was the editor and biographer of Plotinus and published his master's philosophical writings at some 
point between 301 and 305, rearranging the corpus into the six Enneads, or 'groups ofnine'. It was a 
selection of these together with the now vanished writings of Porphyry himself that Augustine read in 
Milan in the spring of386 in the Latin translation of the rhetorician Marius Victorinus. On Porphyry's 
role in Augustine's Platonism see Brian Stock's After Augustine: The Meditative Reader and the Text 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001) p. 39. The description of the trinity in Ennead 
V. 5. 6: 28- 34 is particularly important to Christianity. Freeman observes that 'Basil's inspiration for 
the terminology of the Trinity appears to have been the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus' and 
discussed the subject at length. Freeman op cit., p. 192 ff. 
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contrast, had the sole aim to transcend material existence- reason, language and state 
included. 
For Augustin~, Porphyry inspires an 'urgency' in his defence of the human access to 
the truth.
86 
Porphyry's definition of the absolute as incorporeal, immovable, and not 
in want of any thing external to Himself must be seen from the contingent, human 
perspective, of a world of things. Speaking of the concept of a single God Armstrong 
states that: 
The senses in which 'being' is used of the One-being, or 'thought' of the 
Divine Intellect, or of our thought when we have reached its level and are fully 
aware of it, remain somewhat mysterious to followers of the tradition and 
puzzling, or even non- sensical, to a great many of our own philosophical 
contemporaries. This is why it was not difficult for Porphyry and those who 
followed his line to draw the One-being upwards into the One. 87 
The Divine Intellect of the One-Being, of which all being is a part, may finally be 
drawn to the One- o.r in Christian terms, God. Porphyry's assertion that the way this 
must be done is through abstention is cognate with the ascetism and conten1plation 
which characterises Augustine's Confessions. 88 However, for Porphyry this ascetisn1, 
which draws all men toward divinity, involves an abstinence from corporeal flesh: 
... ought we not to sustain every thing, though of the most afflictive nature, 
with equanimity, for the sake of being purified from internal disease, since our 
contest is for immortality, and an association with divinity, from which we are 
prevented through an association with the body? By no means, therefore, 
ought we to follow the laws of the body, which are violent and adverse to the 
laws of intellect, and to the paths which lead to salvation. Since, however, we 
do not now philosophise about the endurance of pain, but about the rejection 
86 M. T. Clark op cit., p. 26. 
87 Armstrong op cit., p. 14. 
88 C7.10, 16. 
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of pleasures which are not necessary, what apology can remain for those, who 
imprudently endeavour to defend their own intemperance? 
(Abst. 1. 56). 
Abstention from eating animals lightens the burden of man's material body for its 
ascent to the Real: introducing one body nature into another will prohibit salvation. 
Enacting a moral, humane ethic, in which care is shown for all earthly manifestations 
of the One, will purify man's soul. Nevertheless, where the dominant Christian 
ideology offers an illusion of autonomy and self-determination, contingent upon the 
official channel of the church, Porphyry's account of individual agency in which 
action can bring about salvation, presents a narrative at odds with such officially 
sanctioned Christian ideology. The church could not accept Porphyry or the 
Neoplatonic 'One' on any terms but its own. Consequently, no matter how important 
the Neoplatonism of Porphyry is to Christian thought his ethic of abstinence is absent 
from its doctrine. Porphyry has suffered the 'dexterity and assiduity with which this 
information has been misrepresented, concealed or allowed to pass into oblivion by 
those endeavouring to impose a different philosophy on humanity' 89 In all of 
Augustine's writing the Neoplatonic apparatus of spiritual attainment (in which 
abstinence from flesh is an essential component) may be pinpointed; yet in none of his 
writings are animal ethics discussed at length. While Porphyry's view on animals is 
excluded from any canon of intellectual thought, the essence of his ascetic spirituality 
is taken particularly seriously, though the version which we know through Augustine 
is one in which what is really left out is a consideration or contemplation of the status 
or spiritual importance of the animal. 
1. 5 Against the Christians: allegoresis and interpretative strategies 
An analysis of allegoresis and interpretative strategies is important to the animal 
argument, because it highlights the way that different modes of reading the world and 




its texts, dictates the way that the animal is understood. Saint Paul, unlike Porphyry 
relies on revelation, and places faith over reason. In his version of the resurrection, he 
can be seen to close the western mind to Hellenic thought. In turn, Porphyry's 
analysis of Paul's writing isolates the way that Paul recommends the authority of state 
control, promotes Roman policing, and seems to delimit thought to that narrowly 
prescribed by himself, and Roman culture. More seriously, for Porphyry, Paul is 
intent on individual human salvation, regardless of all else, in such a way as to 
suggest that he is firmly Gnostic. As an anti-Gnostic, and more in line with later 
Christian doctrine, Porphyry highlights problems with the way Paul devalues creation, 
and seemingly denies God's immediate presence in the world. Indeed, stylistic 
differences in reading are closely involved with the perception of animals, and 
subsequently dictate theological values and attitudes to creation. 
During his lifetime Porphyry was a renowned scholar of Christian scripture and 
Christian modes of allegorical interpretation, yet he refuses to accept the readings of 
the New Testament which were approved of and followed by the early church. 
Despite his familiarity with Christian texts, he refutes Christian exegesis as ingenious 
misreadings of scripture, calculated to justify the right of the state to control 
individual thought. Porphyry's attack is not so much upon the words and lessons of 
Jesus, as on the subsequent interpretations of His teachings, and in particular on 
Paul's inability to base his Christianity on any authentic gospel or text at all. 
Porphyry's arguments should be seen in the context of the persecution of 
Neoplatonists, and as a response to the right to permanent existence granted to 
Christianity by Constantine in 312. Equally, Porphyry's attack can be modified by 
attributing much of the contradiction that he finds to Paul's over-eagerness to form an 
institution of Christianity, resulting in the hasty composition of his letters. Charles 
Freen1an has remarked that '[t]he difficult circumstances in which [Paul] wrote can 
explain n1uch of the coherence and contradiction in his letters, which have taxed 
theologians ever since. He seems to have failed to absorb, or at least express in his 
letters, any real awareness of Jesus as a human being, or to reflect his teachings ... ' 90 
9° Freeman op cit., p. 124. 
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Paul's apparent lack of awareness of Jesus' life and teachings results in the two main 
criticisms which characterise Porphyry's Against the Christians. His first claim is that 
Paul uses Jesus to assist the jurisdiction of 'state' power by legitimising it with His 
spiritual authority. He sees that 'the teaching of the Christians is self- contradictory: 
they look for the end of the world, but what they really want is control of the 
empire. '
91 
His second criticism is aimed at critical approaches to textual material, and 
in particular at the rhetorical and interpretative strategies of early Christian 
hermeneutics. Porphyry's approach is to begin by examining the New Testament at its 
literal sense, though by refusing to bring a comprehensive allegorical reading or 
interpretation of his own he allows the cleric Macarius Magnes (the commentator and 
notary who copies the work to criticise it, thereby preserving it from destruction) to 
answer the 'errors' of each criticism. As with early scholasticism's suspicion of the 
poetic allegoresis of imaginative literature, Porphyry approaches Christian scriptural 
allegoresis with a profound suspicion that Christianity is too ready to accept that its 
texts are authentic or suitable material for contemplation. Porphyry also objects to 
Paul's use of hyperbole to win converts, and his lack of textual evidence or reasonable 
philosophical argument. In this way, Against the Christians presents a site of 
scrutinising awareness that spiritual 'truth' presented in the form of an allegorical 
narrative, can be problematic because it is interpretative. In order to illustrate this 
Porphyry begins his treatise at the literal sense by criticising the differing accounts of 
the Gospels, observing that the selected accounts of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John 
are far from concordant: 
Where one says ""into your hands I will deliver my spirit," another says "'it is 
finished" and another ""my god, my god, why have you forsaken me," and 
another "My God, my God why do you punish me?'' 
(AC p. 33). 
Macarius' commentary designates the philosopher's view 'Hellenic' because of its 
literal sense logic, and then uses allegory to override the apparent literatim 
contradictions of the text, interpreting obvious inconsistencies as peculiarities of style, 
91 Hoffmann op cit., p. 17. 
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and adding that the eye witnesses were drunk with fear at the 'earthquake and the 
crash of rock around them.' (AC p. 33, citing Matt. 27. 51 -53). Macarius' own 
version of the crucifixion here, employs a language of negative hyperbole to emphasis 
the importance and 'otherness' of events by an imagistically- rooted representation of 
the power of God. Macarius' response to such a criticism is to extend the accepted 
version of the crucifixion into an imaginative fiction where phenomenal, material 
'evidence', stresses the importance of the truth. We know that Porphyry's critical 
attitude to Christian exegesis was devastating at the time, because the criticism came 
from someone who knew the Old and New Testament and their doctrine intimately. 
Hoffmann states that in his attack Porphyry 
... denied the Christian teachers their favourite refuge: allegory. Porphyry 
dealt with the plain sense of words. Having mastered allegorical interpretation 
as a student of Longinus, he knew the tricks of the trade. 92 
Longinus93 makes the distinction that poetry differs from rhetoric in being aitned not 
at persuasion but at transport (ekstatis), an effect that it achieves by means of a 
distinction of expression. He places a strong emphasis on the 'sources' of the sublime 
as rhetorical figures of artful expression; contemporaneously, this is unique in its 
resolution to translate literary technicalities into terms of spiritual inspiration. It is in 
the description and understanding of the crucifixion that fundamental stylistic and 
ideological differences of reading and understanding are revealed. Porphyry delimits 
the text to its literal level, where as a student of Longinus, he would expect to find a 
coherent philosophical rhetoric, providing spiritual insight, and highlighting 'ruptures' 
in arguments signalling parallel as well as linear readings of the text- or in fact, 
allegory. But because this is not presented in such a way, the events of the crucifixion 
92 Hoffmann, op cit., p. 17. 
93 The writer known as 'Longinus' or 'Dionysius Longinus' is elusive, his identity being truly 
unknown. Some agree with a date of the third century while others (the NC£) as early as the first 
century AD. What is known is that he was a Greek literary theorist and author of Peri Hypsous or 
Treatise on the Sublime. As it is generally accepted by philosophers such as Evangeliou that Porphyry 
studied under 'Longinus' in the third century at Athens, I assume the latter date for Porphyry's 
exposure to the works attributed to 'Longinus' in a formative setting. See D. A. Russell & M. 
Winterbottom, eds., Ancient Literary Criticism: The Principle Texts in New Translations (Oxford: 
Oxford Clarendon Press, 1972) pp. 460-61, and Evangeliou op cif., p. 1. 
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and the symbolism attributed to it are seen by Porphyry as unconvincing and badly 
written poetic attempts to express ontological truth, which neither have philosophical 
validly, nor move the reader to believe the truth of the event. 
The exegetical techniques of Longinus, Porphyry and Plotinus, defend the world 
against Gnostic Puritanism and do this by reading the world as a sign of the 
transcendent. 
94 
In contrast Paul's method of finding evidence is seen by Porphyry as 
inconsistent, and at times markedly Gnostic. This is evident in the way Paul's 
description of the resurrection seems hysterical. Indeed, Charles Freeman sees this 
hysteria as the frenetic negation of reason by revelation: 'Paul's Christ only has 
relevance through his death and resurrection, a theology presented in his own words 
in letters whose eloquence has reverberated through the ages. ' 95 Paul is fanatically 
engaged with convincing his audience that Christ died and was buried before rising on 
the third day, listing those who saw Christ after his death: 
Et quia visus est Cephae, et post hoc undecim; deinde visus est plus quam 
quingentis fratribus simul, ex qui bus multi manent usque adhuc, qui dam 
autem dormic:runt. Deinde visus est lacobo, deinde apostolis omnibus; 
novissime autem omnium, tamquam abortivo, visus est et mihi. [He was seen 
by Cephas, then by the eleven. After that He was seen by over five hundred 
brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain to the present, but some 
94 Plotinus speaks against Gnostics who affirm the Creator and the cosmos itself to be Evil in 
Ennead 2. 9. It is art, especially in Ennead 5. 8, which allows a creative access to metaphysical ideas of 
form, traceable in the mathematical and musical versions of beauty as order and unity in Augustine and 
Boethius. Ennead 5. 8 'On the Intellectual Beauty' states: 'It is a principle with us [the Neoplatonists] 
that one who has attained to the vision of the Intellectual Cosmos and grasped the beauty of the 
Authentic Intellect will be able to come to understand the Father and Transcendent of that Divine 
Being.' Plotinus uses the example of sculpture from stone which, although beautiful as it is, is 
enhanced by the 'beauty of form ... or idea introduced by the art'. This creative form is not in the 
material but in the artificer and his participation in art. Aesthetic endeavour imitates the higher and 
purer degree of divinity by its appreciation of the form of things and of their creation - the source of 
beauty itself. Man, as a Microcosm of Creator and creation can locally de-scribe the creational mode of 
production there by bringing himself closer to the First Mover. As Sidney puts it of the personifications 
'only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour of his own 
invention, doth grow in effect another nature, in making things either better than nature bringest forth, 
or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature, as the Heroes, Demigods, Cyclops, Chimeras, 
Furies, and such like.' Similarly, the nature of man's spirituality should be to appreciate and re-
construct nature, and abstain from its destruction at whatever level. 'The Defence of Poetry', The 
Norton Anthology of English Literature Vol. 1. Sixth Edition. Gen. Ed. M. H. Abrams (London: Norton 
& Co, 1962) p. 41 0 ff. 
95 Freeman op cit., p. 146. 
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have fallen asleep. After that He was seen by J ames, then by all the apostles. 
Than last of all He was seen by me also, as one born out of due time. ] 
(1 Cor. 15 : 5 - 8) 
In this way Paul provides 'material' evidence in the form of a host of witnesses to an 
event without which nothing remarkable could be said to have occurred after the 
Crucifixion. Paul includes himself as a witness- but not one contemporary with the 
others, as his experience was a revelation or vision. Paul emphasises the empty tomb, 
and this, coupled with the enigmatic fragments of Gospels which defy a single 
narrative, leads Paul to suggests that followers should have faith in his personal 
account. But this also limits the meaning of Paul's statements to the value placed 
upon it within the culture of its first audience. The value of Paul's writing lies in its 
ability to persuade that first audience that Jesus was raised, and that he was seen to 
have been raised: 'si aut em Christus non resurrexit, inanis est ergo praedicatio 
nostra, inanis est et fides vestra ... Quod si Christus non resurrexit, van a est fides 
vestra; adhuc enim estis in peccatis vestris' [And if Christ is not risen, then our 
preaching is vain and your faith is also vain ... And if Christ is not risen, your faith is 
futile; and you are still in your sins] ( 1 Cor. 15. 14 - 17). Paul enunciates the first set 
of expectations of the original readers, for whom there may well have been 
internalised, unconscious assumptions about the nature of Christ's divinity. Equally, 
the resurrection story could have been difficult to comprehend, and one of Porphyry's 
concerns is that the symbolism of the crucifixion is too complex for ordinary people 
to understand with no philosophical background to support it: 
If Christians were to proclaim the historical reality of the rising of their Lord, 
they had to insist on a somewhat crude understanding of it in order to reach 
the masses. If they were to defend their faith from critical opponents, they had 
to insist on the novelty of the resurrection. Other gods died and rose; only 
Jesus rose in the flesh. 96 
96 Jones, V., 'The Phoenix and the Resurrection' in Debra Hassig (ed.) The Mark of the Beast: The 
Medieval Bestiary in Life Art and Literature (London: Garland Publishing, 1999) p. 99, citing R. M. 
Grant, 'The resurrection of the body', The Journal of Religion 28 ( 1948) p. 120. 
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A belief in the resurrection reinforced the historical reality of Christ's own 
resurrection and divinity. But a belief in resurrection was not easy for the early 
church, and faith alone was unreliable for many commentators. Symbolically, 
resurrection can be explained in a number of ways, and the phoenix presents one such 
creature whose existence becomes solely illustrative in a Christian context. 
The fabulous Phoenix of Herodotus, Ovid and Pliny the elder, carries multiple 
meanings, though in the light of scripture, the first two centuries perceives the 
Arabian bird with new Christian significance: 'Nemo tollit earn a me; sed ego pono 
earn a me ipso, et potestatem habeo ponendi earn, et potestatem habeo iterum sumendi 
earn: hoc mandatum accepti a Patre meo.' [No one takes it from Me, but I lay it (i.e. 
My life) down of Myself. I have the power to lay it down, and I have the power to 
take it again. This command I have received from my father] (John 10. 18). In the 
Alexandrian Physiologus a direct correlation is made between Christ's resurrection 
and the bird as a symbol: 'The Lord said in the Gospel, "I have power to lay down my 
life, and I have power to take it again," and the Jews were vexed by the word. There is 
a bird in India called Phoenix. Every 500 years it comes to the forests of Lebanon and 
fills its wings with spices, and signals to the priest of Heliopis on the new month ... 
[who] fills the alter with vine-wood.' 97 The bird comes to the alter and incinerates 
itself, and the next day the priest finds the chick of the bird. By the time ofChaucer's 
The Book of the Duchess the phoenix symbolises the power of Christ to come back to 
life: 
Trewly she was, to myn ye, 
The soleyn fenix of arabye; 
For ther livyth never but oon, 
Ne swich as she ne knowe I noon98 
Inevitably such symbolism has variations. In Pearl, for example, the poet regards the 
bird as one of God's imn1aculate creations, unique, though evidently like the Virgin: 
97 Cited in trans. by Grant 1999 op cit., p. 52. 
98 Chaucer, Book of the Duchess in The Riverside Chaucer, Third Edition, ed. by Larry D. Benson, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) 981 - 984. 
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From being a relatively obscure symbol the bird takes on new Christian symbolic 
meanings and allegorical value, in the example of Pearl, extending to the cult of the 
Virgin, from Christ Her son. However, this symbolism speaks of a need to explain 
and illustrate an occurrence in a way that scripture does not do. Indeed Porphyry 
highlights what had become a stock objection to the divinity of Jesus, namely that 
divinity is susceptive of proof and that at the point where such proof might have been 
expected, Jesus produces none. The point, for Porphyry is that if apotheosis, in this 
case the sublime quality of the deification story, is the hallmark of divinity, then only 
Classic figures such as Asklepios, Herakles, and Dionysus are worthy of reverence, 
owing to the greater antiquity of their stories. Of course, there is a distinction to be 
made here. In his rigorously logical appraisal of the crucifixion Porphyry requires 
textual evidence of its philosophical basis, while Paul encourages men to have faith 
on the basis of an as yet unwritten mysticism. Charles Freeman explains that 'Plato 
specifically condemned faith as a means of finding the truth; for him the only secure 
way of understanding the immaterial world was through the use of reason. Although 
there is no evidence that Paul knew of Plato's thought, we can assume that he realised 
that his concept of 'faith' was vulnerable when set against the mainstream of the 
Greek intellectual tradition.' 100 In contrast Paul asks that the proof of his text be seen 
as comprising a straight forward exegesis - that oracular proof is valid proof of the 
resurrection. However, the fragmented narratives of the Gospels offer only 
inconsistencies for Porphyry, inviting philosophical criticism because they contain 
within them the seeds of alternative positions. In a very different context Alan 
Sinfield remarks that 'all stories comprise within themselves the ghosts of alternative 
99 Gawain- poet, Pearl, in The Poems of the Pearl manuscript: Pearl, Cleaness, Patience, Sir Gawain 
and the Green Knight, ed. by Malcolm Andrew and Ronald Waldron, York Medieval Texts., 2nd series 
(London : Edward Amold, 1979) 249 - 32. 
10° Freeman op cit., p. 119. 
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stories they try to exclude.' 
101 
Similarly for Porphyry, such inconsistencies suggest 
that Paul is trying to hide something. While Paul asserts that his reading is the only 
reading, this is ironic and inconsistent for Porphyry because Paul says both that God 
is revealed by holy scriptures and manifest in Christ and that any other view which 
denies this is false and that his authority is his own experience, and that his word 
alone is authoritative: 
Miror quod sic tarn cito tran~ferimini ab eo qui vos vocavit in gratiam Christi 
in aliud evangelium; quod non est aliud, nisi sunt aliqui qui vos conturbant, et 
volunt convertere evangelium Christi. Sed licet nos aut angelos de caelo 
evangelize! vobis praeterquam quod evangelizavimus vobis, anathema sit. 
(Gal. 1. 6 - 8) 
Let me warn you, Paul tells the Galatians, that if anyone advocates a version of the 
gospel different from the one I have preached to you, he should be condemned. While 
for Porphyry other accounts of Jesus' life are already inconsistent, Paul seems to 
confirm that they are there to confuse the truth. As discussed above, Paul is 
desperately afraid of losing what authority he has already gained, and because of this 
Porphyry sees the texts as stories: 'The evangelists were fiction writers and are not 
observers or eyewitnesses to the life of Jesus. Each of the four contradicts the other in 
writing his account of the events of his suffering and crucifixion' (AC p. 32). 
Characteristically, Porphyry maintains throughout his arguments that reason has been 
abandoned by Christians, in favour of a faith that is nothing less than hysterical. His 
account of Paul's reading of Romans (7. 12 - 14) illustrates this in relation to the idea 
of the superiority of the new law over the old- a point on which Paul's teaching are 
indeed contradictory: 
Paul next turns around like a man startled awake by a night-mare, screaming, 
"I Paul, testify that if a n1an keeps any bit of the law then he is indebted to the 
101 Alan Sin field, 'Cultural Materialism, Othe/lo, and the Politics of Plausibility' in Rivkin. J. & R. 
Ryan, eds. Literary Theory: An Anthology (London: Blackwell, 1998) p. 819. 
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whole law". He says this rather than simply asserting that it is wrong to keep 
the commandments set down in the law. 
A man whose intellectual powers are worthy of admiration- one instructed in 
the sp~cifics of the law of his fathers, one who frequently invokes the 
authority of Moses- is also one, it seems, so sotted with wine that his wits 
have abandoned him 
(AC pp. 61 - 62). 
The view of Paul that God is manifest in Christ, and that any other view which denies 
this is false, is problematic once 'evidence' for the statement is removed. 
Notum enim vobis facio, fratres, evangelium quod evangelizatum est a me, 
quia non est secundum hominem; neque enim ego ad hominem accepi illude, 
ne que didici, sed per revelationem Iesu Christi. [But I make known to you, 
brethren, that the gospel which was preached by me is not according to man. 
For I neither received it from man, nor was I taught it, but it came through the 
revelation of Jesus Christ.] 
(Gal: 1. 11 - 12) 
Paul explains that the Gospel proclaimed by himself is not of human origin, because 
he did not receive it from a human source, nor was he taught it, but received it 
through a revelation of Jesus Christ. He emphasises that the Gospel he preaches is 
revelatory, and directly from Christ and not through the disciples, despite the fact that 
he has had every opportunity to follow Christ's teachings directly from them. Paul 
stresses that faith in Christ does not involve any kind of identification with Jesus as a 
man, but has validity only in his crucifixion, death and resurrection. Charles Freeman 
has commented that Paul's emphasis demonstrates that, because others speak with 
much greater authority of Jesus' life, Paul 'feels he has to carve out a distinct area of 
expertise where he has scope to develop a theology that is not dependent on 
knowledge of Jesus' life on earth?' 102 Indeed, in On True Religion Augustine showed 
an awareness of the difference between the Porphyrian position and that of Paul. In 
102 Freeman op cit., p. 112. 
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his awareness of Porphyry's empiricism, coupled with his awareness of the need for 
historical facts necessarily reported in scripture by others who experience them, 
Augustine saw that the difference between philosophical and revealed religion was a 
difference between reason and faith. 103 
Porphyry's critique of the resurrection of the flesh focuses closely on John's account 
of the events of the three days following the crucifixion. In his commentary on John's 
account of the crucifixion in his Gospel, Porphyry states that: 
it is clear that these addled legends are lifted from accounts of several 
crucifixions or based on the words of someone who died twice and did not 
leave a strong impression of his suffering and death to [sic] those present. [It 
follows that] these men were unable to be consistent with respect to the way 
he died, basing [their account] simply on hearsay, then they did not fare any 
better with the rest of their story. 
(AC p. 33). 
Porphyry directly attacks John's account of the crucifixion: 'no wonder John is so 
anxious to swear the truthfulness of his account, saying, "He that saw it testifies to it -
and we know his testimony is true." ' (AC p. 34; citing 'Et qui vidit testimonium 
perhibuit, et verum est testimonium eius, et ille scit quia vera dicit, ut et vos 
creditatis' [And he who has seen has testified, and his testimony is true; and he knows 
that he is telling the truth, so that you may believe] John 19. 35). The essence of 
Porphyry's argument here is that John's statement 'He that saw it testifies to it- and 
we know his testimony is true' refers to no-one but John himself, and is an 
uncorroborated, self- referential testimony. Seeing the Christian martyrdom to be 
based upon fabricated 'fairy tales' (AC p. 35), Porphyry takes the silence of the other 
three gospel writers as evidence that the events described by John did not happen. Self 
- referential evidence is much too simplistic: 'the truth is not to be sought by looking 
for facts in syllables and letters' says Porphyry (AC p. 33), his logic being based 
merely on the empirical assumption that 'an event like the resurrection, while not in 
103 M. T. Clarke op cit., P 10. 
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itself impossible, demands credible witnesses- "men of high renown"- whereas the 
Christian record in the gospels introduces witnesses whose reports are dubious, 
coming as they do from the lowest strata of society.' (AC p. 34). 
Seeing John's Gospel as an implausible account he asks for evidence from 'your 
record' of the 'other world.' Porphyry was well known for his attack on the Gnostic 
idea that the world was separate from God, and inherently bad. He is uncomfortable 
with Paul's statement that the form [skema] of the world is passing away, 104 and he 
very perceptively isolates the Gnostic tendencies of John's gospel, in this case: 'Nunc 
iudicium est mundi, nunc princeps huius mundi eiicietur foras; et ego, si exultatus 
fuero a terra, omnia traham ad me ipsum' [Now is the judgment of this world; now 
the ruler of this world will be cast out. And I, if I am lifted up from the earth, will 
draw all peoples to myself] (John 12. 31 - 32). Asking for a philosophical clarification 
about the 'other world' indicates his awareness that John's statement implies God's 
innate separatism, and therefore eagerness to escape from creation, which would 
fundamentally conflict with the non-dualistic Christian thought in which God both 
encompasses, and is a part of, the material world. In these terms God cannot be cast 
out of everything which is at once himself: 
Tell me, for heaven's sake, what sort of judgment is this supposed to be- and 
just who is the "ruler" who is being cast outside? If you say "The emperor [is 
the ruler]," I say that there is no single world ruler- as many have power in 
the world - and none have been "cast down." If, on the other hand, you mean 
someone who is not flesh and blood but an immortal, then where would he be 
thrown? Where is this invisible world ruler to go outside the world he rules? 
Show us from your record. If there isn't another world for this ruler to go to-
and it is impossible for there to be two such worlds- then where other than to 
the world he's to be expelled can he go? 
104 'et qui utuntur hoc mundo tamqquam non utantur: praeterit enimfigura huius mundi' (1 Cor. 7. 
3 1 ). in contrast Hoffman ibid., cites Enn. 2. 10, 13 as an example of the anti-gnosticism of Plotinus and 
Porphyry: 'How can anyone [viz., the "Gnostics"] deny that [the world] is a clear image, beautifully 
formed, ofthe Intellectual Divinites? p. 67(n). 
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One cannot be cast out of what he is already in. Unless of course you are 
thinking in terms of a clay pot which, when broken, spills its contents not into 
oblivion but into the air or the earth.' 
(AC p. 35). 
Porphyry understands John's gospel as an article informing men that creation should 
be escaped, while providing no philosophical basis for how this is to be understood. 
John treats Christ as though he was unborn into the material world, incorporeal and 
without form: a man in appearance only. This is, for Porphyry, a rejection of the 
material world as separate from God, and fundamentally bad. However, Christianity is 
non-dualistic, as Porphyry realises, and early Christianity's view overwhelmingly a 
theocentric one, where God is seen to be in all things. Porphyry's argument in On 
Abstinence is that animals should not be consumed because of the divine within them. 
Indeed, without a fundamentally theocentric view of creation, animals would in no 
way be a sign for God because there would be no direct line between their reality and 
interpreting Him. 105 Such an attack on narrative credibility extends to a critique of 
biblical hyperbole, which is often used in conjunction with negative terminology. The 
focus on hyperbole 'was a feature of the quarrel between pagan culture and Christian 
teaching from its beginning, and a trademark of the Greek and Latin rhetoric in which 
the argument was conducted.' 106 Porphyry uses the example of Jesus casting the 
demons into swine to show how differing accounts are not only exaggerated but 
contradictory: 'It is Matthew who is probably guilty of the greater exaggeration, 
turning Mark's single demoniac into two possessed men. Matthew specifies a "large 
number" of swine, where Mark gives "about two thousand"- a little less than half the 
number required to accommodate a legion of demons.' (AC p. 39). This is 'an offence 
to reason' for Porphyry because Christ has not actually cast the demons out- merely 
transferred them from one element of creation into another: 
If the story is true and not some fable (as we hold it to be), what does it say 
about Christ, that he permitted the demons to continue to do harm by driving 
105 Discussed in detail below, 3. 2 (c). 
106 Hoffman op cit., p. 7. 
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them out of one man and into some poor pigs? ... [it is] odd that someone who 
alleges to have come into the world to patch up the harm [done by the evil 
one] to all mankind should limit himself to helping out just one. To free only 
one man from spiritual bondage [of sin] and not two, or three, or thirteen, or 
everyone ... a reasonable person, upon hearing such a tale, instinctively makes 
up his mind as to the truthfulness of the story; he says something like, "if 
Christ does not do his good for the benefit of everyone under the sun, but only 
relocates the evil by driving it from place to place, and if he takes care of some 
and neglects others- well, then, what good is he as a saviour?" By this sort of 
action, he who is saved only makes life impossible from someone else who is 
not, so that the unsaved stand to accuse those who are saved. 
(AC pp. 42 - 43). 
The exclusivity of helping the individual alone and not all men and things 'under the 
sun' is a problem for Porphyry, not least of all because it is a fundamental rejection of 
the divine within creation. The individuated Christian ontology in which man has a 
closed and personal relationship with God, who aids him to escape an evil or 
corrupted world, is too humanocentric, and the casting out of the demons into the 
things of that world overemphasises the importance of man alone. The pigs, though 
not human beings, and with no immortal souls, are treated as irrational creatures 
solely for man's use, and in terms of Porphyry's broader argument, this is far too 
Gnostic. For Porphyry, rather, the Creator has a relationship with his dynamic 
creation which cannot be delimited to man alone. The interests of nature and variety 
of its valuable things should be seen as analogous to that of other- human- beings as 
breathing things filled with the spirit of soul or No us of the One. In Christian terms, 
granting animals such a fundamental privilege would be to accept that they can be 
wronged - indeed that God can be wronged in His good world. The anti-Gnostic 
subtext here is that mistreating creation is mistreating God, or as Andrew Linzey puts 
it we should conceptualise what is 'owed animals as a matter of justice by virtue of 
their creator's right. Animals can be wronged because their Creator can be wronged in 
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h. . ' 107 F h . f . f ts creatton. rom t e potnt o vtew o the Givenness of created reality, God 
cannot really be indifferent to creation, and man's (or in this case Jesus') stewardship 
should consist in exercising special protection over all God's things. From this 
perspective, ~an should witness the covenant relationship in a way that John and Paul 
never do.
108 
However, here too, Porphyry's problem is with the rhetoric of faith over 
the language of reason; how much is man really like God without his reason? 
Unquestioning faith, based on a belief in inconsistent narratives, might make men like 
beasts in their irrationality - in fact like the pigs who are the mistreated things of 
God's creation. 
Porphyry's critique of Christian exegesis should be seen in the context of its 
sponsorship by the state to the detriment of its main competitor, Neoplatonism. 
Hellenic reason and Neoplatonic moral values are not, in Paul's thought, given any 
consideration. In response, Porphyry is critical about the spiritual 'norms' which Paul 
prescribes, seeing them as religious stories, which are formulated as if they had no 
antecedents. He sees Romans 13 as consistent with the attempts to construct 
narratives closed to the contingency of a range of positions: it is an exclusivity which 
both isolates Paul'~ teaching from the majority of men, but which also has a political 
agenda in aiming to assure that his version of Christianity is compatible with the 
dominant imperial Roman culture. In his letter to the Ron1ans Paul states: 
Omnis anima potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit, non est enim poles/as nisi 
a deo; quae autem sun/, a Deo ordinatae sunt. Itaque qui resistil potestati, Dei 
ordinationi resistit; qui autem resistant, ipsi sibi damnationem acquirunt. Nam 
principes non sunt timori boni operas, sed mali. Vis autem non timere 
potestatem? Bonumfac, et habebis laudem ex ilia; dei enim minister est tibi in 
bonum. Si aut em malum feceris, time,· non enim sine causa gladium portal: 
107 Linzey, A., & Regan, T., trans. and eds., Animals and Christianity: A Book of Readings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 135. 
108 God remembers the covenant which is between Himself and all animals: 'et recodobor [sic] 
foederis mei vobiscum, et cum omni anima vivente quae carnern vegetal' (Gen: 9. 15), and promises a 
covenant with the animal to abolish slaughterand bring it to salvation: 'Et percutiam cum eis foedus in 
die ilia, cum bestia agri et cum vo/ucre caeli et cum reptili terrae; et arcum et gladium et bel/wn 
conteram de terra, et dormire eos facia m fiducial iter' (Hos. 2. 18). 
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Dei enim minister est, vindex in iram ei qui malum agit. Ideo necessitate 
subditi estate, non solum propter iram, sed etiam propter conscientam. Ideo 
enim et tributa praestatis; ministrae enim Dei sunt in hoc ipsum servientes. 
[Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no 
authority except from God, and the authorities that exist are appointed by God. 
Therefore whoever resists the authority resists the ordinance of God, and those 
who resist will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers are not a terror to 
good works, but to evil. Do you want to be unafraid of the authority? Do what 
is good, and you will have praise from the same. For he is God's minister to 
you for good. But if you do evil, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword in 
vain; for he is God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath on him who 
practices evil. Therefore you must be subject, not only because of wrath but 
also for conscience sake. For because of this you also pay taxes, for they are 
God's ministers attending continually to this very thing.] 
(Rom. 13. 1-6). 
Paul explains that every person should submit to the subjection of the governing 
authorities because their authority is instituted from God, and whoever resists that 
authority resists what God has appointed and will incur judgement. Rulers should be 
seen not as a terror to good, but as judges of the bad: authority is God's servant for the 
good of man, and wrong-doers should fear the sword of authority, which will execute 
wrath on them. Because earthly authority exists by the appointment of God taxes must 
be paid. Religious practice here is based upon a set of beliefs manipulated by Paul, to 
help instil obedience and respect for authority. His text typifies the composition of a 
master narrative which implicitly involves the state and temporal power as a function 
of God's judgement on earth, cleverly implicating the reader in the text. Indeed, the 
Christian judiciary tradition subsequently claims that government is essentially just 
because it is divinely appointed, based on divine law. Earthly government must 
imitate God's government of nature because 'man needs someone capable of opening 
up the way to heavenly bliss through his conformity, here on earth, to what is 
hones turn.' 109 Porphyry states: 
109 Carrette., op cit., p. 146. 
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We may conclude that Paul is a liar. He is the adopted brother of everything 
false, so that it is useless for him to declaim, ''I speak the truth in Christ, I do 
not lie" [Rom. 9. 11]; for a man who one day uses the law as his rule and the 
next day uses the gospel is either a knave or a fool in what he does in the sight 
of others and even when hidden away by himself. 
(AC pp. 60- 61) 
Porphyry sees that Paul combines political and spiritual discourses in articulating a 
power structure, which then necessarily involves the state in spiritual mediation. 
However conscious or unconscious such an adaptation may be, the criteria of spiritual 
objectivity are lost as they are made to fit the system's interests: 
The same man who writes, "The law is spiritual" to the Romans, and "The law 
is holy and the commandment holy and just" now puts a curse upon those who 
obey what is holy! Then, as if to confuse the point further, he turns everything 
around and throws a fog so dense that anyone trying to follow him inevitably 
gets lost, bumping up against the gospel on the one side, against the law on the 
other, stumbling over the law and tripping over the gospel- all because the 
guide who leads them by the hand has no idea where he is headed! 
(AC p. 62). 
Again, Macarius' answer to Porphyry's objections is that 'law' is an allegorical 
application of an Old Testament prototype, and is 'spiritual' or 'holy' when 
interpreted in the light of Christ's coming. Macarius ignores Porphyry's criticism that 
the doctrine of salvation of John and Paul not merely excludes all men from coming 
to God, but all creation: 'Is it for oxen that God is concerned? Does he not speak 
entirely for our sake? It was written for our sake.' (AC p. 62). Macarius perpetuates 
the humanocentric notion that God cares only for men, and that those who have 
earthly authority must, by some logic, have been granted it by God as mediator of his 
care and judgment. For Macarius the Authentici, or Biblical writers establish a fixed 
spiritual ideal. But the juristic tradition of the state is legitimised by the religious 
60 
CHAPTER ONE 
tradition of the Church in a trinity of medieval world powers, studium, imperium, 
sacerdotium within which the Disputatores are the officially and divinely sanctioned 
authors of prescriptive discourses. 
1. 6 Summary 
Such radically different approaches to interpreting the animal result in a discursive 
battleground, where competing ideologies debate the relative validity of textual 
authorities in deciding spiritual truth. Authority, however, must be seen in conjunction 
with the ideological norms defined by the dominant political power, and competing 
spiritual and religious systems and practices. Paul developed a theology within which 
faith in the depth and resurrection of Christ could dissolve the barrier between Jew 
and Christian, and the Old Testament law be superseded. Rituals such as 
circumcision, and the dietary restrictions of Exodus and Leviticus, would no longer be 
of importance. Paul's conviction that the Old Testament laws about the sacrifice and 
consumption of animals were obsolete, based upon the change of dietary prescription 
after the flood, is merely interpretative; it is a strange logic upon which he attempts to 
persuade Jews that they could and should eat what had been previously forbidden, in 
the light of Christ's coming. Paul also refers disparagingly to Christian vegetarians at 
Rome, saying that one who believes may eat what he likes, yet vegetarians are weak 
of faith: 'Infirmum aut em in fide assumite, non in disceptationibus cogitationum. 
A/ius enim credit se manducare omni; qui aut em infirmus est olus manducut.' (Rom. 
14. I - 2). Paul effectively asks Jews and vegetarians to justify not eating certain or all 
animals. This begs an outstanding question: why should they justify what they do not 
do? Paul wanted to unify the church, not describe varieties of Christian practices and 
understandings, 'make for peace and build up the common life' he says to the Romans 
( 14. 19). As Porphyry observes, this sounds suspiciously as though he is trying to 
make his theology compatible with the existing cultural practices of imperial Rome. 
Paul states that whoever resists authority resists what God has appointed, and those 
who resist will incur judgement (Rom. 13:1). Porphyry's response is that 'the same 
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man who writes, "The law is spiritual" to the Romans, and "The law is holy and the 
commandment holy and just" now puts a curse upon those who obey what is holy!' 
(AC. P. 62). Porphyry sees that the Law of which Paul speaks is, by his own words, 
also Rome itself. In contrast Porphyry assumes no divine authority, only a logic aided 
by the received precepts of philosophy. His conclusions, rather than preceding their 
inscription find validity 'through a confutation derived from an argumentative 
discussion.' (A BST. 1. 1) They are a product of writing, speaking, and reading: a 
result rather than primarily a constituent of representation. For Porphyry the spiritual 
journey is one of self- enquiry and personal responsibility. Spiritual value, for him, 
lies in individual realisation of philosophical truth through experience. Coming to 
realise that 'a fleshless diet contributed both to health and to the proper endurance of 
philosophical labours' (A BST. 1. 2) involves the practice of ethics, not just by the 
belief in words. Faith or belief in the Prime Mover, for Porphyry, must be informed 
by what is right, not by a subjective utterance which seeks to inform an audience of 
beliefs empty and useless to spiritual progress. Knowledge, in other words, has no 
significance unless it is transformative. Accepting Christian doctrine through Paul, for 
example, is in Porphyry's eyes fruitless because it offers only the abdication of 
personal responsibility to an official creed and an automatic fealty to received ideas. 
Porphyry's opposition to the Christian theology typified by Paul's letters presents a 
voice of dissent to the prevailing norm. Against the Christians is heretical, but it is 
also too difficult to control, offering too precise a textual pathology for the comfort of 
the new religion. In the process On Abstinence is occluded because all of Porphyry's 
works are seen as heretical. When Porphyry's works becomes acceptable, On 
Abstinence clearly does not conform to dominant Roman cultural practices, or Paul's 
interpretation of Christian theology. Indeed, its acceptance would compromise the 
classification of boundaries of human and non-human in Christian thought, which are 
presented as the only plausible means of defining the human self, and inform an 
individual agency which can not renounce the religion of the state which polices and 
protects its 'meanings.' 110 An incompatible Hellenic knowledge is clearly censored 
110 By the eleventh century the structure of government 'began to develop which gave the papacy 
and the hierarchy of the church, between the 131h Century and the reformation, a coercive power unique 
in the history of Christendom. This coercive power presupposed a machinery of government and group 
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from Christian thought, in part because its observations subvert Christian doctrine by 
revealing the inadequacy of officially approved, theologically sanctioned boundaries. 
For Foucault transgression is the interrogation of boundaries, 'a realm, no doubt, 
where what ~s in question is the limit rather than the identity of culture.' 111 But 
Foucault also sees that the biblical text and its interpretation provided the ultimate 
source of an authority informing those who read, prospered by it, and believed in it. 
He observes that the history of ideas 
deals with the field of discourses as a dominant with two halves; any element 
located there may be characterised as old or new: traditional or original; 
c . d . 112 con10ITn1ng or ev1ant. 
He categorises two formulations; the ordinary, everyday idea is not responsible for 
itself, going 'so far as to repeat it word for word, from what has already been said', 113 
characterised by inertia and the slow accumulation of the past. Alternatively, original 
ideas are highly valued and rare and have no similar antecedents, serving as a model 
for others. They constitute successive ruptures, the progression of thought, and 
facilitate the emergence of future discourses. 
Questionable margins are identifiable as 'ruptures' in this way, and in Middle English 
literature, borders are always the sites of the most powerful symbolic repertoires 
where identity itself is inseparable from limits, and where existence out- runs 
definition. As I discuss below this can be seen in the hybrid humans of the Animalibus 
of Bartholomaeus who are safely 'other', always defined by lust, carnal desires, and 
as rapists of human woman. It is 'always a boundary phenomenon and its order is 
of people in need of coercion. Throughout the early Middle Ages the church had been a strong 
authoritarian. At various times the exigencies of a missionary church had compelled the toleration of 
Paganism; but this was dropped as soon as conveniently possible, and the same tolerance was rarely 
extended to Christian heretics. Bishops and secular rulers worked closely together for the control of 
men's souls as well as their bodies. Muslim traders were accepted, Jewish inhabitants of Christendom 
tolerated and even protected; but apostasy was condemned.' See Joan Evans, ed., The Flowering of The 
Middle Ages (London: Thames and Hudson, 1966) p. 32. 
111 P. Stallybniss & A. White, The Politics and Poetics a/Transgression (London: Methuen and 
Co., 1986) p. 200. 
112 Foucault op cit., 1972, p. 141. 
113 Foucault ibid., p. 141 - 142. 
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always constructed around the figures of its territorial edge.' 114 The centre is always 
in animated discourse with the periphery, only maintaining its identity through this 
defining activity. Speaking of such boundaries Dorothy Y amamoto observes that: 
any ordered system means that there must be boundaries between the different 
categories- the sort of demarcation visually expressed in tiers of animals 
shown in some of the illuminations of creation. Where there are boundaries 
' 
and border- line areas there is always a danger of frontiers being crossed and 
categories being mixed, with formless or hybridisation the result. The bestiary 
text is concerned with this kind of liminality. Since it presents a model of total 
orderliness, incorporating stability of habitat as well as stability of form, its 
anxiety over creatures who breach the boundaries sometimes appears as 
repudiation of the areas in which they live- which are described as physically 
marginal, neither one thing nor the other. 115 
Correspondingly, Bartholomaeus Anglicus' DPR articulates a structure which 
collates information, and assigns it to rigid categorisation. Such structures influence 
and inform western civilisation; indeed the control of thought - power itself- is 
comprised of instruments for the formation of recording knowledge. Encyclopaedia, 
compilatio and commentatio constitute methods of observation, registration, 
procedures for investigation, which are all apparatus of control. The 'objective' 
method of observation and registration is specifically designed to inform. As such it is 
a teaching apparatus for Christian morality, which is obedient to such forms of 
control. Again, Foucault makes the observation that: 
From antiquity to Christianity, we pass from a morality that was essentially 
the search for a personal ethics to a morality of obedience to a system of rules. 
And if I was interested in antiquity it was because, for a whole series of 
reasons, the idea of a morality as obedience to a code of rules is now 
114 Stallybrass et al., op cit., pp. 20, 200. 
115 Dorothy Yamamoto, The Boundaries of the Human in Medieval English Literature, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 30. 
64 
CHAPTER ONE 
disappearing, has already disappeared. And to this absence of morality 
corresponds, must correspond, the search for an ethics of existence. 116 
Personal ethics through Christian 'truth', is an interpreted, fixed vision forcing 
'obedience to a system of rules.' Correspondingly and ethically, animals in the text 
stand not only for themselves, but for individuals whose moral agency is prescribed 
by 'norms' of Christian definition which serve, for the most part, as the controlling 
agent of dominant state power. To ask why animals need suffer as the hapless victims 
of man's fall from grace is to ask why anyone subjected to the authoritative claims 
and actions of another upon them, need suffer? 'Thus dumb animals and "brute 
beasts" carry out recognisable "Christ - like" functions as they sacrifice themselves 
for the sake of an endangered and sinful humanity.' 117 
116 M. Foucault, in McHoul. A. & Grove. W., eds., A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the 
Subject (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1993) p. 118. 




THE PLACEMENT OF THE ANIMAL AT THE LITERAL SENSE IN 
BARTHOLOMAEUS ANGLICUS' DE PROPRIETATIBUS RERUM 
... the literal sense must always come first as that which contains in its meaning 
(sentenza) all other meanings ... as the philosopher [Aristotle] says in the first book of 
the Physics, nature wishes us to proceed with due order in our acquiring of 
knowledge: that is, by proceeding from that which we know better to that which we 
know less well. 
Dante 118 
[Preachers] should know the natures of animals and also of other things, because 
there is nothing which moves the hearts of an audience more than the properties of 
animals and of other things. 
Thomas ofChobham (d.l236) 119 
2. 1 De proprietatibus rerum 
Porphyry's outward looking attitude to the animal stands in stark contrast to the closed 
n1atrix of interpretation which can be seen to characterise the medieval period, where 
the book of creation and its replica the text is read through a fideistically enclosed 
meaning system. 120 Prescribed by Augustine and scripture, the injunction that faith 
must come first if understanding is to follow 'si non credideritis, non permanebitis' 
[if you do not believe you will not be established] (Isaiah 7. 9) is taken seriously. As 
118 Dante, If Convivio cited in Minnis & Scott op cit., p. 397. 
119 Thomas ofChobham, Summa de arte praedicandi extracted from D. L. D' A very, ed. & trans., 
The preaching of the Friars: Sermons diffused from Paris before /300 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 
p. 232. 
120 The title and subject matter of Charles Freeman's The Closing of the Western Mind: The Rise of 
Faith and the Fall of Reason, op cit., retains this concept, and traces the exclusion of Hellenic reason 
and openness of thought by the dominant mysticism and faith of early Christianity. 
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already observed, such pre-existent faith would suggest that Christian doctrine 
supplies the enquirer with predetermined answers, thus dismissing the importance of 
the animal if that doctrinal answer already assumes its unimportance. Etienne Gilson 
explains that 
In their [the church fathers'] mind faith was essential. The formula "The 
Platonism of the Fathers" would lead to an absurd interpretation if it were 
meant to say that the fathers were Platonists. They were essentially Christians, 
that is to say, teachers of a doctrine of salvation by faith in Jesus Christ, and 
not at all the disciples of a philosopher who conceived salvation as a natural 
reward for the philosophical exercise of reason ... one does not understand in 
order to believe, but on the contrary, one believes in order to understand: neque 
enim quaero intelligere ut credam, sed credo ut intelligam. Understanding of 
faith, in short, presupposes faith. 121 
Despite the influence of Porphyry's Neoplatonic rationalism on Augustine and the 
early church, faith becomes a uniquely Christian way to find salvation. Equally, 
Neoplatonic positions on the status of the animal are excluded from Christian thought 
in favour of other authorities such as Augustine, Isidore, and Dionysius the 
Areopagite (6th century) who constitute the doctrine behind belief and faith in De 
proprietatibus rerum. 122 A faith based on the doctrinal understandings and 
interpretation of, for example Augustine, will inevitable see the status and meaning of 
the animal through his eyes, so that interpreting the animal results in a predetermined, 
doctrinal answer. There are, of course, other forms of such 'closure' and, as I discuss 
below, Augustine's Logocentrism is perhaps the most influential in this period. This 
too, however, requires that the enquirer turn to God for a divine illumination which 
would seem dependent upon the individual belonging to a faith which dismisses the 
value of the animal before it approaches 'knowledge' in the form of a creation ordered 
according to doctrine. In this way turning animals into texts forces physical bodies to 
121 Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and Ward, 
1955) pp. 93, 129. 
122 See Brockhurst op cit., p. 38 ff. 
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conform to the notion of a regimented creation. They become available to be read in 
the intricate world laid out as a book. Bartholomaeus Anglicus' encyclopaedia De 
proprietatibus rerum presents such a version of the world, which is comprehensively 
ordered by categories to allow easy reference for students and clerics alike. 123 As a 
literal sense 'scientific' text it has no commentary from its compilator, rather bringing 
together a range of authoritative accounts and statements on each of its subjects. Book 
eighteen of the DP R - De animalibus - is a bestiary, having one hundred and 
seventeen entries on a range of animals, with the two notable exceptions of chapter 
thirty-two (De cornu) and chapter forty-nine (De femina). 124 As such, it provides a 
cross section of the way that the animal, and each animal in particular, is understood 
by a Franciscan scholar in the early scholastic period. This chapter will examine the 
way the animal is defined by Aristotelian notions of category. It will also observe that 
there are Christian doctrinal understandings, which allow the animal to constitute a 
comprehensively meaningful sign to medieval semiotics. Such a reading reveals the 
problems inherent in synthesising Aristotelian categorisation with Christian 
hierarchies, and we must be prepared to perceive the meaning of the animal in 
medieval thought through the way it is misunderstood, and the way it is displaced. 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus was born in the late twelfth - century in Norfolk. He was 
educated as a Franciscan at the Paris studium around the year 1224 where the 
appellation 'Englishman' seems to have been bestowed upon him by students of other 
nationality .125 It is known that Bartholomaeus became lector or lecturer of texts at the 
Paris Franciscan School as well as sixth 'minister provincial' of Saxonia in 1262!26 
Between his time at the studium and his post in Saxonia he wrote the DP R - most 
123 D. C. Greetham 's article on Bartholomaeus deals comprehensively with apparent inconsistencies 
caused by the appropriation of classical fable material, as well as the other influences which seem to 
dictate his textual approach: 'Isidore's theory, with its sense of a real, as well as metaphorical, link 
between two areas of experience (the world itself and the words used to describe that world), is, of 
course, very attractive to Bartholomaeus and provides him not only with much incidental material but 
also with a further justification for the rationale of his own work.' Greetham op cit., p. 674 (n). 
124 See appendix C, 'The placement and displacement of the feminine in Bartholomaeus Anglicus' 
De proprietatibus rerum'. 
125 See NCE Vol. 2. p. 131 a. M. C. Seymour's account varies in details about Bartholomaeus' 
earlier origins and movements. M. C. Seymour, ed., Bartholomaeus Ang/icus and His Encyclopaedia, 
(Oxford: Varorium, 1992). 
p 6 S . 22 - eymour op c1t., p. . 
68 
CHAPTER TWO 
probably around 1245 while still lector at Magdeburg. The DP R is his most notable 
work and is the largest and most comprehensive work of its type. It comprises the 
encyclopaedic categorisation of known creation into a Latin compilatio designed both 
for use with the technique of scholastic Lectio, and as a reference text for scholarly 
clerics. 127 The Middle English form of the DPR, John Trevisa's translation of 1398, is 
a prime example of a vernacular summa, its conventions arising directly from the 
original. As Trevisa's version is the best known and most used by English writers it is 
this translation from which I work. 128 
The DPR was extremely influential, perhaps because it is the most practical and 
comprehensive of its type. Its immediately obvious inspiration and source is Isidore of 
Seville's attempt to compile an encyclopaedia of all human knowledge in his 
Etymologies. However, taking his authorities from a wide range of earlier works, and 
with access to a larger body of sources and analogues, means that Bartholomaeus' 
compilation easily rivals Isidore's work in size and complexity. It constitutes an 
encyclopaedia of theology and science arranged in nineteen books: a unified and 
comprehensible statement of 'universal' knowledge as understood by its author. The 
material of the DP R is presented in relation to scripture interpreted by Augustine, and 
comprising Aristotelian learning in the natural sciences available through new Arabic 
and Jewish scholarship permeating the west such as Aristotle's Parts of Animals, 
Physica and Metaphysica, which were admitted to the curriculum early in the 
thirteenth century. 129 
The importance of the influx of new ideas in the early twelfth- century, what became 
known as 'new Aristotelianism', cannot be exaggerated. The old and new dialectic of 
127 See appendix D 'De proprietatibus rerum: lectio as context' 
128 Lawler p. 268 ff. 
129 Bartholomaeus refers often to 'Austyn,' first at book one, (DPR 1. 25) The sources for 
Bartholomaeus use of Augustine are De genesi ad /itteram and De civitate dei. If the twelfth century 
was in essence Augustinian, Isidore produced the substance of its prevailing philosophy, in Tres libri 
sententiarum. Drawn in the most part from Augustine, it preceded many similar works of the twelfth 
century. Seymour observes that 'The general intellectual patterns of De proprietatibus rerum are thus 
clear: the Augustinian orthodoxy of its cohesive theology, the reliance upon Aristotle alongside Pliny 
and Isidore ... and the modem colouring given to the work by the frequent citation of contemporary 
and twelfth century authorities.' Seymour op cit., pp. 11, 27. 
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Aristotle (i.e. the Organon with the Eisagoge of Porphyry) were read ordinarie as the 
prescribed curriculum. 130 E. R. Curtius pinpoints the advent of 'new' Aristotelian 
thought, seeing Thierry of Chartres' Heptateuchon (1148) as the last great 
presentation of the old artes liberates system before the influx of new realms of 
knowledge from the East. 131 Only decades before the compiling of the DP R one of 
Bartholomaeus' main authorities, the Arabic Aristotelian Averroeis (1126- 1198) 132 
translated Aristotle's natural history, Ethics and Politics from the Greek, and 
facilitated the widespread dissemination of Aristotle's theory of poetry as laid out in 
the Metaphysics- the Poetics being as yet unknown. Not popular initially, 
Aristotelianism came to be accepted as a necessary bridge to the classical scholarship 
and logic absent from Christianity in the later Middle Ages. Etienne Gilson saw that 
'pagan' philosophy provided an explanatory logic that complemented Christian 
Truths, being itself resolved by the transcendence which Christianity brings to it. 133 
The synthesis of the two are evident in the early thirteenth - century's appropriation of 
the 'Aristotelian Prologue' which became popular among arts faculty lecturers at the 
University of Paris as a sophisticated analytical framework for interpreting the world, 
but which could only be constituted at the literal level of the scientific text. The literal 
sense was thought essential to the two part speculative theology popular in the 
thirteenth century. 134 It was felt that faith in the Divine compelled the student to seek 
understanding through the explication of philosophical thought, accumulated 
examples of material 'things', and the description of those things through language. 
This was first possible by exposition and the organisation of theoretical material into 
texts. Secondly, the resultant texts were available for theological reflection and were 
meant to stimulate the deepest exigencies of the intelligence - the search for order and 
incorporation into logical design. 135 
130 See Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, 2"d ed., ed. by F. M. 
Powicke and A. B. Emden, 3 Vols., (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1936) pp. 440- 441. 
131 c . . 42 urtms op crt., p. . 
132 Averrois or Averroes (1126- 1198) was a well- known contemporary Arab or 'Moorish' 
commentator on Aristotle. 
133 Gilson 1936 op cit., see especially Chapter 2 of that work. 
134 For a detailed discussion see A. B. Cobban, The Medieval Universities: Their Development and 
Organisation (Methuen & Co. London, 1975) pp. 79- 85. 
135 NCE Vol. 4. 954 b. 
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As a compilatio, the DP R is no exception to these modes and is meant to be 
understood in the literal sense, the scientific nature of the work being stated in the 
preface or prohemium. 
By Cause herof I profre pis work to pe edificacioun of pe hous of our lord 
pat is God gloryous and hy3e and blessed withouten ende. In pis werk me 
speketh and tretip of somme propirtees of kyndeliche pinges, of pe whiche 
pingis so m is bodiliche and so m not bodiliche ... pe propirtees of 
kyndeliche pinges bep isommed and schortliche conteyned, as pe eeres pat 
scapi de pe hones of ripemen my3te come to myne hondes. In pis work I 
haue iput of myne owne wille litil opir nou3t, but al pat schal be seid is 
itake of autentik bokes of holy seyntes and of philosophres and compile 
schortliche withoute idilnesse ... 
(Proh. pp. 41 - 3). 
The intention (intentio) of the author, his approach and level of discussion, and the 
interpretative strategy required by the reader is clearly stated. He indicates the 
primarily informational content of the work. Spiritual enlightenment is hoped for, but 
is of secondary consideration to the purpose of a text which bases its empiricism in 
the material. The primary function of the DP R is as an encyclopaedic aid to logic. The 
specific references to 'kyndeliche pingis' is important, because it inforn1s us that 
Bartholomaeus will not engage with what things mean as signs, but document them as 
examples of creation for discussion and commentary elsewhere. Andrew Linzey 
comments that 'Scholasticism has for centuries regarded animals as "things." The 
consequence is unsurprising: animals have been treated as things.' 136 Such 
unsympathetic objectivity extends to the scientific mode of the text, in which 
Bartholomaeus follows the conventional literal sense topos of the compilator and 
passes no comment upon his subject matter. He states '[I]n pis work I haue iput of 
myne owne wille litil opir nou3t'; 'adding nothing out of my own head' is an idiom in 
which self-depreciation signifies the intention to be objective by disavowing 
136 Linzey and Regan op cit., p. 135. 
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responsibility for, and unwillingness to comment upon, the material he has 
compiled. 137 He will, in other words, describe the animal as it is reported, 
unquestioningly, and without passing comment or judgment on his sources' accounts 
of individual animals. 
At first sight the DP R represents a synthesis of biblical knowledge and Aristotelian 
thought, though it is neither exclusively a theological or philosophical work. Book 
One reflects abstract ideas from books one to seven of Augustine's De trinitate and the 
understanding of what God has revealed to himself: 'pat al ping pat is seyd of God, it 
is essentia opir nocio opir persona' (DPR 1. 3). Focus is on the external trinity of the 
thing seen, the process of seeing, the intention of seeing that distinguishes scientia 
'knowledge through senses' and sapienta or wisdom gained from the contemplation of 
'eternal reality.' 138 In this way Bartholomaeus' aim to be scientific is clearly evident in 
his use of the literal mode, and in the care taken to justify the synthesis of science with 
the other literal mode of canonical scriptural authority, or in fact, God's word. 
The literal sense was believed to represent the intention of the human auctor as 
expressed at the primary narrative level. The allegorical senses that involve 
significative things are of no use to the logician because he is confined to the literal 
sense. While the world presents a system of symbols open to interpretation as the 
work of God, only from the literal sense may valid argument be drawn. Aquinas 
reiterates Augustine's definition of words as signs of the earth and things as signs of 
heaven: God is the sole auctor of things and uses things as signs. Human authors are 
the 'auctors of words and use words to signify ... when words are used significantly, 
we have the literal sense.' 139 And through the literal, the purpose of the DP R is its 
utility (utilitas), its final end (finis) the informing of students about the world and its 
'things.' 140 But while the text provides a basis for meanings not apparent at the literal 
137 A. J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic LitermJ! Attitudes in the Latter Middle 
Ages (London: Scholar Press, 1986) p. 199. 
138 s . 41 eymour op c1t., p. . 
139 Minnis 1986, op cit., p. 79. 
140 Seymour observes that the sermons ofBerthold V on Regensburg, lector between 1230 and 1234 
at the Franciscan Convent of Regensburg, demonstrate the utilisation of Proprietatibus as it was 
intended, its animals being used as exemplars in sermon writing. Seymour op cit., p. 33. 
72 
CHAPTER TWO 
level, the book itself does not extend to allegorical or spiritual readings. The DP R, as 
its author has indicated in the prohemium, will present source material without 
commentary, its only prescription that 'oure wit may not sti3e vnto pe contemplacioun 
of vnseye pi~ges' until we have considered 'pinges that bep iseye' (Proh. p. 41 ), the 
reader should go no further than an acceptance of the authorities employed. 
IfHorace's closely followed advice that the chief aim ofthe poet is 'to instruct and 
delight' -to do good and to give pleasure 141 -then the encyclopaedia might be said to 
inform, the greater emphasis of its compilator being on the informational content 
presented at the literal sense of the scientific text. As a scientific literal sense 
exposition of that which is already known, the animals of the DP R should pose little 
complication, the value of the text lying in objective or literal descriptions of the 
animals of creation, and the value of the animals themselves lying in their ability to 
reveal or signify some aspect of their creator. But it is wrong to ascribe absolute value 
to such a medieval collection of beasts. While Bartholomaeus claims to offer no 
interpretation or commentary, the animals of his bestiary offer a plethora of symbolic 
and allegorical readings which defy a literal sense categorisation in line with the 
structural hierarchy of substances which govern the text. In this respect what the 
animals represent could be operative at a multiple of levels, as signs both positive and 
negative, depending upon different contexts and attributes. As Bartholomaeus reports 
or describes animals which he has never seen, such as elephants, tigers and griffins, 
he is unaware that any objective account will still include the inbuilt symbolism 
bestowed on individual animals by this chosen authorities. This is evident to such an 
extent that reading the DPR as absolutely literal in its sense or modus is impossible. 
Subsequently, it seems reasonable to suggest that reading the DPR from Aristotelian 
and doctrinal modes of interpretation will provide much to be said about the way in 
which the animal is placed and understood in the Christian world. 
141 Horace, 'The Art of Poetry,' in Classical Literary Criticism, ed. by D. A. Russell & M. 
Winterbottom, Oxford World Classics Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) p. l 06. 
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2. 2 The substance of De proprietatibus rerum 
The key to understanding how the animal is placed in the scholastic thought of the 
DPR lies in the understanding that 'substance' provides the principal structural 
premise of the text. The work presents the reader with a version of Aristotelian 
thought in which the animal is placed according to the universals of genus and 
species, though in the Christianised version of that Aristotelian structure, as evidenced 
in the DP R, the animal is clearly - if only cosmetically - displaced from its usual 
location in Aristotelian thought, by being apparently located at the very bottom of the 
list. 142 While operating upon the principle that universal substances provide definition 
of things, Bartholomaeus' bestiary also disrupts the notion of such categories by 
providing the reader with examples of particularly medieval animals, including 
hybrids and fabulous beasts who have specific symbolic potential, pertinent to the 
medieval paradigm. In Trevisa's rendering ofBartholomaeus' preface, a comment is 
made about the way that things should be understood relative to their substance: 'For 
pe propirtees of pinges folewyth pe substaunce, pe ordre and pe distinccioun of 
propirtees schal be ordeyned to ordir and distinccioun of pe substauce perof.' (Pro h. 
41 ). What exactly does it mean to say that to find the properties of a thing you must 
know its substance? And how might an understanding of this statement facilitate a 
reading of the animals and mythical creatures of a text, which characterise 'an age 
which was obsessed with classification, valuing the universal over the particular and 
the typical over the individual'? 143 Minnis' statement is necessarily broad; theories 
change over time, and an alternative and inverted understanding of the universals is 
discussed below. As a general rule, however, the dominance of the universal over the 
particular may provide an approach to the structure of the DPR and to bring a reading 
to its bestiary, though it is first necessary to define how Bartholomaeus understands 
the principle, and in what way the animals of the bestiary conform to or subvert, the 
logical categorisation of scholastic thought. In turn the text can provide explanations 
142 See appendix C. 
143 Minnis 1986, op cit., p. 2. 
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for other texts, such as those by Langland and Chaucer, who use De proprietatibus 
rerum as a source. 
Bartholomaeus' literal level compilatio follows the Aristotelian premise that things 
can only be known by first establishing their substance (substantia). For Aristotle 
substance is primarily a being (ousia) and the things that qualify most as beings 
particular individual entities- You and I- are primary substances: 'this is just what we 
mean by the individual -the numerical one, and by the universal we mean that which 
is predicable of the individuals.' 144 A primary substance pertains to an individual 
alone: 'a substance- that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most 
of all - is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual 
man or the individual horse.' 145 
The purpose of Aristotle's focus on substance is to define the 'universal' (that which 
can be said to be universally true of a thing shared in relation to others of its type) by 
first focusing on a particular example. He states 'I call universal that which is by its 
nature predicated of a number of things, and particular that which is not; man, for 
instance, is a universal, Calli us a particular.' 146 In this sense things are defined in 
relation to the types of substance to which they belong. Aristotle uses 'genus' and 
'species' for any two consecutive levels of generality. Both 'man' and 'animal' are 
'second' substances in that they are categorised by genera (i.e. animal) and his 
species (i.e. man). What is genus relative to a lower clause can be called a species 
relative to a higher one. 'Genus' signifies the 'kind' or the essence of a thing given by 
its definition, which in turn indicates what the thing really is in its first instance 
(genus proximum). Its specific difference is its species (differentia specifica). The 
most often used example in the debate on universals, offers the definition of human 
being, as a rational (specific difference) animal (the nearest kind). 
t.t
4 Aristotle, Metaphysics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vol. 2, ed. by Jonathon Barnes, 
Bollingen Series LXXI (London: Princeton University Press, 1985). 1000 a, 1. 
145 Aristotle, Categories 2 a, 11 - 14, in Categories and /nterpretatione, trans. by 1. L. Ackrill 
(Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1963). 
146 Aristotle De Interpretatione 17 a, 39- 40, in Categories and lnterpretatione, op cit. 
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For Aristotle, only facts about secondary substances are scientifically knowable: a fact 
about an 'individual' human may be rational and appertains to you and me, but it 
appertains to our species and not to us as individuals. We are rational as human 
beings, not as John or Jane, reason giving the definition of man's species being 
common as it is to other men: 'that which is common [ koinon] is present in many 
things at the same time; so that clearly no universals exist apart from the 
individual.' 147 By the logic of Aristotle's empiricism only a fact which is necessarily 
true, existing in relation to others of their type, can be known scientifically. As we 
cannot know an individual scientifically we cannot, therefore, really know him at all. 
It is false to say that the essence of man has existence in singular because particular 
truths about particular individuals are too variable, and cannot be objects of scientific 
knowledge. If existence in singular pertained just in relation to man, man would never 
exist, except as a singular: 'for no universal is a this, nor is it found at the same time 
... It is what is found always and everywhere which we say is universal.' 148 In this 
sense all facts about individuals as 'particulars' are contingent. 
When Bartholomaeus says that for the properties of things we must first find and 
understand their substance he refers directly to this understanding. He explains that 
singular examples of individual entities should be observed in order to categorise their 
belonging according to their properties, or in fact the things that commonly form their 
genus and species. Since all of the facts about individuals as individuals are 
contingent, the object and proper end of scientific knowledge for Aristotle are the 
facts about genera and species evidenced in singular examples, Bartholomaeus 
explains this first step to understanding the things of creation: 
For it is not possible to oure witte to st3e vp to pe contemplacioun 
vnmaterial of pe ierarchies of heuen by materialledinge pat longith thereto 
... oure wit may not sti3e vnto pe contemplacioun of vnseye pinges but it 
be ilad by consideracioun of pinges pat bep iseye 
(Proh. 41) 
147 Met. 1040 b, 25 - 26. 
148 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. by Jonathon Bames, ed. by J. L. Ackrill & Lindsey Judson 
(Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1994), 87 b, 32. 
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In a Christian milieu which takes as its authority 'Videmus nunc per speculum in 
aenigmate, tunc autemfacie adfaciem' [For now we see in a glass darkly, though 
sometime face to face] (1 Cor 13. 12) Bartholomaeus states that creation reflects only 
veiled meanings which we may read, though they are an imperfect sign of God's 
intention, and a bad reflection of ontological reality. But to begin to understand, we 
must first read the particular things of creation, 'pinges pat bep iseye'. Following 
Aristotle, Bartholomaeus' intention is to establish the universally knowable facts 
about particular examples who will give definition, genera and species. 
Correspondingly, Bartholomaeus' title is De proprietatibus rerum, and not De rebus, 
and the subject of the book is 'somme propertees ofkyndeliche pinges ... in comun 
and in special' (Pro h. 41 ), not things themselves. 149 Thus the particular significance 
of individual animals is not the subject of the text. Rather, the 'properties' of his title 
are the things about concrete examples which facilitate classification. In the 
classification of the bestiary animals, as in man, existence precedes essence. 
The first chapter of De animalibus offers an overview 'in general' of Aristotle's 
definitions of the animal. Other authoritative commentaries on the denominative 
characteristics of each beast in particular are to be dealt with in the proceeding 
chapters on each particular animal 'in special' where the aim is to report and 
categorise particular things known about 'animal, a beste' (DPR 18. 1) one species to 
one chapter. This idea that truths about particular individuals cannot be objects of 
scientific knowledge is useful for categorisation but also irredeemably problematic 
resulting in the uncomfortable, if beautifully put, observation of the especially 
complicated duality of man's status as a species of animal who, while essentially 
defined by his Logos, must primarily be defined in the corporeal context: 'Isider seip 
pat a man is a best iliche to God ... ' (DPR 3. 1). In spite of himself man is inseparable 
from beasts: '3it for pe properties of man schulde be pe more opunliche iknowe to 
149 i.e. shared and in particular. In its Middle English sense the word properties suggests the 
distinctive physical qualities, attributes or characteristics of a thing though in the Latin proprietatibus 
(proprium or 'properties') may be better rendered 'distinguisher' especially given the Quiditative 
approach to definitions of man, animal, plant, and their subsequent definition at each level by book and 
chapter of the text. 
77 
CHAPTER TWO 
bestis-sche men and simple of his parties of pe which he is imaade and componed ... ' 
(DPR 3. 1 ). Mankind, we are told, has quiddity, or defining characteristics, as an 
animal and at a biological level. Outside the delimitation of the De animalibus the 
animal, in other words, is always explained in relation to its highest point of definition 
-that of mankind and a superior intellect. But definition must start at the literal and 
with the beast-like or animal 'parts' which will in turn allow a better understanding of 
the beast in man, and bestial men. This dichotomy of the bestial and the reasonable, 
which becomes a doctrinal commonplace in Christian theology, is what 
Bartholomaeus refers to when he states that the 'animal' part of man (Humo) is of 'pe 
erpe' yet is also 'Antropos' or 'arered vp' to face his God, plainly glossing Aristotle 
in Parts of Animals. 150 
opir bestis lokep don ward to pe erpe, and God 3af to man an hi3e tnoup and 
hete hym loke vp and se heven, and he 3af to man visagis are rid toward pe 
stars. Also a man schal seche heven and nou3t putte his pou3t in pertpe and 
be obedient to pe wombe as a best. Isider spekep of double maner man, of 
pe inner man and vtter man. 
(DPR 3. 1). 
This 'double maner man' of both inner and outer parts has on the one hand 'sou le' 
and reason or 'vnbodiliche substaunce intellectual'. Always bearing corporeal 
similarity to God his nature is to aspire to be more like God. Theologically, and no 
longer in a purely Aristotelian mode, Bartholomaeus wrongly extends Aristotle's 
thought into 'insensibles' placing man 'next aftir angels' (DPR 3. 1) 151 thereby 
departing from Aristotelian structure to link man with his Christian God, through the 
doctrine that man is made in God's image, and may attain a status equivalent to that 
of angels. On the other hand the soul is anchored to the material: 'ioyned to pe body 
in twey maners' which defines the soul as mover to the moved, controlling the body 
150 See Parts 656 a, 15 - 20. 
151 This is precisely why the philosopher Porphyry defends the 'categorical doctrine expounded by 
Aristotle by rejecting any claim identifying Categories with "genera of Being"' Porphyry sees his 
master Plotinus' approach to be mistaken in applying Aristotle's categories (in Porphyry's view 
intended to account for the natural world) to the intelligible and supernatural realm, and then criticising 
them as inapplicable- exactly what Bartholomaeus does here. See Evangeliou op cit., pp. 5 - 6. 
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by reason 'as a schipman is i-oned to pe ship' (DPR 3. 1 ). Since man as a unitary 
whole, though,blended of the corporeal and the spiritual, is one substance, body and 
soul cannot be thought of as two complete entities. The soul, rather, informs matter 
and is the principle of bodily structure, sensation and thought being the form of the 
body (anima est forma corporis). This is the same for both man and animal, the 
difference only that man's soul is reasonable. The stress of the Aristotelian analogue 
is man's special duality in his shared species as an animal, and the potential problems 
encountered at the literal level of interpretation, where he is categorised as both man 
and animal. 
The reason for inverting the priority of the universals by Aquinas is to privilege man 
above animal, and particular over universal. He makes the important distinction that 
universals are not 'primary' but come as the result of thought, abstracts based on 
examples of what unquestionably exists. For Aquinas thinking penetrates through the 
particular to the universal. He sees Aristotle's particulars as instances of universals 
which are themselves abstracts. For Aquinas it is not until thinking is completed that 
universals as such are evident to the mind. 
Aristotle distinguished two meanings of the substance. Firstly, the what a 
thing is, as given by its definition [and contrasted as a category of being 
with the where it is, how it is, how much it is, etc] ... secondly, substance 
means an individual subject subsisting in this category of substance, [the 
thing whose what we are giving]. Subject is the general name for anything 
that can be described in this way; but as existing independently and not 
within something else it is said to be subsistent, as instantiating a nature it is 
called natural thing, and as subject to properties a substance. 152 
This reads like an explanation of the principle of the DP R, though Aquinas moves 
toward a theological understanding where things are defined not merely biologically, 
but within a hierarchy with God at the top. While Aquinas' exposition on substance 
152 sr 1999., Q 29 art. 2., pp. 68- 69. 
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sounds very much like Aristotle, he disagrees that man does not exist as a particular 
and can only exist in the categorisable sense, as a secondary substance or universal. 
That man exists regardless of scientific definition is of primary importance for 
Aquinas, who sees substance itself as logically prior to the actual positions in space 
and time, as required by Aristotle's universals. Under these terms a spiritual being 
which occupied space could be said to be at once individual and species because it 
exists, regardless of denominators. Again, Aristotle's material empiricism is extended 
into the realm of insensibles for the sake of inherently Christian thought, where 
knowledge and being are correlative: if a thing is, it is knowable and in it resides its 
ontological truth. But we can never really know it in itself. Rather, it can only be 
known by us, from our own limited perspective. The more perfect its being, the more 
difficult it is for us to know it. This shifts the emphasis of species and genera to a 
genera of being. Our ability to conceive of hybrid animals, albeit that we cannot 
perceive their complete meaning, is physical proof enough that they exist and have a 
meaning. Such empiricism is a secondary aid to understanding, supporting faith as 
being of primary importance. As Gilson specifies, empiricism does not singularly 
allow belief, but belief facilitates understanding: credo ut intelligam. Existence, prior 
to empirical or scientific definition, provided Aquinas with another understanding of 
the universals. 
Such a reversal of the primacy of second substances such as species and genera over 
the concrete individual, prioritises individuals or particulars. Following Etienne 
Gilson's outlining of the privileging of the universal, where individual existents 
should not be neatly comprehended within universal categories, but give fuller respect 
to their particularities, Kevin McGinley observes that: 
The generally-held principles that universals preceded particulars in the order 
of being (even if, from the Aristotelian perspective, the priority was reversed 
in the order of knowing), and that this order of being involved an ontological 
hierarchy rising from things through their universal forms to the divine Ideas 





existence is also what is highest therein and thus most worthy of attention, 
being closest to God. 153 
The problem of positing this prioritisation of the two types of primary substance, man 
and beast, is that man as a first substance has an ontologically different status in 
Christian thought. How can the individual not exist when it is the individual which 
gives scientific definition in the first instance of creation, and who in the first instance 
is made in the image of God? It is typical of the Christian paradigm that it underlines 
the importance of an individuated ontology of man, who is made in God's image, as 
being of fundamental significance. In Thomastic thought a species is something 
intermediate between external object and mind. The motivation for this is twofold: i. 
the external object is material, but the grasp of the mind is not: ii. objects are 
particular, whilst the mind contemplates universals. Active reason abstracts the form 
of species from the Phantasmata so that it issues in the passive reason as species 
expressa. It is expressed, rather than impressed or imposed [impressa]. Aquinas calls 
this the conversio ad phantasmata; using an analogy which he takes from Aristotle, he 
refers to the illumination of the species. By defining the species, the act of cognition 
and the object of cognition can come together. Aristotle's statements, however, still 
dominate the understanding of the animal in the DPR as the statement that 'pe 
propirtees of pinges folewyth pe substaunce' illustrates. Clearly man and animal do 
exist as particulars. However Aristotle and Bartholomaeus obviously understand that 
in order to make general statements about a species or genus, individuals must be 
cotnpared to find common denominators. 'If the primary substances did not exist it 
would be impossible for other things to exist' says Aristotle, 'animal is predicated of 
man and therefore also of the individual man; for were it predicated of none of the 
individual men it would not be predicated of man at all.' 154 Porphyry's exposition on 
the subject provides a useful recapitulation of Aristotle's thought: 
153 Kevin McGinley, 'The (r)uses of poetry: a study ofthe work ofRobert Henryson in the context 
of scholastic literary theory', unpublished 1996 Ph.D. thesis (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 
1997) p. 87. 
154 Cat. 2a, 362 b. 6. 
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It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and 
genera should be the only other things called [secondary] substances. 
For only they, of things predicated, reveal the primary substance. For 
if one is to say of the individual man what he is, it will be in place to 
give the species or the genus (though more informative to give man 
than animal); ... Further, it is because the primary substances are 
subjects for everything else that they are called substances most 
strictly. But as the primary substances stand to everything else, so 
the species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: 
all the rest are predicated of these. 155 
Porphyry highlights that a difference between Aristotle and his scholastic 
commentators is one of priority. Though not scientifically knowable, Particulars are 
obviously important to Aristotle because they are the basis for knowledge about types 
of thing. As observed above, where Aristotle bestows priority on the science and 
methods of categorisation based upon the universal, Aquinas' Christian thought 
emphasises the primacy of the particular. This means that individual animals take 
precedence in Thomastic thought, and individual men, made in the image of their 
God, and with the logos which encapsulates the rationale of their Creator, take 
precedence over all other things. The scholastic tendency to displace the Aristotelian 
perspective which sees man as primarily an animal, and secondarily a rational animal 
is a clear illustration of the way that the animal is displaced and distanced from n1an 
by the Christian paradign1. The DPR, being earlier than such definitions as Aquinas 
propounds, however, still employs Aristotle's conception that understanding form and 
substance allows orderly definition by species and genera. While Bartholomaeus 
categorises all animals in one book, man is not included in the bestiary. He is, though, 
defined first and foretnost in the corporeal context as an animal, as a beast who is like 
God (DPR 3. 1). 
155 Evangeliou op cit., pp. 61 - 62. 
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While the text clearly takes Aristotelian structures and principles, by the terms of 
definition which it propounds man should be included in the bestiary. Instead 
mankind is treated separately, and placed in the third book. This subverts the 
Aristotelian structure, which would highlight man's corporeal similarity, kinship, and 
definition as an animal. This is important if we are to understanding the placement of 
the animal. Though prior to the unequivocal Thomistic statements which re-categorise 
man as a primarily spiritual being, mankind is already separated from the animal in 
the DP R, and placed higher than the animal, when according to the adopted 
Aristotelian structure he should primarily be seen as the same. Equally, if the 
universals of genera and species are to be followed truly, the text must be seen as one 
which deconstructs and tests such methods of categorisation by including particular 
examples of fabulous beasts, which cannot be, in Aristotle's terms, scientifically 
known. The very medieval collection of fabulous and hybrid beasts speak rather of a 
desire to test, extend and explore boundaries of thought and category, in such a way 
as to suggest that they do not really exist. In doing so, the boundary between man and 
animal is categorically widened, and so thoroughly explored, that mankind's 
preoccupation with distancing itself from, and Othering, the animal, is revealed. 
2. 3 The problem of universals 
The universals debate is important to the study of the way the animal is perceived in 
this period. It asked whether the terms 'universal', 'species', 'genera', had any 
relation to reality, or had grammatical significance, where signs exist as meaningful 
acts, and where n1etaphorising the status of a thing contrasts with a specific temporal 
object. This second sense must not be confused with the notion that words have 
merely 'grammatical' significance, but they have crucial metaphysical significance, as 
mental acts. The debate provides a critical position by which we may begin to 
understand the literary representation of 'real' animals. It also allows us to understand 




depictions of the animal. In addition the very existence of such thought illustrates the 
centrality of Porphyry's thought and influence on medieval philosophy and literature, 
while his position on animals remains unacknowledged. Aristotle's terms and 
propositions are clarified and formulated into the medieval problem of universals by 
the set of questions raised by Porphyry in his Eisagoge or introduction to Aristotle's 
Categories: 
I shall beg off saying anything about (a) whether genera and species are 
real or are situated in bare thought alone, (b) whether as real they are 
bodies or incorporeals, and (c) whether they are separated or in sensibles 
and have their reality in connection with them. Such business is 
profound, and requires another, greater investigation.' 156 
Porphyry does not undertake the investigation, leaving irresistible questions for 
medieval thinkers and Latin commentators, beginning with Boethius. The result is 
that universals as a mode of classification became a paradigm of cognition pre-
occupying medieval thought. Knowledge, sited in the individual parts of things, was 
equated with a complete and total knowledge of the whole. As already observed, 
discussion was of the two sorts of class names, species and genera. Porphyry asks not 
if things exit in 'merely words' [verbum tanta] but 'in bare thought alone'. The 
distinction that he makes here is not that words are signs which express ideas or 
concepts, but that words such as 'genera' and 'species' are ideas and concepts. 
Though it is not the modus of the compilator to interpret or comment but to report 
things as they are understood by his chosen authorities (auctoritates) there is a sense 
in which Bartholomaeus acknowledges the problem in chapters six to fifteen of book 
one of the DPR which follows the 'nouns abstractum opir concretum' (DPR I. 7) or 
conceptual gran1mar of Abelard which 'Gilbert de la Pon~e applied to theology as a 
grammatical description, then being modified by speculative grammar which reflects 
156 Though cited above, Porphyry's comment is important, and for the sake of the flow of argument, 
I refer to it here for a second time. Spade op cit., p. 2. 
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like a !,peculum the reality underlying the phenomena of the visible world.' 157 But 
Bartholomaeus also demonstrates an understanding akin to Aquinas' version of the 
universal where both material empiricism and divine Truths are synthesised. 
The specific representation of animals, be they known and 'real' or fantastical and 
reported, are represented by distinctive features which are subordinated to the prior 
universal values which must be available if the animal is to be knowable in general, 
encyclopaedic terms, and which in turn define their significance and function as 
aspects of creation. This viewpoint is fundamentally 'realist' in privileging the 
universal, because it embodies a faith in the possibility of ratiocinating or aligning 
particular elements within the bounds of universal norms. This is not seen as 
neglecting the importance of the corporeal or worldly reality, but rather to represent 
that which is most real within it. 158 Thus, understanding elements such as the 
fantastical animals as both 'real' literal sense examples, but also as symbolic 
epistemes embodying a meaning abstracted from their literal sense reality, is an 
attempt to bring a blurred ontological reality into focus by highlighting some 
universal or ontological truths for which they stand. 159 A creation already abstracted 
in a book mapping God's creation must inevitably involve textual animals as 
statements of Christian belief and faith, revealing to the exegete Christian truth, which 
may not alone be signified by a 'real' or any literal- sense understanding. 160 The 
universals debate had come to a head in a conflict between William of Champeaux 
( d.l120) and A be lard who won his case that universality is predicable of words alone. 
Abelard makes it clear that he is not speaking of the word as a literal sense physical 
entity (flatus vocis) but of the word or name expressive of a logical content161 which 
the word signifies. This logical content is the universal concept formed by and in 
abstraction. If, for instance, man is considered a member of the class of substances, 
we predicate of him the content of a universal concept which is formed by abstract 
157 Seymour op cit., p. 40. 
158 See Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies, 1949) p. 59. 
159 For a detailed account ofthe understand of real and ideal see my discussion below p. 22 (3. 4). 
160 Jerome, after all, had declared that classical fables could be employed only if they were not 
'contrary to sothness that is known.' For a further discussion see Greetham op cit., pp. 674- 675. 




action from actual or primary substances. So, to thinkers like Abelard, however real or 
unreal a thing seems to be is irrelevant in comparison with the grammatical qualities 
of an abstract thing and the idea or truth for which such grammar is a vehicle. 
2. 4 Species (n)or genus 
Bartholomaeus' adherence to aspects of Aristotle's categorical system highlights 
incongruities in the bestiary of De proprietatibus rerum. Concerns and discomfort 
surrounding the animal, as well as elements which seem scientifically specious or 
anomalous, can prove incongruous when whatness or belonging defies categorisation 
by species and genus. This is characterised at the literal level by the extreme 
categorical and ontological indistinctness of particular animals. 162 My focus upon the 
fantastical and hybrid animals illustrates the way that they constitute the most 
convenient animal sign. They combine man and beast as a single animal to provide 
the strangest - though clearest - sign of the way man is inseparably involved with his 
animal nature. Hybrids, in terms of species and genus, are also inherently problematic 
because they are indistinct, and neither one species or another. While my focus here 
includes all animals, man and beast alike, my particular attention to the abnorn1al 
group, is to reveal the way that such monstrosity and hybridity constitutes the 
symbolic amplification of man's distancing from himself and exclusion of animality. 
Animals of the imagination, such as fable animals and hybrid animals became 
essential metaphors, which acted as exemplars and guide the reader to metaphysical 
162 One way to see this is in terms of Aristotelian semiotics which would focus on signs secondary: 
the inscribed word, uttered word, and corresponding thought to cause an affectation of the soul which 
would signify the sign primary, or in fact the thing itself. 'Spoken words are the symbols of mental 
experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same 
writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which they directly 
symbolise, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images ... As 
there are in the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or falsity, and also those which must be either 
true or false, so it is in speech. For truth and falsity imply combination and separation. Nouns and 
verbs, provided nothing is added, are like thoughts without combination or separation; 'man' and 
'white', as isolated terms, are not yet either true or false. In proof of this, consider the word 'goat-stag'. 
It has significance, but there is no truth or falsity about it ... ' De !nterpretatione 1. 16 a, 4- 18. 
Grammatical truth, in other words is contingent, merely instigating the thought for which words are 




truths. They also test philosophical boundaries and definitions in such a way as to 
suggest that the animal is impossible to place in any simplistic or categorical sense. 
The animal, in these terms, escapes from the confines of the bestiary to take on 
inherently Christian roles and functions. Their metaphysical duality makes them alien, 
but at the same time draws attention to man's own potential, monstrous duality. If 
'animal' is a genus and man or dog is a 'species', then the fantastical hybrids, for 
example, are ambiguous because while they are definitely 'animal' their type is so 
hybrid that it challenges generic categorisation. The cameleopardo of chapter twenty 
presents a conglomeration of binary opposites. A 'beste of Ethiopia' it is described as 
sheep- like in its nature, though it looks fierce. It is both carnivore and herbivore with 
'pe heed of a came le, pe nekke of an hors, and legges and feet of a bugle, and spekkes 
of pe parde'. A parde is a small wild cat, which explains the second part of the noun, 
the name being descriptive of other types of animal altogether. Bartholomaeus 
continues 'pe beste was clene to mete by Moyses lawe but nought to sacrifice ... as it 
is ywrtie Deuteronomii xiiii.' (DP R 18. 20). However, this is a spurious citation of the 
Deuteronomy list of clean and unclean animals: as the cameleopardo chews cud and 
is cloven footed it may, apparently, be consumed (Deut. 14. 7), though of course in 
terms of the practical context of the discussion the animal does not exist. While giving 
scriptural credence to the animal's existence the cameleopardo is not one of the 
animals mentioned in Deuteronomy. And where the camel is a cud-chewing anin1al in 
Deuteronomy, it is hoofed and cannot be eaten, while Bartholomaeus' cameleopardo 
is cloven footed so, by the Deuteronomy criterion, can. 
A cameleopardo is certainly of the genus animal. But attempting to categorise it as a 
species, such as camel or leopard, is impossible because of its hybridity. What may 
have symbolic value for a Christian reading would have no value at all for Aristotle, 
because it resists definition. This inability to know such hybrid animals 'scientifically' 
as a second substance or as anything other than a singular example leads to an 
inconclusive categorisation, unless there is a category which may accommodate such 
patent plurality, isolation, and the symbolic existence of each individual animal. 




with the thing than with defining its properties as a type we would expect to find the 
significant universals that they signify, and share in common with other animals of 
their species. This being inconclusive at the literal level, we can approach them in a 
number of ways. The first approach would be to say simply that as they are reported 
from the writings of other authorities within the compilatio. In this sense a distinction 
cannot be made empirically between real or ideal. Bartholomaeus has to trust reports 
and commentaries and so cannot conclude whether these animals are 'real' in the 
material sense, or not. 
There is also a sense in which an animal such as the cameleopardo tests a number of 
boundaries as well as testing the philosophical text itself. The frequent use of hybrids 
can be seen as evidence of this, though categorisation is a problem of the animal in 
general and especially so of man, whose hybridity consists in him being both animal 
and spiritual entity. Such hybridity is dealt with in textual abstraction in order to draw 
attention to the inadequacy of categorical orderliness. At the literal level of Aristotle's 
universals which distinguish, discriminate and separate, the cameleopardo precisely 
tests categorisation by not conforming to the biological or categorical organisation of 
genera and species. On another level, and despite the literal sense status of the text, 
there is a moral need to prove man's humanness by illustrating what he is not, and by 
showing what he wishes to distance himself fron1. This constitutes what we might see 
as the indistinct boundary of the human where human fears of underlying similarity 
prompt the dissolution of the Aristotelian boundaries of the animal, in favour of 
illustrative metaphors which exaggerate man's duality as an animal, precisely in order 
to warn him what he could potentially become. The patently figurative domain of the 
hybrid, on these terms, is highlighted by the fact that only human beings would 
discriminate by producing logical and categorical boundaries, writing a philosophical 
text, and distancing themselves from other animals. Hybrids in this sense are a 
distancing device which demonises the beast as well as the animal in man. They defy 
any biological and categorical order, and infringe the boundaries of the human. While 
they tnay look like man they are monstrous precisely because they are so close to 
man's own image. Monsters and hybrids, in this way may be seen as an attempt to 
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articulate the Hellenic base to Christian thought, by testing the philosophical 
categories and principles which sustain the order of which it is a part, or discrediting 
such categorisation in favour of Christian author-isation and symbolism. 
Bartholomaeus notes that St Anthony is reported to have seen a fauns, giving the 
beast's existence the best authoritative credence. But the example of the faun raises 
other questions about the categorisation of the animal. We are told that 'Certeyn 
bestes bep yclepedfauni and satiri also and bep bestes wonderliche yschape wip 
likenesse and schappe of men but pay bep nought ful partyn[ er ]s of resoun of 
mankynde.' (DPR 18. 48) Fauns have bestial wit alone, and an appetite for lechery, 
killing women by the very act of rape: 'suche bestes bep fullecherous, in so n1oche 
pat pey sleep wommen in pe dede of leccery if pey takep hem walkynge in woodes.' 
(DPR 18. 48) The account reads like a morality lesson about pastoral excursions, in 
which a courtly separation is the prescribed antidote to a natural world which 
threatens to infringe its boundaries and impinge upon the human with that which is 
already distinctly, in fact, human. James Knowles places this impingement in 
interestingly psychological terms: 'boundaries of the human and the animal are highly 
contested limen' [sic: liminis, (pl.) 'limina'] 163 suggesting a subconscious desire to 
separate the idea of a rational human self from its own animality. As such, the 
boundaries typified by the faun are both transparently moral, human, and dangerously 
permeable, yet also a metaphor for man's own state in relation to the universals which 
highlight his corporeal kinship with, and inseparability from the beast. 
At another level the faun is a classic example of the medieval paradigm's 'othering'. 
Like an animal from the waist down and human from the waist up, the hybrids often 
have a man's head, leading to man's identification with rationale as the defining 
characteristic of his species. 164 Bartholomaeus tells us that fauns do not speak, are 
"nought ytaught to speke by crafte nouper by kynde'. Yet in the same few lines he 
163 Knowles, James, 'Can ye not tell a man from a marmoset?: Apes and Others on the Early 
Modem Stage', In Erica Fudge, ed., Renaissance Beasts, (Illinois, forthcoming 2003), p. 2. 
164 I am aware that this argument is akin to post-structuralist assertions that reason has often been 




says they do speak, though only to mimic man: 'pough suche bestes vsen nou3t 
resoun of mankynde, 3it pey bep like to mankynde in voice.' (DP R 18. 48). Like the 
figure of Caliban in Shakespeare's The Tempest, fauns speak an alien language which 
they gibber, ~hough do not understand. Like Caliban too, it is uncertain whether they 
can make a man. They have an uncertain ontology where it is unclear whether a 
hybrid is a man in the making or unmaking, revealing and exploring the dangerous 
animality of humanity in relation to what are readily transcendable categories. 165 
While analogous to man, their lustful behaviour signifies the misplaced value of the 
worldly object over the spiritual. Though they have 'human heads and therefore 
presumably have the capacity for advanced reasoning, their half-animal natures 
suggest that their behaviour is governed by their baser physical instinct.' 166 
This close identification with, yet alienation from reason, can be seen in 
Bartholomaeus' inclusion of cenocephali, ciclopes, panchios and men with no head or 
neck but with recognisable human faces: 'pese wonderful bestes ... bep al hedles and 
nekeles and he[ re] yhen bep in pe schuldres' (DP R 18. 48) As already noted, 
according to Aristotle mankind is supposed to look upwards to God, his upright 
posture the sign, symbol, and physiological manifestation of his reason; 
Bartholomaeus stresses that though he is of 'pe erpe' man is also 'Antropos' or 'arered 
vp' to face his god. 167 But men with no neck or heads would not fall into the 
categorical species of man, thus changing and at the same time fixing the shape of the 
reasonable man: 'Some bep in Ethiopia pat gop stouping, lokynge to pe grounde-ward 
as bestes and m owe nought rere hem self vpright.' (DP R 18. 48). While beasts are 
different from man by their appearance, the hybrids complicate such a distinction by 
virtue of their similarity to man. Can the hybrid have a prototype? If man bears 
corporeal similarity to God, where does this situate the hybrids, who are in some part 
similar to God's image, if inconclusively so? In part the answer is rhetorical: to know 
man you must first understand his corporeality; 'for pe properties of man schulde be 
165 For a discussion see Erica Fudge, Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beast in Early Modern 
English Culture (~hicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002) p. 89. 
166 Carmen Brown, 'Animals as Human Exemplars' in Debra Hassig, ed., The Mark of the Beast: 
The Medieval Bestiary in Ltfe Art and Literature (London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1999) p. 57. 




pe more opunliche iknowe to bestis-sche men ... of pe which he is imaade and 
componed ... ' (DPR 3. 1). In what may be seen as animal Orientalism, the textual 
representation of hybrids is clearly an analogous attempt to define the human by 
denying the animal. Being like - though not actually - man, the physical dichotomy of 
animal and man highlights man's nature and genus as an animai. 168 
In these terms, the fantastical appearance of the half-man always retains an overt 
suggestion of metaphoricity, often underpinned by the generic geographical 'othering' 
of the East. Fauns are very definitely from Scythia: 'also in sicia bep bestes wip 
schappe of men and feet of hors.' (DP R 18. 48). When the locus of the fantastic beasts 
was not specified as India, Ethiopia was often, in medieval literature, said to be their 
place of origin. David Williams observes that what he terms the India-Ethiopia 
complex 'is an example of medieval sign making at work in the field of teratological 
geography, where spatial semiotics oppresses the idea of the monster as 
simultaneously participating in the material and spiritual worlds and thus forming a 
bridge between the two.' 169 In the sense of geographical distancing, and by racial 
difference and definition, the hybrid animals are understood to really exist but far 
away, not here, while concurrently guaranteeing that they cannot be empirically 
authenticated, nor in fact pose any real threat. This understanding of hybridity both 
figurative and geographical, is accentuated by the awareness of the corporeal 
hybridity of mankind. That Pygmies are included in the bestiary poses the question of 
whether they are animal or human. This is clearly answered by the statement that 
though they are perfectly made if small, they inhabit mountains in, and are from, 
India: they are bestial at best, and confined to the bestiary. 170 
In the case of an animal such as the onocentauro, categorical and ontological 
ambiguity, a bestial lack of reason, and geographical othering, are most polarised. 
Half man, and ass from the navel down, the onocentauro is a centaur from India 
168 See Donna Haraway's discussion of what she terms 'simian orientalism', in Primate Visions: 
Gender, Race and Nature in the World of Modern Science (London: Verso, 1992) p. 10. 
169 David Williams, Deformed Discourse: The Function of the Monster in Medieval Thought and 
Literature (London: University of Exeter Press, 1996) p. 14. 
170 See 'pigmeis', DPR, 18. 86. 
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which 'feynep somdele pe schapp of mannes kynde.' (DP R 18. 79). His licentious 
lechery and the suggestion that he forces himself upon human women in order to 
copulate and breed, signifies a profound anxiety about the re-generation of bestial 
aspects of man. While he already has the categorical status of the animal, mankind 
may easily embody the form of his bestial nature should he forget his God and his 
reason and live by the habitual satisfactions of the flesh which came with the fall. 
Allowing such characteristically worldly 'animal' passions to invade the Christian 
self, would merely assist the continuance of the post-lapsarian metamorphosis toward 
the bestial and the beast. In his description of the pilosis Bartholomaeus describes a 
wild man who forces human women to have sex, explaining the noun incubus to be 
'doyng pe dede of generacioun.' (DPR 18. 84). Piloses exist for the purpose of 
copulation alone. Tellingly, beneath their questionable appearance they are like men, 
merely taking the shape of a beast. What seems clear is that there is a blurring of 
categories which reveals the animal within each human. That the primary 
characteristic of the Pilosis is lust, again suggests a prescriptive warning that by 
immoral acts human people can descend to the level of the beast, allowing the beast 
that is always contained within mankind to emerge as the other of itself. An 
expression of mankind's animal nature, such a figure stands as a warning to avoid 
digression to animal acts and habits. As might be expected from the non-conformity 
of a textual world of hybrids, this emergence of the animal is also a characteristic of 
the text. While the animal is contained at the literal sense its symbolic meaning cannot 
be suppressed beneath the text's literal surface, emerging as a distinct subtext whose 
origin lies in reality, or in Aristotle's terms, in the concrete existence of individuals 
who are the basis of an embodiment of some truth, however abstract and hybridised 
such an expression seems to be. In A vicenna' s terms it is 
impossible for the universal animal to be a particular real animal, for it 
would then have to be both walker and flyer, as well as not walker or flyer, 




except in thought. Its reality, however, both exists in thought and is 
external to thought. 171 
Avicenna's statement allows us properly to understand that what is improbable in 
reality, is possible ontologically, and may be believed, in a significantly illustrative 
way. But this also allows a view of the DPR as a text which is far from merely literal 
in its literary sense, and that inbuilt, there are two realms to account for if 
interpretation of hybrid animals is to bear fruit: that of the potential and that of the 
actual. Reading the text as a scholastic summa from a modern point of view involves 
subjecting its statements, and the textual representations of animals, to the inquiry of a 
close textual pathology, rather than questioning the literal believability of the 
information presented, about the animals of the text. 
2. 5 Habeas corpus: did imaginary animals exist? 
Carmen Brown makes an important observation about the way in which the twelfth -
century saw different types of animal appearing in literary texts: 
These were animals of the imagination, fable animals, fantastical 
animals .... Animals become important as metaphors, as guides to 
metaphysical truths, as human exemplars. These imaginary animals 
exerted an even more important influence over the relationship between 
humans and animals than did the ox ... 172 
Brown draws attention to the notion that 'imaginary' animals illustrate metaphysical 
truth by means of metaphors. D. C. Greetham suggests that the phenomenon presents 
a difficulty which is inherited with classical fable material and analogues, prompting 
171 Morewedge, Parviz, The Metaphysics of Avicenna (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 
1973) p. 33. 
172 Brown op cit., p. 103- 104. 
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the 'inevitable doctrinal problem of how to deal with such pagan authority.' 173 That 
these animals,are included in the 'scientific' literal sense text of the DPR is 
problematic in that the meaning they had to their first audience is lost to a medieval 
audience. In the DP R such animals can be seen instantly to infringe categories 
because they overlap cognitive paradigms. Meaning has to be ascribed to them in their 
new context. Each animal, in these terms, represents a point of departure signifying 
the negation of the animal element in man. But each departure is a linguistic one 
where textual nomenclature serve as labels for the conceptual, providing a series of 
symbolic, hybridised polarities which define what is. In this way the 'objective' literal 
sense definitions have a value which does not directly correspond to a material reality. 
Bartholomaeus' bestiary does not alone provide a self explanatory hermeneutic of 
how its animals should be understood. Bartholomaeus' initial statement that the 
Aristotelian principle of knowing the properties of things by their substance is 
important. However, it is also true to say that the animals of chapter eighteen are a 
very medieval collection of beasts, and would be interpreted by a specifically 
exegetical approach. Gilson states that: 
... it would be of little use to consult the mystics; they are not interested in 
what nature is, but rather in what it signifies. To go to the Lapidaries and 
Bestiaries, as some well-known philologists have done, would be like going to 
an almanack-maker for the contemporary scientific astronomy. The only 
possible witnesses to medieval philosophy are ... the philosophers 
then1selves. 174 
Though the two are obviously interdependent, I am concerned here with how hybrids 
and fabulous beasts are semiotically understood and not with what they sign. As 
Gilson suggests, a compilator like Bartholomaeus is not the best authoritative 
hermeneut to explain how his bestiary should be understood, while theologians such 
173 Greetham op cit., p. 665. 




as Augustine and Aquinas provide a way to understand the way in which these 
animals signify. 
In what way do the hybrid animals of the DPR relate or conform to distinctions of 
'real' and 'imaginary'? As an approach to reading mythical beasts, understanding that 
universal characteristics are more significant than unique examples because numerous 
signs prove a coherently readable intention, allows the idea of a thing to be placed 
above the thing itself. As abstractions which inhabit the borders of the imagination, 
any particular animal is almost irrelevant compared to its universal or symbolic 
meaning. At the literal level the objective description of an animal, however 
'scientific' it claims to be, can never represent the sum total of all that animal's 
potential symbolic meanings, which if not about a real known existence may speak of 
a possible existence. In this way an animal such as Bartholomaeus' griffin can be seen 
to embody values which, in the absence of a physical body, maintain its anagogic 
truth. It is like a 'leoun in alle pe partyes of pe body and to pe eagle oonliche in hede 
and wynges.' It is a 'strong enemy to hors, as Hugucioun seip, pat he takep vp hors 
and pe man y-armed.' (DP R 18. 56). 175 The griffin exists solely to guard jewels and 
riches. Bartolomaeus goes on to describe how its defence of material wealth is 
characterised by its aggression to the armed man, and so effective is its guardianship 
that its form is copied as a deterrent and set at the borders of kingdoms. In this mould, 
the griffin is disseminated into poetic fictions such as Chaucer's Knight's Tale, a tale 
about the divine order of the universe in which the griffin is a microcosm: a simile, 
symbol, and synecdoche for the majesty and Kingship of 'Lygurge hymself. 
And like a grifphon looked he about, 
With kempe heeris on his browes stoute; 
His lyn1es grete, his brawnes harde and stronge, 
His shuldres brode, his armes rounde and longe 
(KnT 2133- 36) 
175 'Hugucioun' or Huguicio Pisanus (d. 1210) was a lawyer and grammarian and is cited in books 
13, 17, 18, 19 ofthe DPR. 
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Grounded in the sort of observational statements of the DPR which describe the 
physical world, the science of the literal sense is a negated discourse when its 
limitations are transcended by raising the signifying power of the hybrid to an 
anagogical level in the poetic text. 176 While Bartholomaeus' assertions about these 
literal existences sustain other levels of truth, such as symbolism in the poetic text, 
reality is one corresponding to nothing that actually is in the material sense. Symbolic 
value is clearly inherited and built into the literal level representation, through the use 
of Isidore and Huguicio Pisanus. The symbolic meaning of the Griffin (Lev. 11. 13; 
Deut. 14. 12) is transmitted through Isidore's emphasis on its hostility and 
aggression, 177 and its status as an evil principle because it attains victory over men 
whom it tears to pieces, remains intact in the DPR and in 'The Knight's Tale'. Indeed, 
it would not be justifiable to impose confines upon the divine by questioning the 
existence of such a beast. 
As an imagistically rooted group hybrids exist, on one level at least, to stimulate the 
intellect and its apprehension, as seen in the Platonic context where the contemplation 
of the corporeal may draw us to the contemplation of the beauty of the soul. The 
intention of distinguishing by sciencia or a knowledge through the senses is the first 
step to sapient a! wisdom gained by the contemplation of the reality of eternal truths. 
These ideal forms are both informatively and persuasively useful where the idea is 
placed higher than the thing itself. 
The poet's function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a 
kind of a thing that might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable 
or necessary. The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one 
writing prose and the other verse ... it consist really in this, that the one 
describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might 
be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than 
history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas 
176 In the text notes of The Riverside Chaucer Vincent J. DiMarco draws attention to Bartholomaeus 
Anglicus as source material, p. 837. 
177 Isidore's On Animals XII, 2. 17, excerpted in Grant 1999 op cit., p. 132. 
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those of history are singulars. By a universal statement I mean one as to 
what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do -
which is the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the 
characters. 178 
From this we may read the hybrids in a specifically poetic sense as the embodiment of 
vice, virtue or as the mobilisation of a set of rhetorical devices the persuasive outcome 
of which is moral betterment: 'The use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions. 
When we know a thing, and have decided about it, there is no further use in speaking 
about it. ... All orators are bound to use the topic of the possible and impossible: and 
to try to show that a thing has happened, or will happen in the future.' 179 In rhetorical 
terms the realm of the potential, where all things are designed for knowledge in 
relation to the Necessary Being, is placed higher than the realm of the actual. 
A vicenna, commenting on Aristotle, explains that 'knowledge of things comes not 
from second hand information, from intermediaries, but from itself, for all things and 
the causes of all things are due to it ... it is our creator who has given genesis to all 
things and has set for them the proper path.' 180 
Bestiary animals can represent abstract ideas or in Plato's terms, are signifiers of a 
universe of pure forms. As Berkeley's esse est percipi, things may exist because they 
are perceived. In these terms alone the fantastical animals do actually exist- albeit in 
the mind. 181 Umberto Eco observes that 'Griffins were just as real as lions because, 
178 Aristotle poetics in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. by Jonathon Bames, Bollingen Series 
LXXI Vol. 2 (London: Princeton University Press, I985)1. 9, 1451 bl. 
179 Aristotle, Rhetoric, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. by Jonathon Bames, Bollingen 
Series LXXI Vol. 2 (London: Princeton University Press, 1985) II. 18, 1391 bl. 
180 Avicenna, cited by Morewedge op cit., p. 35. 
181 As much is meant by Ruskin when he says 'a fine grotesque is the expression in a moment, by a 
series of symbols thrown together in bold and fearless connection, of truths which it would have taken 
a long time to express in any other way.' Ruskin, John, 'Ofthe True Ideal' in Modern Painters (1856), 
abridged edition in 3 vols., ed. by David Bame (London: Andre Deutsch, 1987), Vol. 3., iv, pp. 331 - 2. 
Coleridge says that 'there is a philosophic (and inasmuch as it is actualised by an effort of freedom, an 
artificial) consciousness, which lies beneath or (as it were) behind the spontaneous consciousness 
natural to all reflective beings.' Coleridge says that man has an intuitive knowledge to be able to 
interpret and understand the symbolism of a mythical animal: 'Potential works in them, even as the 
actual works on them! In short, all the organs of sense are framed for a corresponding world of sense; 
and we have it.' The consciousness itself, for Coleridge, furnishes 'proofs by its own direction.' S. T. 
Coleridge, Biographia Literaria: or, Biographical Sketches of my Literwy Life and Opinions, ed. by 




like them, they were signs of a higher truth' 182 and Rudolph Wittkower cites scripture 
when he states that 'the fabulous races were the products of God's will who 'is 
righteous in all his ways and holy in his works.' 183 Eco goes on to explain that: 
The pelican, which was believed to nourish its young with its own flesh, 
became a symbol of Christ who had given His blood for humanity and His 
flesh in the Eucharist. The unicorn could be captured by a virgin if it rested its 
head in her lap, so it was doubly a symbol of Christ- as the Son only-
begotten of God, and begotten again in the womb of Mary. Once the 
symbolism had been accepted, the unicorn became even more 'real' than the 
ostrich or the pelican. 184 
The metaphysical issues which Eco addresses directly here, are those of how 
ontological truth is signified. The typology of the pelican's messianic self- sacrifice 
has metaphorical truth with a potential meaning which the actual may never contain. 
Augustine suggested that it was not important whether certain animals existed or not: 
what was important was their meaning. In Contra mendacium he defends Aesop' s 
fables against the charge that they were lies, stating 'quod utique to tu m fingitur, ut ad 
rem quae intenditur, ficta quidem narratio ne, non mendaci tamen, sed veraci 
signi.ficatione veniatur.' 185 Augustine explains that through a fictitious narrative a true 
signification may be referred to the matter at hand. While what exists in a fallen and 
delusory world may not be trusted the mind can see for itself what may be true. 
However, Augustine is also careful to avoid unqualified belief in the existence of 
hybrids: 'accounts of some of these races may be completely worthless' he admits. 186 
Examining the problem of the fantastical from a literal perspective Augustine also 
meets the problem of ontological origins head-on, with the suggestion that human 
elements of hybrid beasts would necessitate their descent from Ad am: 
182 Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, trans. by High Bredin (1959: London: Yale 
University Press, 1986) p. 53. 
183 Rudolph Wittkower, Allegory and the Migration of Symbols (London: Thames and Hudson, 
1977) p. 53 ff, citing Psalm 145. 17. 
184 E . 55 COop Clt., p. . 
185 Augustine, Contra Mendacium, PL, col. 538. 




Whatam I to say of the Cynocephali, whose dog' s head and actual 
barking prove them to be animals rather than men? Now we are not 
bound to believe in the existence of all the types of men which are 
described. But no faithful Christian should doubt that anyone who is 
born anywhere as a man- that is, a rational and mortal being- derives 
from that one first-created human being. 187 
At the literal level, Augustine highlights a metaphorical anomaly; the hybrids are 
metaphorical figures illustrating the dual nature of man's existence as a spiritual being 
made in his creator's image, while being an animal in the world of creation. 
Metaphorically too, Augustine draws attention to the fundamental belief that God is 
the creator of all, who has the wisdom to weave the beauty of the whole design out of 
its constituent parts. However the observer who cannot view the whole is offended by 
what appears 'a deformity of the part, since he does not know how it fits in, or how it 
is related to the rest.' 188 Dorothy Y amamoto picks up on this paradox, where analogy 
and metaphoricity become confused, suggesting that: 
what is true of deformed human births is equally true of the "monstrous races" 
- any of their members may be human, no matter how "extraordinary such a 
creature may appear to our senses in bodily shape, in colour, or motion, or 
utterance, or in any natural endowment, or part, or quality". God, in his 
capacious providence, knows the true nature of each individual component of 
his creation. The problem is that humans lack God's sublimely analytic vision. 
How are they to decide whether a being - a wild man - is human or not? 189 
Augustine also argues for the importance of a literal- typological correspondence to 
explain the fantastical, arguing that no untruth can exist in the scripture and its 
commentary whose reliability in accounts of past events is attested by the fulfiln1ent 
187 DCD XVI, 8. 
188 DCD XVI, 8. 
189 DorothyYamamoto, The Boundaries of the Human in Medieval English Literature (Oxford 




of its prophesies in the future. So in Christian discussions of the bestiary by 
commentators such as Albertus Magnus, potentiality takes precedence over actuality. 
Pamela Gravestock observes that 'Albert as a man of the church, had as his ultimate 
agenda the s~pport of scriptures rather than strict empiricism.' 190 It is difficult to 
disagree with the word of God, so hybrids are accepted, assimilated, and explained. C. 
S. Lewis identifies the allegorical nature of interpreting creation by apparently 
specious beasts and the bestial when he states that '[a]llegory, in some senses, belongs 
not to medieval man but to man, or even of mind, in general. It is the very nature of 
thought and language to represent what is immaterial in picturable terms.' 191 
Representation of the 'immaterial fact' such as the passions of actual experience lead 
to the invention of visibilia which express them: Lewis explains this when he says: 
As the god Amor and his figurative garden are to the actual passions of 
men, so perhaps we ourselves and our 'real' world are to something else. 
The attempts to read that something else through its sensible imitations, to 
see the archetype of the copy, is what I mean by symbolism or 
sacramental ism. 192 
As Lewis understands it the 'real' exists in an elsewhere which, being no longer on 
earth after the fall, is all the more difficult to locate, finding its expression in 
imitations which embody some part or truth of that world. Sacramentally, being 
involved in the things of the world is also to participate in God's act of Creation, 
which should be reverenced, as God is, in a sense, in the finite things of the world. 
They are not him, though are a part of him. The medieval understanding of that which 
cannot be empirically proven is not that it should be in any way negated or dismissed. 
Hybrids are not, in fact, a contradiction of God's good nature, but rather a 
contradiction of unbending epistemological categories, which occurs in the testing of 
the philosophical text. Seeing hybrids in these terms deals Augustine's realism in 
'deriving' them from the first rational man a death blow, by demonstrating the absurd 
190 Pamela Gra,vestock, 'Did Imaginary Animals Really Exist?' in Hassig op cit., p. 124. 
191 Lewis, C. S., The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1958) p. 44. 
192 Lewis 1958 ibid., p. 45. 
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consequences which follow from confusing the logical and the ontological orders, 
with different logical types. Augustine understands the metaphorical status of the 
hybrid, and its potential significations. But he also feels he must justify such 
anomalies by explaining the placement of the hybrid in direct relation to the literal 
logic of scripture. Mystical meaning, in other words, should not be subjected too 
rigorously to rational scrutiny. David Williams states that: 
The Christian middle ages frankly declared the ultimate unknowability of 
the Supreme Cause, who remained, and would remain forever, a mystery 
beyond human intellection. But medieval thinkers were vigorous in their 
pursuit of whatever could be known- of causes, beings, concepts- even 
if they could not know Being, Cause or Nous. 193 
Williams draws attention to the Neoplatonic - and subsequently Christian -
awareness of the problems of over reliance on language and logic. Instead he suggests 
that symbolism and representation are at the very centre of scholastic thought because 
they are divine in origin, and only in a derivative sense constitute a human science. 
The Neoplatonic idea of the No us or One which transcends all Being altogether 
cannot be conceptualised because of its infinite immensity, and by virtue of the fact 
that it is prior to thought and Language. Any attempt to think of the No us results in 
the moment of fixity, either conceptually or linguistically, which prohibits the 
perceiver from understanding the Nous. 194 There is something of the Nous, however, 
within all created beings. In the corporeal setting the first level of reality derived from 
the One is the realm of mind, the realm of true Being - also called the No us - of which 
each individual mind is a part. Though not identical with the Christian Triune 
Godhead, the idea of the Christian trinity takes as its theological and philosophical 
analogue this essentially Neoplatonic idea, in which each person is the entire divinity 
as well as individually himself. 195 
193 Williams op cit., pp. 25 - 26. 
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Such an understanding presents another Neoplatonic elucidation of the question of 
whether anything at all can have a truly independent existence; while a chair or a 
Griffin may not actually speak for and of itself, its purpose and design speaks of its 
maker, and contains something of him. The significance of the meaning of such things 
- albeit that they are imagined things -must be understood in the realm of mind. Thus 
the realm of the potential and the realm of the actual in the Neoplatonism of Porphyry 
are notions which serve to stress the concept that truth exists in incorporeals: 
Platonism has been much maligned because of the idea of an incorporeal, 
archetypal realm has been seen as merely the projection on our minds of 
sense-objects; and this less real than these objects. The materialist-positivist 
assumption that there are no such incorporeals and that the sense world is the 
summit of reality, however, has serious faults. The first is that mathematical 
consistency can be explained by the assumption that mental objects have an 
objective existence, while it cannot be demonstrated through purely formalist 
theories, as incompleteness theories have shown. 196 
Plato's theory of ideal forms would not place emphasis on such abstract forms as 
representations of knowledge and belief, but rather identify them as replicas of things 
in an ontological reality. In book five of the Republic Plato does not argue that 
knowledge requires forms as objects: rather knowledge is argued to be of 'what is' 
and forms brought in as examples of 'what is', demonstrating that such a form is, a 
universal distinct from particular things. 197 Arguing about whether forms are tangible 
n1ay never, for Plato, negate their validity. For him mirrors are insentient and are not 
self-contained, but consciousness is always pure and self-contained; it does not 
require an external object to create an image. Ordinary mirrors are liable to be soiled 
by extraneous dirt whereas consciousness has nothing foreign to it, being always 
alone and undivided. 198 Objects, in this sense, are necessary for producing images in 
the mirror which is the world. They are not, however, necessary for consciousness 
196 Porphyry's Launching Points to the Realm of Mind: An Introduction to the Neoplatonic 
Philosophy of Plotinus, trans. by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie (Michigan: Phanes Press, 1988) p. 16. 
197 Rep. 435 b (my emphasis). 




because consciousness itself is self-contained. God pictures the universe in his Being, 
of which the world is merely a fallen mirror. A Christian equivalent is the way 
Anselm of Canterbury (1 033 - 11 09) describes his proof for the existence of God: 
For it is quite possible to think of something whose non-existence cannot be 
thought of. This must be greater than something whose non-existence can be 
thought of. So if this thing (aliquid quo maius cogitari non potest) can be 
thought of as not existing, then, that very thing than which a greater cannot be 
thought is not that than which a greater cannot be thought. This is a 
contradiction. So it is true that there exists something than which nothing 
greater can be thought, that it cannot be thought of as not existing. 199 
Anselm explains that if God does not exist, the idea of God remains, yet the reality of 
God is absent. The reality of God is greater than the idea of God. Therefore if God is 
'that than which no greater thing can be thought,' the idea of God must lead to 
accepting the reality of God, in that otherwise the mere idea of God is the greatest 
thing that may be thought. Simply put the idea of a thing implies its existence, as well 
as implying that God places it in one's mind in the first instance. This idea existing, 
present to the mind, and 'given' by God, confirms its reality, albeit a reality which is 
not available to the external senses. What has potential meaning in the realm of the 
material, may be absolute in ontological terms. In terms of God's providence it is 
impossible to regard anything as absolutely accidental. Nothing happens by chance, 
and nothing can be contingent in the work of an infinite mind. Gilson observes that 
Absolutely speaking, there can be neither chance nor monstrosities for a 
Christian thinker, for although on the relative plane of human experience these 
conceptions may and ought to be upheld, they lose all meaning when we set 
out to describe the universe from the standpoint of God. The ancient 
conception of the fortuitous is quite familiar to St. Augustine: it is all that 
which is produced without cause, which depends on no rational order: qui ea 




dicunt esse fortuit a, quae vel nul/as causas ha bent, vel non ex aliquo 
rationabili ordine venientes [Augustine DCD 5. 1]. Now in the Christian 
universe nothing ever happens save in the name of rational order, nothing 
exists save depending on it. In everyday conversation we may be permitted to 
speak of chance, but since the world is God's work and nothing it contains is 
withdrawn from His providence, it is impossible to regard anything as 
absolutely fortuitous. Nihil igitur casu .fit in mundo; nothing happens by 
chance: that is the ultimate Christian attitude to the universal order?00 
In absolute terms, the fantastical and the hybrids are as impossible as chance, because 
as nature they are God's creation. Gilson goes on to point out that God does not make 
mistakes; matter lends itself to form just so far as its author wills. Defectus naturae 
must be God's will, and must have been made with some end in view. Equally, Gilson 
sees that where Greek thought tolerates an 'indetermination' resulting from a certain 
lack of rationality, Christian thought 'tightens the bonds of natural determinism by 
reducing the apparent disorder of nature to the laws of a higher reason. And the 
converse is equally true. Where Greek thought admits an anti-rational necessity, 
Christian philosophy casts off the bond of this necessity precisely because it is anti-
rational. ' 201 Again, in absolute terms the act of bringing chance under Christian laws 
frees nature from fate, in the sense that everything has a sufficient reason which is 
none other than Reason itself. Where a major metaphysical difference is that the 
animal in Greek thought presents an arbitrary signifier which is also a locus for 
bringing absolute ideal forms out of chaos, in the practical Christian context of 
understanding the animal in the DP R, animals are seen from the commentary 
tradition, and in particular in a manner similar to Isidore's etymological explicatio.202 
The very word animal is intrinsic to the concept of creative depiction of abstract 
200 Gilson 1936 op cit., p. 369. 
201 Gilson 1936 ibid., p. 370. 
202 Etymological explanation amplifies the way such abstract images, rhetorically and 
grammatically configured, might have been conceived by earlier paradigms. Bartolomaeus' Latin 
animatus, for example, is traceable to Aristotle, who uses the Greek zoon (~wou, T6) or 'living 
creature'. From zoon is derived the word zographos (~wypacpoc;, B), or a painter who depicts living 
creatures. In this way 'animal' became, in scholarly usage, a term for art. In Aristotle's own words 'art 
is the logos of the article without the matter' privileging the form over its material materialisation. See 




concepts, and it is particularly appropriate that the earliest uses of the word 'animal' 
in Middle English are to be found in the text of the DP R, and specifically in its book 
eighteen, which aims to inform the reader of the nature of animals by depicting them 
. 1· b . 203 T . 1 . 1 fi 1n a 1terary .estlary. rav1sa trans ates an1ma rom Bartolomaeus' animatus, 
meaning breath, life. Further translation maintains the Aristotelian definition of all 
breathing life, and Bartholomaeus explains, for example, that 'Al pat is comprehended 
of fleissh and of spiryte of lif is ycleped ani mall, a beest.' (DP R 18. 1 ). 
Dionysius the Areopagite (c. AD 500) expresses a clear preference for a disordered 
imagery in art such as the aenigmata of fantastical creatures which should stimulate 
the imagination of an audience who should not dwell with the symbol but move to its 
spiritual realities. Equally, Hugh of Saint Victor explains that the more the simile 
becomes dissimilar, the more the truth is revealed under the guise of hideous images. 
What Richard of Saint-Victor described as the 'analogical signification' of the 
celestial hierarchy of Pseudo - Dionysius involves 'the reason and the imagination, 
wholly together as mistress and handmaiden' motivating the early stages of the soul's 
'journey to God' but being 'rejected in the higher reaches of contemplation. ' 204 In this 
way Dionysian thol:lght discourages the superficial anthropomorphism of texts and 
images, and over reliance on the rational, in favour of the quidditative definition at a 
particular level of thought. Williams explains that: 
In recompense it guarantees that through a proper approach to the image, a 
real and fulfilling comprehension of the intelligible may be had. Indeed, in 
Pseudo-Dionysius epistemology as well as in his symbolism, cognition of 
a thing through its image leads to the experience of the thing, a becoming 
one with, through the transcendence of the image: "The truth we have to 
understand is that we use letters, syllables, phrases, written terms and 
words because of the senses. But when our souls are moved by intelligent 
203 The earliest ~sage of the word 'animal' in the DPR is noted in Middle English DictionQ!y ed. by. 
Hans Kurath & Sherman M. Kuhn (London: University of Michigan Press, 1956). 
204 Minnis & Scott, op cit., p. 169. For an in depth discussion see below, chapter three p. 12 ff. 
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energies in the direction of the things of the intellect then our senses and 
all that go with them are no longer needed. "205 
What Williams highlights in Dionysius' thought is the way that literary or artistic 
expressions work at different levels or sense, and that the idea it ultimately expresses 
is placed higher than the article itself while always remaining dependent upon its 
initial literal expression for existence. In an age that believed ideal forms offered a 
greater philosophical resource, that they are in fact more 'real' than their particular 
and individual embodiments, the "symbolic" and "wonderful" animals of 
Bartholomaeus' bestiary need no justification at all. Gilson emphasises that they mean 
what they mean in terms of their metaphorical truth, without any direct reference to 
empirical proof: 
Thanks to its active power, the intellectus agens abstracts the universal 
from the particular, intelligible species from sensible species, essences 
from actually existing things. Now it is quite certain that universals, 
intelligible species, and the essences of things are not bound up with any 
actually existing thing. On the contrary they are quite indifferent to the 
existence or non - existence of things, they take no account of place or 
time, so that the existence or non-existence of the thing has nothing to do 
with our knowledge of it. Thus, just as the intellect n1ay know the essence 
of a thing by its intelligible species when the thing exists, so also it can 
know it in the same way even when it does not. 206 
Even in abstraction, Gilson points out, category may to some degree be sought or 
recognised. It seems a contradiction to suppose that what is nothing can be an object 
for intellect. But there is a distinction to be made here, in that the object of the 
intellect is the essence of a non-existing thing. Ockhamist nominalism holds that the 
real is the individual, and that ideal forms are just that- ideas in the mind. They do 
not have more reality than the individuals that fall under them, or of which they are 
205 Williams op cit., p. 27. 




predicate. For Aristotle, there can be no scientific knowledge of an essence if nothing 
has the essence, though having grasped the essence through a study of those 
individuals who have it, we will know the essence after the individuals have ceased. 
Thus, with imaginary creatures we cannot, have scientific knowledge of the essence, 
and must rather say that their essence lies elsewhere, and not in one single or 
particular example. As will be discussed below, the essence of each hybrid may be 
seen to have mankind as its true prototype or original. Correspondingly, for 
Bartholomaeus, the object of the intellect is never the being or existence of animals. 
Rather, the intellect draws on animals as the corresponding concept and does not need 
to represent the animal either as existing or as not existing. The object of the intellect, 
as Aristotle propounds and Porphyry rehearses, is thus the essence of the thing 
independently of its existence. But the sign is all important because things emanate not 
from thought to thing, but from thing to thought, their truth being in the human 
intellect but also in a way in things 'albeit in things as related to the divine 
intellect. ' 207 Another way to extend this discussion - though they are not related, 
Gilson's story not involving regress where Plato's is dependent upon possible regress 
- is to rehearse Plato's 'third bed' argument. The argument may be paraphrased thus: 
the Maker makes only one individual, which is a bed, because ifhe made two there 
would have to be a third whose form which they in turn would both have. This one -
not those two -would be What Is Bed?208 The Form of Bed is made by God the 
craftsman, and there is only one?09 There cannot be more than one Form; if there 
were two, then these two would have the same form, and so there would (per 
impossible) be a further Form of Bed in which they both partook. 210 We call all beds 
"beds' because the word 'bed' means the form of the bed, and particular beds are so 
called because of their relation to the Form of Bed. The existence of the Form of Bed 
justifies our practice of calling all beds 'beds'. Animal hybrids, in these terms, may be 
said to be the second man that God made, being only partly in His image, though both 
are 'a beste ilike to God' (DPR 3. 1 ). They are the same, but never truly identical, 
being different in aspects of their appearance and in their patent metaphoricity, which 
207 Gilson 1936, op cit., p. 238. 
208 Rep., 597 c. 
209 Rep., ibid., 597 c. 
210 Rep., ibid., 597 c- 597 e. 
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actively questions their own form. Hybrids, in this way are questions in themselves, 
and in the terms of Plato's argument the third whose form they take would be, What Is 
Man? 
Aquinas' analysis of the relation of essence to genus, species and difference yields a 
typically dense if illuminating contribution to this discussion: 
[N]ature or essence is considered in a second way with reference to the act 
of existing [esse] it has in this or that individual, when the nature is so 
considered. Something is attributed to it accidentally by reason of the thing 
in which it exists; for instance, we say man is white because Socrates is 
white, although being white does not pertain to man as man. [i.e. man as 
such] 
This nature has a twofold act of existing, one in individual things, the 
other in the mind ... Individual beings, moreover, have numerous acts of 
existing corresponding to the diversity of individuals. Yet, the nature 
itself, considered properly - that is to say, absolutely, - demands not of 
these acts of existing. 211 
For Aquinas the universal concept expressed by words or names exists in the mind: 
that which is signified exists extra-mentally, though as an individual and not just as a 
universal. For Aquinas fictitious creatures do not exist potentially. They can't exist if 
they don't exist, because a species is immortal. This is to say, that is they were created 
in the mind of God they must always have been, in the first instance. However, in 
Bartholomaeus treatment they are attended to precisely as substances from which are 
formed the concepts predicable for each as an individual. As individuals of a God-
given substance the properties of things, however abstract, must always in some sense 
signify their creator. To accept this of the bestiary hybrids is to understand that the 
idea of their reality and identity is placed higher than themselves. 
211 Aquinas, On Being and Essence, trans. by Armand Maurer, Mediaeval Sources In Translation 
Series (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies, 1965) p. 39 ff. 
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2. 6 Are animals fallen? 
Why and how is the notion of the fall important to this thesis? While material 
substances and things may provide a basis for categories and knowledge, in the 
Christian world they are seen differently, in particular because there is an assumption 
that things are corrupted after the transgression of A dam and Eve in Eden. Man's 
fallenness consists, in part, of a habitual lust and appetite, which is equated with the 
animal side of his nature. In this way, animals in literature often constitute symbols 
mirroring man's animality. However, the way medieval thought read the book of 
creation is also in question. Often contradictory positions warrant examination, in 
order that we understand the status of the animal as a sign for its creator. Augustine, 
for example, sees creation as fallen, yet also sees it as a theocentric one, in which God 
is immanent; Langland suggests that man cannot see clearly after the fall, yet presents 
his dreamer Will with a vision in which perfect animals may be read from a 
theocentric, unfallen perspective. 
Indeed, if animals are 'fallen' in what sense may they, as part of a 'fallen' creation, 
provide the best sign, and offer what is the most obvious method of Christian 
debate? By Augustinian definitions reading a fallen creation in terms of morality is 
suspect because the laws of nature operative in a fallen world would not correspond 
to God's will. But Aquinas' interpretation (by arguments from design, and of the 
fall in man as microcosm) distinguishes animals as manifestations of divine 
providence in a state of innocence. This section examines the Scholastic rejection 
and redefinition of the Augustinian fall doctrine as an index to scholastic thought, 
and its relevance as an interpretative strategy for later medieval poetic writing. 
The traditional view that all creation falls from God's grace at man's disobedience 
demonstrates a profound discomfort with the idea that man alone is fallen. On the one 
hand this question serves to test the overall hypothesis that there are ethical questions 
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about animals which are repressed from the theology and literature of a Medieval 
Christian discourse which rejects the importance of animals as created beings. On the 
other, the DP R is important as a text which influences later thought and the production 
of poetic worl<s, by positing the animal as a sign at the literal level of an 
encyclopaedia, which offers material for the use of others who will then interpret, 
moralise, and allegorise. As such it is necessary that we understand something about 
the status of the creation that is represented. If we understand creation as a fallen one 
then there may be an inconstancy in the relationship between the animal as sign, and 
its relation to that which it is said to signify. The belief that all creation is fallen would 
be a paradox, if it were still thought absolutely to speak of its maker: how could the 
animal, imperfect as a sign though it might be, signify something from which it is 
irretrievably separate and corrupted, and which in itself has no opportunity to gain 
salvation from the results of man's disobedience? 
In this context two putative ways to read the placement of the animal is to observe a 
spiritual as absolute, temporal as contingent distinction. Augustine makes an absolute I 
contingent distinction between the literal level of scripture as writings of 'outstanding 
authority' in whose.truth we can trust, and all 'other' literal things. If the theological 
line of truth is literal though, we must also bear witness by our own knowledge to 
things within our range of senses, but which signify things out of the reach of these 
senses. Thus, the mental process of reason (sententia) presents a second level of 
understanding where arbitrary signs offer a secondary level involving our 
interpretation.212 Do we view a fallen creation (both man and beasts) as literally true? 
Or must we read it from the premise of an allegorically persuasive sign of an all-
creative God? Correspondingly, the answer is either or both. In the first instance the 
fall of creation is true at the literal level of the scriptural text, whose words are 
absolute; it happened because The Bible - and God its author - says it did. In the 
temporal context the fall is contingent upon a specific definition of man's relationship 
to creation. It is a relationship grounded in the idea of man as a microcosm of God 
who speaks him_ into being, and who in a sense contains all the cosmos within himself. 




All creation is fallen, though fallen within man as microcosm. Creation and its animals 
can be seen as separate from this fall' though they reflect man's state being as he is, an 
animal. But animals retain meaning as signs in a way that only the unfallen could. By 
these distinctions we may come to understand scholastic interpretations of the fall 
narrative as both true in a sense and allegorically persuasive. Scholastic thought, as 
represented by Aquinas and Bartholomaeus, offers a clear answer to these questions: a 
pre-emptive recognition of the problem of reading creation as a sign. Classical theism, 
or the traditional Augustinian view, teaches that the fallenness of human nature is a 
state that in principle affects the whole of the created world. But contradictions to the 
'classical' understanding of the fall appear as recurrent motifs in De proprietatibus 
rerum. There is an understanding that creation is fallen, and yet an understanding that 
it only is so in a specific sense. As a result the DP R addresses the status of man in 
relation to the rest of creation in order to predicate the validity of 'things' as an 
authentic sign for God. 
2. 7 The Augustinian perspective 
A world in which one species has, for its survival, to prey upon and destroy another is 
not one that we might expect an omnibenevolent God to create? 13 In the beginning it 
was not. In the garden of Eden man had no need of animals. But with the fall the 
relationship changes: 'mal edict a terra in opere tuo; in laboribus come des ex ea 
cunctis die bus vitae tuae' [cursed is the ground for your sake; in toil you shall eat of it 
all the days of your life] (Gen. 3: 17). By his disobedience man forfeited his easy 
dominance over other species and the earth degenerated. A further consequence of this 
conscious disobedience was that Adam and Eve lost health and immortality, would be 
subject to work, pain, illness and death - and became aware of their sexuality. 
213 Discussed as a specifically theologically problem see Michael Lloyd 'Are animals fallen' in 
Linzey, A., & Yamamoto. D., (eds.) Animals on the Agenda: Questions About Animals for Theology 
and Ethics (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1998) pp. 147- 161. See also Michael Lloyd 'The Fall' in Paul 
Barry Clark & Andrew Linzey., Eds., A Dictionaty of Ethics, Theology and Society (London: 
Routledge, 1996) p. 370. 
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Subsequently, humanity, who were all in a way in Adam would carry the burden of the 
fall. 'Every man is his own Adam' (Rom. 5 : 12) was a virulent idea to a society who 
saw themselves as 'a moral mess, weak of will and prone to lust, envy, greed and 
every sort of unkind and anti-social behaviour.' 214 Man's chosen free-will, in other 
words, involved him in choices of good and evil. 
The attempt to explain what evil is, and where it came from produced a paradoxical 
impasse, especially for earlier theologians, for whom the question of whether creation 
had fallen provides a premise for questions such as, is evil necessarily built into 
creation? Irenaeus of Lyon's 'On the Origin of Evil' (c.200) sees evil as growing from 
human frailty. God did not create humanity in perfection but with the capacity/or 
perfection through a process of growth. The initial vulnerability of mankind leads to 
its seduction in Eden: '[H]umanity was a child; and its mind was not yet fully mature; 
and thus humanity was easily led astray by the deceiver. ' 215 Irenaeus is trying to 
negotiate the paradox that God, despite creating everything, cannot have created evil: 
Evil is an entity for Irenaeus, and it is the deceiver who manipulates what becomes 
manifest through human frailty. To account for the occurrence of evil, Irenaeus sees its 
root in the frailty of the fallen and therefore perverted process of man's development. 
But this is unsatisfactory, because it doesn't answer the obvious question: if the 
deceiver is evil pre-existent to the fall, where did the evil that he embodies or 
incarnates come from? Bishop Athanasius (d. 428) meets the same problem head on 
when he justifies the incarnation as God's absolute presence on the earth by providing 
a definition of man as inherently sinful. God must enter the world in the form of the 
Son, in order than man may be saved from such sin by the sacrifice of the word made 
flesh. Like Irenaeus, Augustine also asserts the notion that God cannot have produced 
evil. But unlike Irenaeus Augustine sees evil as a free 'turning-away' from God, rather 
than an entity in its own right. As 'all good is from God ... hence there is no nature 
which is not from God ... there is no nature which we admit is sin. ' 216 Part of this 
214 H. J. Lynch., The Medieval Church: A Brief History (London: Longman Publishing, 1998) pp. 
262- 3. 
215 lrenaeus 'On The Origin Of Evil' in McGrath op cit., p. 92. 




turning away is man's indulgence in his animal nature. In City of God Augustine states 
that the result of man's disobedience is an uncontrollable lust evident in the carnal 
nature of sexual activity. In Eden man's genitals were servants of his mind and 
obedient to his will. Anger and lust were not part of man's healthy state and 
intercourse did not involve the involuntarily excitement of instinctive lust. If he 
wanted to procreate he could do it with the same control as he could sow seeds in the 
ground, a faculty lost with the fall. Augustine states: 
let us never imagine that it was impossible for the seed of children to be 
sown without the morbid condition of lust. Instead the sexual organs would 
have been brought into activity by the same bidding of the will as controlled 
the other organs ... without feeling the allurement of passion goading him 
on, the husband would have relaxed on the wife's bosom in tranquillity of 
mind and with no impairment of the body's integrity_2 17 
Augustine's statement assumes that in Eden man had complete control over bodily and 
sexual functions. Indeed man may aspire to the pre-lapsarian sexual state of harmony 
(which Augustine assumes and which is not mentioned in scripture) where physical 
lust did not exist. After the fall, though, sexual intercourse becomes an uncontrollable 
activity. Augustine's description of the intensity of sexual climax and the extinction of 
mental awareness suggests an almost irrational fear of an epileptic attack on the human 
body, which can in no way cope with such intense physical effects. Enjoying such a 
state might be inevitable. However, Augustine's advocacy of the idea that the real sin 
is habitual lust is drawn from the notion that man is essentially an animal, and that his 
anin1al nature may easily detract from his spiritual nature. Indeed, by presenting this 
explanatory version of man as a reasoning being in his original state Augustine 
provides an exemplar to which he encourages man to aspire through the resistance of 
habitual and carnal acts: 
217 DCD 14, 26. 
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So intense is the pleasure that when it reaches its climax there is an almost 
total extinction of mental alertness; the intellectual sentries, as it were, are 
overwhelmed ... surely such a man would prefer, if possible, to beget 
children without lust of this kind. For then the parts created for this task 
would be the servants of his mind, even in their function of procreation, just 
as the other members are its servants in the various tasks to which they are 
assigned. They would begin their activity at the bidding of the will, instead 
of being stirred up by the ferment of lust. 218 
Augustine's analysis is one which concedes that sexual relations could have taken 
place in Paradise before the fall, but Adam's body was obedient to his will. Anger and 
lust were not part of man's healthy state and intercourse did not involve involuntarily 
excitement, or lust. If he wanted to procreate he could do it with the same control as he 
could sow seeds in the ground. With the Fall Adam rose up against God to escape 
God's will in favour of his own, ignoring the fact that the existence of his own will 
depended entirely upon the will of his creator. Man's punishment is to leave the 
garden of Eden and live in the world independently of God. He will lose control of 
himself, and at times become like an animal as his mental awareness is extinguished 
by the carnal acts and lust to which he is subject. For Michel Foucault man's free will 
and carnal nature are characteristically seditious in opposing an authoritarian system: 
'The arrogance of sex is the punishment and consequence of the arrogance of man. His 
uncontrolled sex is exactly the same as what he himself has been towards God - a 
rebel. ' 219 For Augustine, in contrast, man would never consciously aspire to a 
condition where his reason would be compromised by his animality. But there is 
clearly a sense in which Augustine sees man's fall as one in which he realises his 
animality, evidenced in the unthinking sexuality of his animal desires. During his 
lifetime Augustine persuaded the majority of Christians that sexual desire and death 
are essentially 'unnatural' and that through an act of will Adam and Eve changed the 
structure of the cosmos, their will corrupting all of nature. The implication of 
218 DCD 14, 16. 





Augustine's argument is that creation is fallen absolutely. His doctrine of the fall thus 
requires and affirms a belief in the free-will of the creatures whom it regards as 
responsible for rebelling against the creator, and disrupting the harmony which was 
His intended ~reation. It is both an affirmation of God's goodness and a denial of His 
responsibility for evil and suffering. 
2. 8 The scholastic rejection: Thomas Aquinas' argument from design. 
Genesis presents an innocence which is inconceivable, but which seemed evident in 
the harmony of natural signs. Brian Murdoch observes that 'fallen mankind cannot 
imagine what it is to be naked and unashamed, and this leads to logical impasses for 
theological and secular literary writers alike. ' 220 These 'logical impasses' may be seen 
to resolve with Aquinas' rejection of the idea of a complete fall in favour of seeing 
animals as allegorically persuasive signs of a benevolent God. In the Summa 
Theologiae he objects to the opinions of some that from being originally tame animals 
became wild and aggressive because of the fall, stating that 'Non enim per peccatum 
hominis natura animalium est mutata. ' 221 In this question, Aquinas is explaining why 
there is a natural antipathy between some animals, going as far as to point out that 
according to Genesis (1. 29- 30) all creation would have herbage to eat, but that 
natural antagonism must still have existed between animals as part of their design. He 
does not think that things were very different before the fall. But in examining one 
question he has to deal with another, namely that if the fall of creation was an all-
encmnpassing cosmological event, as Augustine insists, semiotics would be seriously 
compromised by the fact that there would be no direct line from present reality to 
interpreting God. Aquinas understands from Augustine [De Genesi ad litteram libri ix. 
14] that the essential goodness of creation and the value of each kind of creature in 
itself is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them 
220 Brian Murdoch, Adam's Grace: fall and Redemption in Medieval Literature (Cambridge: D. S. 
Brewer, 2000) p. 21. 
221 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium 




names expressive of their respective natures: 'Quod significatum est per hoc quod 
Deus ad eum animalia adduxit, ut eis nomina imponeret, quae eorum naturas 
designant.' 222 Aquinas explains that creation is essentially good (Gen 1.21), but it is 
provided for man's use. In the beginning animals were provided by God so that man 
could have experiential knowledge of their nature, and of His nature in turn. If 
providentially indeterminate, or in any way random in their behaviour, animals would 
be an empty sign because they would no longer maintain the purpose of their original 
design, and the intentions of their creator. Indeed random behavioural patterns would 
suggest a free will which would go against the assertion that animals have no logos or 
ratio in the human sense. If animals had fallen and become entirely corrupted as signs, 
they would no longer offer the 'experiential knowledge' provide by the essential 
determination of each animal nature, existing as it does to inform the highest 
quidditatively definable level of its species, man. Even as in the process of generation 
nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection, so in Eden man considered other 
animals, and with the benefit of reason understood himself: 'Sicut enim in generatione 
rerum intelligitur quidam ordo quo proceditur de imperfecta ad perfectum' .223 
Aquinas explains that in the process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection 
to perfection, and referring to Aristotle, sees the essential purpose of the animal as 
informing that which is rationally above it: 'If then nature makes nothing without 
some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made all of them 
for the sake of man.' 224 In these terms the proper end of animals is to nourish man's 
knowledge of Creation. Elsewhere Aquinas makes the same clarification: 
For a creature's shaping and conditioning indicate that it comes from some-
where; its specific form indicates its maker's word as a house's shape 
indicates its architect's idea; and its functional order indicates its maker's 
love as a house's uses indicate what its architect willed.225 
222 sr part 1 ' Q 91' 1' ad 3. 
223 STpart 1, Q 96, 1, cf, Q 64, ad 1. 
224 Aristotle, The Politics, Trans. by Sinclair. T. A., (London: Penguin, 1981) l.iii. 1256 b pp. 78- 79 . 




Aquinas makes a distinction between the natural subjection of the animal to its 
superior and what the purpose of this subjection is. In the state of innocence, before 
man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. While 
the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin, for his disobedience to God man 
was punished by the disobedience of the animals: 'inobedientia ad hominem eo rum 
quae ei de bent eius, eo quod ipse fuit inobediens Deo' ?26 While in his state of 
innocence, Aquinas asserts, man had no need to make use of animals for clothes or as 
food. All he would take from them was the experimental knowledge of their natures, 
the purpose for which God made them. Reading the animals of Genesis on these terms, 
they appear to be more like fable animals, designed by an author to serve as illustrative 
exemplars. Genesis animals present themselves to man to be named- though not to be 
eaten.227 
For Aquinas' human ascendancy is subject to a divine plan in which nature, and each 
animal in particular, is designed to serve a purpose. In Eden this was to inform man 
about his creator, Man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in 
commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance: 'et 
sic etiam homo in statu innocentiae dominabatur plantis et re bus inanimatis, non per 
imperium vel immutationem, sed absque impedimenta utendo eorum auxilio' .228 
After fall and flood, all that changes is the way man's mastership is applied. Animals 
become a commodity. In a mainstream understanding Bartholomaeus states that -
'bestes bep y-ordeiynede nought oonliche for mete ... [but] ymade to relieve and helpe 
pe neede of tnany man ere infirmities of mankynde.' (DP R 18. 1 ). Elsewhere, when he 
addresses the lawful treatment of animals, Aquinas interprets their use in terms of 
original intended purpose, observing that there is no sin in using a thing for the 
purposes of which it is. Animals still retain their 'meaning' as a transcript of divine 
226 STpart 1, Q 96, 1. 
227 'Dixit que De us: Ecce dedi vobis omnem herbam afferent em semen super terram, et universa 
ligna quae habent in semetipsis sementem generis sui, ut sint vobis in escam et cunctis ammantibus 
terrae omnique volucri caeli, et universes quae moventur in terra et in quibus est anima vivens ut 
ha be ant ad vescendum. Et factum est ita' (Gen. 1. 29- 30). 'Dixit quoque Dominus Deus: Non est 
bonum esse hominem solum; faciamus ei adiutorium simile sibi. Format is igitur Dominus Deus de 
humo czmctis animantibus terrae et universis volatilibus caeli, adduxit ea ad adam, ut videret quid 
vocaret ea ... ' (Gen. 2. 18- 19) 
228 STpart 1, Q 96. 2 
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goodness. And while they are innocent victims of man's sin, man is innocent of 
parasitism because he has already been granted the 'use' of animals by God. 
What Aquinas' distinction highlights is that if animals were fallen, they would no 
longer fulfil their purpose as meaningful Sign. They might be contingently useful. But 
reading a fallen creation in terms of morality would be highly suspect at best, for the 
laws of nature operative in this fallen world would not correspond to the will of God 
and the Christian reader of creation could not assume creation as a textbook for moral 
reference because it would be morally imperfect. But as God's intention was to create 
all things good animals must be objects of value for man's knowledge and a signifier 
for their creator, continuing to exist with His approval, which they do existing 
meaningfully to demonstrate His benevolence of intention toward man. The design 
premise, in other words, must encompass the fall as a means to an unchanging 
providential end within which things have inherent value. D. C. Greetham comments 
that 'all the peculiar animals and peoples which populate the geography of the DPR ... 
are part of the variety of kind, and all serve God's will since they behave according to 
the rules of their kind. ' 229 Greetham is pointing out that by the design premise all 
animals- including fantastical ones- have a God- given design, and serve the 
purpose of illustrating an aspect of God's character. In the beginning man had a better 
knowledge, though having fallen he can no longer attain that knowledge in its entirety. 
God, in his capacious providence, knows the true nature of each individual component 
of his creation. But after the fall mankind lacks God's sublimely analytic vision. In 
this way the design premise means that Reality remains always and indivisibly the 
same. Man's perspective, on the other hand, changes, becomes mutable and 
contingent, and his vision of animals and their nature clouded after the fall. 
2. 9 The microcosm - macrocosm relationship 




Aquinas' argument from design provides an understanding of the way in which the 
animal is understood as a sign in a fallen world, though it never questions that there 
was a fall. It does, however, imply a different version of the fall from the traditional 
Augustinian one in which the whole cosmos is affected by man's first disobedience. It 
might be asked, what version of the fall did Aquinas propounds? 
Aquinas provides a scholastic rejection of the early fall doctrine which involves an 
absolute I contingent distinction. The fall is seen on two levels; in a contingent sense 
all things are fallen, though in an unconditional sense man alone is fallen. Aquinas 
makes this distinction by observing a macrocosm- microcosm correspondence, where 
man has within him all things over which he can be master. In this sense Aquinas sees 
that man has authority over all things: 
Dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sunt omnia; et ideo secundum modum 
quo dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei 
dominari aliis. Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, 
secundum quam convenit cum angelis; vires sensitivas, secundum quas 
convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales, secundum quas convenit cum 
plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit cum rebus inanimatis. Ratio 
autem in homine habet locum dominantis, et non subiecti dominio. Unde homo 
angelis non dominabatur in prima statu; et quod dicitur omni creaturae, 
intelligitur quae non est ad imaginem Dei. Viribus autem sensitivis, sicut 
irascibili et concupiscibili, quae aliqualiter obediunt rationi, dominatur anima 
imperando. Unde in statu innocentiae animalibus aliis per imperium 
dominabatur. Viribus autem naturalibus, et ipsi corpori homo dominabatur 
non quidem imperando, sed utendo. Et sic etiam homo in statu innocentiae 
dominabatur plantis et re bus inanimatis, non per imperium vel immutationem, 
d b . d. d .,. 230 se a sque zmpe zmento uten o eorum auxz ro. 




Aquinas explains that in a sense man is the master of what is within himself. In the 
same way he can have mastership over other things, which are also contained within 
his being. He describes four things that man has within himself; reason [rationem] 
which makes }:lim like angels; sensitive powers [vires sensitivas] which make him like 
the animals; natural powers [vires naturales] which liken him to plants; and his body 
[ ipsum corpus] which contains them, and which is like inanimate things. Within man 
reason is the master and not subject, in the same way that man had no mastery over 
angels in Eden because of their superior intellect. From this Aquinas deduces that 
when we read 'all creatures' we must understand this to mean those not made in God's 
image. Over the sensible powers [irascibili et concupiscibili] which obey reason in 
some degree, the soul has mastery by commanding. So in the state of innocence man 
had mastery over the animals by commanding them, though over the natural powers 
and the body itself, man is master not by commanding but by using them. Thus in 
Eden [statu innocentiae] man's mastery of plants and inanimate things consisted not in 
commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance 
[impedimenta]. Aquinas' discussion here works on two levels. He speaks literally, and 
defends the notion that man has dominion over all things corporeal. But, in line with 
the argument from d~sign which he makes, he must grant that animals are signs which 
retain some integrity. By speaking metaphorically of man as a microcosn1, he allows 
that events may happen within man which do not threaten the integrity of other aspects 
of creation. 
This thought is not new to Aquinas, being developed by earlier theologians such as 
Irenaeus of Lyon, who sees all things in man and God, and uses Christ to make an 
anti-Gnostic, non-dualistic point that Jesus was of the same substance (homoousios) as 
the Father: 
For the creator of the world is truly the Word of God: and this is our lord, 
who in the last times was made man, existing in this world, and who in an 
invisible manner contains all things created, and is inherent in the entire 




therefore He came to his own in a visible manner, and was made flesh, and 
hung upon the tree, that he might sum up all things in himself. 231 
As Irenaeus understands the concept, Jesus is the same substance as God, though 
manifest on earth. But as a man Jesus also contains all, in the way that God contains 
all. Man became microcosm as he was spoken into being in the similitude of his 
creator: 'Et ait: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram' (Gen. 1. 
26). Man exists amongst the elements which make up his being as they do the world 
itself. But these elements are also within him. Isidore of Seville says that 'all things 
are contained in man, and in him exist the nature of all things' 232 and in his 
Elucidarium Honorius of Autun states that: 'Man is a little world composed of four 
elements .... [Man] ... represents the world in summarised form, is dependent on the 
cosmic forces, which are combined in his make-up in the same proportions as in the 
universe at large. ' 233 
The metaphor of the human body as a universe in literary conception certainly comes 
from the platonic school's continuous production of likeness out of the analogy of the 
human body to the cosmos. 'Our world must necessarily be a likeness of something', 
says Timaeus. 234 The search for that something gives rise to the notion of an infinite 
regress of likeness beginning with men and proceeding all the way to the eternal 
principle. In medieval thought this is best expressed by Bernardus Silvestris' ( c.ll50) 
'De mundi universitate sive megacosmus at microcosmus' in his Cosmographia. In 
book one, or Megacosmus, the figure of Natura complains to Noys- the image of 
living life [ vite viventis ymago] - that the confusion of primary matter which has come 
out of chaos is intolerable.235 We are told by Natura that God is wholly beyond the 
231 Irenaeus of Lyon' Against Heresies' in The Writings of Iranaeus, trans. by A. Roberts and H. 
Rambaut, Clark's Ante-Nicene Christian Library (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, I868) Vol. I, v, I8, 3. pp. I 05 
- 6. 
232 Isidore of Seville, as cited in P. Brehant, An Encyclopaedia of the Dark Ages: lsidore of Seville (New 
York: Burt Franklin, I964) p. 62. 
233 Seznec. J., The Survival of the Pagan Gods: The Mythological Tradition and its Place in 
Renaissance Humanism and Art (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, I972) pp. I04, 49. 
234 Barkan, Leonard, Natures Work of Art: The Human Body as Image oft he World (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, I975) p. I 0. 
235 Bernardus Silvestris, Cosmographia, ed. by Peter Donke (Leiden: E. J. Brill, I978), 
'megacosmus' I. 4. 
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reach of the cosmos
236 
and is a splendour that brings forth darkness without form. In 
response Noys divides the four elements, and places the earth at the centre of the 
universe. But it is in book two, or Microcosmus, that Noys tells Natura that man will 
bring the cosmic design to its consummation, as the first element which combines all 
other within a living body: 
Extimum telluns globum sapiens genus homo, quem pergimus fabricatum, 
digno possederit incolatu. Porro sedem mundi median genus insistit tercium, 
de extiemorum proprietate val participatione confectum. Participat enim 
angelice creationis numerus cum siderum divinitate quod non moritur, 
participabit cum homine quod passionum affectibus incitatur.237 
Noys glories in the beauty of the universe and, in an allegorised version of Genesis, 
takes the things of the cosmos and completes it by creating man. Man is made fron1 
the cosmos. While the firmament has stars of fire as its angels, we are told, earth will 
soon have impassioned man. Bernard is not afraid to utilise and allegorise 'pagan' 
material and as a result he was known negatively as a crytopagan, though this seems 
an unfair criticism given that his allegory is transparently Christian, and written at a 
time when pagan literature and mythology no longer constituted a threat to 
Christianity. The fact that his Cosmographia is one of a nutnber of similar works, 
such as the Microcosmus of Geoffrey of Saint-Victor, also indicates the genre and 
subject matter to have been widespread and accepted, and macrocosm I microcosn1 
correspondence to be well understood. 
In terms of man's soul, immateriality and spiritual completion mean that nothing may 
be given or taken away. In his fallen state, however, man is subject to a constant 
interaction with forces other than his own reason, which dictate his actions by acting 
upon him. This is recognisable in the recurrent figure of the goddess Fortuna, who can 
give and take from man in the corporeal context. From Hellenic thought, too, comes 
236 Bemardus Silvestris op cit., megacosmus 2. 13, 'ex superantissimus extrammundus, 
superessentialis.' 
237 Bemardus Silvestris op cit., Microcosmus 7. 4. 
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the idea that the 'influences' which radiate from the Heavenly bodies effect the human 
body, which contains all four elements in the form of humours. These influences, 
playing upon the elements, dictate man's behaviour, temperament and character. 
Aristotle understands man to be not just a rational being but a rational animal, 
perceptive and logical but also, in his corporeal context, a biological, elemental entity. 
'Like is in fact acted upon by like ... the same organs contain fire, earth and the other 
elements, which are the objects of perception either in themselves or through their 
accidents. '
238 
The elements which exist by nature are 'those things are natural which 
undergo continuous change, starting from an intrinsic source of change and concluding 
at a particular end. ' 239 Such understandings supply Aquinas with a basis on which he 
can observe man's mastership to be essentially over himself. 
Where in book five of the DPR man's corporeal context, involves comparative 
statements about the differing functions of organs among man and beasts, in book 
three Bartholomaeus observes that man is essentially rationale (Logos): 'lsider seip pat 
a man is a best iliche to God ... ' (DPR 3. 1). In spite of himself, man has a foot in both 
camps and straddles anima and animal. He is inseparable from beasts: 
Isider spekep of double maner man, ofpe inner man and vtter man (DPR 3. 
1) ... [De diffinicione ani me racionalis] pe resonable soule pat we wole 
speke of in pis doynge is diffined of somn1e seintis and philosophris as a 
spirit [of somme as a soul,] and of somme opir as ani m a et spiritus 'soule 
and spirit.' 
(DPR 3. 2). 
A sou le is an vnbodili substaunce intellectual pat fongip schinynge of pe 
firste be pe laste relacioun. By pis diffinicioun know we [pe] firste and chef 
propirte of pe soule, for mannes spirit fongip pe schinynge of God next aftir 
238 Aristotle, De anima ed. & trans. by Michael Durrant (London: Routledge, 1993) 11. 416 b, 32., cf, 
Ill. 435 a, 11. 




angels. Also in pat he is a soule he is diffined in tweye maners. For he is 
ioyned,to pe body in twey maners, pat is to menynge, as meuere to pe body 
in imeved, and also as a schipman is i-oned to pe schip. 
(DPR 3. 3). 
As already discussed, definition of man must begin with his animality in the corporeal 
context. What Bartholomaeus calls the 'double mannered man' is both 'soule' and 
animal. As a rational animal man's chief goal is to want to be like God, taking his 
place 'next aftir angels' (DPR 3. 2). On the other hand the soul is anchored to the 
material: 'ioyned to pe body in twey maners' which defines the soul as mover to the 
moved, and which must take control the body. In this context it is the macrocosm -
microcosm relationship which makes the DP R a specifically Christian text. Though he 
does not discuss the fall directly Bartholomaeus observes man as a microcosm in book 
eight, De mundo. He sees the world as a sphere made of elements. There are three 
perspectivallevels from which to read the world. Firstly, God is understood in the 
world that He made: 'as Boys seip: pow bringest forp alle pinge of hey ensample, pow 
fairest: berest in pi mynde pe fairest worlde and makest and worchist by a lik ymage.' 
(DPR 8: 1). The second world is the world as it is made up of the things of the cosmos 
and the elements: 
as heuen in pe whiche pe sterre[ s] schinep, and fyre pat hetip al pinge, ay er 
by pe whiche alle ping pat hap lif brepep and pryuep, watir pat biclippep pe 
sides of perpe, erthe pat susteynep and holdep vp and fedip al pis lowe 
pinges. 
(DPR 8: 1). 
The third world is man hin1self: 'for he schewip in himself likeness of al pe worlde ... 
pe thridde worlde is somdel euerlastinge and so m del passing, beringe in hitself licness 
of all pinges.' (DP R 8: 1 ). It is what is seen and felt in these worlds that is important 
for Bartholomaeus. The likeness of bodily properties to their correspondences allow an 
understanding of 'pe vnseye pingis of God bep iseye and iknowe by pingis pat bep 
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imade and vnderstonde.' (DP R 8. 1 ). Again this enforces the hypothesis that creation 
is fallen but it is so in a specific way, being so in man as a microcosm, where his fall 
and subsequent free will are solely responsible for his condition. As signs, animals and 
'things' retai~ their integral design in correspondence with the original Will of the 
creator, being separate from this fall. To ask whether creation is fallen, Scholastic 
thought returns not merely the question, what exactly is creation? but asks at what 
level and on what terms it may be understood. In one sense at least man as a 
microcosm of creation presents an immediate and convenient example in which all 
things are present, and 'ruled' by the intellect which is distinct to man, and by which 
all other animals are quidditatively defined. The reason which makes man distinct 
from animals is what, for Aquinas, controls the things of the cosmos. For this reason, 
there is a sense in which man is fallen by his own free will, though the present really 
remains unchanged. 
The revision of Augustine's semiotics of the fall and interpretative approaches to 
creation as a sign for its creator by Aquinas demonstrates an anxiety with the way 
animals, and man's relationship to them, are read. It is significant that animals in 
particular are the fo~us of this revision. Where man's fall is of cosmological 
significance the understanding that this is contingent, indeed contained within, allows 
creation to be read as a coherent unity where perception changes while a designed 
totality remains constant. At the literal level it would seem a necessity that if a 
straightforward line is drawn from present reality to God's purpose, animals can not be 
seen to have fallen, because the cosmos which falls is the one which man alone 
encircles. As contemporary theological values, such ideas are expressed and explored 
in Middle English literature, in a way that Aquinas' theology may never engage with, 
and in the following chapter I will show how important the displacement and 
placement of the animal in theological works is to the understanding of a man and 
animal in medieval literature. 
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Omnis mundi creatura 
Quasi liber, et pictura 
Nobis est, et speculum. 
Nostrae vitae, nostrae mortis 
Nostrae status, nostrae sortis. 
Fidele signaculum. 
Alan of Lille240 
BEAST FABLES 
CHAPTER THREE 
3. 1 Signa pro rebus: Augustine's sign theory and contemporary theological values 
This chapter develops the thesis that a fundamental difference between theology and 
literature is medieval literature's capacity to theorise positions that are not theorised and 
explored in commentary, and theological discourses. It does so in relation to representations 
of animals in medieval fiction, where often simplistic doctrinal statements become available 
to interpretation. Because doctrine often varies between commentators, texts and times, 
doctrine itself may be seen as contingent, and a bad reflection of scripture. In contrast the 
literary text may delimit doctrine by the rhetorical strategies which allow exploration of an 
idea in a controlled or guided manner. Such an analysis reveals the way in which the animal 
is displaced from moral consideration in doctrine, and re-examined in literature. The broad 
nature of so general a thesis is potentially problematic from a historical (or even New 
Historicist) perspective, a point made by R. 1. Lyall, who recognises that interpretations of 
240 Alan of Lille, in PL, 210. 579. B., cited in Gillian. R. Evans, A/an of Lil/e: The Frontiers of Theology in 
the Later Twelfth Century (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1983) p. 151, and in English translation by 
Minnis and Scott as "Every creature in the world is like a book or a picture to us, and a mirror; a faithful 
representation of our life, our death, our condition, our end.' M inn is et a/, 1986, op cit., p. 171. 
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Augustine in the twelfth century are inevitably different to those of the fifteenth century.241 
Accordingly, modern scholarship should not be surprised by discrepancies between the 
understanding of statements in their original context and that of a fifteenth - century poet. 
There is a sense, however, in which broad, central lines of Augustinian thinking retain unity 
and are omnipresent in later medieval thought.242 His sign theory, for example, deals 
expressly with the contingency of all signs, and may be summed-up by the word inferiority or 
inwardness. This interiority, which encompasses three interrelated concepts of the inner self, 
inward turns, and outward signs as expressions of inner things is surprisingly akin to what we 
now broadly term post-structuralist theory and criticism. For Augustine, as for post-
structuralism, meaning is not inherent in words, things - or animals. Rather there is a 
plurality and the openness of all signs to a multiplicity of interpretations, none of which can 
be either correct or incorrect. For Augustine, however, this contingency may be overcome, 
fixity of meaning attained, and the 'transcendental signified' found. In the medieval 
paradigm, while the play of meaning is endlessly fallen and contingent, individuals who have 
faith may be guided, and turn inward to find illumination. At the centre of the Christian self 
'differance' is delimited, the Logos found, and God's meaning revealed. Thus, the process of 
reading creation for Augustine requires and assumes a meaning system which is fideistically 
enclosed: have faith in God and understanding will follow. Correspondingly, reading things 
and words in a medieval world requires its subjects to utilise what may be termed the free-
ranging hermeneutic of a comprehensive system of interrelated meanings or, as Alistair 
Fowler puts it: 'Medieval literature has an endless fascination. It lies at an extreme edge of 
241 See R. J. Lyall, 'Henryson, the hens and the Pelagian fox: a poet and the intellectual currents of his age', 
in Medieval Scottish Literature, ed. Sally Mapstone (East Linton: Tuckwell Press,forthcoming). Lyall provides 
important contextual material, and in particular his discussion ofNeo-Augustinianism in Scotland as a reaction 
to a late revival of Pelagianism, generates a precise political reading of Robert Henryson's (c. 1450- c.1505) 
Moral/ Fabilis (c.1470). For a broader discussion of this approach see Lee Patterson, Negotiating the Past: The 
Historical Understanding of Medieval Literature (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987) pp. 1 - 7. For 
a specific discussion ofNeo-Augustinianism, see H. A. Obennan, Masters of the Reformation: The Emergence 
of a New Intellectual Climate in Europe, trans. D. Martin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) pp. 
67-110. 
242 A writer such as Henryson is, of course, composing fiction while Augustine and Aquinas deal with the 
realm of theology. There is an essential medieval distinction here, which Henryson highlights and plays with 
quite wittily- discussed below. The gap between the two is of questionable size, given Augustine's argument 
that all words, being contingent, may never represent actuality. While a different code is required in each case 
it is also true to say that both require the freedom of a free ranging hermeneutic in each chosen context. 
Henryson goes to great length to define the figurative nature of his fables, where the human audience would 
see themselves reflected in animals. The doctrinal commonplace of comparing man with animal, for example, 
extends to the figurative, or metaphorical, in a context where the two are combined to draw attention to the 
similarity between human and animal conditions by the use of strategic representations ofverbal relationships. 
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our historical reach. And it opens a strange, ceremonious world- hierarchically ordered, 
comprehensively meaningful- whose ideals at least, are in some respects superior to those of 
h d ld , 243 A . . . . h t e mo em wor . sa consequence, 1t 1s surpns1ng t at Augustine's sign theory is so 
little referred to by modem literary theorists, while being comparable to, if not rather more 
eloquent than, its modem theoretical counterparts. 
As Augustine has such a profound influence upon the way the animal is defined, 
understanding literary attitudes to animals in this period requires some analysis of his 
thought. He influences medieval attitudes to creation. But he also influences the way that 
creation is read, his understanding of fallen things as fallen signs forming theological 
attitudes by the very exclusion of the animal. For Augustine Man is a microcosm whose 
rationale encapsulates the rationale of God, and whose ability to see is what makes him 
different from other animals. But Augustine's version of the fall paradoxically suggests that 
creation is a coherent totality, viewed by man through the impaired vision of his fallen 
perspective. 
3. 1 (a) Literary theory and interiority 
Augustine's sign theory may be summed up by the word inferiority or inwardness. 
Interiority for Augustine encompasses three interrelated concepts: the inner self, inward 
turns or revolution, and outward signs as expressions of inner things. Correspondingly 
Augustine's thought can be seen to establish firstly the concept of the self as a private inner 
space. 244 Secondly, he develops the notion of personal revolution and illumination by which 
we turn into this inner space to look for God - the theological project of Confessions: 'into 
myself I went [to discover] the unchangeable light of the Lord. ' 245 Thirdly, he develops the 
243 Alistair Fowler, A History of English Literature: Forms and Kinds from the Middle Ages to the Present 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) p. 29. 
244 In Confessions Augustine states: 'Behold, in those innumerable fields, and dens, and caves of my 
memory, innumerably full of innumerable kinds of things, brought in, first, either by the images, as all bodies 
are: secondly, or by the presence of things themselves, as the arts are: thirdly, or by certain notions and 
impressions, as the affections ofthe mind are.' St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. by W. Watts, Loeb Parallel 
Editions series, 2 vols., (London: W. Heinmann, 1912) 10. 17. 
245 c 7. 10, 16 
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conception of both words and sacrament as outward signs expressing inner realities.246 In 
addition, metaphor in De doctrina christiana is itself defined as a kind of sign where things 
signified by appropriate terms are usurped by others signifying something else_247 For 
Augustine a spiritual metaphor allows the usurpation and transformation of the things of the 
world - which are carnal [ carnaliter] or literal - once we reflect on, and understand, their 
meaning through the grid of anagogic reflexivity. 
Augustine's interior world not only contains images of the exterior world, but also contains 
the very reality (res ipsa) of intelligible things.248 It is not just a private world, therefore, but 
the world of eternal truth - in literary terms the realm of the potential - where the soul finds 
intelligible truth and ultimately the one eternal Truth which is God by turning to the divine 
mind (Plotinian Nous) articulated first in De Libero arbitrio,249 though most commonly cited 
in Confessions?50 
In De doctrina christiana Augustine uses a nut and kernel metaphor to illustrate the 
difference between literal and figurative levels of representation: 'inside its attractive shell 
246 In De doctrina christiana Augustine states that: 'Given signs are those which living things give to each 
other, in order to show, to the best of their ability, the emotions of their minds or anything they have felt or 
learnt. .... It is this category of signs- to the extent that it applied to humans- that I have decoded to examine 
and discuss, because even the divinely given signs have been communicated to us by the human beings who 
wrote them.' DDoC 2. 2, 3 - 4. In the second instance, the Old Testament sacrifice of animals should be seen 
as a symbol, says Augustine, 'God is saying in effect "Had I needed such things I certainly would not have 
applied to you for them, seeing that I have them in .my power."' DCD 10. 5. 
247 In De doctrina christiana Augustine states that 'there are two reasons why written texts fail to be 
understood: their meaning may be veiled either by unknown signs or by ambiguous signs. Signs are either 
literal or metaphorical. They are called literal when used to signify the things for which they were invented: so 
for example, when we say bovem, meaning the animal which we and all speakers of Latin call by that name. 
They are metaphorical when the actual thing which we signify by the particular words are used for something 
else.' DDoC 2. I 0, 15. 
248 In Confessions Augustine observes: 'For surely the things themselves are not let into the memory, but 
the images of them only are with an admirable swiftness catched in, and in most wonderful cabinets stored up; 
whence they are most wonderfully fetched out again by the act of remembering.' ... 'I have perceived with all 
the senses of my body those numbers which we name in counting; but those numbers by which we count, are 
far different, not only are they the images of these, and therefore they have a real existence' (C 10. 9, & 10. 
12). 
249 Augustine states: 'I think that by reason we comprehend that there is a certain interior sense to which all 
things are referred by these five well know senses' [arbitror ratione comprehendere esse interiorem quemdam 
sensum] ... 'For, as has been said, he would not be sure that he wants to be wise, and that he ought to be, 
unless that notion of wisdom were inherent in his mind' [nisi notio sapientiae menti ejus in haereret]. DLA 2. 
3, & 2. 15. 
250 'I entered even into mine own inwards ... and with the eyes of my soul, over my mind, the 
unchangeable light of the Lord.' ( C 7. 1 0). 'I had by this time found the unchangeable and true eternity of truth, 
residing above this changeable mind of mine' (C 7. 17). 'But another faculty there is ... commanding the eye 
not to hear, the ear not to see, but the eye not for me to see by, and this for me to hear withal; assigning what is 
proper to the other senses severally, in their own seats and offices; which being diverse through every sense, 




this husk is a jangle of fine sounding stones: but it is the food of pigs, not men. ' 25 1 In his use 
of this particular metaphor it can be seen that Augustine is devaluing interpretation which 
involves the literal sense alone and where the sign is seen ambiguously as thing (signa pro 
rebus). Agai~st this, he values the interpretation of the more significant figural meaning, 
citing Paul as his authority: 'littera enim occidit, spiritus aut em vivificat', the letter kills but 
the spirit gives life [2 Cor. 3:6]. Neither, though, has set or fixed meaning: 
for at the outset, you must be very careful lest you take figurative expression literally. 
What the apostle says pertains to this problem: "for the letter killeth, but the spirit 
quikeneth." That is, when that which is said figuratively is taken as though it were 
literal, it is understood carnally [carnalia]. Nor can anything more appropriately be 
called the death of the soul than that condition in which the thing which distinguishes 
us from beasts, which is understanding, is subjected to the flesh in the passing of the 
letter [hoc est, intelligentia carni subjicitur sequndo litteram] .252 
Augustine refers to the delusory nature of corporeal things in a fallen world, and in the 
context that he has constructed he poses the question of how we learn or understand anything 
from a creation wh~ch is irretrievably fallen. His answer, stated initially in De magistro, is 
that those with faith become the subjects of divine illumination: while earthly teachers can 
never actually teach anything absolute (simpliciter), they may assist the pupil to see truth not 
by didactic narratives but by dialectic dialogue involving choices facilitated by a fortunate 
fall. The only true teacher, Augustine points out, is the logos or 'inner word' that sets 
standards and mediates human choices of ascent and dissent. The logical conclusion for 
Augustine is that Christ alone is our true teacher. 
One who hears [a teacher] likewise sees those things with an inner and undivided eye, 
he knows the matter of which I speak by his own contemplation, not by means of 
words. Hence, I do not teach even such a one although I speak what is true and he 
sees what is true. For he is taught not by words, but by the realities themselves made 
manifest to him by God revealing them to his inner self.253 
251 DDoC 3. 2. 
252 DDoC 3. 5. 




The soul is seen as the recipient of divine truth whether this is by experience of the 'real' by 
sciencia or knowledge through the senses, or in abstraction to words [littera] which would 
enable sapientia or wisdom from the contemplation of God. The student must employ 
reasonable discrimination to perceive arbitrary and attenuant words and signs while inwardly 
he comes to understand by internal truth and illumination by the grace of God. 254 A reader of 
signs should have faith, and understanding will follow. In this respect the nut and kernel 
metaphor used in De magistro is a metaphor about how we read, and implies that religious 
allegory and doctrine is itself the literary representation of the contemplative practice which 
occupies the mental space. 
Augustine can be seen to draw on his Neoplatonic understanding of the way the infinite 
should not be conceptualised in such a way that it becomes finite. The nutshell represents a 
dichotomy between the literal and the doctrine or moral it contains. As a finite 
conceptualisation God cannot be perceived in worldly things - even if he is in a sense, in 
them - because words would fix the transcendent into concepts, actualising them in the fallen 
world. As soon as the concept can be summed up in a nutshell it becomes measurable, opens 
up new- even literary- discourses, and becomes inadequate to represent the transcendent 
reality. Once that which we can only glimpse becomes fixed in a phrase, we are stuck with 
the finite phrase, and not the infinite concept.255 The concept of the 'One' as defined in 
Neoplatonic thought is attained by pushing beyond all that exists or can be conceived in the 
created world, being ontologically prior to the Being which comes from it. Since it 
transcends this being the One approximates that which is prior to thought and language and 
can never be full grasped by the intellect. In the Enneads we are told: 
If the One- name and reality expressed was to be taken positively it would be less 
clear than if we did not give it a name at all: for perhaps this name was given it in 
order that the seeker, beginning from this which is completely indicative of 
254 For a useful discussion in full on this understanding and its uses see Ake Bergvall, The "Enabling of 
.Judgement": Sir Phi/ip Sidney and the Education of the Reader, Ph.D. thesis at the University ofUppsala 1989 
(Sweden: Uppsala, 1989) pp. 84. 
255 For a rigorous discussion seeK. Guthrie op cit., (Michigan: Phanes Press, 1988) pp. 8- 11. 
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simplicity, may finally negate this as well, because, though it was given as well as 
possible by the giver, not even this is worthy to manifest that nature?56 
The problem for Porphyry is that as soon as the One is conceptualised or named by the 
individual, what cannot be limited has been given a form in the mind, which will then 
prohibit that individual from even attaining unity with the One, thus developing the idea that 
the One exists prior to and independently of Being or Intellect, and established the identity of 
intellect and thought with its objects. Porphyry argued that everything that did not seem to be 
the One was in fact an appearance of the One resulting from our inability to think the One as 
it truly is. In fact the One can not be said to be any individual thing, as this fixity would limit 
launching to the realm of mind, and instantly 'block' the attainment of the One. In terms of 
material things such as animals, then, God may be in all finite things, but this is still 
problematic, because the infinite cannot be fixed conceptually, grammatically, nor literately. 
As such animals could only be seen as metonyms, or parts of, the Creator. 
In summary, it can be seen that for Augustine, Truth is superior to the human intellect, and is 
not constructable by the human mind. 257 From this position animals as signs have only 
limited meaning; indeed, a text which used animals to indicate some fundamental truth 
would merely provide material for reflection: 'for medieval thinkers reading was rarely an 
end in itself, most often it was conceived as a means to an end, which is the creation of a 
contemplative state of mind. ' 258 Equally for Augustine, words are signs which point not to 
things but to thoughts; they indicate rather than represent. The subordination of words to 
thoughts is recognisable in the fact that, unless the reality that a word signifies is known, it 
does not function as a sign of anything beyond itself.259 Strictly speaking this means that 
words may only indicate abstractions such as thoughts or intentions. 
Truth, in this sense, cannot be exterior but interior, coming from a particular light in the 
mind, the light of the inner man, who is intrinsically empowered to know the truth because 
he is created in the image of God, and a part of God's Truth. Connaturally, the Creator is 
256 Enn. V. 5, 6. 28- 34. 
257 c 4. 25. 
258 Brian Stock, After Augustine: The Meditative Reader and the Text (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2001) p. 17. 




omnipresent and inseparable from His creation: though as this cannot be seen in things, it 
would seem to be limited to God's presence in man, who participates in the word, and in 
Christ who is the light of humankind. 
260 
Despite the plethora of discussion across the breadth 
of Augustine's writing, City of God provides what is perhaps the most developed statement 
on the nature of illumination by Grace, and does so from a transparently humanocentric 
perspective. The Platonic idea of illumination from the 'soul of the universe' explains, for 
Augustine, John the Baptist's observation that it is the Light which enlightens every man 
who comes into the world [John 1. 6-9]. But Augustine makes the distinction that John was 
not the Light, but heralded the true Light.261 This most developed of Augustine's analysis of 
interiority reveals a very problematic basis. As critics are aware, in the first instance we 
might ask, how can words really signify thoughts: surely they are the subject matter and 
result ofthought?262 But in the second instance Augustine's reading of John the Baptist's 
words demonstrate a dramatic inconsistency in the idea of interior illumination through the 
Logos in that while the innate reason which all have may bring them to the truth by God's 
grace, Augustine's logocentrism only really occurs An no Domini and does not account for 
John the Baptist's reason, nor any other human's innate ability to reason, as he has defined it. 
In fact, what Augustine articulates here, is a spiritual as absolute, temporal as contingent 
distinction; Jesus lives as a man in the world before the crucifixion, though after the 
resurrection becomes Christ the saviour, existing absolutely, and providing illumination for 
those with faith. In this way, rather than explaining how human reasoning may come to 
illumination, Augustine uses Plotinus to explain the way in which the human soul may 
transcend the corporeal world. 
What this means is that Augustine's theology is theocentric: it is not just an account of God 
as in the human soul, but where the creator is in his whole creation. God is present in all 
things, though Augustine delimits God's presence in the world to the interiority of the human 
soul where he may be most readily perceived. Augustine's understanding that signs have no 
inherent meaning or presence in their fallenness, logically progresses to perceive that things 
must have meaning given to them. Likewise the influence of the En ne ads would suggest that 
Augustine is mistaken to think of man's participation in intellect as a result of his imagistic 
26° C 4. 25, DCD X. 2 
261 DCD, X. 2. 




similarity to God; as soon as the One is conceptualised or named by the individual the 
infinite becomes finite, prohibiting the person's attaining unity with the One. In fact the One 
cannot be said to be any individual thing, as this fixity would limit the launch into the realm 
of mind, and instantly obstruct the attainment of the One. Rather than tailoring the creator to 
our measurements the more apposite question is, what was the image that God gave to man? 
Or: is his image reflected in all things, rather than man alone? 
While medieval literature may be hierarchically ordered and comprehensively meaningful, 
its theological underpinnings are exclusivist, providing a closed matrix of interpretation 
where understanding is fideistically enclosed. The individual must have faith before he 
approach knowledge, or it will be meaningless. But this pre-existence of faith implies a pre-
existent answer, which would seem to exclude the importance of the animal from Christian 
thought. Augustine's bestial metaphors, equating the things of the world and a literal 
understand of them with the ignorant animal attributes of a beast have particularly negative 
connotations, an unfair imposition of human concerns upon God's animals, and contrary to 
God's covenants with all living things?63 
By the time of the Didascalicon (c.1120) ofHugh of Saint-Victor (c.1096- 1141) 
Augustine's thought on the nature of the sign remains essentially the same, though creation is 
more explicitly seen to reflect God's purpose: 264 'the idea in the n1ind is the internal word, 
which is shown forth by the sound of the voice ... And the divine wisdom, which the father 
has uttered out of his heart, invisible in itself, is recognised through creatures and in them. ' 265 
263 God remembers the covenant which is between Himself and man and every living creature of all flesh 
not to bring further retribution after the flood: 'et recordobor foederis mei vobiscum, et cum omni anima vivente 
quae carnem vegetal' (Gen: 9. 15), and promises a covenant with the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, and 
the creeping things of the ground to abolish slaughter, bring safety, and betroth them to Him forever: 'Et 
percutiam cum eisfoedus in die ilia, cum bestia agri et cum volucre caeli et cum reptili terrae; et arcum et 
gladium et helium conteram de terra, et dormire eosfaciamfiducialiter' (Hos. 2. 18). 
264 'For Hugh, as for Augustine before him, the special power of biblical language lay in its unusual method 
of signification. In On Christian Doctrine Augustine had adumbrated a distinction between the two kinds of 
signs: words, whose very raison d'etre consists in their function of signifying, and things, which on special 
occasions can signify something else ... ' Minnis and Scott, op cit., p. 66. 
265 Hugh of Saint -Victor, Didascalicon, V. iii., trans. by Jerome Taylor in The Didascalicon ofHugh ofSt. 
Victor: A Medieval Guide To The Arts (London: Columbia University Press, 1961) p. 122. Taylor notes the 
similarity to Augustine's 'We speak flying words which pass away: as soon as your word has sounded in your 
mouth, it passes ... into silence' [In Joannis evangelium VIV. Iii. 7 (PL, XXXV, 1506)] p. 219 (n). Augustine 
is commenting on the arbitrary nature of words as mutable signs of things, and Taylor also cites Augustine in 
De Genesi as litteram liber imperfectus [V. 19 (PL, XXXIV, 227): 'away with the impiety by which we should 
think that the Word of God, the only-begotten son, is like the word uttered by us. The Word of God neither 




We must not, Hugh is saying, prefer our own ideas to the divine authors. Likewise Richard of 
Saint -Victor (d. 1173), a 'Scottish' Augustinian, states that '[a]ll bodies have a likeness to 
good things which are invisible. '
266 
While Hugh did not always agree with Augustine on 
other matte~s, Augustine's central lines of argument retain their integrity, though they are 
adapted to new contexts with new ideas. 
3. 1 (b) Bestiaries and beast fables 
How does the thesis that there are ethical questions about the animal which are repressed and 
occluded in medieval theology, but which are evident in medieval literature, apply to fictive 
texts? Medieval literature has the freedom and capacity to theorise positions that cannot be 
conjectured in 'official' discourses, the difference between theology and literature being 
highlighted by graphic fictional representations of the animal, often as metaphors for 
mankind, and nearly always as epithets of symbolic values. What is clear is that doctrinal 
issues are often only explored, albeit with reference to an authority such as Augustine, 
Boethius and Aquinas, in the realm of the imaginary. Each authority provides a different 
perspective, and it would be too generalising to suggest that there is a single, integral line of 
thought into which can explain all doctrinal understandings. A text such as Boethi us' (d. 524) 
The Consolation of Philosophy, however, discusses man's relationship to God 
philosophically, and develops discussion poetically. It provides an analogue to a particular 
line of thought which n1ay be affinned or departed from in subsequent literary texts. 
Giving the story of Circe Boethius claims that the vices are more powerful to corrupt the man 
than the enchantress, as they change the heart instead of simply altering the body. While 
'Circe's hand was weak' temptation to vices may corrupt from within: 
Those poisons, though, are stranger, 
Which creeping deep within, 
language as a sign which may only ever bear analogous comparison to that which it ultimately signifies. The 
authority of Augustine's theory of language provides a basis for the fable form and bears striking similarity to 
Aquinas' principle of analogy, discussed below. 
266 Richard of Saint- Victor, Benjamin Major, 11, 12, PL, 196, col. 90. 
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Dethrone a man's true self: 
They do not harm the body, 
But cruelly wound the mind.267 
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While the bodies of the sailors are corrupted by Circe's power, their minds could not be. 
However, the potentially degrading effects of vice, while not altering the body, may lower the 
man to a level where he loses his humanity, and be thus re-defined according to animal types. 
Philosophy tells Boethius that: 
all that exists is in a state of unity and that goodness itself is unity; from which it 
follows that we must see everything that exists as good. This means that everything 
which turns away from goodness ceases to exist, and thus that the wicked cease to be 
what they once were. That they used to be human is shown by the human appearance 
of their body which still remains. So it was by falling into wickedness that they lost 
their human nature. Now, since only goodness can raise a man above the level of 
human kind, it follows that it is proper that wickedness thrusts down to a level below 
mankind those whom it has dethroned from the condition of being human. 
The result is that you cannot think of anyone as human whom you see transformed by 
wickedness. You could say that someone who robs with violence and burns with 
greed is like a wolf. A wild and restless man who is for ever exercising his tongue in 
lawsuits could be compared to a dog yapping. A man whose habit is to lie hidden in 
an ambush and steal by trapping people would be likened to a fox. A man of quick 
temper has only to roar to gain the reputation of a lion-heart. The timid coward who is 
terrified when there is nothing to fear is thought to be like the hind. The man who is 
lazy, dull and stupid, lives an ass's life. A man of whimsy and fickleness who is ever 
changing his interests is just like a bird. And a man wallowing in foul and impure 
lusts is occupied by the filthy pleasures of a sow. So what happens is that when a man 
abandons goodness and ceases to be human, being unable to rise to a divine condition, 
he sinks to the level of being an animal. 268 
267 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. by V. E. Watts (Hannondsworth: Penguin, 1969) 4. 3. 
268 CP, ibid., 4. 3. 
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The particular Christian context of this is important. As I will discuss below, Augustine sees 
that evil has no real existence, rather being a turning from God, and that all that God creates 
is essentially good. Similarly, in the first of the above paragraphs Boethius deals with the 
spiritual truths of man's fallenness when he turns from God to become wicked. In the second 
paragraph, he discusses the way that this should be understood comparatively in the worldly 
context, through the mirror of the world itself. While a dog or a pig in literal terms are solely 
animals, this Christian Boethian view extends their significance into the realm of symbolic 
moral agency, where they almost exclusively represent morally reprehensible traits of 
mankind. This was pressed into the service of moral didacticism by the medieval church,269 
where animals are compared with men, being seen as signs with taxonomic classifications 
which reflect human types. Man, just below the angels and just above the animals was 
provided with these illustrations, warning him of what he would become it~ instead of 
elevating his soul, he submitted to the base desires of the body. Since the Aristotelian 
perspective that man's inner characteristics are exemplified by his outward physical form 
was widely known,270 the animal, 'both by virtue of its position in the Chain of Being and its 
appearance, served as a most appropriate metaphor for human corruption' 271 and an obvious 
method, therefore, of Christian debate. Such metaphorisation of man's characteristics are 
developed differently in poetic texts. Chaucer, for example, often seems to hold the popular 
Boethian perspective, where he might alternatively appeal directly to scripture such as 
269 Preachers 'should know the natures of animals and also of other things, because there is nothing which 
moves the hearts of an audience more than the properties of animals and of other things.' Thomas of 
Chobham's (d.1236) comments on the natural Properties formulates in a helpfully explicit way the idea of the 
world as a 'universal and publick manuscript.' He states that 'The Lord created different creatures with 
different natures for [man's] instruction, so that through the ... creature we may contemplate ... what may be 
useful in the soul ... for there is no creature which may not preach that the God who created it is powerful, and 
that the God who gave it its order and form is wise, and that the God who conserved it in being is merciful. And 
speaking in a words sense - there is no creature in which we may not contemplate some property belonging to 
it which may move us to flee form the Devil, for the whole world is full of different creatures, like a manuscript 
full of different letters and sentences (or meanings) in which we can read whatever we ought to imitate or flee 
from.' See D' A very, D. L., trans., The Preaching of the Friars: Sermons diffused from Paris before 1300, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) p. 232 and pp. 232- 233. For a discussion of the 'imaginary' animal serving a 
symbolic, didactic purposes, mandates and theological beliefs see Pamela Gravestock, 'Did imaginary animals 
exist?' in Hassig op cit., p. 130. 
270 Direct physiognomic correlations are made between animals and human character traits, and pepper 
literature and art in this period. The discussions of direct semiotic correspondences which instigate the 
discourse are to be found in the Physiognomies 1, 805a 1 - 8, and Prior Analytics 11, 27. Man as upright animal 
in Parts 658 b 10- 15, and Mov 710 b 1 0; as animal in genus, in Parts 643 a 25; in reproductive 
correspondence see appendix C, 'The placement and displacement of the feminine in Bartholomaeus Anglicus' 
De proprietatibus rerum'. 




'iustitia tu a quasi monies Do mine iudicium tuum abyssus multa homines et iumenta salvos 
facies Domine' (Psalm 35:7 in Vulgate cycle, 36.6 in translation). The idea that God brings 
salvation to man and animal alike is evidently a canonical 'exclusion' from his 
consciousness, and signifies that his paradigm is one which simply excludes or overlooks 
scriptural references to animal salvation. This Boethian influence is most evident in a speech 
of Arcite's in The Knight's Tale, which provides a distinction between man and beast and 
suggests that the beast does not share in the Christian plan of redemption and can follow its 
animal nature: with no 'soul' there is no punishment post-mortem. 
And yet encresseth this al my penaunce, 
That man is bounden to his observaunce, 
For Goddes sake, to letten of his wille, 
Ther as a beest is deed he hath no peyne; 
But man after his deeth moot wepe and pleyne, 
Though in this world he have care and wo?72 
However, elsewhere, in his poem 'Truth' Chaucer departs from this Boethian understanding 
when he employs the imagery of man as a beast who must leave his stable, suggesting a 
spiritual distinction between 'beasts' and the human animal: '[f]orth pilgrim, forth! Forth 
beste, out of thy stal! I Know thy contree, look up, thank God of al. ' 273 While animals cannot 
look upward to God, man's upright posture is a physiological distinguisher between hin1 and 
the beast- the obvious analogue being Aristotle's Parts of Animals.274 Different fron1 the 
beast types as catalogued by Boethius, the idea of man as an animal with the agency of reason 
(ratio) provides a quidditative distinction between the beastly animal and the human animal 
at a moral or tropologicallevel. Man may share attributes with beast-types, but he is also an 
animal who has choice - including the choice to behave without reason. Ignoring the beast as 
a literal, didactic sign is to abandon the ability to understand its meaning and to deny the 
human spirituality which exists above the human carnal body. Cicero, who in De natura 
272 KnT 1315 - 1321. References are taken from The Riverside Chaucer, ed. by Larry D. Benson et al., 
(1987: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
273 'Truth' ( 18 - 19) in The Riverside Chaucer, ibid, though in other editions such as, for example, Medieval 
English Lyrics, ed. by R. T. Davies (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), this poem is also known as 'Truth shall 
set you free'. 
274 Parts 656 a, I 0- 15. 
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deorum states 'Quae primum oes humo excitatos clesus et erectus constituit, ut deorum 
cognitionem caelum intuentes capere possent' [First, [nature] has raised men from the ground 
to stand tall and upright, so that they might be able to behold the sky, and so gain a 
knowledge of the gods],
275 
argues that when the vicious man becomes a beast, abandoning his 
reason, he in effect abandons his upright posture which is the symbol and physiological 
manifestation of his reason. Bartholomaeus Anglicus too states 'whanne an vnresonable beste 
is perfitliche ymade ... pe face perof bowep toward pe erpe ... and oonliche to mankynde 
ordeignep vpright stature'. Man should 'seche heven and nout putte his poupt in pertpe and 
be obedient to pe wombe as a best'. 276 Individual 'beasts' may be 'obvious' symbols of 
human traits, but the boundaries of the broader categorical term 'animal' are readily 
transcendable ones. Man's genus as an animal, in other words, allows him to be viewed 
always and primarily as an animal who can transcend the animality of his humanity by 
aspiring to be like God. Neglecting this duty to his reason, a neglect of the divine within him, 
is seen to result in the outward expression of his animal nature. 
3. 2 Animals as perfect sign in William Langland's Piers Plowman 
In Passus XI and Passus XII ofWilliam ofLangland's (c.1330- 1387) Piers Plowman 
( c.1367) the narrative persona Will is presented with a scene which illustrates for him the 
relationship of the natural world to the human. That this is an inner dream - a dream within a 
dream (XI 1 - 5) - provides the best conceivable moral version of world order. Within this 
inner-dream Will is taken by kynde, or Nature, to witness the natural world. In this natural 
world all creatures except humans act according to Reason. In this context Reason designates 
the principles of divine law manifest in nature and through the animals of the dream. (XI 319 
- 67) Within this Langland uses the animal in two senses; firstly, in the context of an 
unequivocal criticism of the clergy and secondly, as a worldly sign of divine order and 
intention. In this second sense he notes the absence of Christian reason yet highlights its 
275 Cicero, De natura deorum, ed. and trans. by H. Rackham (1933) Heinmann Parallel Texts Series 
(London: Heinmann Ltd., 1953) 11, 56. 
276 DPR 3.1. This reference to the 'wombe' carries the double meaning of the organ of reproduction which is 
also the origin of lust and desire, as well as the stomach, in referring to the greed and gluttony associated with 
animals. See appendix C. 
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significance as a sign by observing the presence of an innate reason 'implanted' in the 
animal by God. The initial use of the animal as a polemic against clerical corruption reveals 
discomfort with the consumption of meat when it has been forbidden, though its 
consumption is justified by pragmatic textual interpretations. Langland's complex 
representation and placement of the animal is collocated with a dogmatic and transparently 
selfish materialism, in which the sensual pleasures of consumption and the misinterpretation 
of sensory signs are laid open to scrutiny. This highlights the humanocentric disregard, 
resentment, and misinterpretation of the animal as a connatural expression of God's will. 
The abuse of a community of poor whose poverty should be praised as an ideal Christian 
state is set against the consumption of the animal as evidence of gluttony and the aspiration 
to civil estate of spiritual leaders: 'This lokynge on lewed preestes hath doon me lepe from 
poverte - I The which I preise, ther pacience is, moore parfit than Richesse. ' 277 It had long 
been a tradition to satirise wealthy clerics by portraying their self- indulgence in order to 
highlight the oppression of the poor that this caused.278 Langland's treatment of this tradition 
highlights the abuse of clerical possessions and assets where clerics are seen to be sinful 
because of their excessive wealth, when they should have no title to the ownership of 
property at all, property ownership being the domain of the civil. 279 This censure is 
particularised by Langland in the feast with the Great Doctor of Passus XIII where meat -
eating is seen as both anti-monistic and anti-monastic, and highlights a friar's neglect of the 
poor, his abuse of almsgiving, and his sinful receipt and abuse of bequests: 
Ac this maister ne his man no maner flesshe eten, 
Ac thei eten mete of moo re cost- mortrews and potages: 
Of that men myswonne thei made hem wel at ese. 
Ac hir sauce was over sour and unsavoury grounde 
277 William of Langland, Piers Plowman, the '8' text, ed. by A. V. C. Schmidt, (London: Everyman 
Classics, 1976), XI, 317- 318. 
278 For the context see W. Scace, Piers Plowman and the New Antic/erica/ism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989) pp. 30- 31. 
279 At the issue of 'The Statute of labourers' in 1349, Langland would have been in his late teens, and must 
have had a strong opinion of the document which tried to push back the cost of labour for landowners and 
employers. Labour had become expensive after the early Thirteen Forties as the Black Death swept across 
Europe making labour short. This legislation, however, did not prevent the Great Revolt of 1381 against the 
authority ofthe Law and the Church. See 'The Statute of Labourers' in Basic Documents in Medieval History, 




In a morter, post mort em, of many bitter peyne-
(XIII, 40 - 45) 
The reference to 'postmortem' is a pun which at the literal sense refers to the meat 
consumed by clerics, and which is the 'good-eating' of ill-gains. But the secondary meaning 
plays on the enjoyment of ill-gains by suggesting that it is spoilt by the sauce, the 'bitter 
peyne' of the prospect of torment after death. Their meat is a sinful feast because its excess 
and expense deprives the poor of more modest sustenance, but this also amplifies the 
criticism of clerical greed as consuming the poor themselves: 'vos qui peccata hominem 
comeditis, nisis pro eis lacrimas et oraciones effunderitis, ea que in deliciis comeditis, in 
torment is evometis' ?80 This criticism of clergy who indulge a gluttony typified by their meat 
eating habits demonstrates the displacement of concerns about the consumption of flesh by 
the pursuit of personal indulgence. These underlying concerns are threefold. As the above 
extracts illustrate, meat eating is seen as an extravagant expenditure of a costly item, which 
is both paid for by, and deprives the poor of, more modest food. Meat eating is against 
prescribed rules. But, importantly, it disregards the importance of created beings as aspects 
and expressions of God's intention and love. 
Langland is particularly scathing about the cleric who 'priked a-bout on palfrais ... I An hepe 
of hounds at his ers, as he a lord were ('C' vi, 160- 161). Sin1ilarly, Chaucer criticises such 
aspirations to lordliness, while making a serious point about what classified as meat, 
parodying the debate in the General Prologue to The Canterbu1y Tales. The monk's eating 
habits are insinuated by the imagery used to describe his hunting, and his ownership of the 
property which makes his hunting possible: 'Ful many a deyntee hors hadde he in stable' 
(GP, 16). He refutes the text that says hunters are unholy, for which he does not give 'a 
280 Piers XIII 45a. Schmidt translates these lines as 'You who feast upon men's sins- unless you pour out 
tears and prayers for them, you will vomit forth in torment what you eat with pleasure.' The visio of Piers 
Plowman begins with the 'fair feeld ful of folk fond I ther bitwene- I Of a lie man ere of men, the meene and the 
riche, I Werchynge and wanderynge as the world asketh' (Prologue 17- 19). Inherent in this symbolism is the 
implication that at the lowest level of the social strata peasant are treated like animals. Similarly Jean La 
Bruyere, the French moralist of the seventeenth century, observes human existence at an agricultural level 
where he explicitly draws the analogy: 'Scattered across the countryside one may observe certain wild animals, 
male and female, dark, livid and burnt by the sun, attached to the earth which they dig and turn over with 
invincible stubbornness. However, they have something like an articulated voice and when they stand up they 
reveal a human face. Indeed, they are human beings ... Thanks to them the other human beings need not sow, 
labour and harvest in order to live. That is why they ought not to Jack the bread which they have sown. Cited by 
Eric J. Hobsbawm, 'Peasants and Politics', Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 1. 1973 - 74, pp. 3-22, p. 6. 
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pulled hen'. That he is like a fish out of water is a text not worth an 'oyster', his greyhounds 
are as swift in flight 'as fowel' and 'a fat swan loved he best of any roost'. Indeed, 'He was a 
lord ful fat and in good poynt' (GP, 177, 182, 190, 206, 200). That we are told he has a 
preference for 'fat swan' is significant in that it makes a specific reference to the rule of his 
Benedictine order, while indicating that he takes no pains to observe the rule of that order. 
Apart from swan it is not explicitly stated what else he eats, though his hunting and its 
associative imagery suggests that as a monk he is a deeply ironic figure whose aspirations to 
lordliness and over - consumption indicate his indifferent to a specified diet, and signify that 
his worldly behaviour should be seen in the context of his negligence of a rule which 
emphasises poverty, chastity and obedience: 'The reule of Seinte Maure or of Seint Beneit-
I By cause that it was old and somedel streit I This ilke Monk leet olde thynges pace' (GP, 
173- 175). 
The Rule of Saint Benedict ( c.530) states: 'Carnium vera quadrupedum omnimodo ab 
omnibus abstineatur comestio, praeter omnino debiles aegrotos. ' 281 While at first sight the 
statement seems unequivocal, controversy grew around how to interpret the conditional 
Carnium vera quadrupedum. Four- footed animals must not be consumed, so fish was 
considered to be acceptable. But subsequently it was thought that fowl might also be 
acceptable food especially as they had two legs and not four. In addition there were grounds 
for supposing that fowl may also be classified as fish based on the biblical authority of 
Genesis 1. 20: 'dixit etiam Deus: producant aquce reptile animce viventis, et volatile super 
terram sub firmament a cceli' [And God said, Let the waters bring forth abundantly the 
moving creature that has life, and fowl [that] may fly above the earth in the open firmament 
of heaven]. The fact that Ben edict himself followed a strict vegetarian diet was evidently not 
rigidly emulated by the order at any time after his death. Rather, the Benedictines made their 
best efforts to avoid the dictum, and the subsequent papal Bull 'Benedicta' of 1336 gave 
dispensation for the consumption of any meat four times a week282 though this is in itself 
spurious given that 'whatever decision St. Benedict makes it has to be observed:- it is 
281 The Rule of Saint Benedict, parallel text edition ed. and trans. by J. McCann (London: Bums Oates, 
1952) Ch. 39, p. 95. "Except for the sick who are very weak, let all abstain entirely from the flesh of four-
footed animals.' 
282 A definitive and scholarly account is provided by Butler, C., Benedictine Monachism: Studies in 
Life and Rule, (London: Longman, Green and Co., 1919) p. 44 ff. 
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absolute law unless he himself modifies it. ' 283 In this sense citation of the Rule of St. 
Benedict controversy presents an example of ecclesiastic debates which were often 
transparently selfish in their interpretations of monastic Rules, and which are parodied in the 
Monk's ambivalence toward meat- eating. Though there is no evidence of Chaucer's 
awareness of Aristotle's comparison of water - fowl to fish the paronomasia he generates 
would seem to demonstrate a depth of understanding, allowing him to suggest that the ironic 
figure's worldly indulgences result in the displacement of his soul from its true vocation. 
Aristotle says that water fowl may be classified as fish being 'web- footed because they live 
in the water, for their feet being of this kind of service to them in place of fins'. 284 Disrupting 
such taxonomies, Chaucer observes that a monk heedless of Rules is monstrous because 
'likned til a fissh that is waterlees' he is out of his element (GP, 180). 
The meat eating debate is not merely a criticism of indulgence in sensual pleasures, but in 
pleasures that are forbidden by textual authority. Chaucer's monk's joy in worldly 
consumption disregards so many of Benedict's rules in this way, though most markedly the 
enjoyment of hunting and eating the animal typifies an indulgence in the things of the world 
that, as things of God, should demand his respect. Benedict's sacramental vision of the world 
emphasises the importance of the stewardship, reverence for, and participation in God's act 
of Creation. Reverence should be given to all things, as God is believed to be manifested in 
finite things and present in the world. There is no marked division between the sacred and 
the profane, between the holy and the material. This covers all things from the abstention 
from meat in chapter thirty - nine of the rule to considering 'all the monastic utensils and 
goods of the monastery as if they were the sacred vessels.' (RB, 31. 1 0). Though the monk 
should honour all men, 'Honorare omnes homines' ,285 this is based on the far less exclusive 
'honour all brothers' of 1 Peter 2. 17: 'omnes honoratefraternitatem diligite: Deum timete 
Regem honor(ficate' [honour all men, love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honour the king]. The 
problem is how to interpret what in Benedictine doctrine constitutesfraternitatem, in the 
same way that what constitutes Carnium vera quadrupedum is arguable given Benedict's 
283 Chapman. J ., Saint Benedict and the Sixth Century (London: Sheed & Ward, 1929) p. 21. 
284 Parts 14 a 20. 
285 RB 4. 8. Neither should he become attached to pleasures (RB 4. 12). He should relieve the poor 
'pauperes recteare' (RB 4. 14), prefer nothing to the love of Christ 'Nihili amori Christi praeponere' (RB 4. 
21) and not be a great eater 'Non multum edacem' (RB 4. 36). He should certainly not own anything whatever 




own vegetarianism and sacramentalism. The Rule, in this sense, is open to wilful 
misinterpretation. Langland attacks clergy for being culpable of such deliberate egress in that 
they 'Glossed the gospel as hem good liked I for coveitise of copes construwed it as thei 
wolde' (prologue 60) and threatens them with divine retribution 'as the bible telleth, for 
breaking of youre rule' (X, 315). Where the clerical domain should find definition in the 
terms of the theological virtue caritas it is exercised through the worldly and sinful counter-
type of Gluttony, and in particular in the consumption of forbidden flesh. In addition a 
disregard for, or selfish misinterpretation of a textual authority or Rule is not merely the 
sinful pursuit of sensual pleasure, but ignores the reason for such a statement's existence. 
This context serves on the one hand to highlight the pragmatic misreading of texts and signs, 
while on the other it satirises clerical corruption and a disrespect for established authority. 
Selfish desire is seemingly placed over the will of the Creator. From this context we may 
view Langland's bestiary, which signifies the presence of God in all things, as well as a 
discussion about how this should be read, as a criticism of the clerical corruption typified by 
its disregard for rules which imply a compassionate ethic toward creation. 
3. 2 (a) Langland's representation of the animal as Sign 
In Passus XI of Piers Plowman, Langland's criticism of the clergy also takes the form of an 
attack on their ignorance and misinterpretation of language as a sign. As the language of the 
law may be challenged 'Iffals Latyn be in that lettre' (XI, 304), so the scribe, who defaces a 
manuscript, or the cleric who misreads scripture, is a fool who betrays the meaning of a text: 
'Psallite Deo nostro, psallite; quoniam rex terrae Deus Israel, psallite sapienter' (XI, 310, 
citing Ps. 47. 6- 7) Juxtaposed with this is a dream visio in which Will observes the actions 
of animals and, though unintentionally, fails to understand their meaning. The dream is an 
oraculum through which Will is guided by the personification of nature, Kynde, who presents 
for his inspection an ordered animal world: 'fet forth by ensaumples to knowe, I Thorugh ech 
a creature, Kynde my creatour to lovye.' (XI, 325). 
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Re son I seigh soothl y sew en alle beestes 
In etynge, in drynkynge and in engendrynge of kynde. 
And after cours of concepcion noon took kepe of oother 
As whan thei hadde ryde in rotey tyme; anoonright therafter 
Males drowen hem to males amomynge by hemselve, 
And [ femelles to femelles ferded and drowe]. 
Briddes I biheld that in buskes made nestes; 
Hadde nevere wye wit to werche the leeste. 
I hadde wonder at whom and wher the pye 
Lerned to legge the stikkes in which she leyeth and bredeth. 
Ther nys wrighte, as I wene, sholde werche hir nest to paye; 
If any mason made a molde therto, muche wonder it were. 
And yet me mervailled moore: many othere briddes 
Hidden and hileden hir egges ful derne 
In mareys and moores for men sholde hem noght fynde. 
CHAPTER THREE 
(XI, 335 - 339; XI 344 - 353). 
The personification of Reson in this passage, is a facet of God, who follows and informs all 
non-human animals how correctly to act. Langland employs the rhetorical device of 
distrihutio, where the specified roles of reason and nature are assigned to personified figures, 
while the animals and their innate reason or kynde-wit serve as notatio or character 
delineation. They describe the character of God's manifestation in the world by the definite 
signs which are attributed to Him. The animals as signs, in other words, stand as synecdochal 
tropes that in their order imply the divine will, and that may be described as the principle 
according to which the world is ordered, apparent in its animal creation. 
Within this context Will observes Reason following the animals in their eating, drinking and 
mating to provide them with the knowledge to live as they do. The act of procreation is 
singled out as an example of how when mating is concluded the animals separate and 'noon 
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took kepe of oother' remaining unhindered by sexual desire. 'Males drowen hem to males 
amornynge by hemselve, I And [ femelles to femelles ferded and drowe] ', presenting 
exemplars who, though mournful to be separated, do not indulge the passion which 
characterises human physical love. 
Will marvels at the craftsmanship of the birds 'that in buskes made nestes'- a skill of which 
man is incapable. Through Reason's whispered message the beast's actions have an intuitive 
perfection of action in order, which is withheld from man: 'There nys wrighte, as I wene, 
should werche hir nest to paye.' The skills of a craftsman cannot compete with what is 
innately possessed by the birds who act according to God's will which, transmitted through 
Reason, is direct and unmediated by the doubt and desire that accompany man's freewill. 
What the figure of Nature reveals to Will is the establishment of orderly partition as a theme. 
The animals represent an ordered universe, whose primal patteming flows from God to be 
interpreted by man. The clear distinctions are made, and Will's marvelling indicates his 
delight and approval in confirming each partition of a particular reality conveying God's 
will. This corresponds closely to the Macrobian doctrine that the universe contained an 
ordered hierarchy of life which provides a means of access to the mind of God: 
ideo ut summi omnipotentiam dei ostenderet posse vix intelligi, numquam videri, 
quicquid humano subicitur aspectui temp/urn eius vocavit qui sola mente conbcipitur 
ut qui haec veneratur ut temp/a, cultum tamen maximum debeat conditori. [In order to 
show, therefore, that the omnipotence of the supreme God can hardly ever be 
comprehended and never witnessed, he called whatever is visible to our eyes the 
temple of that God who is apprehended only in the mind, so that those who worship 
these visible objects as temples might still owe the greatest reverence to the 
creator.] 286 
While there is no evidence that Langland would have had direct reference to such thought, 
Christian Turner has pointed out that Boethius' De consolatione philosophiae is based upon 
286 Macrobius (Ambrosius Aurelius Theodosius Macrobius) Commentarii In Somnium Scipionis, ed. by J. 
Willis, Macrobius Vol.2 Biblitheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Lipsiae: In aedibus B. 
G. Teubneri, 1963) 1, 14, p. 55, and in English translation in Macrobius Commentary on the Dream ofScipio, 
trans. by Williams Harris Stahl, 53 ofthe Records ofCivi1isation, Sources and Studies series (New York: 





Accordingly, Langland's animals perform their lives in an ordered 
perfection - which man may never himself accomplish - because God compensates for the 
deficiency of rational power in animals through the superiority of their instinctive sense. 
The admirable reasonableness and purpose of the animal behaviour he sees leads Will to 
wonder who is ultimately responsible for them: 'what maister thei hadde, I and who taught 
hem on trees to tymre so heighe.' (XI, 359- 360). But the animal's privileged access to 
Reason also seems unfair to Will whose mood of wonder changes from reverent admiration 
to anger, as he rebukes Reason for favouring the animal over man: 
Ac that moost meved me and my mood chaunged-
That Reson rewarded and ruled alle beestes 
Save man and his make: many tyme and ofte 
No Reson hem folwede, [neither riche ne povere]. 
And thanne I rebuked Reson, and right til hymselven I seyde, 
I have wonder of thee, that witty art holden, 
Why thow ne sewest man and his make, that no mysfeet hem folwe.' 
(XI, 368- 374). 
In response Reason tells Will that it is none of his concern. Only in Passus XII is a Conclusio 
to the debate deduced from the necessary consequences of what has been witnessed. 
Ymaginatif- the personification of imagination- explains that Kynde (nature, though 
glossed in this context by Schmidt as 'God') is responsible for the arrangements of the 
natural world: 
And so I seye by thee, that sekest after the whyes, 
And aresonedest Reson, a rebukynge as it were, 
And will est of briddes and of beestes and of hir bredyng knowe, 
Why some be alough and some aloft, thi likyng it were; 
287 The most recent appraisal of the influence ofNeoplatonic thought on the later part of the period is 
Christian Turner's, "The Reception of Plato and Neoplatonism in Late Medieval English Literature," 
unpublished D.Phil thesis (University of York, 1998) p. 7ff. 
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And of the floures in the fryth and of hire faire hewes -
Wherof thei cacche hir colours so cl ere and so brighte, 
And of the stones and of the sterres - thow studiest as I leve 
' ' 
How evere beest outher brid hath so breme wittes ... 
'Clergie ne Kynde Wit ne knew nevere the cause, 
Ac Kynde Knoweth the cause hymself and no creature ell is. 
He is the pies patron and putteth it in hir ere 
That the thorn is thikkest to buylden and brede. 
(XII, 217- 228). 
CHAPTER THREE 
Will cannot clearly see what is signified and wants a more thorough knowledge from 
Reason. Ymaginatif is 'imagination' most literally, but is also the faculty of forming mental 
images of things in the exterior world: 
Imaginative thus makes it possible for the mind to work since it cannot act on the 
data given by experience and the senses directly but must interiorise them before it 
can do so. Medieval psychology did not generally associate this faculty with the 
creation of art, but rather with memory and with the power of the mind to make 
analogies and abstractions for use in reasoning. 288 
Understanding must come from the internalising of experience. As Ymaginatif points out, as 
clerks who use reason though find no answers by their intelligence, Will 'sekest after the 
whyes' which is not equivalent to the sapientia of Psalm forty six as has been cited in Passus 
XI. The love of knowledge for its own sake is the selfish pursuit of knowledge over the 
pursuit of love of God. Equally, sapiential knowledge of God is not fully available to any 
creature by intelligence and learning alone, a point made by Ymaginatif: 'Quare p/acuit? 
Quia voluit' (XI, 216a). White's explanation that 'It makes perfect sense that thorough 
knowledge of all things in a created being should be deemed against the natural order, 
involving as it does the usurpation of the creator's omniscience by the creature' 289 provides a 
clarification of why intellect and learning alone are inaccessible, but does not explain how 
288 Talbot Donaldson, E., Piers Plowman: An Alliterative Verse Translation, ed. by E. D. Kirk and J. H. 
Anderson (London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1990) p. 253. 
289 White, H., Nature and Salvation in Piers Plowman (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1988) p. 47. 
148 
CHAPTER THREE 
this understanding comes about. Christian Turner's account of the reception of 
Neoplatonismi'especially through Augustine and Boethius, illustrates a particular line of 
thought: 
Following Plato's theory, Boethius divided the life of the mind between two orders of 
object, intellectibilia (intellectible objects, including only the accessible divinity) and 
intelligibilia (intelligible objects, including all of the sense- created world), which 
correspond to two types of knowledge; intellecta and ratio. However, this distinction 
contains two contradictory impulses which create a tension at the heart of 
Neoplatonisms. The first is that sense- perceptible and intelligible worlds are 
opposed, and therefore that any ascent to the divinity is fraught with difficulty. This 
'divisive' impulse devalues the world of the flesh in favour of the spirit, represents a 
dualistic world view and maintains that there is a gulf between the human and the 
divine, which for Augustine could only be surmounted by grace. In contrast, a second 
Neoplatonic impulse ... asserts the opposite, that the macrocosm is reflected in the 
microcosm, and that the World Soul might act as an intermediary between 
intellectibilia and intelligibilia. This 'aspirant' impulse emphasises the notion of 
unity and hierarchy, and presents the corporeal world as an allegorical medium which 
can express the spiritual world. Such unity of the two worlds opposed Augustinian 
notions of Grace, and threatened to reduce tenets of Christian soteriology into an 
inevitable emanation followed by the return of the divinity. Therefore 'aspirant' 
Neoplatonic doctrines of harmony which presented the cosmos as unified by a Great 
Chain stood in contrast to the 'divisive' Neoplatonic doctrines which asserted that the 
earthly mundanity of the body resisted transcendence. 290 
Augustine's Neoplatonic understanding of the corporeal as that which 'could only be 
surmounted by grace' stands in contrast with a second Neoplatonic idea, namely that the 
microcosm I macrocosm correspondence is one in which all things may be reconciled in 
unity, and within which the things of the world stand as an allegorical presentation of the 
spiritual. Augustine's 'divisive' Neoplatonic doctrine (though not Gnostic in the Christian 
sense) of a fallen world where illumination is attainable by grace alone, is also one in which 
290 Turner, op cit., pp. 23 - 24. 
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salvation is imminent in and by this world. Turner's observation that Humankind stands at a 
paradoxical borderline between these corporeal and non - corporeal impulses, is one 
allowing us to see man either as dragged down by matter or as given the possibility of 
participating i_n divine reality by soul. While there is no evidence that Langland has any of 
these ideas directly in mind, what is apparent is that intellecta and ratio are found to be 
insufficient alone as a means to salvation; the gulf between man and God is not merely a 
division of two worlds, but a division of understanding. Though essentially a platonic idea 
this gulf, in Augustine's Christianised paradigm, may be bridged by the interior faith of the 
individual to bring an understanding of the world around him. 291 
The dream provides a selection of animals who stand as moral exemplars of what man's 
behaviour should be. This is innate to them. Where reason has been a faculty at its first 
definition, 'For rightfully Reson sholde rule yow alle, I And Kynde Wit be wardeyn youre 
welthe to kepe' (I, 54- 55), at Passus XI it is a natural principle. When Reason fails to sewe 
man, 'No Reson hem folwede' (XI, 371). Animals behave unquestioningly according to the 
principle of reason, while men who possess the faculty of reason and its power of moral 
choice often neglect the principle itself. Rather, through the contemplation of external reality 
the perceiver should turn to his faith in God for knowledge of the Truth. Where knowledge 
of books is natural to scholars the nature of clerks is constituted by their involvement in 
those books- a potential block to the Truth. Piers' journey to Truth ended at Passus IV with 
the realisation that Truth dwells in the heart. But in Passus XII it is particularly appropriate 
that a poor plowman should be told by Y maginatif that he should reflect on the natural signs 
available to him, and then look to himself for the Truth of their meaning. As for Augustine, 
the earthbound moral enterprise of those living without the Christian revelation is essentially 
worthless without salvation. Contemplation of the beast, unillumined by divine revelation, 
will not alone bring salvation. 
291 Charles Freeman traces this thought back to Paul, who sees the concept of 'rational argument' typifying 
the Greek intellectual achievement itself, being superseded by the coming of Christ: 'The more they [non-
Christians] called themselves philosophers, the more stupid they grew ... they made nonsense out of logic wand 
their empty minds were darkened' (Rom. 1. 21-2) to the Corinthians ( 11. 25) he writes 'the wisdom of the 
world is foolishness to God' there is something ofthe mystic in Paul's disregard of logic (and a paradox in the 
way he uses his considerable rhetorical skills to attack the very intellectual tradition of which rhetoric was part). 
This regard had unfortunate consequences. As Paul's writings came to be seen as authoritative it became a 
mark of the committed Christian to be able to reject rational thought, and even the evidence of empirical 




3. 2 (b) Bartholomaeus Anglicus and influence of the literal sense 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus' De proprietatibus rerum contains a passage of striking literal 
similarity to that in which Will observes the actions of animals, and the understanding of the 
potential significance of the animal which is consistent in both texts suggests the possibility 
that Bartholomaeus provides an analogue, or at least a shared understanding of theological 
values.
292 
The first chapter of Bartholomaeus' De animalibus is an introductory chapter in 
which, by reference to Aristotle, animals are described 'in general' or by their universal 
characteristics. 
And oonlyche man hap mynde of pat was for3ete, as Auicenne seith. But many 
bestes holdep in mynde pinges pat he seep and lemep, as Aristotle seip libro i. And 
oonliche in man is mynde, as mynde is obedient to resoun. l>erfore libro xi. de 
ciuitate dei Austyn seip pat in vnresonable bestes is wonder re dynes se of witte but 
in hem is no science, propurliche to speken of science. But in hem likenesse of 
science is yfounde, for pey hauejJ redynesse of witte in bredynge and of rerynge of 
hire brood and in buldynge and makynge of dowweres and dennes, in sechynge 
and getynge of mete and of nourisshynge, in medicyne and helynge of woundes ... 
in knowynge of loue of hire makes . ... Also Aristotle seip pat in euery beste is a 
radical membre pat is welle and heed of alle pe vertues natural and spiritual and of 
fielynge .... As Auicenne seip, of pe roote of pe herte bygynnep creacioun, 
makynge, and scappe of alle bestes. Whanne an vnresonable beste is parfitliche 
yn1ade and yschape pe face perof bowep toward pe erpe pat is pe original and 
material matiere wherof it corn. And oonliche to man kynde ordeignep and esep 
vpright stature; in pat mankynde is wonderliche ymade noble and passynge alle 
292 In On Abstinence Porphyry makes comparison between man and animal, though he sees the bad qualities 
in men, which prohibit them from performing properly as being far worse that those in the animal. In striking 
similarity to Augustine, Bartholomaeus Anglicus and Langland, Porphyry describes the way that animals build 
nests, have natural sagacity and prudence, and know where and how to mate in exemplary fashion. He sees this 
as a clear rational which, because man cannot do what they can do nor understand how they do it, does not 
mean that divinity is not present in them (Abst. 3. 11 ). 
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o}xe bestes, as pe poete [Aristotle] seip pat kynde hap 3iue to man an high moup 
and vertu to loken on heuene. 
(DPR 18. 1, my emphasis). 
The description of the animals having 'redynesse of witte in bredynge', rearing and nest-
building, together with the observation that they have some innate knowledge or 'likenesse of 
science', is cognate with Langland's description of the kynde -wit of animals. Equally here, 
Bartholomaeus states that only in man is the mind obedient to reason, though other beasts 
have the appearance of a memory which is a different kind of reasoning activity. 
Bartholomaeus' literal exposition has as its authority Augustine who, we are told, says that 
animals are quick of wit, though have no understanding of that wit. His statement that 
animals have 'redynesse ofwitte' or innate knowledge accords, both conceptually and 
literally, with Langland's negotiation of the same subject matter which, in con1mon with 
Aquinas' understanding, perceives the prudence of animals as intrinsic: 'Dicendum quod 
omnia animalia habent quandam participationem prudentie et ration is secundum 
aestimationem natura/em' [all animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation in 
prudence and reason]. 293 lfLangland does indeed owe a debt to Bartholomaeus then it might 
be Bartholomaeus' reference to Augustine that allows the retrieval of a fuller meaning of the 
context in which both writers are thinking of the animal. 
Bartholomaeus refers to book eleven of City of God, and in chapter twenty seven of that 
book Augustine discusses the design of the animal as a sign of God's purpose, but takes the 
opportunity to combine his observations on the animal with a summation of how he 
understands the function of the animal as a sign: 
Why, even the irrational animals, from the immense dragons down to the tiniest 
worms, who are not endowed with the capacity to think on those matters, show that 
they wish to exist and to avoid extinction. They show this by taking every possible 
action to escape destruction .... Some other creatures may have much sharper vision 
than we have for seeing in the light of the sun; but they cannot attain to that 
immaterial light which casts as it were its rays upon our minds, to enable us to come 
293 ST part 1 ,Q 96, art. 1, ad. 4. 
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to a right judgement about all these other creatures. For this we can do, in proportion 
as we receive this light. Nevertheless, although there is no kind of real knowledge in 
the sense of irrational creatures, there is at least something parallel to knowledge. 
Yet these and all other material things have their causes hidden in nature; but they 
offer their forms to the perception of our senses, those forms which give loveliness to 
the structure of this visible world. It almost seems as if they long to be known, just 
because they cannot know themselves. We apprehend them by our bodily senses, but 
it is not by our bodily senses that we form a judgement on them. For we have another 
sense, far more important than the bodily sense, the sense of the inner man, by which 
we apprehend what is just and what is unjust, the just by means of the 'idea' which is 
presented to the intellect, the unjust by the absence of it. 294 
For Augustine the design of all creatures includes an in-built will to live which leads them 
instinctively to avoid annihilation. Indeed this is a fundamentally Platonic idea: in On 
Abstinence Porphyry refers to Aristotle's De anima. Elsewhere Aristotle states that 'some of 
the animals whose blood is watery have a specially subtle intelligence ... a more mobile 
faculty of sensation. This is why, as I said before, some of the bloodless creatures have a 
more intelligent soul than some of the blooded ones. ' 295 The will to exist and the logic by 
which annihilation is avoided is not a self-conscious one. Rather, this will is the will of the 
creator which is inherent within them. Seemingly, the idea that the animal is an index to 
God's intention contradicts Augustine's assertions that it is the interior world alone which 
allows a true perception of the real meaning (res ipsa) of intelligible things such as 
animals.296 But he is careful here to qualify the idea that the form and design observed in the 
29
-t Augustine, DCD, op cit., XI, 27, cf, the Platonic understanding of the innate knowledge in man being 
brought out to be conscious of itself as expressed by Boethius: 'We are not dealing with willed motions ofthe 
conscious mind, but with instinctive motions, like the way we digest the food we have taken without thinking 
about it, and the way we breath in our sleep without being conscious of it. Not even in living things is the love 
of self-preservation due to the wishes of their mind, but to the principles of their nature. For often when there 
are reasons which force death upon a creature, Nature turns away in horror, but the will accepts it. And on the 
other hand, the work of procreation which alone gives mortal creatures their continuity and which Nature 
always desires, is sometimes curbed by the will. To such an extent does this love of self-preservation stem not 
from conscious desire, but from natural instinct. Providence has given its creatures one great reason to go on 
living, namely that instinctive desire for the greatest possible self- preservation' CP Ill. XI. 
295 Aristotle, Parts 650 b 20-25. Porphyry's Abst., 3. 8., citing De anima 3. 427 b 14 ff., cf., 
296 In Confessions Augustine observes: 'For surely the things themselves are not let into the memory, but 
the images of them only are with an admirable swiftness catched in, and in most wonderful cabinets stored up; 




animal's avoidance of annihilation is itself significant, by explaining that that significance is 
contingent upon man's capacity to understand it through the divine Light. The animal cannot 
know its own meaning. But stating the importance of the interiority of divine illumination to 
man, Augustine observes that on the one hand animals, though literally having the ocular 
capacity to see like- if not better than- man, cannot see ontologically, having no logic and 
awareness of themselves. In contrast man may see onto logically and understand the 
significance of animals which have no knowledge of themselves. Man may do this through 
'that immaterial light' which enables him to come to a 'right judgement about all these other 
creatures.' In reflecting God's intention in their design they provide the Sign upon which 
man in turn reflects and may ultimately perceive the meaning of, though only by inward 
turns to the 'inner man' and faith where, by reflection on the 'idea,' illumination will be 
found. 
In Bartholomaeus' 'literal sense' description animals have intrinsic reason and innate 
intelligence. For Augustine, the significance of this innate intelligence is contingent upon the 
way we understand them. In Langland' s fictional version, we are encouraged to see God's 
presence in his creation, but advised that we may indeed only understand what that presence 
means if we have the faith which would allow His presence and purpose to be revealed. Just 
as Y maginatif explains that Learning and intelligence alone are insufficient to perceive the 
reason why the animals behave as they do, 'Clergie ne Kynde Wit ne knew nevere the cause, 
Ac Kynde [God] Knoweth the cause hymself and no creature ellis,' so interior faith n1ay 
provide the perceiver with understanding. That animals have something which makes them 
perfect at what they do- breeding, rearing, and building their homes- is frustrating for Will 
because though he glimpses the moral significance ofNature's harmony his spontaneous 
attempt to understand why man is excluded from this harmony affords no immediate answer. 
Theologically Augustine, and figuratively Ymaginatif, point to God's significant presence in 
animals- though what this means may only be understood quiditatively at an ontological 
level. For an answer Will should look to his inner faith, and rather than questioning the 
purpose of kynde- wit, understand it as God's presence and will. 
the senses of my body those numbers which we name in counting; but those numbers by which we count, are 




3. 2 (c) Langland's Theocentric view of the animal 
The failure of scripture to yield an immediate answer to Will's questions results in 
expressions of doctrinal thought about the difference between knowledge and understanding, 
and defers the problem to representations of the animal which illustrate what that problem is. 
This demonstrates a pre-emptive recognition that language alone is unable adequately to 
represent the transcendent. 
In Piers Plowman what is shown to Will is an essentially theocentric view of creation 
in which humans should have a God - centred view of nature which does not 
overemphasise the singular or humanocentric importance of man's will. God, as self-
existent omnipotent who brings into being the worldly reality, does not need a 
creation whose foundation is quite literally nothing other than His will. Rather, nature 
continues to exist as an expression of His love: 'The created order is dependent upon 
God not only for its creation but for its continued existence. Everything that exists 
therefore does so in a relationship with the creator to which it belongs. ' 297 As with 
Porphyry's understanding of the animal in On Abstinence, animals are seen 
discursively to perceive the manner in which they are inwardly affected, while it 
cannot be vocally enunciated to or by them. For Porphyry there is a silent discourse 
which takes place in the soul. The human law of speech offers a language which is 
incapable of effectively representing such a transcendent communion between the 
animal and its maker. Animals act conformably to the laws which they receive from 
the gods and nature (ABST 3. 2). This is a good enough reason for Porphyry not to 
consume the animal, though similarly Aquinas' sees the essential goodness of 
creation, based on the creation of beasts and birds in Genesis 2. 19298 in terms of the 
value of each kind of creature in itself, signified by God's leading the animals to man 
so that he would give them names expressive of their respective natures: 'Quod 
297 Andrew Linz~y, Animal Theology, (London: SMC Press Ltd., 1994) pp. 96- 97. 
298 'formatis igitur, Dominus Deus, de humo cunctis animantibus terrO! et universis volatilibus cO!Ii, addzcdt 





significatum est per hoc quod Deus ad eum animalia adduxit, ut eis nomina 
imponeret, quae eo rum naturas designant. ' 299 Creation is essentially good (Gen 1.21 ), 
but it is a utility for man. With the exception of man, who is created in God's image, it 
is created according to types (Gen. 1.25). When man does go against God's will he 
irretrievably separates himself from his union with nature and acquires the knowledge 
of the good and evil which will require his salvation, and which changes his 
understanding and perspective of God's good world. 
Divinely, the crucial question is how far such scholastic theories may properly be described 
as theocentric. Ultimately, of course they are. A God of all beings is, by definition, the 
centre of the universe, which, anagogically, has no existence outside his essence. This 
constitutes the most ineluctable difference between Christian theory and non- Christian 
theories. In any comparative consideration 'theocentricity' in that sense stands on the 
distinctive side of the equations. 
Thus, the question of how Will should come 'Thorugh ech creature, Kynde my creatour to 
love' is answered in two ways. The first, at the conclusion ofPassus XI, is that 'wit and 
wisdom ... was som tyme tresor I To kepe with a commune- no catel was holde bettre- I 
And muche murthe and manhod' (XI, 293- 295). In broad correspondence with Augustine's 
doctrine of sign and salvation we are told that intelligence will allow some understanding, 
but will not alone assist the attainment of salvation. The second answer is implicit within the 
assertion that while intelligence and wisdom allow Will to see the significant harmony of the 
animals as moral exemplars, ontological meaning is indicated by a creation which God 
occupies. When Etienne Gilson states that 'Faith, properly speaking, is in the human 
intellect, but must in a way reside also in things, albeit in things as related to the divine 
intellect' ,300 he draws attention to this presence. Schmidt's glossing of kynde as 'God' (XII 
226) highlights that Kynde is a synecdoche device, a part of a whole from which He is 
inseparable, irreducible and for which no dichotomy will suffice. While it may have 
significance for man creation exists not for him, but for God - a simple fundamental 
Christian truth that is obscure to Will. Even if human animals are the ultimate aspect of a 
299 ST part 1, Q 96, art. 1, ad 3. 
300 Gi1son, op cit., p. 238. 
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material Creation it does not follow that everything was made for man. In the figures of 
Reson and Kynde God can be seen to be 'for' all creation, caring for them and loving them 
as He does. When Will asks why the birds and beasts have such sagacity, the response is that 
it is because it is God's will, the cause only known by God himself: 'Clergie ne Kynde Wit 
ne knew nevere the cause, I Ac Kynde Knoweth the cause hymself and no creature ellis'. 
It is God's will because He has paid the greatest cost for creation in the Incarnation and 
Sacrifice, principal in the plan of redemption in which all things are created in Christ and 
saved in him: 'qui eripuit nos de pot estate tenebrarum et transtulit in regnum Filii dilectionis 
suae' [Col. 1. 13]. In this way God has emptied himself into creation and is pre-eminent in 
that creation: 'who suffereth more than God' quod he [Reason]; 'no gome, as I leeve. I He 
myghte amende in a minute while al that mysstandeth, I Ac he suffreth for som mannes 
goode, and so it is oure better.' (XI 379- 382). Thus, Reason explains that God could 
imminently put right all wrong but continues to suffer and tolerate evil in the world for the 
benefit of particular individuals, and that God so loves the world that He gave his only 
begotten son: 'sic enim Deus dilixit mundum, ut Filium suum unigenitum daret' (John 3. 16). 
Divinely, the Christ principle here is one of transparency, in which the dream within a dream 
affords will with a momentary ability to see through things to God, as He is contained within 
all things. Creation is not fallen, merely man's perspective of it, and in a fleeting moment 
Will is privileged to see it as it really is. Our human reason, and the contingencies of free-
will, perverts a clear perspective of the truth, and fron1 seeing it in all its glory. Thus we 
cannot, either, use words to describe God's creation. 
What Will's oraculum does is to actualise creation. Animals would merely be instrumental to 
man if man's pleasure alone was God's main concern. In Piers Plowman every creature is 
blessed with a function and significance or it is no creature at all: to posit that the creator can 
be indifferent to creatures, especially those who are indwelt by the spirit, is ultimately to 
posit a God indifferent to his or her own nature and being. In this way, Christian theology in 
Piers Plowman is not found merely in the ascent of man to God but in the 'revelation of God 
in his self-emptying in the crucified Christ which opens up God's sphere of life to the 
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development of man in him. '
301 
It is the special task of man within creation to do with his 
reason what other animals cannot: 'honour, respect and rejoice in the creation in which God 
rejoices' 302 and in the differentiated creatures fulfilled by Himself. 
Augustine's understanding of nature in De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus 
Manichaeorum (On the Catholic and the Manichean Way of Life) is also essentially 
theocentric, though he sees this in terms of absolutes and contingency. All things other than 
God are mutable. Natura, for him, straightforwardly means anything that exists: Natura nihil 
est aliud, quam id quod intelligitur ... aliquid esse [a nature is nothing but that thing which is 
recognised as something]303 and everything that is a' "nature" viz., a really existing 
thing. ' 304 Only one existing being has an immutable natura. As with the Neoplatonic 
understanding of the One (Nous) we should understand God in the terms of 'Ilia natura [sic., 
Dei] quae facta non est ... ob hoc immutabilis sola est' [That nature- namely, God- which 
is not made is on that account the only immutable one].305 Self-existent and eternal, God is 
Natura with an unchanging essence. All other natures are mutable because they are made by 
Him from the nothingness on which they are founded: 'Omnia quae fecit, quex nihilo fecit, 
mutabilia sunt' [all things that He made are mutable being made from nothing].306 
While animals work and abide in creation, man's reason takes him outside essential needs, to 
his wants, and so like Will he tries to read and correct creation from his point of view: a 
solely humanocentric concern which comes from free choice, placing him outside of a 
structure where God's will is inherent. The will of an individual is immaterial and 
misguided, while God's will is expressed through His animals, who always abide by His 
will. Thus, the animal becomes, in this context, exemplary. 
301 Moltmann, Jtirgen, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian 
Theology (London: SCM Press 1974) p. 275. 
302 Linzey, 1994, op cit., 25. 
303 Augustine, On the Manichean Way of Life 2.2, P L, 32: 1346. 
304 James F. Anderson, Saint Augustine and Being: A Metaphysical Essay (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1965) p. 22. 
305 Augustine, Incomplete Work Against Julian, 5. 44: PL, 45. 1494- 95, 1508-9, cited in English 
translation by Anderson, ibid., p. 18. 
306 Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, PL, 42: 551, glossing Gen. 1. 1 'in principio creavit Deus caelum 
et terram' and Col. 1. 17 'et ipse est ante omnes et omnia in ipso constant' before which there is literally and 




Augustine's position seems paradoxical in that he is saying that God is present in the world, 
yet also saying,~hat the world has no inherent meaning. Inconsistently, he propounds a 
theocentric attitude to creation, but also says that it cannot be read because it is fallen. To see 
the paradox in terms of absolute and contingent structures of understanding may be seen to 
resolve this apparent paradox. Derrida, explaining such structures, states that: 
... reading and writing, the production or interpretation of signs, the text in general as 
fabric of signs, allow themselves to be confined within secondariness. They are 
preceded by a truth, or a meaning already constituted by and within the element of 
the logos. Even when the thing, the "referent", is not immediately related to the logos 
in general (finite or infinite), and a mediated one with the signifier, that is to say with 
the exteriority of writing. When it seems to go otherwise, it is because a metaphoric 
mediation has insinuated itself into the relationship and has simulated immediacy; the 
writing of truth in the soul, opposed by Phaedrus (278a) to bad writing (writing in the 
"literal" [prop re] and ordinary sense, "sensible" writing, "in space"), the book of 
nature and God's writing, especially in the Middle Ages; all that functions as 
metaphor in these discourses confirms the privilege of the logos and founds the 
"literal" meaning then given to writing: a sign signifying a signifier itself signifying 
an external verity, eternally thought and spoken in the proximity of a present logos. 
The paradox to which attention must be paid is this: natural and universal writing, 
intelligible and nontemporal writing, is thus named by metaphor. 307 
Derrida explains that meaning is always secondary to the logos even if the referent, in this 
case the animal, has no immediate relation to the logos. Meaning may be generated by 
textual representations, which as metaphors may make meaning more immediate. This 
privileges the logos, which may then see through signs to their meaning; the imminence of 
real meaning in the logos, in other words, is dependent upon material, metaphorical, 
contingent signs, which may only be represented and identifiable in a system of signs 
expressing God's intentions- or nature as a comprehensively meaningful book. How this 
structure may be interpreted is perspectival and dependent upon the position of the 
307 Jacques Derrida, OfGrammatology (1967) Corrected Edition trans. by G. C. Spivak (London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998) pp. 14- 15. 
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individual. In this way, for Augustine an absolute point of view is inexpressible through 
material things, though they indicate anagogic absolutes. 
3. 3 'Be figure of ane vther thing': Robert Henryson and the animal as figure 
Despite the hardening of attitudes towards animals in the early scholastic period, the borders 
and peripheries between the human and animal can be seen to be in constant discourse with 
one another. In the fictive text this discourse produces powerful symbolic repertoires where 
the human - animal dichotomy can be seen to be dynamically unstable. There can be no 
better example of this symbolic, poetic discourse than the Moral! Fabillis of Esope the 
Phrygian of Robert Henry son where both correspondences and disjunctions between the 
animal and man provide a plethora of examples of the way in which a straight-forward 
categorisation or dismissal of the animal becomes problematic and threatens any unified 
integrity between tale and moralitas. There is nothing new in the assertion that Henryson 
disrupts expectation between the two, though in addition I will illustrate here that it is the 
animal which provides the discursive site which disrupts generic expectations. 
What I do not intend to do here is examine either the origins of the fable form or the breadth 
and diversity of its use and popularity. Rather, I will examine the fables as the most distinct 
use of the animal in fictions of this period from the premise that the occurrence of the animal 
in fiction questions its own displacement from ethical inclusion and consideration in 
Christian thought. In drawing the comparison between beasts and a mankind whose souls are 
embodied in an animal body, fable animals provide an apposite vehicle for the exploration of 
man's sinful or 'anin1al' tendencies. Highlighting the similarity between men and animals, 
Henryson's Fables express the man I animal inter-changeability by using animal types, or 
'typis figurall ' 308 as metaphorical figures of types of men, and allows the irrational to 
become rational in order to illustrate the various sins mankind falls prey to when he forgets 
his reason and follows his instinct and habit to become like a beast. In this way the anin1al 
308 Robert Henryson, The Poems of Robert Hemyson, ed. by Denton Fox, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981) 
589. I take Fox's edition and its ordering as authoritative throughout. 
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provides an obvious vehicle for Christian debate- especially evident in those instances 
where Henryson draws direct attention to the similarity between the two. In the first instance 
I will look at the way Henryson deals with the 'lying' charge in which he defends his poetic 
use of animals. In the Didascalic tradition, didactic fiction persuades by drawing on nature 
and animals as a taxonomic sign of how man should or should not behave, in order to lead 
him to live a better Christian life. Within this didactic mode Henryson's defence of poetry in 
the 'Prolog' to The Fables provides an example of the way the poetic may deal explicitly 
with ethical questions about the animal and the bestial aspects of man, which the official 
discourses of theology and philosophy that underpin the fiction do not. Expressed poetically 
these questions are evident in the imagined reality of a fictive animal world, offering a 
tremendous hermeneutic flexibility inseparable from Henryson's use of the animal as 
metaphor in a fictional context. Correspondingly I will look at Henryson's use of 'figure', 
and in particular at the 'syllogism' to which he refers to ask whether the logic which the 
animals 'dispute' stands up alone, or is dependent upon it being animals who use it. 
3. 3 (a) The rhetoric of fiction 
The 'Prolog' to The Fables delineates Henryson's art as one involving construction, 
combination and argument in a fictive context- in fact the art of the makar.309 Within this it 
emphasises the importance of the guidance of a critical criterion which must be observed in 
order to follow the author's intentions. Pleasure will be gained from the artist's work but the 
reader or listener must exercise effort to gain a fuller understanding of fables which 
defamiliarise their message by illustrating and allegorising their lessons through the 'central 
figure of the cycle- man as animal' 310 
This combination of the man and the beast emphasises the concept that each human is 
composed of a rational soul in a carnal body, and indicates the didactic nature of the fables in 
309 The creator or poet. Henryson and the Scottish poets Douglas and Dunbar were seen as skilled craftsmen 
who construct intricate poetic structures with words. Thus the reference to them as Makars is a similitude 
which draws on a building construction analogy. 
310 Jamieson, I. W. A., The Poetry ofRobert Henryson; A Study of the use of Source Material, unpublished 




seeking to educate Christians that from this inner dichotomy they should prioritise the needs 
of the soul above the physical desires of the body. Over and above this general teaching aim 
specific morals and spiritual truths are encouraged to be found - not merely at the literal level 
of each fable, but in its figurative meaning: 
Thocht Fein3eit fabils of aid poetre 
Be not al grundid vpon truth, 3it than, 
Thair polite termes of sweit rhetore 
Richt plesand ar vnto the eir of man; 
And als the caus quhy thay first began 
W es to rep re if the of thi misleuing, 
0 man, be figure of ane vther thing. 
(Prologue, 1 - 7). 
Henryson instructs that the moral purpose of the allegory will be as a rebuke to the reader's 
life style. But the immediate claim that the fable animals will stand in as, or be metaphors for 
man 'be figure of ane vther thing' to highlight man's animality seems to complicate the 
overall intention that man should repress or at least move away from his animal nature 
whose digressive tendencies can result in him behaving 'lyke ane beist I Quilk lufis ay 
carnall and foull delyte' (Prologue, 50- 51). 
Though merely fictional, rhetorical and figurative, the alternative world of the fables is a 
space preoccupied by the animal. Theologically, as in Henryson's fictive world, mankind is 
already digressive; but in The Fabillis mankind's animal nature is assumed and prefigured by 
types of animal who represent human traits and characteristics emphasising and illustrating 
that over which he should exercise dominion. But taking man back to the realm of the animal 
is also an ironic move on Henryson's part, creating ambiguity about the relationship 
between, and borders of, man and anitnal. While Henryson's poetic treatment of theological 
problems concerning man's similarity to the animal leaves him open to the charge that fables 
are a lie which intentionally disrupt or distort an understanding of 'truth', it is also the case 
that where the animal is not examined in any detailed or practical context by 'official' 
discourses, it is explored more fully in the poetic. Consequently, by observing at the outset 
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that 'Brutal beistis spak and vnderstude' (Prologue, 44) in the fables, Henryson emphasises 
the ironic disturbance between a person or thing and their sign which is always inclined to 
generate ambiguity, play and paradox. Subsequently he must have been acutely aware that 
the metaphor of 'aping', especially given that his intention is to deal with speaking animals, 
must prompt an immediate defensive stroke to counter the charge of being a liar.311 R. D. S. 
Jack describes the problem thus: 
The fact that animals do not normally conduct conversations highlights the sensitive 
question of whether imaginative art should be dismissed as 1 ying. In a brief but 
thorough defence Henryson moves from the text to author to audience. He opens his 
case (st. 1) by squarely facing the 'lying' charge. Imagined particulars may represent 
truthful concepts and so draw us to a better life (sts. 2- 3).312 
The verbal persuasion of the fables, in other words, converts an argument which transforms 
fiction, or a 'lie', into the perfect vehicle for the poet's persuasive, didactic craft. Its 
defamiliarisation through the allegory of the fable allows an understanding of the animal as a 
figure or metaphor which, though bearing little relation to the 'real' at the literal level, 
transmits truths about animalness over and above a mere literal sense 'scientific' taxonomy 
and physiognomy. 
311 According to E. R. Curtius the 'aping' topos can be used against an intelligent imitator of another's 
thoughts, actions, or work. By effecting the modesty or deferment topos the poet may leave himself open to the 
accusation that he acts habitually, unthinkingly and in an ape- like manner by copying another writer. Curtius 
states: 
The metaphorical use of simia is frequent in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries .... simia can be applied 
not only to persons but also to abstractions and artefacts which assume the appearance of being something 
they are not. The real ape (simius) becomes the simia when he imitates man, (simius humanae naturae 
simia), as an example of which the elder Pliny had adduced the fondness of apes playing draughts. An 
intelligent imitator could thus be called simia. (Curtius, op cit., pp. 538-539) 
In response to this position Boccaccio employs an inversion on the same theme: 'these fine cattle bellow still 
further to the effect that poets are tale-mongers, or, to use the lower and more hateful term which they 
sometimes employ in their resentment -liars.' Boccaccio, The Genealogy of the Gentile Gods, XIV, chapter x: 
'It is rather Useful rather than Damnable to compose stories' (fabulae), trans. by Charles, G. Osgood, 
Boccaccio on Poetry: Being the Preface and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Books of Boccaccio 's De genealogia 
deorum, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1930) p. 67. Animal types are used as an insult by comparing 
them to human counterparts who share designated attributes; the animal is manipulated to speak a chosen 
message with which they might be associated in the same way that the misuse of reason may become an animal 
act: 'irrational animals are not masters of their own actions, for they do not act but are acted upon' ST 1. 1 1 a, Q 
6, art 2. 
312 R. D. S. Jack and P.A. T. Rozendaal, eds., The Mercat Anthology of Early Scottish Literature 1375-
1707 (Edinburgh: Mercat Press 1997) p. 280. 
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An overview of the history of the debate is useful in revealing a belief in the basic premise 
that outside of spiritual, absolute truths, the temporal and contingent nature of signs in the 
world may indeed legitimate fictions as white lies which signify truths at a spiritual or 
anagogic level. A concise overview of the problem is given by C. S. Lewis when he 
discusses Philip Sidney's Defence of Poetry. 
The defence of poetry will not be rightly understood unless we keep two facts 
carefully in mind. In the first place, it is a defence not of poetry as against prose but 
of fiction as against fact. The word poetry often covered all imaginative writing 
whether in prose or verse, and even those critics who did not so extend it thought of 
poetry primarily as invention. What is in question is not man's right to sing but his 
right to feign, to 'make things up'. In the second place, the attack which necessitates 
this defence is not, save locally and accidentally, a puritan attack. In England, no 
doubt, most of the attackers were protestants. But so were most of the defenders. The 
controversy had begun far from England and long before the Reformation. 
Boccaccio's De genealogia deorum (XIV and XV) is as much a defence as Sidney's 
Apology. So is Plutarch's De Audiendis Poetis. Our sixteenth- century critics are 
really contributing to, or concluding, an age-old debate; and that debate, properly 
viewed, is simply the difficult process by which Europe became conscious of fiction 
as an activity distinct from history on the one hand and from lying on the other. 
It was, of course, Plato who opened this debate, and he made two very different 
contributions to it. On the one hand, in the Ion and the Phaedrus, he stated in an 
extreme form the doctrine of inspiration. He denied that poetry was an art. It was 
produced in a divine alienation of mind by men who did not know what they were 
doing. The non-human beings who were its real creators showed this by sometimes 
choosing as their mouthpiece the worst of men or even the worst of poets. On the 
other hand, in the Republic he condemned poetry along with all the other 'mimetic' 
or representational arts. This condemnation was two-sided. In part it is directed (and 
so indeed is his theory of inspiration) against the old error, still dangerous when 
Plutarch wrote, of mistaking art for science and treating Homer as an encyclopaedia. 
To that extent it was a real advance. In part it was metaphysical. Nature, the 
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phenomenal world, is in Plato's dualism a copy of the real and supersensuous world. 
Dialectic leads us up from unreal Nature to her real original. But the arts which 
imitate nature lead us down, further away from reality, to "the copy of a copy."313 
As Lewis indicates, Plato's dismissal of the poetic is based on his belief that mimesis 
involves the reproduction of a reproduction; an imperfect sign of an illusion; there can never 
be an absolute mimesis, only an alternative and even more misleading reality. There were, 
however, other responses to the question of whether poetry was a lie, such as the Aristotelian 
and the Neoplatonic. In particular it is Aristotle who says that poetry does not copy the 
particulars of nature but disengages from apparent reality and represents its general or 
universal characteristics. In this way the poetic myth shows us what would necessarily or 
probably or possibly happen in all situations of a certain kind. In a particularly rhetorical 
sense the use of talking animals- though they are in a sense merely the mobilisation of a set 
of rhetorical devices - would, for Aristotle, have some metaphorical truth, the persuasive 
outcome of which would be moral betterment: 
The use of persuasive speech is to lead to decisions. When we know a thing, and have 
decided about it, there is no further use in speaking about it. ... All orators are bound 
to use the topic of the possible and impossible: and to try to show that a thing has 
happened, or will happen in the future. 314 
In the Poetics Aristotle writes that: 
The poet's function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of a 
thing that might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable or necessary. The 
distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other 
verse ... it consist really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the 
other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and 
of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of 
universals, whereas those of history are singulars. By a universal statement I mean 
313 C. S. Lewis, English Literature in the Sixteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954) pp. 318- 319. 
314 Aristotle, Rhetoric, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. by Jonathon Bames, Bollingen Series LXXI 
Vol. 2 (London: Princeton University Press, 1985) 11.18. 1391 b, l. 
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one as to what such or such a kind of man will probably or necessarily say or do -
which is the aim of poetry, though it affixes proper names to the characters. 315 
For Aristotle, while history is limited to the particular and the actual the poet may attend to 
the universal in its potentiality, or what may happen in the future. For Henryson, as for 
Aristotle, the realm of the potential is placed higher than the realm of the actual because the 
potential scenarios of poetic fiction reveal things that are universally true to mankind and 
beast alike, and are thus more scientific than the particular events of a historical narrative. 
Henryson's mode clearly employs the idea that there are shared or universal attributes 
common to both man and animal: 
A proper understanding of reality must depend on an understanding of that which is 
universal in it. In both ontological and (when dealing with rational beings) ethical 
terms, particular realities move towards the realisation of an ideal form, and they are 
to be understood in terms of the degree to which their assimilation within that ideal 
had been achieved .... the specific details of the text and the distinctive features of 
the mode employed are subordinated to a prior set of universal values in relation to 
which their significance and function are defined. Such a viewpoint is fundamentally 
realist in its privileging of the universal. It embodies a faith in the possibility of 
aligning particular reality within the bounds of universal norms, this faith being 
underpinned by the conviction that to do so is not to neglect or retreat from important 
aspects of the realities of existence, but to depict that which is n1ost real in it.316 
For Aristotle only the universal is scientifically knowable and beasts and men can only be 
known by their universal or genus. In his use of the animal Henryson's imagined reality can 
encompass, and is dependant upon the shared or universal characteristics of man and animal, 
by compounding attributes of both in order to effect persuasion. 
315 Aristotle, Poetics in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. by Jonathon Barnes, Bollingen Series LXXI 
Vol. 2 (London: Princeton University Press, 1985) 9. 1451 b1, 1- 10. 
316 McGinley, Kevin, "The (r)uses of poetry: a study of the work ofRobert Henryson in the context of 
scholastic literary theory", unpublished 1996 Ph. D. thesis (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1997) p. 32. 
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What Henryson's defence of the beast fable demonstrates is his eagerness to legitimate his 
choice of the fable form as the discursive site addressing man's corporeal context, which he 
does by clarifying the distinction between the 'real' discourses of theology and philosophy, 
and the poetic mode in which he develops Christian theology in a practical context, and for a 
lay readership. By doing so he demonstrates that it is an authorised and accepted theological 
debate which underpins the fables. The advantage of the poetic is, of course, that it deals 
with and develops the official in an illustrative, didactic manner, and in analogous language 
appropriate to the imaginative context. Indeed, Aquinas provides a rigorous distinction 
between absolute and analogous modes of language which allow for the contingency of 
artistic discourse of the various problems not addressed by the 'official'. 317 The 'Pro log' 
constitutes an index to a plethora of doctrinal thought, indicated in a number of ways. 
Jamieson identifies Gualterus Anglicus' 'Prolog' to his version of Aesop's fables as 
Henryson's analogue. He examines both together in order to stress 'the theological and 
philosophical elements underlying The Moral! Fabillis, elements which earlier collections, in 
which the fables deal with unrelated ethical problems, do not develop. ' 318 But Henryson can 
be seen legitimately to develop doctrinal problems by appealing to the highest authority as 
the instigator of his text; in the reference to 'the great lord' required by the modesty or 
humility topos (excusatio) there is an uncertain figure who may, as R. D. S. Jack suggests, be 
God.319 By the observance of the modesty topos in this way the critic could not reproach the 
faults of the form or Henryson's treatment of it, as this authority would negate any excuse 
for not attending to the doctrine which has been signified by Henryson to be present in his 
work. In addition, Henryson's 'How mony men in operatioun I Ar like to beistis in 
317 Discussed below. 
:lis Jamieson, op cit., p 30. On the changes made to Gualterus' version see Fox, ed., Poems, p 274' Powell, 
M., 'Studies in the Background and interpretation ofHenryson's Moral/ Fabilis' D.Phil thesis (University of 
York, 1980), pp 245 -247; and I. W. A. Jamieson ibid., pp. 104-143. 
319 Jack notes this in The Mercat Anthology (p. 281) though elsewhere he develops what is an important 
point given Henryson's quidditatively defined rhetorical, dialectic focus, signifying a final ontological end: 
'medieval authors, seeing themselves as "efficient" (that is- 'caused') causes of their own work, readily 
accepted authorities greater than their own because they saw themselves humbly. Their aesthetics made them 
word artisans. Their metaphysics placed them as shadow-signs of the first cause using an inadequate signing 
system (words) within a referential mystery. Seen from this perspective, the phrase, 'Of quhome the name it 
ne id is not record' becomes a series of particularly ambiguous strokes of the pen or sounds in the art. They 
suggest at once, that the exact identity of the 'first cause' ofHenryson's tales is unimportant (human; 
rhetorical) and that its identity is 'so obvious that I need not name it' (God; metaphysical).' R. D. S. Jack, 
'Henryson and the Art of Precise Allegorical Argument' in The European Sun: Proceedings of the Seventh 
International Conference on Medieval and Renaissance Scottish Language and Literature (University of 
Strathclyde 1993) ed. by Graham Care, Roderick J. Lyall, Sally Mapstone and Kenneth Simpson (East Linton: 




conditioun' cites the theological and commonplace doctrine of comparing man and animal, 
pedagogically defined in relation to other textual definitions and commentary: 
although God created the animals as inferior beings ("all Creature he mad ffor the 
behufe I Off man"), and made man "last off all, I Lyke to his image and his 
similitude," man often degrades himself to the level of animals, because "our saull 
with sensualitie I So fetterit is in presoun Corporall" [ll. 1671 - 72, 1668- 69, 1629-
30]. The central joke of the Fables, that of animals speaking and acting like men (or 
animals bodies with human minds) remains an excellent joke, but it also has a deadly 
serious side. 320 
The complex artistic structures and discussion in the fables is, in this way, posited on a 
simple theologically commonplace premise which has biblical authority : 
Magis autem eos qui post carnem in concupiscentia immunditiae ambulant, 
dominationemque contemnunt. Audaces, sibi placentes, sectas non metuunt 
introducere blasphemantes, ubi angeli fortitudine et virtute cum sint maiores, non 
portant adversum se execrabile iudicum. Hi vero velut irrationabilia pecora 
natura/iter in captionem et in perniciem in his quae ignorant blasphemantes, in 
corruptione sua peribunt. 
[ ... and especially those who walk according to the flesh in the lust of uncleanness 
and despise authority. They are presumptuous, self-willed; they are not afraid to 
speak evil of dignitaries. Whereas angels, who are greater in power and might, do not 
bring a reviling accusation against them before the lord. But these, like natural brute 
beasts made to be caught and destroyed, speak evil of the things they do not 
understand and will utterly perish in their own corruption ... ] 
(2Peter2. 10-12)321 
That mankind has habitual and bestial tendencies after the fall, and that he should be mindful 
to aspire to a higher purpose indicates the basic tenets of Christian thought, and is especially 
320 Denton Fox, 'Henryson's Fables' in English Literary History, 29 (1962), pp. 337-56 (p. 341). 
321 This is used extensively in exegesis by Boethius, in the Cloud of Unknowing and in Bartholomaeus' 
Anglicus De animalibus, and I deal with its use below. 
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evident in those instances where Henryson draws attention to the dual characteristics of 
mankind's nature. Henry son takes doctrinal correlations between human and beast and 
presents them in a way which is complicated by virtue of the requirement of the audience to 
make moral distinctions and evaluations for themselves. The correlation between man and 
animal, used in conjunction with the nut and kernel metaphor, provides Henryson with an 
established doctrinal basis for his teaching and discussion, a critical criterion for his 
audience, and an illustration of the dialectic necessity of figurative language. 
3. 3 (b) Metaphor and doctrine 
Such exposition of the doctrinal comparison is particularly evident in the reference to the nut 
and kernel, which is in turn the citation of a multiplicitous metaphor concerning reason and 
logos: 
The nuttis schell, thocht it be hard and teuch, 
Haldis the kirnell, sweit and delectabill; 
Sa lyis thair ane doctrine wyse aneuch. 
(Prologue, 15 - 17). 
Jamieson demonstrates how Henryson takes the image of the nut's shell and kernel directly 
fron1 Gualterus and understands the doctrine as the kernel contained within the shell itself, 
noting too that Henryson's words here would 'seem to condemn those who refuse to take his 
ethical and religious preoccupations seriously. ' 322 In penetrating the meaning of the fables, 
Henryson explains, the doctrine will be revealed, effectively signalling that his discourse has 
the official authority of a range of exegetical writers, and that as such accepted authorities 
are present within his poetry and provide it with the 'doctrine wyse aneuch' which he 
develops. 




In particular Henry son's use of the nut and kernel metaphor imports Augustine as a prime 
doctrinal and theological authority while simultaneously ensuring the accretive significance 
of the husk of the material or bestial body and the meaning or logos contained within it. At 
the literal level this signs the metaphysical nature of the argument to be employed in the 
fables; the 'nuttis schell, thocht it be hard and teuch' contains a 'delectabill' kernel 
' 
indicating that an understanding of the fables and of the doctrine which it elucidates will 
only come with some considerable effort. In this context the metaphor is explained by 
reference to a twelfth - century commentary on the Thebaid of Statius : 
the compositions of poets seem not uncommonly to invite comparisons with a nut. 
Just as there are two parts to a nut, the shell and the kernel, so there are two parts to 
poetic compositions, the literal and the allegorical meaning. As the Kernel is hidden 
under the shell so the allegorical [figurce] interpretation is hidden under the literal 
meaning; as the shell must be cracked to get the kernel so the literal must be broken 
for the allegories to be discovered. 323 
The term allegory (figurce) in this passage refers to the meanings which are concealed 
beneath the literal sense of poetry. But it is the literal sense which also gives access to 
meaning; it is necessary to break the surface tension of the literal sense, or in the 
metaphorical terms of the text, the husk. At the literal sense a cock is a cock and a nut just a 
nut. For the commentator the use of the nut and kernel is a topos which signals a discourse 
on the metaphoricity of metaphors. What the commentary highlights in terms of the fables is 
that in poetic modes and language the animal only has metaphoricity, being 'notal grundid 
vpon truth'. 
It is at the figurative level, however, that the metaphor evokes theological issues concerning 
both the nature of corrupted signs, and mankind's corruption. When Henryson states that 'Sa 
lyis thair ane doctrine wyse aneuch' the word that stands out is, of course, doctrine, implying 
as it does that both the nut and kernel metaphor, or the doctrine which it contains, is taken 
from a significant authority who brings theological validity to the poetic text. Jamieson 
suggests that a theological context, or para-text, for the Moral/ Fabillis is The Cloud of 






The text is useful in providing a context: 'before er man synnid was the 
sensualyte so,obedyent vnto the witte ..... alle oure levyng schall be more beestly and 
fleschly than ovther manly or goostly. ' 325 However, there is no evidence that Henryson was 
aware of, had access to a copy of, or had read, The Cloud of Unknowing, and the use of the 
word doctrine would seem to suggest a much broader relevance to the metaphor employed 
than a single textual analogue. Nonetheless, what setting the two texts together reveals is the 
shared theme of the choices to be made by man, who is at once a perfect soul abiding in a 
beastly, deadly body. Reason, as part of his nature, might have been all that man needed 
before the fall, says the author of The Cloud of Unknowing: 'but now it is so blinded with the 
original sin that it cannot work this work unless it be illumined by Grace ... Will is a power 
through which we choose good. ' 326 The significance of illumination, 'by a man's brain is 
ghostly understood imagination; for by nature it dwelleth and worketh in the head', is 
illustrated by the Cloud-poet with the nut and kernel metaphor: 'therefore let us pick off the 
rough bark and feed us with the sweet kernel. ,327 
This particular use of the metaphor is significant because it draws on Augustine as a prime 
doctrinal and theological authority. 328 Augustine, explaining the difference between the 
literal and the figurative states: 'inside its attractive shell this husk is a jangle of fine 
sounding stones: but it is the food of pigs, not men', 329 devaluing any interpretation which 
involves the literal sense alone. He states that 'when something meant figuratively is 
324 
Jamieson, op cit., p. 37. Though Jamieson does not identify a specific point of reference in the text, he 
clearly refers to chapter 65. 
325 
Just in McCann, ed., The Cloud of Unknowing and Other Treatises, (London: Bums Oates, 1952) eh. 65. 
326 Cloud eh. 64. 
327 Cloud eh. 58. 
328 It is generally accepted that The Cloud of Unknowing is essentially Augustinian, relying as it does upon 
analogues and doctrine directly from Augustine, as well as amongst others, Pseudo-Dionysius and Richard of 
Saint-Victor (Benjamin Major). For a comprehensive discussion see J. P. H. Clark, 'Sources and Theology in 
"The Cloud of Unknowing" ' in The Downside Review 98 (April 1980) pp. 83- 110. In particular it can be seen 
that when Augustine discusses the name of God he describes how man may no longer see Him now that 
mankind inhabits a fallen existence. God may no longer be found in a fallen material sign. As he is 
incommutabilis, God is properly Essentia, not substancia; his attributes are not accidental characteristics, liable 
to change, but reside instead within His Being (De Trinitate, 5, 2, 3 PL 42, 912, citing Exodus 3. 14). As with 
Augustine's sign theory, the illumination of the intellect by the grace of God is fideistically enclosed, the 
necessity of faith preceding that of intellectual understanding. Thus the cloud of unknowing becomes as 
metaphor for fallenness: it is as a consequence of sin that man can no longer see God in this life. Only in the 
move from carnal to spiritual love and faith (Sermo 143, PL, 38, 786) will allow some retrieval of 
understand in g. 




. d 1' 11 . . d d . 330 tnterprete ttera y, It Is un erstan tn a carnal way' referring to man's inability to 
understand the literal significance of corporeal things. 
Thus, Henry~on's evocation of the nut and kernel metaphor not merely assists the critical 
criterion that he has laid down with an authorised, imagistic metaphor, but indicates that any 
sign in the fallen and temporally contingent world cannot have absolute truth, though 
contingent signs may signify spiritual or absolute truth. Once again the 'real' or the 'truthful' 
exists in the realm of the real where metaphorical truth may signify an absolute ontological 
truth, which a fallen creation can never contain or signify absolutely. Indeed the metaphor 
that Henryson uses to illustrate his suggested interpretative strategy for the fables is also, as 
in The Cloud of Unknowing, the bodily human skull, the kernel or lesson already contained 
within the mind or logos. Both Augustine's and Henryson's use of this metaphor highlights 
the dynamic instability of the human - animal dichotomy by observing that meaning is 
present in the human animal and in the significance of the beast, but that such meaning will 
always be contingent to the perceiver, who must look to himself and to God for the truth of 
the sign.331 Paradoxically, Augustine's doctrine of illumination, then, would seem to signify 
that doctrine itself is a bad reflection of ontological reality, requiring a creative exegesis by 
individuals in orde:r; better to understand God's intention. But by his choice of the metaphor 
Henryson also answers the charge that fables are a lie with the response that all discourses, 
be they 'official' or 'poetic' are a potential disruption or distortion of Truth when not 
fideistically enclosed by the pre-existent faith which will guide the reader to a correct 
understanding of the moral content of the text and the Truth which it signifies. 
330 DDoC 3. 5., 9. 
331 Though I mean to imply no direct correspondence or analogue between the two texts, Julian of 
Norwich's Showings present a similar eschatological understanding of the significance of a hazelnut. For her it 
represents creation in microcosm and at the same time provides her with an understanding that no matter how 
small or apparently insignificant a thing is, it is created, and therefore, loved by its creator. 
And in this he [God] shewed a little thing, the quantitie of an haselnott, lying in pe pal me of my 
hand, as me semide, and it was as rounde as a balle. I looked theran with the eye of my vnderstanding, 
and thought: What may this be? And it was answered generally thus: I It is all that is made. I 
marvayled how it might laste, for me thought it might sodenly haue fallen to nawght for littleness. And 
I was answered in my vndertsanding: It listeth and ever shall, for god loueth it: and so hath all thing 
being by loue of god. In this little thing I saw iij propreties. The first is pat god made it, the second 
that god loueth it, the thirde that god kepyth it. But what behyld I ther in? Verely, the maker, the 
keeper, the louer. 
In this context Julian goes on to point out the importance of the animal in relation to man and God- the 
Theocentric unity between Christ and all creation - for when He was in pain we were in pain, and all creatures 
able to suffer in pain suffered with him. Julian of Norwich, A Book Of Showings to the Anchoress Julian of 
Norwich, 2 vol., ed. by E. Colledge and J. Walsh (Toronto: Pontifical Institute ofMedireval Studies, 1978), vol. 
2. Ch. 5 rev. 1. pp. 299- 300. 
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3. 3 (c) Fables and Ideal Forms 
Augustine also offers a critical criterion for understanding the poetic and makes direct 
reference to fables. He suggests that it is not important whether certain animals existed or 
not: what is important was their meaning. In Contra mendacium he defends Aesop' s fables 
against the charge that they were lies, stating 'quod utique to tu m fingitur, ut ad rem quae 
intenditur, ficta qui de m narratio ne, non mendaci !amen, sed veraci significatione 
veniatur' ;332 through a fictitious narrative a true signification may be referred to the matter at 
hand. Augustine's doctrine of lying is typical of his moral theology generally, operating as it 
does sub specie aeternitatis, rather than from the perspective of human temporality. Simply 
put, this means that any human sufferings entailed in telling the truth should be weighed 
against the eternal values which are of immeasurably greater consequence: and in this way 
human suffering should be tolerated for the sake of truth. In the context of the fable however, 
its fictitious narrative should be seen as a temporal occurrence which involves expression 
and representation in a fallen language, and is therefore contingent upon interpretation. 
While the fable may, in this way, be a lie, the lie is a contingency which should be tolerated 
as a white lie, and off-set against gaining the spiritual truth of which the animals are 
persuasive signs. Boccaccio develops the idea when he states that he 
had supposed that a lie was a certain very close counterfeit of the truth which 
served to destroy the true and substitute the false. Augustine mentions eight kinds 
of lies, of which some are, to be sure, graver than others, yet none, if we employ 
them consciously, free from sin and the mark of infamy that denotes a liar. If the 
enemies of poetry will consider fairly the meaning of this definition, they will 
become aware that their charge of falsehood is without force, since poetic fiction 
has nothing in common with any variety of falsehood, for it is not a poet's 
purpose to deceive anybody with his inventions .... My opponents will add that 
332 Augustine, Contra Mendacium, in PL, col. 538. 
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their writings are not fiction but rather figures, to use the correct term, and their 
authors are figurative writers.333 
Boccaccio discusses the dialectic bases of the syllogism of philosophy which are not 
considered damnable. The fable has honourable origins, we are told, and if it is a sin to 
compose stories it is also, therefore, a sin to converse. Invention, rather, illustrates or proves 
an idea. Looking back to Augustine, Boccaccio also draws a distinction between wilful 
deception and extolling through illustration. Where Augustine mentions eight kinds of lie, 
and all are sin and infamous if entered into consciously, poetic fiction is free from the charge 
of lying because it is not the poet's intention or purpose to deceive anybody with invention. 
Fabulae obviously bears no resemblance to the 'real' truth. Equally for Boethius, man must 
consider his beginnings and God his author, and realise that no man is degenerate in this 
sense, as the truth of fiction lies with God its author. 334 
3. 3 (d) Henryson's use of the animal as analogy 
Henryson's use of the comparison between man and beast draws on the similarity between 
their respective physical states, with the singular difference that man has a rational, 
reasoning soul which animals do not posses. Because of the complex notion that man both 
shares and does not share qualities with animals, the chosen fable genre allows Henryson to 
explore the human with an analogy which is suited to imaginative logic whose final cause 
(causafinalis) is persuasion and the effective moving (delectatio) of the audience by his 
creative skill. The correction of human folly through symbolism and figurative language is a 
critical elen1ent of the fables, the importance of which is recognised by other participants of 
333 Boccaccio, De genealogia deorum, XIV, xiii 'poets are not liars', trans. by Charles, G. Osgood, op cit., 
p. 63. 
JJ-l The Consolation Of Philosophy 3. 5. See also Conrad ofHirsau, for whom the role of the poet is either 
to be useful or to give pleasure. Conrad points out that the reader knows that fables were invented so that by 
introducing the fictitious conversation of dumb animals or insensible objects, certain similarities in human 
morals and behaviour might be criticised. Invented stories about human events and characters correspond with 
the truth, even if only in a certain sense. The poet's purpose, in these terms, is to describe the ignorance and 
stupidity of those who err, and thus to summon the straying conscience back to a state of goodness by these 
comparisons. Conrad of Hirsau, Dialogue on the authors, 'on Aesopic invention' cited in Minnis and Scott op 




the 'invention' debate who are keen to observe that divine authority approves analogous 
comparison. 
Hear what our lord himself says: "foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests" 
[Matt. 8. 20; Luke 9. 58] and again: "say to that fox" [Luke 13. 32], that is to Herod, 
comparing his wiliness to that of a wild beast. You will find many things of this sort 
in Holy Scripture where insensible objects are moulded to fit good or bad human 
qualities, so that a comparison with the lower creature may show whether the God-
given grace of the superior being has been increased or lost.335 
The focus here is a particularly theological one, rather than the popular one which Henryson 
as a teacher chooses in the fables, though it demonstrates the preoccupation with the 
justification of figurative language and metaphor. Of particular importance in this context is 
Henryson' s collation of the idea of animals as figurative representatives of men, with the 
syllogistic moral logic which they espouse. 
My author in his Fabillis tellis how 
That brutal beistis spak and vnderstude, 
And to gude purpois dispute and argow, 
Ane sillogisme propane and eik conclude; 
Putting exempill and similitude 
How mony men in operatioun 
Ar like to beistis in conditioun. 
Na mervell is ane man be lyke a beist, 
Quhilk lufis ay camall and foull delyte, 
That schame can not him ren3e nor arreist 
Bot takis all the 1 ust and appetite, 
Quhilk throw custom and the daylie ryte 
Syne in the mynd sa fast is redicate 
That he in brutal beist is transformate. 
335 Boccaccio op cit., pp. 47- 48. 
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(Prologue, 43 - 56). 
At first sight this is an uncomplicated expression of the sentential mode of Henryson' s 
rhetoric and the animal context in which it operates. In the first stanza Henryson describes 
how animal fables depict 'brutal beistis' behaving as humans and using logic in a way which 
suggests that they are acquainted with and understand the importance of reason. R. D. S. 
Jack states that Henryson 
... educates 'be figure of ane uther thing' 'figure'- in its strictly rhetorical sense 
means that he will use figures of speech to suggest ideas. In the Morall Fabillis, for 
example, he will make brutal beasts appear to speak and understand. Because they 
share part of our soul, the animal part, but do not share the higher, rational 
component reserved for humanity, they provide ideal analogies (similar to, yet 
different from) the human state. 336 
Henryson's teaching method, in other words, will involve the representation of animals 
behaving, as some humans, in elevated or noble ways, and with the benefit of self knowledge 
and awareness. They will have particular experiences and form from them morally 
advantageous conclusions about a life limited to carnal desires. As the second stanza here 
states the moral lessons concern the avoidance of 'carnall and foull delyte' or characteristic 
behaviour which transforms the human in a 'real' sense, into brutal beasts. From this it can 
be seen that the 'brutal beistis' which speak and reason in the fictional world of the fables are 
not the same as the 'brutal beistis' into which men are transformed by habitual carnal acts, 
and Henryson urges the reader to keep two separate concepts of the beast clearly in mind. 
In drawing attention to the figurative nature of the fables in response to the lying charge 
Henryson highlights that the literal 'lie' should be excused as part of his teaching method, 
which aims to highlight doctrine, and use animals as metaphorical expression of a higher 
meaning. But when he says that the fables teach 'be figure of an vther thing' he also claims 
336 Jack, R. D. S., 'The Sense of an Ending' in The Cloak of Poetf)l: Proceedings of the Seventh Annual 
Conference of The Robert Henryson Society 2000, ed. by Morna R. Fleming (Dunfermline: The Robert 
Henryson Society, 2001) pp. 61 - 84, (p. 64). 
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that his use of the word figure comes from his translation of his 'author' Aesop,337 though as 
already shown this use of figure evidently comes directly from Gualterus Anglicus Latin 
fables. 
Denton Fox's analysis of Eric Auerbach's discussion offigural writing in his essay 'Figura' 
provides a compelling argument based on the typological interpretation of the events of the 
Old Testament, which were seen as historically 'true', but also prefigured (figurce) events of 
the New Testament, or in fact, Christianity. Where Auerbach states that '[f]igural 
interpretation establishes a connection between two events or persons, the first of which 
signifies not only itself but also the second, while the second encompasses or fulfils the 
first' ,338 Fox observes that 'Henryson's animals while remaining animals signify men, while 
we are continually reminded that men encompass or fulfil (but sometimes are no better than) 
animals. ' 339 At first glance this particular statement would seem to be a useful hermeneutic, 
though the broader argument of the essay is one which Phillipa M. Bright sees as limited and 
problematic. The problem as she states it, is that Auerbach's essay is 
Based on Latin writing of the first to sixth centuries [and that] it focuses on the 
relationship.between the term figure and the typological method of writing and 
interpretation. Auerbach acknowledges that figure was also used in conjunction with 
the more abstract, ethical kind of allegory and that in the Middle Ages "there were all 
sorts of mixtures between figural, allegoric and symbolic forms," [Auerbach 64] but 
he stresses the dominance of the typological mode and does not explore further 
complexities, such as the fact that although medieval exegetes believed in the 
historical truth of the events they were interpreting, they often ignored or dissolved 
historical contexts when uncovering the real meaning of such events. ' 340 
Bright makes an important point which she does not develop but is worth stating here as it 
the way in which the effectively humanocentric typology treats the animal as an 
337 References also include 'Figure' (59), 'typis figurall' (589), 'figurate' (600), 'fabill figurall' (1099), 
figure' (1258), 'vnder the figure offane brutal beist' (1400), 'similitude of figures' (2593), 'figurate' (2935). 
338 Eric Auerbach, 'Figura' in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature, ed. by D. Bethurum and 
trans. by Ralph Manheim (1959: Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) p. 53. 
339 Fox, op cit., 1962, p. 341. 
340 Phillipa M. Bright, 'Medieval Concepts of the figure and Henryson's Figurative Technique', in The 




inconsequential sign. In the context of scripture, for example, The Bible differs from other 
kinds of writing in offering a text which manifests its sacred truths not only through words, 
but also by means of the signification of "Things": 
the manifestation or expression of some truth is sometimes able to be made 
concerning things and words, in as much no doubt as words signify things and one 
thing is able to be a figure of another. Indeed, the author of things is not only able to 
use words to signify something, but is also able to arrange a thing as a figure of 
another thing. And in accordance with this, in Sacred Scripture, truth is manifested 
doubly. According to one way since things are signified through words: and in this 
way the literal sense is formed; according to another way, since things are figures of 
other things and in this way the spiritual sense is formed. 341 
The truths manifested by means of these types of symbolism, Aquinas explains, pertain to 
the spiritual sense, while those expressed by means of words involve only the literal sense. 
Aquinas makes use of the term figure in the specifically typological mode of figuration in 
which the Old Testament foreshadows or prefigures (jigura) the New Testament, and where 
the mode of figuration in which the Old and New together signify, or are considered to be a 
prefiguration (jigura) of heavenly things. This typology provides no perceptible hermeneutic 
for Henryson's fables, the animals of The Bible having little or no significance in Aquinas' 
typological mode. Jonah and the whale, for example, can be seen as a typological allegory of 
Christ's descent into hell, which is prefigured by J onah as a faithless man, being encased in 
the deathly body of the whale for three days, and from which death he ultimately rises. 
Typologically the New Testament equivalent is the resurrection of Christ after his three days 
in hell. One prefigures the other, but together the comparison signifies God's preordained 
purpose to be present in events even before Christ's coming [Matt. 12. 40- 42]. Within this 
the tneaning of the animal is limited to negative connotations of burial in the deathly and has 
otherwise limited meaning. Similarly, Abraham goes out into the wilderness with his son in 
order to sacrifice him, and prove his devotion to God. The disturbing scenario, which raises 
ethical and philosophical questions both about Abraham's motivation as well as God's 
341 Aquinas, Quaestiones Qudlibetales, 6a. 1. extracted from Umberto Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle 
Ages, trans. by Hugh Bredin (1959: London: Yale University Press, 1986) pp. 60-62. 
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omniscience, is answered by the New Testament. Isaac is to be a 'burnt offering' and carries 
the wood for his own pyre upon his back. Abraham 'laid it on Isaac his son' and when Isaac 
asks his father where the lamb is for the sacrifice, Abraham says that 'God will provide for 
himself the lamb for a burnt offering.' When Abraham is about to kill Isaac, the angel of the 
lord intervenes, providing instead a ram, which is caught in a near-by thicket by its horns 
(Gen. 22. 1 - 3). Aquinas' typological mode would interpret this episode as one which 
prefigures God's sacrifice of his only son, the Lamb of God who carries the cross on his back 
and is sacrificed on the cross, and who like Isaac is risen from his own death. While the two 
episodes together signify the ontological importance of the crucifixion, apart from drawing 
our attention to the comparison of Christ to an innocent lamb, what they do not do is see the 
animal itself as significant. 
Another aspect offigure, as has already been observed, is that though a thing might not be 
'real' or believable in a material sense, it may have a metaphorical truth, the truth of its idea 
or essence, which signifies an absolute reality. This is expressed in Quaestiones Qudlibetales 
where Aquinas sees that both scripture and poetic fiction transmit truths extending beyond 
the literal level, however incredible they may seem. Truth, for Aquinas, exists not merely in 
relation to the literary context but rather emerges from realising that its events indicate a 
higher or veiled truth. The 'corporeal' or actual reality, though imperfect and inferior, 
transmits the potential truth of the idea. 342 
Any discussion of 'figure' must also consider Dante, who sees that it could be unnecessary, 
or even meaningless when used incorrectly. In La Vita Nuova Dante had objected to poets 
who cover their subject with figure and rhetorical ornament to create fables, 'ancient poets 
spoke of inanimate things as if they had sense and reason, and made them talk to each other 
... as if they were substances and men' 343 but who prove incapable of divesting literary 
devices and ornament to reveal their true intention or meaning. Dante states that 
342 Aquinas, Quaestiones Qudlibetales, 7. 6, 3. cited by Eco, ibid., p. 60. 
343 Dante Alighieri, La Vita Nuova, Trans. by Barbara Reynolds (Harmonsworth: Penguin 1969) 25, 50- 55. 
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it would be a disgrace if someone composing in rhyme introduced a figure of speech 
or rhetorical ornament, and then on being asked could not divest his words of such 
covering so as to reveal a true meaning. 344 
Later, in 11 Convivio, he points out that the literal and allegorical should be seen from two 
distinctive points of view- that of the 'allegory of the poets' and the 'allegory of the 
theologians'. For Dante secular allegory is essentially moral, as opposed to the typological 
sense of scripture: 
He points out that the first sense is the literal and 'is that sense which does not go 
beyond that enunciated by the fictitious word, as in the fables (javole) of poets. The 
next is called allegorical, and this is that which hides beneath the mantle (manto) of 
such fables, and is truth hidden beneath a falsehood ... Truly speaking, theologians 
and poets use this sense in different ways ... ' 345 
Even though Dante's description of the literal and allegorical depends upon words, it is 
'things' that signify having more meaning than words, which are merely signs of signs. 
In theological texts three allegorical senses (allegorical, moral, and anagogic) may be found, 
but in poetry only secular allegory. This secular allegory, 'which is essentially moral and to 
that extent unified and "one" ... can develop different layers or levels, but these do not 
match the several senses of scripture identified by theologians ... '. 346 As Minnis observes, 
that this distinction is not clearly explained may be due to the complexity of the term 
allegoria. However, a rigorous explanation is provided by Aquinas. As with Dante's 
distinction between the two types of allegory which relate to different types of text and 
language usage, Aquinas negotiates the problem of the contingency of language by 
designating all language as figurative when it is not used in direct proportion to its principal 
referent and originator, God. By the same criteria Henryson's fables present animals that are 
as figurative as the sentence (sententia) that they speak. Indeed, any allegorical or figurative 
344La Vita Nuova, ibid., 25, 81 - 84. 
345 Dante Alighieri, '!I Convivio, Tract. ll: Voi che 'ntendendo and Extracts from its exposition' in Minnis 
and Scott, op cit., p. 396, cf, Boccaccio makes the distinction that 'Sacred Scripture has three ways of 
conveying meaning- namely, history, allegory, and tropology' in Didascalicon op cit., V. ii, p. 120. 
346 Minnis and Scott, op cit. p. 383. 
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interpretation is dependent upon the contingency of language, figure and analogy being 
employed to represent other things whose meaning is in some way irretrievably obscure at 
the literal sense of the meaning. Aquinas explains that language still provides a sign, though 
it can not mean in relation to God what it means to temporal things. There are certain modes, 
however, such as the analogous use of language, which offer some retrieval of meaning. 
Aquinas approaches the problem by arguing firstly that speaking about God involves using 
words that normally apply to things in the everyday world then secondly, asking how these 
two different uses relate to each other. Drawing a distinction between the univocal and the 
equivocal use of words, he designates that the univocal is where a word means exactly the 
same wherever and whenever it is used. The equivocal on the other hand, is where the same 
word is used, but has different meanings. Aquinas argues that words cannot really be used 
univocally to refer to both God and humanity, because of the gulf between them. Yet, the 
word, in this sense, is neither used equivocally, as if it referred to something completely 
different. 
Dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creatures univoce. Quia 
omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis recipit similitudinem agentis 
non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter,· ita et quod divisim et mutipliciter 
est in effectibus, in causia est simpliciter et eodem modo,· sicut sol secundum una, 
virtute m, multiformes et varias formas in is lis inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut 
supra dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones quae sunt in re bus creatis divisim et 
multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur cum aliquod nomen ad 
pelfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significant illam perfectionem distinctam 
secundum rationem distinctionis ad a/is; puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine 
dicitur, sign(ficamus aliquam perfectionem distinct am ab essenentia hominis, et a 
potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. [It is not possible to predicate 
anything univocally of God and creatures. The reason for this is that every effect 
which is less than its cause does not adequately represent it, in that the effect is thus 
not the same sort of thing as the cause. So that which exists in a variety of divided 
forms in the effects, exists also simply and in a unified way in the cause: just as the 
simple power of the sun produces many different kinds of lesser things. In the same 
way . . . the many and varied perfections in creatures pre-exist in God in a single and 
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unified I united form. . . . So the words that we use in speaking of creatures differ in 
meaning, and each of them signifies a perfection which is distinct from all the others. 
Thus: when we say that a man is wise, we signify his wisdom as something distinct 
from o~her things about him- such as his essence, his powers, or his existence. But, 
when we use this word in relation to God, we do not intend to signify something 
distinct from his essence, power, or existence]. 347 
Aquinas concludes that there is a relation between the use of a word to refer to God and its 
use in a human context, or as he puts it, there is an analogy that is a certain proportion 
between them (nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, id est, 
proportionem ). Where, in the created world a word, such as wise might signify an aspect of 
a man's humanity, what wise signifies in relation to God is not limited by our meaning of the 
word, but rather, goes beyond it. Thus the word is used in different senses: 'words cannot be 
used univocally of God and creatures' he states, though they may draw an analogy between 
the word's meaning in its spiritual usage, and that of its temporal. Aquinas goes on to point 
out that all words used metaphorically in relation to God apply primarily to creatures and 
secondarily to God. If this is applied to the fable animals it becomes clear that Aquinas' 
understanding woulq be that what is spoken of in terms of God must be determined on the 
basis of its meaning in relation to animals in the corporeal context first, according to the 
similarity of proportion (secundum similudinem proportionis).348 
As Henryson's fictional mode is defined with considerable precision, carefully delimiting 
how his use of figure and metaphor should be understood, and his mode quidditatively 
defined grammatically, rhetorically, and morally, it is clear that the animal should be 
understood (in fictional text and doctrinal context) as man, sharing as it does the same genus 
of animal - and sharing similarity of body. Understanding the moral content of the fables, 
however, requires that our understanding is disrupted, that language does not alone contain 
meaning- and that we do relate to the animal as the moral sign through which our own lives 
are morally mirrored. 
347 s Q Tpart 1, la, . 13, art. v. 




3. 3 (e) Summary 
While Henry son's use of the animal compounds the doctrinal premise that man should aspire 
to be different from beasts, it also complicates it. In taking the human animal back to the 
realm of the beast, the boundaries which he would seem to want to solidify remain 
undefined. Henryson' s poetic allegory, as distinct from the 'official' or doctrinal, 
defamiliarises what man's position is. In fact, it stresses the interrelationship, similarity and 
two way-ness of the way medieval thought configures the animal by the comparison which it 
makes. Part of the problem is that at a moral or tropologicallevel there is such a range of 
meaning, and such a contrast between the tales and their moralitas. The contingencies of 
fictional language at this level always remain contingent: '[n]ever does a Moral state that the 
story seeks to convey an absolute truth. The language is always contingent, conditional and 
personalised. "This selie scheip may present;" "this wolf I likkin to;" "Sad sentence men may 
seek," "My brother ... be this fabill thaw may persave and se." Such are the particular 
suggested paths of persuasion offered by these images to lead better lives. ' 349 The morals are 
not what the reader may expect and are never absolutely prescribed but are the nut left for 
the reader to crack. 
It is generally accepted that the fables follow two analogues, these being the Aesopic and 
Renardian. Denton Fox's ordering follows the logic of the clear pattern which places 'The 
Lion and the Mouse' at the epicentre of the 400 stanzas, making for a perfect symmetry and 
logical thematic unity. 350 Accordingly the fables would fall into an ordering dictated by the 
two analogues, which appeared thus: 
Fable: 1 2 3 4 5 
Source: Aesop I Renard I 
349 Jack 2001, op cit., p. 6. 
35° Fox, lxxviii- lxxix. 
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Aesop I Renard I Aesop 
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But Phillipa Bright has noted that the fables may be classified according to three, rather than 
two, apparent sets of figurative technique. The first encompasses such fables as 'The Two 
Mice, The Fox and the Wolf and 'The Wolf and the Wether', in which the animal 
protagonists are metaphoric representatives of the human world and have a single referent 
only in that the fable narrative concludes with a general moral statement which either sums 
up the main idea of the fable ('The Two Mice') or explains what the fable illustrates. In the 
second group, the concluding moralisation of each of the fables sees Henryson following the 
exegetical practice of reducing the narrative to a number of parts and of providing one-to-one 
correspondences for each part. In the case of 'The Cock and the Fox' and 'The Wolf and the 
Lamb' the figurative meaning expounded in the moralitas is the metaphoric sense of the 
fable, arising out of what the animal protagonists, as metaphors for human beings, say and do 
in the narrative. The third classification comprises 'The Sheep and the Dog', 'The Cock and 
the Jasp', 'The Trial ofthe Fox', 'The Preaching ofthe Swallow', 'The Fox, the Wolf and 
the Cadgear' and 'The Fox, The Wolf and the Husbandman', which are tales offering an 
additional sense in which the meaning expounded in the moralitas co-exists with the literal 
narrative and extends and complements it thematically. 
This third group, whose 'additional sense' involves the animal as a syntagmatic, thematic, 
adjunct that intersects with the diachronic doctrinal material underlying the text, is my point 
of focus. In 'The Cock and the Jasp' this is clearly evident in the disruption between tale and 
moralitas. Where tale plus the moralitas provides figurative analogies, or the signifier and 
the signified provide the sign, the additional sense of the animal's misreading and 
coincidence of its appetitive soul bifurcates the moral sign. Henryson states that he has 
chosen animals because they are close to man, sharing the animal soul in 'operatioun'. When 
he goes on to posit similarity in 'conditioun,' he is in the realm of invention for man's soul 
the additional element of reason, which makes that 'conditioun' different. But neither 
category is discrete, as the appetitive soul is shared and in certain situations human and 
animal needs may coincide. Fox comments that: 
The 'Tale of the Cok and the Jasp,' which opens the collection, illustrates this 
strategy very clearly. The story of the starving bird raises the question of rejecting a 
jewel in the case of starvation, a 'conditioun' shared by man and anin1al with a shared 
184 
CHAPTER THREE 
implication in sensible 'operatioun'. It would be silly for either man or beast to scorn 
luxuries when necessities are the thing. Henryson, then, imaginatively changes the 
premises in the moral to highlight a case where reason makes man's problem 
different. 'Let us suppose the jewel represents knowledge and then re-run the case.' 
This is the subtle challenge to the reader. The drama of dialectical subversion 
involves the intellects of an audience, who are constantly being asked to review their 
understanding of an apparently simple test. ' 351 
'This gentill iasp ... Betakinnis perfite prudence' ('The Cock and the Jasp' 127- 128). It is an 
immutable symbol of spiritual knowledge and illumination, described in contrast to the food 
the cock seeks as 'etemall meit' ('Jasp', 140). The moralisedjasp is given a single 
signification out of the many possible. It represents knowledge- and, specifically, the duty 
of academics to bring that knowledge back into the 'real' world. Although the syllogism 
mentioned in the prologue is limited because there is no animal interaction in this tale, what 
is clear is that while the cock may be ignorant of his spiritual needs, he is also modest and 
commonsensical, dismissing the jewel in honourable terms: 'Rise, gentill Iasp, of all stanis 
the flour' (' Jasp', 11 0). He has merely missed the point of an allegory concerning the neglect 
of the divine in men, which is ambiguous without the explanation of the mora/it as, because it 
is outside of his realm. 
In this way the moralitas is dependent upon the ambiguity generated by it being the anin1al 
who, as a fictive addition to reasoning, propounds a logic of uniquely human doctrinal 
thought. Making animals speak takes Christian reason a further step away from God, and 
from the rules of how to think about God. You can allegorise all you like- and Henryson 
does it well. But his allegory draws attention to the basis of shared similarities and 
characteristics. In this world man remains an animal and shares these characteristics. Giving 
moral agency to animals may highlight this similarity, nevertheless; it remains that 
Henryson' s fictions also highlight the rhetorical, the figurative, and types, which presuppose 
their agency: a wylie wolf and the sly fox, are the imposition of human choices on the animal 
as a space which is theologically pre-occupied. Animals may 'be figure' but this merely 
highlights the one 'real' and evident truth that animals may only really 'be'. In being so they 
351 Fox Ibid., p. 10. 
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may indeed make us look at ourselves and reproach us for our unchristian living. To 
understand this' we need only to follow Augustine's advice and look inward to find the truth. 
3. 4 The fall of man and the 'repreif ... of thi misleving' in Henryson 's Moral/ Fabillis. 
In the prologue to the Moral! Fabillis, Robert Henryson states that example and similitude 
show '[H]ow mony men in operatioun I Ar like to beistis in condition.' (Prologue, 48 - 49) 
highlighting the fallenness of material creation and the theological and pedagogically 
commonplace doctrine of comparing man and animal. Denton Fox sees the central 'joke' of 
the Fables to be that of animals having human minds, though it is edged by a deadly serious 
side. 352 The focus of this section is that deadly serious side; the interrelationship of animal 
and man in their fallen nature and theological state. It aims to define the understanding of the 
fall in the Fables which at the literal sense at least constitute an explication of man's 
condition in the worldly or corporeal context. It also asks: are there ethical questions about 
animals which are repressed and occluded in medieval theology, but which are evident in 
medieval literature? Indeed, if medieval writers see the animal as irretrievably fallen, how 
can anything be learned from it, either literally or figuratively? As Augustine and Aquinas 
define and re-define the concepts of fallenness, my reading of the Fables is based on 
Augustine's sign theory and Aquinas' argument from design, both of which are reconciled 
by the understanding of man as a microcosm of creation. 
Henryson's Fables present a view of human moral success and failure through their 
reconstruction of animal behaviour, thereby reinforcing the values important in society. 
However, in Henryson' s bestial world animals, rather than humans, emphasise moral 
messages at the literal sense where sin is embodied - highlighting the misplaced values of 
worldliness- and where sin is habitual and instinctive after the fall. 
At a figurative level, the anthropomorphised animal world of the Fables reflects worldly 
men who seem learned yet can never pass into the condition of God being in part animal. It 
352 Fox, op cit., 1962, p. 341. 
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compares sinful men to irrational beasts, a commonplace whose biblical authority offers a 
model of the fall and an obvious method of Christian debate.353 Consequently, morality in a 
fallen world finds as its focus the bestiality of men who are, as Henryson puts it, 'like to 
beistis in condition. ' 354 
If we understand creation as a fallen one in the conventional sense of an absolute fall there 
may be inconsistencies in the way the animal may be read as a sign. The paradox is that in 
the first instance animals are used as moral exemplars despite man's constant distancing of 
himself from the most obvious evidence of his fall- his bestial animality. But a second 
problem is that a fallen creation may not still be thought to speak of its maker: how could 
the animal, imperfect as a sign though it may be, signify something from which it is 
irretrievably separate, and which has no opportunity to gain salvation from the results of 
man's, rather than its own, disobedience? Do we view fallen creation as literally true, or 
from the premise of an allegorically persuasive narrative of man's state in relation to an all-
creative God? The answer is a typically medieval 'either or both'. In aiming to clarify how 
animals may, as part of a 'fallen' creation, present the best possible harmonious sign and 
useful method of Christian debate it is necessary to observe Augustine's spiritual as 
absolute, and his temporal as contingent distinction. For Augustine the literal level of 
scripture is writing of 'outstanding authority' and absolute truth. If the theological line of 
truth is literal, though, he also stresses that we must be witness by our own knowledge to 
things within our range of senses, but which signify things out of the reach of these senses. 
For Augustine the mental process of reason constitutes a second level of understanding 
where the arbitrary signs of the temporal involve interpretation.355 While Genesis as a literal 
sense scriptural text presents the fall as an all-inclusive one, Aquinas' view of man's 
corporeal context is contingent upon a specific definition of man's interrelationship with 
creation, a relationship based on the idea of n1an as a microcosm of God who speaks him 
353 Cf, 2 peter 2. 12, 'Hi vera vel ut irrationabilia pecora natura/iter in captionem et in perniciem in his 
quae ignorant blasphemantes, in corruptione sua peribzmt', and Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy 
(Chaucer's translation) IV. 3 'syn he may not passe into the condicioun of God, he is turned into a beeste' and 
Ill. 8, man is a 'thyng that is right foul and brutyl (that is to syn, seruant to thi body). Jamieson, op cit., pp. 36-
38. 
354 John MacQueen sees these lines as the reaction of 'incorruptibility to the corruptible which became so in 
consequence of the fall of A dam, but still retains something of its original appearance. God made man in his 
own image; fallen man retains the likeness, but has much ofthe nature ofbeasts.' MacQueen, John, Robert 
Henryson: A Study OfThe Major Narrative Poems (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1967) pp. 199- 120. 
355 DCD 11. 3. 
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into being. In this sense, man contains all the cosmos within himself, and within him alone 
all creation is fallen. By this premise, animals can be seen as separate from this fall, 
retaining meaning as signs in a way that only the unfallen could. 
3. 4 (a) Do the Fables conform to a traditional view of creation as fallen? 
There seems little doubt that the fall narrative can be seen as an explanation of what 
medieval thought already knew from experience: that it did not inhabit a paradise free from 
suffering and death and that man's habitually animal appetite is analogous to his fallenness: 
Na meruell is, ane man be lyke ane beist, 
Quhilk lufis ay camall and foull delyte 
That schame can not him re3ne nor arreist, 
Bot takis all the lust and appetyte 
Quhilk throw custom and the daylie ryte 
Syne in the mynd sa fast is redicate 
That he in brutal beist is transformate. 
(Prologue, 50 - 56) 
The 'brutal beistis' which speak and reason in the fictional world of the fables are not the 
same as the 'brutal beistis' into which men are transformed by habitual carnal acts, and 
Henryson urges the reader to keep two separate concepts of the beast clearly in mind. The 
distinction between the beast and the human behaving bestially operates at a moral or 
tropological level, where the beast does not share in the Christian plan of redemption and 
can follow its animal nature: with no 'soul' there is no ontological judgment or punishment. 
Despite the incorruptibility of his soul man's fallen state and corresponding comparison to 
animals expresses a regrettable, even uncomfortable, understanding of the necessity of a 
corporeal body yet a subjection to that bodies' 'lust and appetyte'. The prologue defines the 
soul in basically Aristotelian terms where it is infused into the corrupted 'camall and foull' 
body upon whose biological conditions it is dependent for its existence. To illustrate this 
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soul I body dichotomy Henryson uses animals because, while talking animals bear little 
relation to reality, the body into which the soul is infused, though not in God's image, is of a 
carnality equal to that of mankind. 
In 'The Paddock and the Mouse', a mouse who desires to cross a river for better food, asks a 
toad to ferry her. The mouse requires the toad to take an oath that she will provide safe 
passage. As the Toad tries to drown the mouse, a kite grabs them both and disembowels 
them. The fable typifies the interrelationship between man and his fallen animality. For 
Augustine, soul 'rejoiced' after the fall in its freedom to act 'perversely' and so 'was 
deprived of the obedient service which its body had at first rendered .... This then was the 
time when the flesh began to "lust in opposition to the spirit", which is the conflict that 
attends us from our birth.' 356 In this way, the discussion by the river represents the 
instantaneous opposition of the soul to body at their joint conception because the desire of 
the body has become an obstacle to the reasoning of the soul, and ultimately therefore, to 
salvation. The soul is created as it is infused into the material, and must necessarily be united 
to the fallen body for the operation of sense perception. This is clear in the fable, in that 
while simultaneously incorruptible and not subject or relevant to time, the mouse is also 
bound within its body: 'suld I be bund and fast quhair I am fre I In howp of help?' 
('Paddock', 2861 - 2) which can be paraphrased: why should I be infused into a body and 
subject to time when at the moment time has no authority over me- yet I can in no other way 
obtain salvation?357 While the fables generally require that the reader work to establish the 
moral values of the tales, they do not generally extend to such complex allegorical exposition 
as we see here. This may be attributed to the fact that 'The Paddock and the Mouse' is the 
final of the fables. Certainly Henryson seems to encourage the reader to reflect not merely on 
the practical connotations that the tale has for their lifestyle, but to shock them into seeing 
the anagogic implications, and a divine perspective- or in fact judgment. Thus, obtaining 
recovery from the conditions of a material body shifts the fable's focus from one of moral 
sent entia to the more pressing concern of spiritual salvation. 
356 DCD 19. 15. 
357 For a discussion see MacQueen, op cit., p. 199. 
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The understanding here is that creation is a fallen materiality into which souls are infused. In 
fact, infusing 'human' souls into the animals of the text becomes an illustration of the 
duality of man's theological definition, as well as a profound expression of discomfort with 
the animality of humanity. 'Paddocks' or toads displaying apparent signs offallenness, 
webbed feet and an ugly appearance, are difficult to read. The mouse asks how the toad can 
cross the river so easily: 'I haif mervell,' than quod the lytill mous, I 'how can thou fleit 
without fedder or fin?' ('Paddock', 2805 - 6). The toad stresses its adeptness when in its 
element, having 'twa feit,' quod scho, 'lukkin and braid' ('Paddock', 2812). Its webbed feet 
and physiognomy (the mouse's physiognomic lore proves more reliable than scripture in the 
fable) are a sign of its and man's fallenness and signify the deceptive nature of the corporeal 
and the danger of being misled by 'false appearances and delusory signs. dSS The mouse has 
no certain means of discerning whether the impression she forms from the toad's outward 
appearance is accurate in a world where the appearance and significance of the animal belies 
reality, thereby pre-figuring the warning of the moralitas not to judge by superficial criteria. 
Signs are contingent when in a corporeal context 'defined and constrained by circun1stance, 
including the spatial and temporal "frames" within which they take place. ' 359 Henryson's 
statement that the Fables 'repreifthe ofthi misleuing, I 0 man, by figure of ane vther thing' 
(Prologue, 6- 7) therefore suggests a reproof of man's animal sins exemplified by the 
fallenness of the toad and mouse. However, in a text that highlights the arbitrariness of a 
temporal context we might ask how the fallen can present any significance? 
3. 4 (b) Augustine's understanding of the fall 
Augustine's view that the fallen state of humanity in principle affects the whole of the 
created world is clearly illustrated in Henryson's world of the wolf and the lamb. A wolf and 
a lamb drink from the same stream, to which the wolf takes exception. The Lamb defends 
itself with scripture and legal terminology, but despite its reasoning is slaughtered by the 
wolf. As arbitrary and dualistic as the lamb's legal rhetoric may be it offers the wolf a 
358 McGinley op cit., p. 249 ff. 
359 McGinley, ibid., p. 249. 
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choice- prefiguring the divine judgement cited by the lamb. The lamb's question 'Haiff3e 
not hard quhat'Halie scripture sayis I Endytit with the mouth off God almycht?' is set against 
the wolfs nihilistic 'hellis fyre' and his very fallenness ('The Wolf and the Lamb' 2665 - 7). 
A world in which one species has, for its survival, to prey upon and destroy another is not 
one that we might expect an omnibenevolent God to create. In Eden, man had no need of 
animals. With the fall, however, the relationship changes.360 By his disobedience man 
forfeited his easy dominance over other species and began to eat them, Adam and Eve lost 
immortality, became subject to pain and death, and became aware of their sexuality. 
Consequently, all humanity, who were all in a way contained within Adam, would carry the 
burden of the fall. 'Every man is his own Adam' (Rom. 5. 12) was a compelling idea to a 
society who saw themselves as 'a moral mess, weak of will and prone to lust, envy, greed 
and every sort of unkind and anti -social behaviour.' 361 Man's chosen free-wi 11, in other 
words, involved him in choices of good and evil. The definitive response comes from 
Augustine, who asserts that God cannot have produced evil. Evil, rather, is a choice, a free 
'turning-away' from God, and not an entity in its own right. As 'all good is from God ... 
hence there is no nature which is not from God ... there is no nature which we admit is 
sin. ' 362 For Augustine this turning away involves man's indulgence in his anin1al nature. 
In City OfGod Augustine states that the result of man's disobedience is an uncontrollable 
lust evident in the carnal nature of sexual activity. In Eden man's genitals were servants of 
his mind and obedient to his will. Anger and lust were not part of man's healthy state and 
intercourse did not involve the involuntarily excitement of instinctive lust. If he wanted to 
procreate, he could do it with the same control as he could sow seeds in the ground, a faculty 
lost with the fall. Sex becomes an uncontrollable activity, the intensity of sexual climax 
involving the extinction of mental awareness.363 With the Fall Adam rose up to escape 
36° Cf, maledicta terra in opere tuo; in laboribus comedes ex ea czmctis diebus vitae tuae (Gen. 3. 17). 
361 H. J. Lynch., The Medieval Church: A Brief History (London: Longman Publishing, 1998) pp. 262- 3. 
362 Augustine, 'On the Relation of God and Evil.' From de libero arbitrio, Trans. by McGrath, op cit., p. 
104. 
363 'So intense is the pleasure that when it reaches its climax there is an almost total extinction of mental 
alertness; the intellectual sentries, as it were, are overwhelmed ... surely such a man would prefer, if possible, 
to beget children without lust of this kind. For then the parts created for this task would be the servants of the 
his mind, even in their function of procreation, just as the other members are its servants in the various tasks to 
which they are assigned. They would begin their activity at the bidding of the will, instead of being stirred up 
by the ferment of lust.' Augustine, City Of God, op cit., 14: 16., p. 577. 
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God's will in favour of his own, ignoring the fact that the existence of his own will 
depended entirely upon the will of God. His punishment is loss of control over his body: 
'The arrogance of sex is the punishment and consequence of the arrogance of man. His 
uncontrolled sex is exactly the same as what he himself has been towards God - a rebel. d 64 
In this same way the wolfs rejection of the lamb's reasoning, despite his understanding it, 
constitutes a rebellion against cited scripture and the abandonment of moral choice to his 
angry nature and the dominant and instinctive blood lust of his animal type. His final remark 
to the lamb is that this is just the way of things in this world: 'Ha,' quod the volff, 'thou 
wald intruse ressoun I Quhair wrang and reif suld duell in propertie' ('Wolf, 2693- 4), 
demonstrating that reason has no place in his nature, illustrated in the graphic description of 
the murder of the Lamb: 
The selie lamb culd do nathing bot bleit; 
Sone wes he deid: the Wolffwald do na grace, 
Syne drank his blude, and off his flesche can eit, 
Quhill he wes full, 
('The Wolf and the Lamb', 2700- 2704). 
The sacrifice of the lamb presents an inversion of the Eucharist where the emphasis placed 
on the drinking of his blood constitutes an act that strengthens the wolf s anitnal rather than 
spiritual tendencies. The lamb and his scripture, representing Christ as the Word made flesh 
from the mouth of God, or 'Endytit with the mouth off God almycht?' ('Wolf, 2666), is to 
be partaken of by mankind in redemptive sacrifice. But the wolf, as the fallen word and the 
fallen flesh, suggests a profoundly pessimistic view of human nature. Haijo Westra's study 
of the speech of animals in the Ysengrimus observes the first method of cunning to be the 
serpent's use of language as a verbal trap. This bifurcation of speech and the dualistic 
thought that it represents is unmistakable in this scenario where the wolf is thinking about 
flesh rather than his soul. The lamb's legal pleading is met with the wolfs response, 'Be 
Goddis woundis, fals, tratour, thow sall de' ('Wolf, 2697), his language revealing his 
character precis~ly because the wolf cannot answer scripture, represented by 'what is 
probably the most intensely physical metaphor for deceitful language ... that of voracious 





Eating his enemy to gain its virtue, he does this in remembrance of the lamb's 
father, visiting the sins of the father upon the son. In what can be termed typological hatred 
he destroys the body of Christ. The wolf destroys because he hates. Moreover, feeding upon 
itself, hatred is the ultimate cannibal that consumes its own body, or in this case, destroys its 
own salvation. He rejects the Word but devours the flesh, the irony being that what he eats 
are in effect his own words. 
The world of the wolf and the lamb is one where all animals, including the men that they 
represent, are fallen, manifested in instinctive and habitual bestiality and lust. While moral 
failure in humans was not theologically excusable, moral failure in animals was excusable 
because it did not involve n1oral agency. But Henryson's anthropomorphised wolf is given 
personal choice, which is negated by the characteristic instinct to kill, in line with his type, 
therefore typifying the habitual lusts of the corporeal, bestial, and habitual man. 
Consequently Henryson's use of animals as exemplars of the dangers of sin suggests a deep 
concern to turn the audience- directly identified as men of law, nobles, and 'mychtie men' 
('Wolf, 2729) in 'The Wolf and the Lamb'- from their 'beastly' ways to behaviour which 
would be best for the soul. During his lifetime Augustine persuaded the majority of 
Christians that sexual desire and death are 'unnatural' like the essentially unnatural acts of a 
wolf whose lustful will contradicts his moral agency but not his animality. Augustine insists 
that it is through an act of will that Adam and Eve 'did change the structure of the universe; 
that their single wilful act permanently corrupted human nature as well as nature in 
general. ' 366 This requires and affirms a belief in the free-will of the creatures whom it 
regards as responsible for rebelling against the creator and disrupting the harmony which 
was His meaningful, intended creation. It both affirms God as creator and repudiates that 
creation is a retrievable sign. So we might ask again, if the fable signifies what is best for the 
soul how does it do so, given that we cannot trust the contingency of signs? 
For Augustine the problem is how we learn or understand anything if creation is 
irretrievably fallen. His answer is the provision of divine illumination: while the teacher can 
365 See Haijo. J. Westra, 'The Speech of Animals in the Ysengrimus and the Subversion of a Christian 
Hierarchy of Discourse', in Reinardus: Yearbook of the International Reynard Society for the Study of the 
Beast Epic, Fable and Fabliau, ed. by Brian Levy & Paul Wackers, Vol. 2., (Amsterdam: John Benjamin's 
Publishing Co., 1989) pp. 195 - 206. 
366 Elaine Pagels, Adam, Eve, and the Serpent (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) p. 137. 
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never actually teach anything, they may assist the pupil to see truth not by didactic narratives 
but by dialectic involving choices facilitated by a fortunate fall. In this way Henryson does 
not take sides in the narrative of the wolf and lamb fable; rather, he supports the tale with a 
balance of seemingly incontestable Scriptural arguments suggesting human moral choice by 
each individual listener or reader. In the same sense the only true teacher for Augustine is 
the logos or 'inner word' that sets standards and mediates human choices of assent and 
dissent: 
One who hears me likewise sees those things with an inner and undivided eye, he 
knows the matter of which I speak by his own contemplation, not by means of 
words. Hence, I do not teach even such a one although I speak what is true and he 
sees what is true. For he is taught not by words, but by the realities themselves made 
manifest to him by God revealing them to his inner self. 367 
The soul is seen as the recipient of divine truth whether this is by experience of the 'real' by 
sciencia or knowledge through the senses: or in the abstraction of words which would enable 
sapientia or wisdom from the contemplation of eternal reality. The student must employ 
reasonable discrimination to perceive arbitrary and attenuant words and signs while 
inwardly he comes to understand by internal truth, illuminated by the grace of God. 368 
Like the problem of knowing in 'The Paddock and the Mouse' n1eaning may not 
immediately be distinguished by signs which draw attention to their very fallenness but in 
correlatives between prologue, fable and, moralitas. Repeating the imagery of the prologue, 
the 'hard nuttis' of the corporeal and the promised 'feist' of the spiritual ('Paddock', 2796-
7) present the far riverbank as symbolic trope and seemingly uncomplicated cliche 
representing heaven and spiritual reward. But the difficulty in reaching it and its meaning by 
the audience - and the mouse - may only ever be attainable by a literary expression which 
represents what man already knows. Literary symbolism, in other words, presents arbitrary 
367 DMa 40, cf., the Augustinian background to Hugh of Saint-Victor's words 'the idea in the mind is the 
internal word, which is shown forth by the sound of the voice, that, by the internal word. And the divine 
wisdom, which the father has uttered out of his heart, invisible in Itself, is recognised through creatures and in 
them.' Didascalicon, op cit., V. iii. 
368 For a useful discussion in full on this understanding and its uses see Ake Bergvall, The "Enabling of 
Judgement": Sir Phi lip Sidney and the Education of the Reader, PhD thesis at the University of Uppsala 1989, 
(Sweden: Uppsala, 1989) p. 84. 
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signs of arbitrary things for decisive interpretation which may be understood if the audience 
has faith and is granted the divine grace to understand its meaning.369 
3. 4 (c) The Scholastic rejection: the argument from design 
To medieval thought Genesis presented an innocence which was unimaginable, but which 
seemed evident in the harmony of natural signs. Brian Murdoch has observed that a fallen 
mankind cannot conceive of what is it to be naked yet unashamed, leading to what he calls 
logical impasses for both theological and secular literary writers.370 These 'logical 
impasses', most evident in Augustine's sign theory, seem to resolve themselves with 
Aquinas' 'rejection' of the idea of a complete fall in favour of seeing animals as 
allegorically persuasive signs of a benevolent God. In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas 
explains that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over animals, and that the 
nature of animals was not changed by man's fall, in the understanding that an all-
encompassing fall of creation would problematise semiotics. There would be no direct line 
from present reality to interpreting God. Aquinas asserts the essential goodness of creation 
and the value of each kind of creature in itself. This, Aquinas explains, is signified by the 
fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their 
respective natures: 'Quod significatum est per hoc quod De us ad eum animalia adduxit, ut 
eis nomina imponeret, quae eorum naturas designant. ' 371 Creation is essentially good (Gen 
1. 21 ). If providentially indeterminate, animals would be an empty sign for Aquinas because 
they would no longer maintain the purpose of their design, no longer offer the 'experimental 
knowledge' provided by the essential determination of each animal nature, existing as it 
does to inform its highest quidditative definition, man. Aquinas explains that in the process 
of generation nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection: 'Sicut enim in generatione 
369 In this sense the interpretation of the Fables by labour and 'grit diligence' (Prologue, 9) lies within the 
frame of a private experience whose content cannot be transmitted or communicated to other individuals, 
leaving the particular individual forever bound inside a nutshell of incommunicable experience. This is a 
classic example of a medieval inversion of the function and use of the universal. Value is not placed on 
universals for Augustine, because they cannot exist in a fallen world. Knowing, rather, is an interior activity, 
truth being contained within the individual logos. 
370 Murdoch, op cit., p. 21. 
3 71 ST Q 91 , 1 , ad 3. 
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rerum intelligitur quidam ordo quo proceditur de imperfecta ad perfectum' .372 In this way 
he sees the essential purpose of the animal as informing that which is rationally above it: 'If 
then nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that 
nature has made all of them for the sake of man. ' 373 The proper end of animals is to nourish 
man's knowledge of creation.
374 
Aquinas' statement that in the state of innocence before 
' 
man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him highlights the 
exemplary relationship for which animals were designed, and while the nature of animals 
was not changed by man's sin, 'Non enim per peccatum hominis natura animalium est 
mutata', 
375 
and for his disobedience to God man was punished by the disobedience of the 
animals: 'inobedientia ad hominem eo rum quae ei de bent eius, eo quod ipse fuit inobediens 
Deo' .
376 
So while in innocence man had no 'bodily' need of animals for clothes or as food 
he needed experimental knowledge of their natures. In what seem closer to fable animals, 
who were designed as illustrative exemplars, the animals of Genesis present themselves to 
man to be named- though not to be eaten (Gen. 1. 19, 2. 18).377 
Reading the Fables from the premise of intended design would involve seeing each animal 
as conforming with its original design, with types such as a 'fen3eit' fox and '[A]ne cruell 
volff whose characteristics must be the God-given ones from which man would learn. 
Though not 'al grunded vpon truth' the further attribution of human characteristics to the 
fable animals presents a mirror to man by the figural relationship tnaintained between 
animal and human which, by Aquinas' argument, would be God's continuing intention. The 
paradox of this is that animals are nominally defined by what man says they are, in Aquinas' 
tem1s the names A dam gives animals being expressive of their respective natures. The 
wolfs characteristics are his 'wickitnes' ('Wolf, 2624) and cruelty, his accusations and 
actions 'contrair ... to ressoun'. ('Wolf, 2644) But he is both what he always was, full of 
372 ST Q 96, 1, res. 
373 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. by T. A. Sinclair (London: Penguin, 1981) I. iii, 1256 b, pp. 78- 79. 
374 'For a creature's shaping and conditioning indicate that it comes from some-where; its specific form 
indicates its makers word as a house's shape indicates its architects idea; and its functional order indicates its 
maker's love as a house's uses indicate what its architect willed.' ST 1991, Q 93. 6. 
375 STQ 96, 1, ad 2. 
376 sr Q 96, 1' res. 
377 For Aquinas human ascendancy is subject to a divine plan in which each animal in particular is designed 
to serve a purpose. In Eden this was to inform man about his creator: 'et sic etiam homo in statu innocentiae 
dominabatur plant is et rebus inanimatis, non per imperium vel immutationem, sed absque impedimenta utendo 
eorum auxi/io', in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in 
commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance. (ST part 1, Q 96. 2). 
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'violens', 'craft' and sutelte' ('Wolf, 2713) as well as types of men, 'fals extortioneris' 
('Wolf, 2711) in the text. He is what God his author made him and what Henryson his 
author makes him. These types are unchanging: '[T]he volfis thocht wes all on wickitnes; I 
The selie la~b wes meik and innocent' ('Wolf, 2624- 5).378 Man in his turn is defined by 
animal types whose designated attributes are universal ones. There could be no universals in 
a fallen world, and without universals knowledge is impossible. Thus, Aquinas' argument 
from design allows the universal characteristics of types, not of individuals, to constitute 
knowable signs where the identity of its type is also its value. The animal is both a universal 
and a lesson remaining consistent and unchanged from the original design of the creator, 
who also designed a fundamental similarity between animals and man so that he could learn 
from the very 'meaning' of each anima1.379 
While the morals of the Fables are ones configured in speaking animals, there is also a sense 
in which literal things are more dependable than words, and types of men and animal more 
universally knowable: '3yt neuertheles we may haif knawlegeing I Off God almychtie be his 
creatouris' ('Preaching' 1650- 1651). MacQueen sees this as Tho1nastic thought,380 God's 
wisdom being proved by the harmony of his material creation. His fairness is proved by the 
beauty of a creatiot: including man made in God's image, and His benign nature proved by 
his subjection of creation to man's use (bonitas utilitas) or in Henryson's terms 'All creature 
he maid for the behufe I Off man, and to his supportation' ('Preaching' 1671- 1672). 
Animals still retain their 'meaning' as a transcript of divine goodness, and while innocent 
victims of man's sin, man is innocent of parasitism because they were designed for his 'use'. 
What Aquinas' distinction highlights is that if animals were fallen, they would no longer 
fulfil their purpose as meaningful Sign being instead a contingent- if useful - sign. Indeed, 
reading a fallen creation in terms of morality would be highly suspect at best, for the laws of 
nature operative in this fallen world would not correspond to the will of God, and the 
378 At a lexical level Bartholomaeus Anglicus' description of the wolf is characterised in this way. What the 
wolf treads on does not live. He is 'a raueyn beste and desireth and coueytep blood' and 'a greet glutoun and 
devourep moche.' But he is also associated with sexual desires, the hairs in his tail acting as an aphrodisac in 
men. For the wolf, though, this desire takes a specific form. He 'deceyuen scheep more wip gyle and wrenches 
pan wip might and strength' because, as Aristotle says 'a) pe kynde of wolves is contrary and adversary to al pe 
kynde ofschep.' DPR 18. 71. 
379 Scripturally underpinned by' Jnvisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellect a 
conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque eius virtus et divinitas, ita ut sint inexcusabiles' (Rom. 1. 20). 
380 Macqueen, op cit., p. 59. 
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Christian reader of creation could not assume creation as a textbook for moral reference 
because it would be morally imperfect. As God's intention was to create all things good 
animals must be objects of value fo! man's knowledge and a signifier for their creator, 
continuing to exist with His approval, which they do meaningfully to demonstrate His 
benevolence of intention toward man. The design premise, in other words, must encompass 
the fall as a means to an unchanging providential end within which animals have inherent 
value. 
3. 4 (d) The microcosm - macrocosm relationship 
As observed above, Bartholomaeus Anglicus sees man as a microcosm akin to the sphere of 
elements which is the world. There are three levels of how we may read this world. Firstly, 
God is understood in the world that He made: 'as Boys [Boethius] seip: pow bringest forp 
alle pinge of hey ensample, pow fairest: berest in pi mynde pe fairest worlde and makest and 
worchist by a lik ymage.' The second world is the world as it is made up of the things of the 
cosmos, or the elements: 'as heuen in pe whiche pe sterre[s] schinep, and fyre pat hetip al 
pinge, ayer by pe whiche alle ping pat hap lif brepep and pryuep, watir pat biclippep pe sides 
of perpe, erthe pat susteynep and holdep vp and fedip al pis lowe pinges.' The third world is 
man himself within that universe: 'for he schewip in himself likeness of al pe worlde ... pe 
thridde worlde is somdel euerlastinge and somdel passing, beringe in hitself licness of all 
pinges' 381 
This understanding would seen to support the idea that animals present potentially unfallen 
signs, stating as it does that man is a microcosm of macrocosmic correspondences. It is in 
this context that Aquinas does not question that there was a fall, but sees man alone as fallen 
in this sense: 'Dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sunt omnia,· et ideo secundum 
modum quo dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei dominari 
aliis' [Man in sense contains all things, and accordingly is master of what is within himself. 
381 DPR, op cit., 8:1. Seymour in his commentary on De proprietatibus rerum observes the relationship with 
'the Hermetic idea of man as microcosm, expressed for example in the Asc/epius ... restated by Bernard 
Silvestrus, De mundi universitate, in Seymour 1992 op cit., p. 97. 
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In this way he can have mastership over all things].382 The view that the cosmological 
change is within man as a microcosm of creation primarily involves the understanding that 
God speaks man into being: 'Et a it: Faciamus hominem ad imagine m et similitudinem 
nostram' (Gen. 1.26). Henryson understands that God both creates and contains all 
' 
speaking man into being in similitude to Himself, who in turn contains all things within 
himself: 
And mannis saull is febill and ouer small, 
Off vunderstanding waik and vnperfite 
To comprehend him that contenis all 
('Preaching' 1644- 1646). 
But this trinity may not truly be understood, as Henryson observes in 'The Preaching': 'Nane 
suld presume be ressoun naturall I to seirche the secreitis off the Trinitie' ( 1648-9). Rather, 
man should have faith, let reason be, and gain knowledge of God's gracious mind from 'his 
creatouris' ('Preaching', 1651). 
In this sense it is the macrocosm-microcosm relationship that makes the Fables a 
specifically Christian text. In the first world God is known by and in the things he has made: 
Henryson's toad 'is mannis bodie' in his corporeal context ('Paddock', 2937). As in 
Bartholomaeus' understanding of the microcosm, the toad comes to represent the corporeal 
world of which she is made, 'inconstant, fals, and wariand' ('Paddock', 2847- 2850). 383 But 
the toad is cognate with Bartholomaeus' man as third world or microcosm of the cosmos, 
bearing as he does all things within himself 'saull and bodye' dwelling in the 'flude' of the 
corporeal ('Paddock', 2958). In this sense the figurative comparison of man's body with the 
toad's allows an understanding of 'pe vnseye pingis of God bep iseye and iknowe by pingis 
pat bep imade and vnderstonde' (DPR 8. 1). 
If the toad is the world how do we read it, especially as we are told that people are not to be 
judged by external appearance? 
382 ST Q 96, 2, res. 
383 The allegorisation of the toad as the world has as its authoritative source Odo of Cheriton' s statement 
'mondus similis est Rane,que blandiendo muri prom is it' cited by Jamieson, op cit., p. 59. 
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Off sum the face may be full flurischand, 
Off silkin toung and cheir rycht amorous, 
With mynd inconstant, fals, and wariand, 
Full off desait and menis cautelous. 
('Paddock', 2847- 2850) 
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The mouse, of course, is right to be sceptical about the paddock's appearance, ultimately 
being easily deceived by the 'silkin toung' because 'as a temporal fallen creature, man is 
subject to illusion. '
384 
The mouse's pact with the toad continues the consistent imagery of 
being tied to and drowned by the material: 'suld I be bund and fast, quhar I am fre, I In hoip 
of help' ('Paddock', 2861- 2). Jamieson goes as far as interpreting the water as the world of 
sin into which man is immersed385 and the paddock 'is mannis bodie' ('Paddock', 2937) 
swimming in the world of the sea 'Ay in perrell, and reddie for to droun.' ('Paddock', 2 940) 
Desire for the material, as exemplified by animals and animal desires offer no salvation: 'of 
all camalllust be the suggestioun, I Quhilk draws ay the saull and duggis doun' ('Paddock', 
2953- 4). 
These multiple levels of interpretation, coupled with the idea of man as microcosm, suggests 
that creation is fallen but it is in the specific sense of being fallen within man, whose 
spiritual fall and free will are solely responsible for his condition. The patently illusory 
presentation of animal as man in the Fables indicates the exemplary nature of animals as 
lessons about man's fallenness in the corporeal. But as signs, animals retain their integral 
design in correspondence with the original Will of the creator, and as signs they cannot be 
morally or spiritually fallen. Thus, to ask whether creation is fallen, Scholastic thought 
returns the question, what exactly is creation? And it finds as its answer that while man has 
the ability to transcend by virtue of his reason, 386 like God he has a creation within himself 
which fell by his own free-will. 'If nature is fallen, then there is no straightforward line to be 
384 M Q . "O ac ueen, op crt., p. -' . 
385 J . . 70 am1eson, op ell., p. . 
386 'Things in general resemble God in existing, some things also in being alive, and some finally in 
intellectual discernment: the closest likeness to God in creation. Properly speaking then, only creatures with 
intellect are made in God's image.' ST trans. by T. McDermott op cit., Q 93 art 2., p. 144. 
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drawn from present reality to the purpose of God', 387 the signs no longer signifying his 
purpose: '3yt,neuertheles we may haif knawlegeing I Off God almychtie be his creatouris, I 
That he is gude, fair, wyis, and bening' ('Preaching' 1650 -1653). Everything that exists 
must do so in a continuing relationship with the Creator to which it belongs. 
3. 4 (e) Summary 
Understanding the synthesis of the fable form via the concept of fallenness opens Henry son's 
Fables to certain readings. The revision of Augustine's semiotics of the fall, and 
interpretative approaches to creation as a sign for its creator by Aquinas demonstrates an 
anxiety about the way animals and man's relationship to them, are read. It is significant that 
animals in particular are the focus of this revision; where man's fall is of cosmological 
significance the understanding that this is contingent, indeed contained within man, allows 
the animal to be read as a coherent sign. Ultimately, of course, the animals ofHenryson's 
Fables are nothing more than the mobilisation of a set of rhetorical devices, or in his own 
words 'Fein3eit fabilis' which' Ane sillogisme propane.' (Prologue, 1, 3, 46) As such, these 
rhetorical animals inhabit many borders; of imaginative art where the actual animal is 
irrelevant compared to its potential symbolic counterpart, as well as the borders of the 
human, and the rational. At the indistinct limits of doctrinal thought, too, the animal finds its 
habitat, serving to express in a practical context what the 'official' texts of Augustine and 
Aquinas may not. It is something that Henryson does well, showing the animal in which his 
audience will find themselves, yet urging them that the humanity of their animality, as 
distinct from the beast of the literal, is a far more deadly beast involving as it does their 
fallenness and subsequent personal choice. Of course, the significance is in reality lost on the 
animal, who has no moral agency and who exists without such concerns, fulfilling alone the 
will of its creator. At the literal level it would seem a necessity that if a straightforward line 
is to be drawn from present reality to God's purpose they did not fall. 
387 Lloyd, A., 'The Fall' in A Dictionary of Ethics, Theology and Society, ed. by P. B. Clark & Andrew 




MAN AS ANIMAL 
4. 1 The doctrinal commonplace in Middle English romances 
There are a plethora of Middle English romances which engage with the animal nature 
of mankind, and explore the notion that he should aspire to transcend the transgressive 
desires of the animal body which he inhabits. This fourth chapter continues to develop 
the premise that the animal is devalued and displaced, by showing how man's natural 
animality- the conditions of his corporeal existence on earth- is seen as a potential 
barrier to salvation, though one which may be successfully outsmarted by reason and 
faith. In this context, the abatement and distancing of the animal side of man's nature, 
entails the distancing of all animality from human consideration. Fictional texts 
attempt to rationalise the relation between human soul and animal body, with a marked 
depreciation of animality which is inevitably influenced by doctrinal thought. My 
focus on two romances from this period, which explore the idea that man is primarily 
or partly animal, provides material which is available to be read in such a way. Sir 
Gol-vther and The Wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnelle illustrate that the 
displacement of the animal in doctrinal discourse gives way to discussion in the fictive 
text, where Sharp boundaries become inadequate, and where man's theoretical 
partition from the animal becomes a matter of considerable complexity, and often, 
undecidability. 
Sir Gowther a~dresses the problem of the identity of a man whose human nature is 
comprotnised by his half demonic parentage. Triggered by his mother's desire to 
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produce a child, the natural, pre-social or primal instinct comes into play resulting in 
the birth of a subject who is instinctively alienated from, and anarchistic toward, the 
norms of Christian society and the courtly aspiration to devout purity. Like the 
fantastical men of Ethiopia and India, and Jews, he is not merely unchristian but anti-
Christian, and until shriven of his sin, bestial at best. Indeed, in this romance the 
animal and the natural are associated with the demonic father who is also a bestial 
man. As a symbolic animal, however, Gowther's penitential humility allows him to 
become a perfect Christian subject. 
The text explores the doctrinal commonplace of man's duality and hybridity, the 
narrative progressing through Gowther' s succession from being a bestial man, to 
penitent dog-man, to Saint.388 David Salter's painstaking reading of Sir Gowther 
draws on biblical analogues and sacred biography to show how the animal motifs 
indicate that Gowther enjoys God's love and protection after his repentance: 
... while it is quite possible that the poem draws on this generalised association 
between dogs on the one hand, and arduous toil and purgative suffering on the 
other, it should be noted that Gowther's experience of dogs is much n1ore all-
encompassing than that of Lazarus or To bias. For unlike these two biblical 
figures, the extremely degrading nature of the penance that Gowther has to 
endure means that he actually comes close to losing his identity as a hmnan 
being. Indeed, he can be said to have symbolically joined the ranks of the 
beast, such is his enforced intimacy with them.
389 
As Salter points out Gowther's experience is a totalising one, in the sense that the 
boundary between him and the dogs he encounters becomes blurred; there is an overt 
metaphoricity in his canine behaviour, but there is also a sense in which he moves 
388 The doctrinal commonplace of comparing man to animal, as discussed above in relation to 
Aristotle, Bartholomaeus Anglicus, Henryson, Boethius (CP IV. 3; Ill. 8) and 2 Peter 2. 10; 2. Peter 2. 
12. 
389 David Salter, Holy and Noble Beasts: Encounters ·with Animals in Medieval Literature 
(Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 2001) p. 78. In particular Salter discusses the penitential patterns, 
hagiographic elements and the resistance of the text to generic categorisation pp. 71 - 81. See also E. M. 
Bradstock, 'The penitential pattern in Sir Gowther'in Parergon 20 (April, 1978) pp. 3- 11. 
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easily between the human and the animal. The symbolism of Gowther as a dog is 
accretive, in that though we come to see him as a dog such an image is dependent 
upon us seeing him concurrently as a man, thereby drawing attention to both the 
animal and the human sides of his personality. Such hybridity accretes meaning as his 
life progresses so that at each interpretative level of the text Gowther's life as a 
Christian subject is evaluated and defined against his animality; as a man he is an 
animal, defined quidditatively in relation to mankind as the highest definition of the 
genus. Mankind, having quiddity as an animal physiologically is also, in Aristotelian 
terms rational, and in Christian terms stood up to face God- the physiological 
manifestation of his reason. Thus is he defined in relation to his highest point of 
definition - that of his superior intellect, and his Christian soul. 
In The Wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnelle man's animal nature threatens to 
emerge if the integrity of chivalric virtue comes into question, highlighting the 
contradictions and inconstancies of a dominant social norm. The court of Arthur is 
being tested in such a way, that if it should fail convincingly to demonstrate that its 
courtesy is genuine and steadfast, the animal instincts which courtly ideals clain1 to 
transcend may be ignored, and individuals digress from their Christian spiritual 
aspirations. When animal 'others' are revealed to be the same as n1en, they are 
represented as anomalies who threaten the coherence of the system into which they 
must be integrated and absorbed, thus neutralising the threat of the animal. 
4. 1 (a) Sir Gowtlzer: caninisation to canonisation 
If God was seen as the divine author (auctor) of all texts (the primary efficient cause) 
and man merely the human scribe moved by him, God was also seen as the 
authoritative guarantor of the value of a particular text. David White raises interesting 
questions about the way in which the monstrous can be seen in literary texts, though it 
is noticeably a question which extends beyond the monstrous to the human and 
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animal. He suggests that we should interrogate the idea of the monster, 'which Isidore 
of Seville identified as monstrations (monere) or warnings (monare) of divine will. 
The question arises: Of what were monsters monstrations, and whom were they 
intended to wam?'
390 
Sir Gowther ( c.1480) is a Middle English romance about a man 
who, though fathered by a devil, passes through the process of living like a dog to 
. 391 I 1 1 . d. b become a satnt. t c ear y warns 1ts au 1ence a out the dangers of digressive 
behaviour, about how the animal side of man's being may become monstrous, and 
about the jeopardy involved with turning from the divine will. The tale is remarkable 
for its exploration of the supernatural conception of an anti-Christian child which 
might be difficult to elucidate at any level, were it not for constant textual allusions to 
the scriptural antecedents which underpin the narrative, and authorise its subject 
matter. A synopsis of the plot demonstrates that the wilful digression resulting in 
Gowther's procreation and birth as a beast-like man, must be countered by his 
reification as an animal, from which state he must rise to become a Christian subject. 
After ten years of marriage the duke of Austria ('Estryke' 31) and his wife have had 
no child. Despite their love for each other the duke tells her that they should part as he 
needs an heir to his lands. The duchess, in a state of extreme distress, prays for a child 
at whatever cost. A man whom she thinks is her husband has sex with her in an 
orchard outside the castle walls, but then reveals himself to be a hairy demon (a 
'feltured fende' 71 ), tells her that she is pregnant, and foretells the fiery nature of the 
child. The duchess conceals the event from her husband and gives birth to the child, 
which is named Gowther. Gowther grows quickly and is strong and aggressive, killing 
his first n1an at an early age with a sword of his own making. After serial rape, murder 
and pillage, Gowther accepts that he must be of 'unnatural' birth and goes to Rome to 
be shriven of his sin. The pope hears his confession and gives him a penance- he 
must not speak, and must eat nothing unless it is from the mouths of dogs. Gowther 
leaves Rome and comes across the castle of an emperor where he resides in the hall, 
390 David Gordon White, Myths of the Dog- Man (London: University of Chicago Press, 1991) p. 
1. 
391 Extant in two manuscripts both ofwhich date from the late fifteenth century: 'A' Edinburgh, 
National Library of Scotland, MS Advocates 19. 3. 1, and 'B' London British Library, Royal MS 
17.8.43. All references to Sir Gowther will be to the edition by Maldwyn Mills which utilises both A 




both in the centre of court life yet on its margins, speechless, and eating food only 
from the mouths of dogs. On behalf of the emperor he anonymously fights in _ and 
wins- three battles against the Saracen. Finally, he is forgiven by God, becomes 
emperor, and after his death is canonised. 
While romances such as Sir Gowther were criticised for being literally untrue, they 
were also understood to reveal fundamental truths and encourage an audience to 
follow a good life. Citing Thomasin von Zirclaere Stephen Jaeger observes that 
romances were often attacked because they were seen as lies which contained fables, 
Wan si bezeichenunge hat 
der zuht unde der warheit: 
daz war man mit ltige kleit.392 
The acceptability of fiction is dependent, Thomas in explains, upon the fact that 
romance contains signs of good manners and representational lessons in courtesy 
which urge chivalric codes on the listener as a model to be imitated and aspired to: 
honest men clothe a higher truth in the 'lies' of the literal. The sensational if 
'marginal' animal acts of Sir Gowther and their apparent non- meaning in relation to 
the central theme of penitence, finds explanation pedagogically if seen as the re-
working of established texts and analogues which explore man's animal nature, and 
which is perfectly plausible when considered from the point of view that 'it is the 
mark of the poetic arts to indicate the truth of things by invented similitudes. ' 393 
These marginal acts are about the anxiety of nomination and the problem of 
signifying a fictional 'nothing' or lie, in order to give birth to a secondary or even 
392 Thomasin von Zirclaere (welscher Gast 124- 26) Cited in Stephen C. Jaeger, The Origins of 
Courtliness: Civilising Trends and the Formation of Courtly Ideals, 939- 1210, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985) p. 266. 
393 Aquinas, Quaestiones Quadlibetales, VII, 6, 3., cited by Eco 1986 op cit., p. 60. Both scripture and 
poetic fiction are seen to transmit truths extending beyond the literal level, however incredible they 
may seem. Truth, for Aquinas, exists not merely in relation to the literary context but rather emerges 
from realising that its events indicate a higher or veiled truth. The 'corporeal' or actual reality, though 
imperfect and inferior, transmits the potential truth of the idea. Elsewhere Aquinas states: 'Dicendum 
quod conveniens est Sacrae Scripturae divina et spiritua/ia sub similitudine corporaliwn tradere:' It is 
good, Aquinas tells us, to transmit the things of God and the spirit by means of corporeal similitudes. 
ST l. Q 1, 9. 
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veiled thematic meaning which might be glossed the defining of human Christian 
selves against the animal. The marginalisation of the animal can be seen at a 
linguistic level where the language of the fiend at Gowther' s conception in the 
orchard, 'Y ~ave geyton a chlyde on the' (Gow. 73), generates meaning by its allusion 
to the scriptural immaculate conception 'Ecce concipies in utero, et paries filium, et 
vocabis nomen eius lesum' [And, behold, you shall conceive in your womb, and bring 
forth a son, and will call him Jesus] (Luke. 1. 31) and in turn, with Gowther' s 
contrasting and spiritually empty, carnal acts: 'Meydyns' maryage wolde he spyll I 
And take wyffus ageyn hor wyll' (Gow. 93- 94), where description becomes 
proverbial by expressing Gowther' s notoriety through the allusive force of repeating 
the manner of his own conception. Reintroducing the 'orchard' images of desire and 
carnal acts by describing them as Gowther's acts, provides two versions of the same 
occurrence: a bestial copulation by the beast and his son, and the spiritually ideal 
predecessor which it imitates and denigrates. Within the form and genre of the 
romance these images are equal: but it is their position, as well as their place within 
the progression of the allegory, which gives them authority. Michael Camille usefully 
observes that the 'all-purpose utterance of proverbial expression is protean, as 
opposed to the fixi~y of written meaning. Just as the proverb has no single divine 
authority, but is spoken in response to specific situations, marginal imagery likewise 
lacks the oceanographic stability of religious narrative or icon. ' 394 In this way, 
Gowther's marginal position in relation to Christian society is deliberately 
ambiguous, being defined in the text experientially, and solely in terms of Christian or 
unchristian actions. 
While romances may be literally incredible, they are also figurative; they provide a 
site for the exploration of such doctrinal comparisons of man with natural brute beasts 
[irrationabilia pecora natura/iter]: man, like beast, may perish in his own corruption 
[in corruplione sua peribunt] (2 Peter 2. 12). Man, though aspiring to God, inhabits a 
material world and is a subject of animal status. The figurative and allegorical nature 
of the text defan1iliarises such material, and recontextualises it as a fiction in which the 
394 Michael Camille, Image on the Edge: The Margins of Medieval Art (London: Reaktion Books 
Ltd., 1992) p. 36. 
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dislocations of the supernatural seem strange (alienum) highlighting parallel as well as 
linear readings, and whose strangeness also constitute clear signs. In this way Gowther 
as a metaphoric figure bears little relation to the 'real' at the literal level, but explores 
man's animalness through an everyman figure, who provides a solution to the animal 
state. 
4. 1 (b) Culpability of the womb and hybridity of the man 
Primarily, Gowther's birth can be seen to be the result of the duchess's feminine 
transgression in praying for a child at whatever cost. This digression from the courtly, 
is defined in relation to chivalric norms. The poet- narrator stresses the importance of 
the tournament which is given to celebrate the marriage, and in which the duke 
distinguishes himself. In this way, the couple are established to be noble and pure, and 
their court to be a shining example of courtly ideals: 'The duke hymself wan stedys 
ten' (Gow. 43). Subsequently they live happily for ten years; but without the birth of a 
child the couple become unhappy. While it is clearly stated that he could not beget, 
nor she bear a child, the blame is ultimately attributed by the duke to the duchess's 
infertility: 
He chylde non geyt ne sche non bare: 
Ther joy began to tyne. 
To is lade sone con he seyn, 
'Y tro thou be sum baryn, 
Hit is good that we twyn; 
Y do bot wast my tyme on the, 
Eireles m on owre londys bee -' 
For gretyng he cun not blyn. 
Tho lade sykud and made yll chere, 
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That all feylyd hur whyte lere, 
For schu conseyvyd noght, 
Scho preyd to God and Mare mylde 
Schuld gyffe hur grace to have a chyld, 
On what maner scho ne roghth. 
In hur orchar, apon a day, 
Ho meyt a m on, tho so the to say, 
That hur of luffe besoghth; 
As lyke hur lorde as he myght be-
He leyd hur down undur a tre, 
With hur is wyll he wroghtth. 
(Gow. 50-69, my emphasis) 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Despite their love for each other, the intention to separate from his wife in favour of a 
fertile woman demonstrates the duke's striking pragmatism, motivated by his desire to 
have an heir to his lands. This pragmatism may ultimately make him culpable in that 
his suggestion that they separate instigates his wife's prayers for a child 'On what 
maner scho ne roghth.' The 'ryche' (Gow. 47, 89) duke's prime concern is to secure 
possession of his estate, or 'londys' (Gow. 56), for his progeny in perpetuity, 
emphasising the value of the material over the spiritual, and generating the dramatic 
irony that his heir is not in fact his son. As will become clear, the duke's bid for 
material transcendence in this sense is not the approved bid for transcendence of the 
conclusion. 
In her grief and panic, however, the duchess prays for a child at whatever cost (Gow. 
63). This is clearly a deviation from the norms of expected behaviour for a Christian 
woman. The reckless prayer should be seen in relation to the conventions of other 
versions such as the comparable scenario in Octavian, where anxiety surrounding the 
En1press' s inability to produce a child, ' [ n ]ow have we sevyn yere togedur byn, I And 
we no chylde have us between', is allayed by an initial response presupposing that the 
circumstance is God's will; the empress suggests that lands and wealth should go in 
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perpetuity to the edification of God: 'A ryche abbey schall we make 1 For owre dere 
lady sake, ... '.
395 
It is the impiety of praying for a child not naturally granted by God 
which leaves the duchess in Gowther vulnerable to being preyed-upon by the devil. In 
this sense a charge of moral obloquy may also be laid upon the duchess for invoking 
the 'fiend' or pagan Other-world lover who is also the 'devil' of Christian theology, 
resulting in the conception of an unmoral child.396 Still at the literal level, though now 
perspectivally focused on the personal actions and intentions of the duchess in her 
desire for a child, attention is focused on her as she turns away from the court to the 
natural and the consolation of an orchard. 
The importance of the demonic events of the orchard lie in their direct association with 
the natural as both site of animal copulation and procreation, and as the natural realm 
which is outside of the boundaries of the duke's castle, and the courtly ideals for 
which it stands. The duchess meets with a man whom she thinks is her husband '[t]hat 
hur ofluffe besoghth' (Gow. 66). Within the boundaries of the courtly life of the castle 
the subject matter of the wife's failure to produce a child is discussed, while the 
process of copulation is taken outside to the natural where 'He leyd hur down undur a 
tre' in the orchard. In this context the orchard takes on a marginal position in relation 
to the confines of the courtly castle and its gaze. She has to go outside the castle 
boundaries and all that it stands for to conceive the child.397 It is only with the 
realisation that she has had sex with a fiend that the duchess abandons the natural and 
395 Octavian, in Mills, op cit., 65- 66, 76- 77. 
396 In Celtic tales of this type the Wish- Child, or Wonder- Child, is produced by the 'mother's 
appeal for a child whether from God or the devil, and her promise to give the child to the devil if it 
should be born through his aid. The child thus born comes into the world already possessed of evil.' 
Laura Alandis Hibbard Loomis, Medieval Romance in England: A Study of the Sources and Analogues 
of the Non-Cyclical Metrical Romances (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924) p. 52. 
397 M. B. Ogle's article on Sir Gowther attempts to bring meaning to the tale by suggesting that 
apocryphal books of the bible, where supernatural beings have intercourse with mortal women, are 
analogues which emphasise aspects of the immaculate conception story. Ogle also places importance on 
stories from the Middle Ages which emphasise the barrenness of the woman, her grief at childlessness, 
and her desire for a child. In these tales the supernatural being appears to her in a garden or orchard, and 
a child is usually conceived under a tree. See M. B. Ogle, "The Orchard Scene in Tydorel and Sir 
Gowther", in Romantic Review 13 (1922) p. 37. In contrast Laura Loomis attacks this line of argument 
when she states that 'it is difficult to see how the pious author of Gowther could ever have borrowed 
[from apocrypha] directly, as Ogle [p. 43] was inclined to think he did, since such a borrowing would 
involve equating the Angel with the devil and the blessed Virgin with the devil-born boy.' See Loom is, 
op cit., p. 54. However, the equation and direct inversion of scripture which Loom is objects to is too 
allusory, and too explicit to be dismissed in this way. 
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takes defence in the castle: 'Into hur chambur fast ho wan, 1 That was so bygly byld' 
(Gow. 77- 78) to encase herself again in the fortress of chastity, and courtly 
ideology. 
398 
The animal act of procreation, here sinful and allegorised as evil, or a 
turning away from God, is taken out the context of the court, to a natural if marginal 
one, beyond the boundary of acceptable courtly norms. The 'personal' perspective of 
the duchess' own will is also a social perspective where the original sin of not 
considering that her childless state may be God's will, results in far-reaching 
consequences for the Austrian subjects of the duke. While unlike Eve, she has picked 
no forbidden fruit, by her free-will has she has 'fallen' from the court and all it stands 
for, thereby continuing the post-lapsarian digression toward the animal. 
There is a long tradition of nature as itself female, though in Gowther nature is clearly 
embodied by the masculine figure of the wild-man or fiend. 399 Set aside the warnings 
against supernatural creatures in the DPR, the duchess's excursion into the orchard can 
398 
There is a distinction to be made here between the idea of nature as a proper mirror of God - a 
perfect sign system through which can be read God's intentions for man - and the use of nature as a 
negative zone. Camille states that the 'assumption often made about marginal animals is that they show 
a 'love of nature' in the modem, Romantic sense. However, animals and birds were lower than man in 
the medieval order of things and were there for him to exploit for meat, sport or vellum-making. This, 
above all, is why they share the margins with the bestial Bebewyn and the brutish peasant.' Camille op 
cit., p. 47. Dominantly romance in genre, Sir Gowther begins from and maintains literal level chivalric 
themes and motifs. Correspondingly, the listener enters the tale from the point of view of secularly 
positioned courtly subjects. But when the tale is perceived solely in these human terms problems are 
encountered: why is the orchard not a place of harmony? Placing the orchard and its activities at the 
margin of court life highlights the perspectival distinction that the creation represented is not a fallen 
one, but rather seen through fallen eyes. In relation to the transcendence of the conclusion the natural is 
only contingently negative when a symbol in this particular context, where its full significance has yet 
to be read within the economy of accretive imagery. At the literal level a place of chaotic desire, this is 
only so in relation to the specified context of the prayer and the 'careless' desire for a child. This is why 
the natural is also positive, and Gowther, the product of an act of desire in a natural context, will 
progress from this natural state to realise his potential and demonstrate the potential of all men: 'All 
bodies have a likeness to good things which are invisible' says Richard of Saint- Victor [Ben} am in 
Major, ll, 12 (PL, 196, col. 90)] cited in ET by Eco (1959) op cit. p. 59. 
399 Discussed below in relation to Celtic analogues. For general discussion See Curtius, op cit., pp. 
38, 106- 127, 198,400,441,444. In particular depth in relation to birth see Gregory B. Stone, The 
Ethics of Nature in the Middle Ages: On Boccaccio 's Metaphysics (London: Macmillan, 1998) pp. 17, 
23, 29, 35 - 6, 44, 54, 72- 73, 83, I 02. In William Dunbar's (c.1420- c.l513) The Goldyn Targe the 
dream allegory involves the shield of Reason facing forces intent of penetrating its defence, forces 
personified as 'Nature and Venus, quene and quene', Dame Beautee, Dame Venus, and Dame Flora. 
Apart from Priapus and Phanus, Classical Gods of fertility, cultivation and wilderness, these 
temptations from reason are all figurative tropes bestowed with female gender. In Langland's Piers 
PIO'wman Nature as a metonymic attribute of God, though, is male. As there is no direct reference to 
nature in Gowther, and its only representative male, the text clearly conforms to the wild- man topoi 
where nature is digressive in relation to spiritual ideology, anthropomorphically symbolised by half-
human figures such as wild- men or hybrid men. 
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be seen to result in predictable consequences. In the DP R supernatural men,fauni, 
satiri, cenocephali and pilosis, are solely motivated by lechery. They 'sleep wommen 
in pe dede of leccery if pey takep hem walkynge in woodes' (DP R, 18. 48). Like a 
morality less9n, natural, especially sylvan environments, are describes as dangerous 
and 'out of bounds'. Courtly separation is the prescribed antidote to a natural world 
which threatens to infringe its boundaries and impinge upon the human with that 
which is distinctly anthropomorphic, and represents human animality. In reality there 
can be no boundary, because a spiritually idealised mankind cannot be separated from 
its animal self in this life. Warnings about illicit sexual relations between courtly 
ladies and supernatural men signify profound anxieties about the regeneration of 
bestial aspects of man, typified by the very animal act of copulation itself. While 
mankind is already an animal, indulging in animal activity reaffirms his bestial nature, 
thereby continuing a post-lapsarian metamorphosis toward the bestial and the beast. 
The parallels between the satiri and Gowther are clear; on asking a satyr what he was, 
St. Anthony received the reply 'I am dedliche and oon of hem pat wonep in 
wildernesse' (DPR 18. 43). Correspondingly, the fiend's telling the duchess that 
Gowther will 'weppons wygthly weld' (Gow. 75) prefigures the violent, deadly nature 
of Gowther, while prophesying his marginalisation as a man. In addition, the young 
Gowther's Anti-Christian tendencies are analogous to the satyr- a Pagan embodiment 
of an animal - who looks like a man, but whose metaphoricity speaks of the deadly 
nature of a corporeality from which God is absent or ignored. In this sense, the 
displacement of courtly ideals by the expedient in a 'natural' or woodland location 
Con what maner scho ne roghth'), provides a context for exploring the impingement of 
dangerously penneable boundaries between the human (the duchesses' status and her 
prayer) and the animal (her openness to sex in the orchard). 
The appalling revelation that the man in the orchard is not at all that he appears to be 
signs a literal to allegorical modulation, n1ade obvious by the disjunctive appearance 
of the 'fiend' into the narrative. But the theological perspective of the duchess' request 
is maintained by the thematisation of scriptural inversions. 
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When he had is wy lle all don, 
A felturd fende he start up son, 
And stode and hur beheld. 
He sayd, 'Y have geyton a chylde on the 
That in is yothe full wylde schall bee 
And weppons wyghtly weld.' 
(Gow. 70- 75). 
CHAPTER FOUR 
This is the first of many inversions of scripture in the text. As already observed 
Gowther, like Christ, is the product of a 'miraculous conception'. However, the 
begetting of a son by an unholy fiend is a travesty of the immaculate conception, only 
compounded by the duchess' lie to her husband that she has had a dream that she is to 
conceive a child: 'Tonyght we mon geyt a chyld, I That schall owre londus weld' 
(Gow. 80- 81) when she is fully aware that the conception has already taken place. 
She insists that the same night they should 'geyt a chyld' (Gow. 80) because 'An 
angell corn fro hevon bryght I And told me so this same night' (Gow. 83- 84). In this 
way, the act of sex is allegorised by its collocation with the scripturally typological, 
supernatural conception, where meaning is inverted theologically to encompass a 
bestial conception by the beast. From this perspective, the act is purely physical, and 
performed by the fiend with evil intent. 
Sub-textually, it is here that the theological perspective is underpinned by a 
philosophical one in the form of the medieval conception of the woman as the prime 
principle of generation in the corporeal context. There is a sense in which culpability 
falls on the duchess by default rather than agency, because she is female. Her body is 
the pritne 'principle of generation' 400 in the corporeal context. In Aristotelian terms, 
the male (in this context the 'fende') brings nothing material to the process of 
reproduction, but rather brings his form to the material body of the mother who 
provides a corporeal body for the child's soul. The imprint, interjected into the materia 
of the maternal body, is the realm of the father, his function being that he is a 
400 Parts 656 a., 10- 15. For a detailed discussion, see appendix C. 
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disembodied site of origin. In this sense, Gowther's soul and sinfulness are externally 
imposed. The functional, animal role of the maternal body, on the other hand, is that it 
is destined to become an embodied or corporeal delivery system producing a genital 
outcome. Aristotle's literal sense exposition of the generation of the animal explains 
both mankind's duality as an animal, and in an analogous way, the duality of Gowther 
himself. Literally, all men are hybrid, born of a definitively animal process, though 
allegorically, Gowther's 'fiendish' hybridisation is a literary amplification, which 
allows the exploration of the boundaries of the human. In spite of the father, 
Gowther's origin and man's origin, are shared corporeal origins in that all are, in the 
most literal sense, animals. 
4. 1 (c) Hybridity as allegory 
At the literal level Gowther's sin is, as it is for all mankind, inherited. Gowther's 
exceptionally sinful acts, however, have a more immediate and diabolical derivation. 
Literally, his actions, and the tale itself may seem improbable. However, it is at an 
allegorical level that the theme of aberrant sin is represented. E. M. Bradstock sees the 
central concern of the text as being a meditation over extren1e sin and the possibility of 
atonement. The greater the sin the more significant the redemption and dispensation of 
God's grace and mercy. Bradstock comments that '[t]he subject matter, apprehended 
at a symbolic level, ceases to be improbable and effectively exemplifies this theme' 401 
to an1plify the patterns of penitence which interweave through the text at a moral or 
anagogic level, and where the central question to be established is, what is the state of 
Gowther's soul? 
Once fully-grown, Gowther is defined by lechery, and concerned with little other than 
his own wilful desire to do evil. He is a 'Warlocke great' (Gow. 22), a powerful 
demon who was conceived in a time when the fiend had the power to appear to women 
401 Bradstock, op cit., p. 3. 
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in 'likenesse of here fere', or husband (Gow. 9). We are also told that Gowther is the 
magician Merlin's half brother, as the fiend begot them both: 'So that he begat 
Merlyng and mo I And wrought ladies so mikil wo' (Gow. 10- 11). Merlin, in the 
same way, allows Uther Pendragon to 'win' the mother of Arthur, by taking on the 
appearance of her husband. The 'fende' was evidently very active in this respect, 
confirmed when we are told that such beings exist in earthly form to do nothing more 
than tempt and copulate with human women: 
Thei servyd never of odyr thyng 
But forto temp[t]e wemen yong: 
To deyle with horn was wrothe. 
(Gow. 97- 99) 
The message is clear; young women should resist the temptation to have any 
'dealings' with these bestial entities. In the DPR, wild-men from woodland locations 
are described as existing for the sole purpose of lechery, and invariably direct their lust 
toward human women: 
Certeyn bestes bep yclepedfauni and satiri also and bep bestes wonderliche 
yschape wip liken esse and schappe of men but pay bep nought ful partyn[ er ]s 
of resoun of mankynde ... suche bestes bep fullecherous, in so In oche pat pey 
sleep wommen in pe dede of leccery if pey takep hem walkynge in woo des. 
(DP R 18. 48). 
While the act of copulation with the fiend does not kill the duchess, she does suffer 
from Gowther's ferocity in biting and ripping off her nipple, when she first tries to 
feed hin1. Subsequently, Gowther is given to the charge of nine wet-nurses, whom he 
kills in the very act of feeding, draining them dry of milk, and in the process, of life 
itself. When hunting, nuns become Gowther's pray. They are 'full ferd of his body' 
and meet 'lecherous' ends when he and his men 'leyn horn by' and then 'brend horn 
up' (Gow. 184- 188). They are raped and then burned alive in their nunnery: 
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Nor no,prechyng of no frere, 
That dar I heyly hette. 
[Erly and] late, lowde and styli, 
He wold wyrke is fadur wyll 
Wher he stod or sete. 
Hontyng lufde he aldurbest, 
Parke, wodd and wylde forest, 
Bathe be weyus and strete. (170- 177) 
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When Gowther hunts, his natural environment is woodland, where he goes about his 
father's business in pursuit of churchmen and women. '[Erly and] late, lowde and 
styli, I He wold wyrke is fadur wyll', is another inversion of scripture, 'nesciebatis 
quia in his quae Patris mei sunt oportet me esse?' [And He said to them, how is it that 
you sought me? Did you not know that I must be about my Father's business?] (Luke 
2. 49), which draws attention to Gowther's antithetical nature at a theological level. 
His actions are set against the approved institutions of virginity and marriage, as well 
as against representatives of the church (perfecti). His actions supply the focus of 
interpretative complexity which warrant exploration because it is, initially at least, 
unclear whether Gowther should be read as a man or an animal. To begin with 
Gowther's conception is, quite literally, inconceivable as anything other than 
symbolic, as is his analogous identity to the animal. But such incredible actions and 
events, coupled with the use of the animal analogy, provides the best possible sign, 
and best method of Christian debate. Quidditatively, the nature of man is defined 
through a comparison which produces an apparently implausible sign, but which in its 
turn offers the clearest of signs. 
While Gowther' s forced conception indicates a profound anxiety about the re-
generation or perpetuation of bestial aspects of man, the stark descriptions of his 
raping and pillage confirm the inherently bestial and grotesque nature of his 
transgressive behaviour. Thus man, already universally categorised as an animal, can 
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easily embody the form of his bestial nature, thereby continuing a post-lapsarian 
digression. It is a grotesque contravention of his spiritual status as a man, and finds its 
hermeneutic equivalence in Bartholomaeus' descriptions of pilosis and cenocephali, 
wild-men who rape human women. Bartholomaeus explains the noun incubus to be 
'doyng pe dede of generacioun' (DP R 18. 84). Pilosis, we are told, exist for the 
purpose of copulation alone. However, beneath their questionable appearance they are 
like men, merely taking the shape of a beast. This inter-changeability confounds 
categories, and reveals the animal within each human. That the primary characteristic 
of Pilosis is lust, suggests a prescriptive warning that by immoral acts human people 
can descend to the level of the animal, allowing the beast that is always contained 
within to emerge. 
If man bears corporeal similarity to God, where does this situate Gowther, who is a 
man bearing God's image? In part, the answer is rhetorical: to know man you n1ust 
first understand his corporeality. Bartholomaeus states 'pe properties of man schulde 
be pe more opunliche iknowe to bestis-sche men ... of pe which he is imaade and 
componed ... ' (DPR 3. 1). Man is a beast first and foremost- an animal made in 
God's image. Indeed while Gowther is made in his Father's image he is, in the 
physical and reproductive sense, also made in his father the devil 's image. Like the 
supernatural beings of the bestiary, Gowther has an uncertain ontology, where it is 
unclear whether he is a man in the making or unmaking. Fiends have, or take on, a 
human appearance and therefore presumably have the capacity for advanced 
reasoning, but their half-animal natures suggest that their behaviour is governed by 
baser physical instincts. In these terms the fantastical appearance or actions of the half-
man always retain an overt suggestion of metaphoricity. The figurative, allegorical 
representation of Gowther as an animal, in other words, reveals the dangerous 
animality of all men. Only by repenting of his animality, does he become a man in the 
making, though not before we have been shown how much more like an anin1al than a 
God a n1an can be. Only through the process of caninisation, and a transitionally 
symbolic anima~ body, does he become a good Christian subject. In an accretive sense, 
the text constitutes a comprehensively readable set of metaphors whose identity 
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depends upon mankind's corporeal kinship with the beast. Thus, the 'educational' part 
ofGowther'sjourney to God, takes him back to the realm ofthe purely animal where 
at his 'lowest' point he 'becomes' a dog. St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1 090- 1153) asks 
if grotesque metaphoric representations such as this can possibly be of use, when he 
criticises the ostentation of church decoration, and the marginalia of scholarly 
invention: 'What profit is there in those ridiculous monsters, in that marvellous and 
deformed comeliness, that comely deformity? To what purpose are those unclean apes, 
those fierce lions, those monstrous centaurs, those half men ... ?'402 In contrast the 
intellectual apprehension of visible grotesquery is seen positively by Pseudo-
Dionysius, also known as Dionysius the Areopagite. Dionysius expresses a clear 
preference for a disordered imagery, which should stimulate the imagination of an 
audience who should not 'remain' with the symbol but move to its spiritual realities. 
What Richard of Saint- Victor described as the 'analogical signification' of the 
celestial hierarchy of Dionysius involves 'the reason and the imagination, wholly 
together as mistress and handmaiden' motivating the early stages of the soul's 
'journey to God' but being 'rejected in the higher reaches of contemplation. ' 403 It is, 
therefore, much more appropriate to describe God in terms which signify not what He 
is but rather what he is not ... when God is referred to as ... a wild beast ... the mind 
is not allowed to rest there, but stimulated to remove all material qualities from its 
thinking about God. 404 
Gowther's animality, though odd, clearly expresses a concern about the transgression 
of all men to their essential animal nature, and prescribes a spiritual antidote to the 
human condition. In this sense, Sir Gowther presents strange animal analogies which 
produce, metaphysically, the clearest of signs because the conditions under which the 
'animal' sign is seen to be symbolically useful, are the conditions of the sign's 
allegorical autonomy within an ultimate unity of Christian values. In his novel The 
402 St Bemard of Clairvaux, Apologia ad Guillelmun or Apology to William, Abbot of St. Thiery, 
cited by E. G. Holt, A documentary History of Art, Vol. 1 (London: Doubleday, 1957) p. 21. Umberto 
Eco sees a paradox in these lines, in that Bemard's analysis is extraordinarily fine, and that a 
characteristic of that language used to denounces the poetic and plastic arts is that is 'exceptionally 
well-wrought'. See Eco, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, op cit., p. 8. 
403 Minnis, 1986 op cit., p. 169. 
404 Minnis attributes this to Gallus' commentary on Dionysius, Minnis, 1986 op cit., p. 170- 171. 
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Name of the Rose, Umberto Eco also attributes this argument to Dionysius the 
Areopagite, and Hugh of St Victor. The wondrous 'aenigmate' of fantastical creatures 
and the 'Babewyn' of an inverted world are designated different symbolic meanings 
and discourses, as depicted in Adelmo's psalter. When the character Jorge ofBurgos 
disputes this, Eco 's protagonist William of Baskerville retorts: 
But as the Areopagite teaches ... God can be named only through the most 
distorted things. And Hugh of St. Victor reminded us that the more the simile 
becomes dissimilar, the more the truth is revealed to us under the guise of 
horrible and indecorous figures, the less the imagination is sated in carnal 
enjoyment, and is thus obliged to perceive the mysteries hidden under the 
turpitude of the images ... 405 
Jorge then sets up Saint Bemard as opposition: 'the man who depicts monsters ... no 
longer sees except through them. ' 406 While clearly incredible at the literal level, it 
seems unlikely that Gowther' s first audience would identify with the negative aspects 
of his character in this way. However, the explicit implication of metaphoricity and 
symbolism suggests that Gowther's 'meaning' is one unmistakably indicative of an 
attempt to define the human against the animal. He presents an implausible, though 
metaphysically perceptible sign, prescribing Christian ideals and courtly aspirations as 
a means to transcending human animality. 
4. 1 (d) Caninisation to canonisation 
When Gowther arrives at Rome he is granted an audience with the pope, and is told: 
'Lye down thi fachon then the fro; 
Thou schallt be screvon or Y goo 
405 See Umberto Eco, The Name of the Rose, (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1980) pp. 77- 80. 
406 Eco ibid., pp. 77 - 80. 
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And asoyly[ d] or Y blyn.' 
'Nay, holy fadur,' seyd Gwother, 
'This bous me nedus with mee beyr: 
My frendys ar full thyn.' 
'Wherser thou travellys be northe or soth, 
Thou yet no meyt bot that thou rev us of howndus mothe, 
Cum thy body within; 
Ne no worde speke for evyll ne gud, 
Or thou reyde tokyn have fro God 
That forgyfyn is thi syn.' 
(Gow. 286- 297) 
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Gowther is instructed that, as part of his penance for the wrongs of his past, he must 
give up the sword or 'fachon' which he made. While he refuses to do this, however, he 
does conform to the penance that he will eat no meat apart from that received from the 
mouths of dogs, and cease hunting animals and men. In addition, he must not speak 
until he has received a sign from God that his penance is complete. Anne Rooney has 
commented that the chivalric hero must give up hunting when an adventure presents 
itself. More important still are the demands of the soul: 
... we find in saint's lives a hunt interrupted by the Word of God. Here hunting 
must give way before the greater work of Christ. ... The saints lives which use 
this motif demonstrate dramatically the major concerns of all the other 
religious hunting motifs: that hunting is an acceptable profane activity, but that 
it must always give way before the church.407 
In these terms, God's intervention in Gowther's life, in the person of the Pope, 
requires that he be abstinent from worldly pleasures such as hunting, especially given 
that Gowther had a particular partiality for hunting men. Rather than be the hunter he 
must be like an animal, thereby relying on compassion in order to obtain food. 




Gowther's forgiveness, and his becoming a man and a Christian subject, depends upon 
the constant reminder of what he was. While in Rome the only food he eats is stolen 
from a dog. Outside Rome he stays on a hill for three days, a greyhound bringing him 
some meat each night, and on the third day, bringing him a loaf of white bread. 
Gowther does not have to fight for the food that dogs bring him. Rather, he is treated 
as one of them, confirming his kinship with, and similarity to, the beast, while the loaf 
of bread on the third day is clearly eucharistic, pre-empting his conversion and 
resurrection as a man. 
Gowther's journey takes him to the castle of an emperor, which he enters, sitting by 
the dais in the castle hall. The steward tries to chase him away like a dog: 'To beyt 
hym bot he wen de awey' ( Gow. 3 34 ), but Gowther will not leave. When the emperor 
guesses that Gowther is performing penance, he suggests a way to administer food: 
Thei gaffe tho hondus meyt ynoghe; 
Tho dompe duke to horn he droghe: 
That was is best held. 
Among tho howndys thus was he fed ... 
(Gow. 361 - 364) 
Food is given to the castle dogs, so that Gowther may take it and eat. Gowther, like the 
beggar Lazarus (Luke 16. 21) who is compared to a dog, eats scraps from the table 
(Matt. 15. 26- 27; Mark 7. 27- 28) while he sits on the floor with other dogs. While 
Bartholomaeus Anglicus reports that 'pe cruelnesse of an hound abatep if a man sittep 
on grounde' (DPR 18. 25), Beryl Rowland comments that 'the virtuous dog does not 
lose his savagery' ,408 and as the tale progresses this is clearly the case. Bartholomaeus' 
chapter on the dog focuses closely on its faithfulness to man. He also describes how 
the hound belonging to Ticius Sabinus was said not to have forsaken his body after his 
death. When a man gave the hound meat to eat 'pe hound took pe mete and wolde 
haue ysette in his moup pat was deed' (DP R 18. 25). There is a sense in which 
408 Rowland op cif., p 155. 
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Gowther, during his penance, is in a state of purgatory; he is a tormented and isolated 
soul inhabiting a beastly, deathly body. Bartholomaeus' tale ofTicius Sabinus while 
' 
emphasising the faithful qualities of the hound, suggests that until Gowther's penance 
is complete, his animal state is a deathlike one with which the hounds around him 
empathise, in their attempts to bring him meat. It is clear in this scenario that despite 
being at the centre of noble life, there is also a sense in which Gowther lives in 
isolation from the human community, in that his place within it is always with dogs: 
Among tho howndus down he hym seytt, I Tho meydon for tho greyhondus feytt' 
(Gow. 505 - 506). While Gowther's caninisation accretes both literal and symbolic 
meaning, it may also be seen as a topos that generates meaning by further allusion to 
scriptural antecedents. At this point, the potentially spiritual nature of man, and of 
Gowther as a particularly animalistic man, is revealed by his juxtaposition with a new 
Other in the tale - that of the Saracen. It is against the Saracen that Gowther establishes 
his identity as a Christian subject. J. J. Cohen comments that '[b ]ecause he embodies 
fears about the fragility of Christian identity in the face of the Saracen threat, the 
medieval cynocephalus was a viscerally disturbing figure, very like a giant. ' 409 In this 
statement, Cohen draws attention to the fact that black - skinned men were frequently 
identified with both Islam as well as with cynocephali, or dog-men, in chivalric 
romance. Indeed a revealing comparison can be made with St. Christopher, 'born a 
pagan and called Reprobus, reminding of Abominable in his unredeen1ed state, he 
changes his name to Christopher [Christ carrier] when converted to Christianity ... In 
some accounts the form of this saint changes upon his conversion. ' 410 Gowther, like 
St. Christopher who was a giant as well as a cynocephalus, begins his life as a monster 
and at his death is transfigured into an icon - a dog-man who is destined to preach the 
word of God. In Dominican thought the dog takes on a particular symbolic 
significance as both the animal most faithful to man, as well as the most faithful 
animal to God. The Dominicans saw themselves as the dogs of the Lord (a pun on 
domini- canes) who chased away the heretical wolves from attacking the faithful 
409 . 
Cohen op cit., p. 120. 
410 John Block Friedman, The Monstrous Races in Medieval Art and thought (1981: New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 2000) p. 72. 
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411 S . D .. ' h sheep. a1nt om1n1c s mot er, as Gowther' s mother, experienced a disturbing 
presence, when while pregnant she dreamt that she has a little dog in her womb. From 
this theological perspective it can be seen that the accretive imagery encapsulates 
images of Gowther as animalistic man, symbolic dog and, in his similarity to the 
Saracen or 'hethon hownde' (Gow. 389) a potential threat to Christian selves. All men, 
though, are capable of conversion and baptism into the church. If the cynocephalic 
saint is indeed a topos, Gowther' s caninisation provides a pre-emptive recognition that 
all Christian life is characterised by animal instincts and behaviour on the one hand, 
and the ability to aspire to transcend this by spirituality, on the other. 
4. 1 (e) Fighting the Saracen foe 
The refusal of the emperor to allow a Persian prince (the 'hethon hownde', Gow. 389) 
to marry his daughter instigates a war with the 'sarsyns blake' (Gow. 472). Gowther 
fights three battles against the Saracen, for God, and for the emperor's daughter, who 
alone knows of his participation. She 'sees and knows everything that is going on; she 
is remote but mutely sympathetic.'412 On each occasion, Gowther prays to God to send 
him arms (Gow. 400- 409, 460 ff, 554- 557) and on the three consecutive occasions 
horse and armour appear, first in black, then red, and finally in white.413 The way in 
which Gowther is miraculously supplied with a horse and armour is clearly 
representative of the process of his becoming a Christian knight; he acts humbly, to 
the benefit of others, and is anonymous to all but the dumb lady, who will later 
become his wife. God grants his wish, and in the appearance of the three suits of 
411 See Hall, James, Hall's Dictionary of Subjects and Symbols in Art (1974: Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) p. I 05. 
412 Mills op cit., xxv. 
413 Marchalonais suggests that the investment of the armour can be understood by colour symbolism. 
She sees an alchemical relationship between the colours and the amplification and particularising of the 
process of Gowther's conversion. Black is the beginning of all processes, but also stands for sin and 
penitence: red stands for the blood and wounds of the passion, fire as the life giving force, ecstasy and 
sublimation; and white is illumination and purity. See Shirley Marchalonais, 'Sir Gowther: the process 
of a Romance', Chaucer Review 6, 1971, pp. 14- 29. For a general context of the use of alchemy, 
colour and its symbolism, see Eco 1986 op cit., pp. 54- 55. 
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armour, the metaphysical occurrence becomes an expression of ontological 
participation. This is paralleled at a courtly level in the behaviour of the emperor's 
daughter. It is she who takes pity on him, washes the mouths of hounds with wine, and 
gives them loaves for Gowther to eat: 'tho meydon toke too gruhowndus fyn I And 
waschyd hor mowthus cleyn with wyn, I And putte a lofe in tho ton, And in tho todur 
flesch full gud' (Gow. 442- 445). 
Drawing attention to the fact that Gowther is, at this point, still living like a dog, such 
description is collocated with the descriptions of the Saracen as 'hethon hownde', and 
is consciously done so to alert the audience to similarities between the Saracen foe and 
Gowther. The biblical use of hounds as epithets of contempt is common among 
romance writers. The hound is a heathen in Layman's Brut (16623) and a Saracen 
king, in King Horn (1465). Like the Pigmies ofBartholomaeus' bestiary, the Saracen 
are bestial at best. Indeed, the comparison of the Saracen with hounds, together with 
their potential for conversion to Christianity, has original parity with the wild - man 
figure; the prototype of cynocephalus is thought to be Greek, but was freely associated 
with the East.414 Gowther retains his falchion, the curved, single- edged sword of the 
Saracen, and thus maintains his connection with the Saracen. However, the falchion 
can be seen as an adjunct to his character, and a personal talistnan.415 It symbolises the 
inherently bestial side of his nature, his anti-Christian similarity to the Saracen, and its 
final use upon them as a symbolic negation of any residual audience doubt that 
Gowther has at last transcended his bestial origins. 
While it may be an apt weapon for persecuting Christians, it is also a constant 
reminder that however animalistic a non-Christian may be, he has the potential to 
become a tnan through baptism. In the same way, as a physical body is seen to 
conform to the soul of its possessor, the falchion is an arbiter of individual intention: 
'[l]ike its Saracen creators who had their dark origins in the race of Cain but were 
414 Wittkower, R., Allegory and the Migration of Symbols (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977) pp. 
54 - 55. 
415 David Salter explains that 'The Middle English Dictionary defines faucoun (fachoun) as: "A 
large broad sword with a curved blade, a falchion: also, a short stabbing-sword or dagger." According to 
the OED, a falchion is "A broad sword more or less curved with the edge on the convex side ... "' 
David Salter, op cit., p. 72 (n). 
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· always reclaimable by baptism, and like Gowther himself who was born of a devil 
' 
this falchion has the potential for good and evil. ' 416 The binary opposites of good and 
bad, Christian and pagan, which characterise the battles, are equivalent to the battle 
Gowther has over himself to win back his soul, and to become a man. There is a clear 
objective correlative in this representation of man's potential for good and evil. In the 
material world, with a corporeal body, and living in a contingent context, clear 
binaries and boundaries are inadequate. Evil, for example, only exists in a contingent 
sense, when man turns from God to follow his animalistic tendencies. Such a turning 
away from God is itself an act of self- will condemned in the tale by the emphasis on 
God's final acceptance of Gowther, once Gowther has acted without himself in mind. 
Gowther's soul was in a poor state until he realised that his will did not ultimately 
matter: rather he realised that what mattered was not my will but Thy will. In the 
corporeal context, man cannot alone win conflicts over good and bad, he can merely 
give himself to God's will. He cannot win the battle of good and evil- he can only 
make himself an instrument of either. 
In his animal body, man cannot win or maintain total control over himself. 
Theologically, the Saracens in Sir Gowther symbolize the uncontrollable nature of the 
animal side of humanity, which could potentially be absorbed and negated, but which 
as a chaotic threat must be displaced as irreducibly Other. David White cotnments on 
the way that men who did not conform to the prevailing norm represented such a 
chaotic threat, and must be expelled from ordered society. 
416 Bradstock op cit, p. 7. The use ofthe fauchion or falchion usually signifies a pagan threat. In The 
Green Knight ( -c.l500) a knight named Sir Bredbeddle has a wife who is in love with Gawain. Though 
she has never met Gawain she loves him (secretly and passionately) for his renowned courtesy. Her 
mother is a witch called Agostes who can 'transpose' (GK 52) knights so that they appear to have been 
killed in battle. Knowing of her daughter's love she transposes her son-in-law into a green knight so that 
he can go to Arthur's court and test Gawain's boldness, courtesy and hardiness. The knight comes to 
Carlisle on Christmas day dressed in green, and while the porter thought him a 'marvelous groome.' 
(GK 92) It is clear that the magic by which Agostes "transpose[s]" his 'likeness' does not seem to 
transform his person, but just his 'vesture' into green (GK 105). Notable is his 'long fauchion verament' 
(GK 76). As in Ragnelle in The Wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnelle and the wild Carle in Sir 
Gawain and the Carte of Carlisle, Bredbeddle, transformed into green, constitutes a challenging pagan 
threat to Arthurian chivalric values. In The Green Knight however, the relatively easy resolution serves 
only to enforce the glamour ofthe Arthurian fellowship (numeration conforms to the editions in Hahn's 
edition of the texts). 
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The nomadic, swarming races ( ethne) share the lot of those members within 
society who turn away from the established order - the heretics (choosers of an 
ideology that is not the ideology), marginals, members of an underground, 
traitors, and madmen. In order to maintain its claims to exclusivity in the realm 
of ideology, the centre must pursue and punish those outsiders who dwell 
within its borders.417 
Though it is not acceptable that Gowther killed Christian subjects, he apparently 
performs God's works in killing the Saracen. While '[h]e raft bathe owt with eyggur 
mode, I That doghthy of body and bon' (Gow. 446- 7) he also now loves the God who 
made him: '[l]ovyd [h]e God- in hart was full feyn- I That formed bathe blod and 
bon' (Gow. 626- 627). Gowther returning to violence once again, is like the 
proverbial dog returning to its own vomit, the sinner returning to his wickedness (2. 
Peter. 2. 22). If such scriptural analogues provide illumination, it might be asked, why 
a dog? Dogs, along with fornicators, poisoners, murderers and idolaters are excluded 
from the heavenly abode (Rev. 22. 15). In Chaucer's The Parson's Tale, the dammed 
that God will consign to Hell are like hounds who are given bones and not meat 
(ParsT, X, 221 ). In this sense, Gowther presents not merely a strange sign, but a 
rhetorical device, existing as a fictive expression of scriptural and proverbial modes 
and analogues, which explain the state of his soul. At this point in the tale, however, 
Gowther is well on the way to completing his penance, and his digressive violence and 
regression to his former diabolical self, acceptable. In another Middle English 
romance, The Seige of Melayne, the characterisation of the French archbishop Turpin 
as a vigorous ecclesiastic who champions the church, seems at odds with the duality of 
his representation as a 'pagan'. Turpin heaps abuse upon the image of the Virgin, 'And 
he hyt redde, Y understonde', (The Seige of Melayne 548) when he hears about a 
French defeat. The mindless rage of a heroic figure is like 'a stock theme in the 
chansons de geste and the heroic romances ... in which a sultan, after hearing of the 
rout of his forces, did physical violence to the images ofhis gods.' 418 In these tales, an 
417 White op cit., p. 12. 
418 Mills, op cit., xiii., The Seige of Melayne also in this edition. 
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apparently diabolical energy is also acceptable if not encouraged, when directed 
against the Saracen. 
4. 1 (f) Summary 
At the appearance of Gowther in his role as the stranger knights, the emperor's ironic 
question, 'Y ne wyst wher thei wer bred?' (Gow. 519), is one which reminds the 
audience of the romance that Gowther's was diabolically 'bred' like an animal. There 
is a sense in which the diabolical Gowther of the first part of the tale must die, in order 
that, at an anagogic level, he rises as a Christian subject from the death of his own 
animality. The strangeness of Sir Gowther, however, draws attention to the way in 
which poetic fiction illustrates and elucidates by producing metaphors as signs of 
man's bestiality, desire, and difference from the animal. Sir Gowther carries a 
particularly Christian prescription that man aspire to transcend his animal nature. It 
devalues mankind's animality, yet ennobles the beast through figures of hounds, 
whose intrinsic nobility is emblematic of Gowther's innate human nobility.419 This is a 
typical synthesis of two sets of different values; the innate nobility, affection and 
fidelity of the animal, as ascribed to it by the Greeks, and the Roman 'Sagax' who is 
not merely faithful, but has supernatural powers. Such a literary negotiation would 
seem to complicate rather that explain attitudes to the animal, though setting the tale 
aside other texts may provide an equivalent hermeneutic. 
Giovanni Boccaccio notes that the poets and the theologians imagine the figurative 
inferno to be within the hearts of all men, and enlarge upon this idea. They interpret 
the n1eaning to be that material desires are difficult to break away from, even in hell: 
• enlarging upon this fiction, they declare there to be a doorkeeper to this inferno, and 
this they say is Cerberus, infernal dog, which when interpreted means '"devourer": 
pointing through.him to the insatiability of our desires, which can never be satiated or 





The dog's duty is to ensure that no- one leaves the inferno, signifying 
that desires never leave man when in the inferno. He can be drawn out, though with 
difficulty: 'this they demonstrate by imagining this dog to have been dragged out of 
the inferno by Hercules: that is, this insatiability for worldly desires to be stilled by the 
virtuous man and to be ejected from the heart of one so virtuous. ' 421 Isidore of Seville 
comments that Cerberus has three heads: 'signifying that there are three ages at which 
death devours man, that is, infancy, youth and old age. ' 422 The trinal equivalence 
between the three ages of man and the heads of the dog has clear parallels with 
Gowther' s three hounds on three days, the three stages of his journey through life, and 
the three battles. Though I do not mean to suggest that the author of Sir Gowther had 
Cerberus in mind, it is also clear that such an understanding allows us to see 
Gowther' s diabolic, infernal life, driven by the fulfilment of material desires, to have 
been negated by his repentant Christian virtue. In rejecting worldly desires from his 
heart, Gowther became a dog, in order that he could empathise with and understand 
the animal within, in order to reject and transcend it. 
4. 2 The place of the animal in The Wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnel/e 
The woodland setting is a romance convention in which the marvellous occurrences 
of the wood offer a plethora of readily transmutable symbols. It may be the site of 
chivalric acts, notably hunting. However, it is also a place for the animal, and has a 
threatening potential for transmogrification. In his archaeology of the wild man, 
Hayden White discusses the threat to civil society posed by the proximity of the anti-
social or animalistic man who inhabits such environments: 'he is just out of sight, 
over the horizon, in the nearby forest ... He sleeps in crevices, under great trees, or in 
420 'The new author: commentary on Dante', reproduced in English translation by M inn is and Scott 
op cit., p. 513. 
421 Ibid., p. 513. 




the caves of wild animals. ' 423 Wild men and animal Others often serve as antithetical 
oppositions which highlight the contradictions and inconstancies of the dominant 
social norm. But when antithetical thinking fails to resolve issues surrounding these 
'others' because they are revealed to be the same, they are represented as anomalies 
who threaten the coherence of the system into which they must be integrated, as 
Gowther, or from which they must be banished or exiled. Seeking them out involves 
the production of a fictive other by which to define socially acceptable versions of the 
chivalric human self. The notion of courtliness is not necessarily equivalent to the 
notion of Godliness, though it is important to note that courtliness is in part an 
aspiration to the higher Christian ideals of purity of action and thought, particularly in 
relation to others. Courtly men and women should aspire to transcend the grosser 
desires and actions of the physical. In this courtly context, The Wedding of Sir 
Gawain and Dame Ragnelle addresses questions about culture and civilization in 
juxtaposition with man's animal nature. Gawain needs to recognise his animality in 
order to transcend it. Ragnelle, the uncourtly Other against which Gawain is defined 
has all the appositional features of the wild-man, and represents 'a mode of life 
completely opposed to that represented by the knight', she is 'a syn1bol of unruly 
passions while the knight is consciously treated as a protagonist of an opposed way of 
life. '424 Unlike the prevailing appositional norm, Ragnelle is a woman, suggesting the 
importance of the male - female interaction in the public testing of Gawain' s 
courtesy. In contrast to the wild man, who inhabits peripheral locations, no 
transformation or confirmation of the chivalric self can be achieved in isolation from 
social and sexual practices. In order to realise his animalness Gawain must realise his 
similarity to the wild man: thus, the boundaries between them dissolve into fluidity in 
order that he realise what it is he must transcend. Indeed, the armour which keeps the 
wild men out in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight is seen by many critics as the 
armour of an alienating identity from which Gawain looks outward, though it is a 
mere distraction from the quest to realise the true nature of his own flawed 
423 Hayden White, 'The Forms of Wildness: Archaeology of an Idea', in Edward Dudley and 
Maximilian Novak (eds.) The Wild Man Within: An Image in Western Thought from the Renaissance 
to Romanticism (London: Pittsburgh University Press, 1972) pp. 20- 21. 
424 Larry D. Benson, Art and Tradition in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (Massachusetts: 




425 Th dl d . . . umantty. e woo an setting 1s Important conventionally, then, where one hunt 
often triggers a parallel hunt and results in the capturing of an animal, or a person who 
displays animal attributes. Peter M cC lure follows this line of reasoning, suggesting 
that the boar and deer in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight exhibit traits Gawain must 
avoid if he is to maintain the mesure appropriate to a knight.426 In The Wedding of Sir 
Gawain and Dame Ragnelle,427 Dame Ragnelle is a woman likened to an animal in 
her hideous appearance and behaviour, in juxtaposition to which is placed the 
representative of the ideals of Arthur's court, Gawain. In this way Gawain's boldness, 
hardiness and courtesy are active qualities utilised against the mysterious and the 
animal which threaten the integrity of the ideals which he personifies. 
In the tale, King Arthur meets a knight, Sir Gromer Somer Joure, while hunting in 
Inglewood forest south of his court at Carlisle. 428 The forest and the hunt are a 
425 See Derek Brewer's 'The Arming Topos As Literature' in A Companion to the Gawain- Poet, 
ed. by Derek Brewer and Jonathan Gibson, Arthurian studies series 38 (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 
1997) p. 176 ff., J. A. Burrow's 'Honour and Shame In Sir Gawain and the Green Knight' in Essays on 
Medieval Literature (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1984) p. 119., and Dorothy Yamamoto's 
discussion of the wild man in her book The Boundaries of the Human in Medieval English Literature 
(Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 153 - 154. 
426 Peter McClure, 'Gawain's mesure and the significance of the three hunts in Sir Gawain and the 
Green Knight', Neuphilologus 57 (1973) pp. 375-387. 
427 The Weddyng ofSyr Gawen and Dame Ragnellfor Helpyng of Kyng Arthoure is extant in the 
late sixteenth century Bodleian 11951 (formerly Rawlinson C.86). Stephen Shepherd comments that 
'The poem's date of composition is held to have been no earlier that the middle of the fifteenth 
century.' Stephen H. A. Shepherd, ed., Middle English Romances: Authoritative Texts and Sources, 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995) p 243. He goes on to point out that Ragnelle is frequently 
collocated with The Wife of Bath's Tale and is a recognised analogue which 'employs the common 
European folk-tale motif of the "loathly lady" transformed' p. 378. The edition used here is The 
Wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnel/e reproduced in Thomas Hahn, ed., Sir Gm-vain: Eleven 
Romances and Tales, Teams Middle English Texts Series (Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University, 
1995), hereafter Ragnelle. 
428 Inglewood forest is a specific location, often mentioned (Rag. 16, 152, 226, 355, 764, 835) and 
constituting a common topos in the Gawain romances. Hahn writes 'It is perhaps worth noting that 
there is a Hutton in Inglewood forest, Cumberland; it is the neighbouring village to Hesket, the Parish 
that contains the Tarn Wathelene. Madden [Madden, Frederic, ed. Syr Gawayne: A collection of 
Ancient Romance- Poems (London: Bannatyne Club, 1839)] ... says the 'whole of the territory 
hereabout was romance- ground.' (p. 334). A 'real' location, though now drained, the Tarn Wathelene 
was at the very centre of the Inglewood forest. Le Goff compares literary forests such as the selva 
oscura of Dante and the 'Gaste fon~t' of Percival to the real which were the 'refuge of pagan spirits 
that were piteously attacked by monks, saints, and missionaries.' See Jacques Le Goff, Medieval 
Civilisation 400- 1500, trans. by Julia Barrow (1988: Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) p. 131. Cumbria, 
Carlisle and lnglewood forest in particular provide, in this way, the generic expectation that an 
adventure into the unknown will be encountered; the forest's natural otherness and the potential for 
meeting with its representatives, pagan, animal or supernatural, means that they can be challenged, 
tamed and contained by the formal, if artificial, society of the court, its Christian meaning system and 
its boundaries- and done so with the literary and allegory economy of the poetic text. In this way the 
cycle ofGawain 'Carlisle' romances have a striking regional coherence. 
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symbolic prelude to the adventure itself, signifying the entrance into an Otherworldly 
domain wheretules change and the unexpected may occur. In the first instance the 
natural other arrives in the form of Sir Gromer So mer Joure 'The Man of the 
' 
Summer Day', whose name identifies him with the summer solstice. It is a turning 
point in the bucolic cycle, and he is a vestige of the yearly King, 'the earliest holder 
of Sovereignty over land he is unwilling to let go. ' 429 If, as Manuel Aguirre suggests, 
the hunt convention is a symbol for some kind of courtship, The Wife of Bath's Tale's 
rape by the lusty bachelor would seem to be the literalisation of that symbol as a 
purely sexual act; in Ragnelle, however, it is the hunt itself which triggers a break in 
protocol, and which will result in the appearance of a loathly woman who literalises 
animal desire- thereby allowing the hunt for, and disclosure of, chivalric truth to 
supplant the purely sexual. The protocols of knightly courtesy are broken when 
Gromer approaches the King and accuses him of unjustly stripping his lands and 
awarding them to Gawain, and (albeit unwittingly) breaking filial and reciprocal 
obligation to him as a subject. Arthur agrees to a trial 'This othe I made unto that 
knyghte' (Rag. 173). A year to the day he must meet Gromer at the same location and 
answer the question of what it is that women desire above all else: 'whate wemen 
love best in feld and town' (Rag. 91 ). 430 In their attempt to discover the answer 
Gawain and Arthur fill two books with a plethora of answers, though as the day of the 
trial draws near they wander into the wood in the hope of finding a single, definitive, 
answer. Desperate for a solution Arthur asks Gawain to 'Lett make your hors redy I 
To ryde into straunge contrey' (Rag. 183 - 184). They enter once again into the 
dangerous natural, where Arthur comes across the loathsome Dame Ragnelle (later 
revealed to be Gromer's sister) who tells him that she is in possession of the answer 
but will only give it to him if she be allowed to marry Gawain. Gawain makes a 
429 Aguirre, Manuel, 'The Riddle of Sovereignty' in Modern Language Review 88. 2 (1993) pp. 
273 - 282., p. 279. 
430 The parallel with The Wife of Bath's Tale is immediately obvious here, as is the conventional 
stipulation that a year be given for the completion of the task. 'To corn agayn att thys twelfe monthes 
endyng' (I 04) is a romance convention also prominent in tales such as Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight. The topos of 'a year-to-the-day' or 'a year-and-a-day' can be seen in terms of the seasonal 
cycle of time, and usually begins during the winter and most notably at Christmas- a time of Yuletide 
transmogrification- in order that rejuvenation be paralleled by the rebirth and re-harmonisation of the 
year. It also, of course, offers proof of perseverance, and therefore personal worth. 
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promise to Arthur that he will marry Ragnelle, in order that the King may acquit 
himself by providing the answer to the question posed. 
The challeng~ requires three seemingly impossible answers, or answers which fall 
outside of what the knight might consider reasonable: a) That women desire 
sovereignty over men, b) that a young knight marry an old Hag and c) that the proper 
choice is surrendering the right to choice. Correspondingly, any analysis must address 
the nature of the unreasonable, the symbol of the woman or loathly lady, and the 
concept of sovereignty. 
4. 2 (a) Thys huntyng lykys me nott we/le: the conventions 
The plot of Ragnelle is a shared episode which lies at the base of many of the Gawain 
romances and poses complex decisions for the court. At the literal level the 
immediate problem is that Ragnelle appears to be less than an ideal bride for Gawain, 
being visually offen.sive, resembling an animal, and unaware of 'correct' or courtly 
behaviour. However, the plot depends upon Ragnelle's repulsive if illusory 
appearance and behaviour being juxtaposed with the chivalric ideals and rewards for 
truth at Arthur's court. The metamorphosis tradition, in other words, reveals the 
complexities of the vow for exploration at the level of the practicalities of human 
relations by compromising the dominant version of what the human is, by revealing 
the potential threat from the animal emerging from within: 'At the heart of Ragnelle 
lies the question of how the unknown, the marvellous, or the threatening is brought 
into line with the legitimate, normative, idealised chivalric society. ' 431 Only in this 
way may Ragnelle' s transformation from an enigmatic threat to a beautiful woman 
confirm the importance of keeping the vows that not just legitimate the court's 
chivalric ideology, but allow the human to transcend its animal nature by reason and 
Christian virtue. Correspondingly the plot's resolution depends on the transformation 
431 Hahn op cit., p. 41. 
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of the heroine both from a symbolic animal into a beautiful lady, and from a badly 
constructed, enigmatic human threat, to a unitary subject and courtly lady. The very 
duality of being both Beauty and Beast 'often attracts itself to women in popular 
romance'
432 
and endows Ragnelle in particular with the deep ambiguity of being 
potentially fatal, yet having life-giving knowledge. Corresponding to conventions as 
it does, the tale's audience would be worried that Gawain agrees so readily to the 
marriage (Rag. 342- 345) were it not for the convention itself, which indicates that 
the conclusion will be a positive one. Within these conventional modes the reference 
to Ragnelle as 'a fend' (Rag. 345), is an element of which the audience may be 
already aware, and a fine use of dramatic irony. It prefigures and sign-posts the 
didactic lesson of the tale. Though he is initially unaware of the fact, Ragnelle will 
later tell Gawain how she was enchanted by her stepmother by 'nygramancy' and 
'enchauntement', 'Thus was I disformyd' (Rag. 691- 699). In this way the tale is both 
an exploration of oaths and bonds in the context of courtesy, and an exploration of 
mankind's animal tendencies, to which courtesy itself is an antidote. 
The resolution of the tale is, again, conventional, in that the life- giving knowledge 
is attained by Gawain's allowing Ragnelle to choose whether she will be ugly by 
night and beautiful by day, or the other way around. By doing this Gawain 
unwittingly gives Ragnelle the 'sovereynte' (Rag. 697, 701) which will break the 
spell under which she has been kept: a worthy man's abdication to her, of complete 
sovereignty over him, negates and normalises her threat. Thus the loathsome 
Ragnelle, in return for crucial information, the demand of sexual favour from the 
hero, and his compliance in fulfilling his bond, is finally transformed into the ideal 
courtly woman. 433 Clearly the connection between the hunt, the animal and obtaining 
432 Hahn ibid., p. 43. 
433 A common convention, the same resolution occurs in Chaucer's Wife's tale: Wommen desiren 
to have sovereynetee I As wel over his housbond as hir love, I And for to been in maistrie hym above. 
(WBT, 1038- 1 040) In Gower's 'The Fate of Florent', an ugly hag is met in woodland, with the offer 
of an answer of what women most desire '[t]hat alle wommen lievest wolde I Be soverein ofmannes 
love: I For what womman is so above, I Sche hath, as who seith, al hire wille; I And elles may sche 
noght fulfille I What thing hir were lievest have. (Confessio Amantis, I. 1608- 1613). In a similar 
Gawain romance to Ragnelle, The Marriage of Sir Gawain, we are told that' A woman will have her 
will, I And this is all her cheef desire' (The Marriage 104- 1 05) which is almost identical to 
Ragnelle's '[o]fthe moste manlyest is oure desyre: I To have the sovereynte ofsuche a syre, I Suche is 
oure crafte and gynne. (Rag. 422 - 430). 
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a lady's favour is that the hunt itself is an exploratory adventure into the nature of the 
natural: 'All three are challenges, tests in which the protagonist's abilities are pitted 
against the Other, whether this Other manifests itself in the magic of the White Stag, 
the deceptive road to the Grail, or the mysterious behaviour of Woman'. Against the 
hunt is set the riddle motif as a symbol for the search for truth, and which in itself 
gives verbal shape to the test. 434 
What makes Ragnelle different from the conventions it shares with other romances is 
the way in which Ragnelle, when compared with an animal, is set in opposition to the 
chivalric courtesy of Gawain and the court. Specifically, it is against the courtesy 
shown toward women for which Gawain is famous, as well as his verbal, rather than 
physical prowess, referred to in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight as 'luftalkyng' 
(Rag. 927).435 This verbal expression of courtesy operates at the same level of the 
oath: Gawain's word is an expression of his honest, noble intentions directed to an 
individual lady. But Ragnelle subverts his avowed intentions, which are verbally 
expressed, by revealing Gawain's promise to be in reality with Arthur and little to do 
with the courtesy for which he is renowned. In this first instance Gawain' s apparent 
'vow' with Ragnelle, is a gesture empty of the avowed intention to her which should 
be its origin. At their first meeting Ragnelle anticipates that they will 'plyghte us 
togeder' (Rag. 528), but Gawain ignores Ragnelle and gives his response- that he is 
ready to fulfil the promise he made to Arthur- directly to the king ' "Syr, I am redy 
of that I you hyghte"' (Rag. 534). Indeed, according to Ragnelle, Gawain's courtesy 
is singularly motivated by his fealty to the king: 'Yett for Arthours sake kysse me at 
the leste' (Rag. 635) Ragnelle later has to ask. Questions about the various 
motivations in the text are visible, though, in a retrospective point of textual rupture, 
where absolute chivalric ideals are undercut by contingent and expedient actions, in 
two elements which subvert the integrity of Arthur himself. Firstly, Arthur in effect 
434 Aguirre op cit., p. 243. 
435 Gawain embodies the courtesy of Arthur's court. Arthur is a 'King curteys and royalle' (Rag. 6) 
in whose 'contry was nothyng butt chyvalry' (Rag. 10) and Gawain the 'flowre' (Rag. 373) ofthat 
courtesy. The Poems of the Pearl manuscript: Pearl, Cleaness, Patience, Sir Gawain Gawain and the 
Green Knight, ed. by Malcolm Andrew and Ronald Waldron, York Medieval Texts., 2nd series 
(Berkeley 1978: London : Edward Arnold, 1979). 
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volunteers Gawain for marriage to Ragnelle without first consulting him, thereby 
negating the personal freedom of Gawain's courtesy. 
"Alas!" he sayd; "Nowe woo is me 
That I shold cause Gawen to wed the, 
For he wol be lothe to saye naye. 
(Rag. 303 - 5).436 
Secondly, the multiple answers written in the two books represent a bureaucratic and 
centralising attempt to confound a serious inquiry into the mysterious. However, the 
court's failed attempt to take control and dismiss the significance of the threat by 
enclosing it within its own bureaucratic practices compel a final desperate 
engagement with the need to find a single, meaningful, answer. With no answer and 
no choice, Gawain gives his agreement without having seen Ragnelle, shrugging off 
the proposed marriage as negligible in relation to his fealty and loyalty to Arthur: 
"Y s this alle?'' then sayd Gawen; 
"I shall wed her and wed her agayn, 
Thowghe she were a fend; 
Thowghe she were as foulle as Belsabub" 
(Rag. 342 - 345). 
The enormity of the request is dismissed by hyperbolically overstating the case, 
though to ironic effect. What is immediately striking about the passage is, of course, 
the oblique suggestion that Ragnelle may bear some relationship to Beelzebub. At the 
moment of his vow Gawain, not yet having seen Ragnelle, is prepared to marry her 
whatever the truth behind her ambiguous ontology, being unaware of what the 
audience of the tale might have already come to expect: that Ragnelle's appearance is 
indeed a likeness imposed upon her by enchantment and that the moment of his 
abdicating sovereignty will be her moment of translation. Her ugliness is unearthly 
436 cf The Marriage of Sir Gawain (77- 80). 
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and designed deliberately to repulse and revolt the beholder, and significantly, require 
her 'lover' to ·act against instinct and custom, since he must suspend his inclinations 
and the social custom and courtly convention for the sake of his fellow man - or in 
this case king. 
The oaths and bonds made in the tale are of dizzying complexity. Hahn provides an 
eloquent summation: 
Ragnelle explores the ties of chivalry through a structured repetition and 
variation of a fundamental pattern. This consists of a series of linked and 
interlocking oaths and commitments (a plotting device that distantly recalls 
the staggeringly complex interlacing of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight). In 
the first place Arthur agrees (under duress) to a compact with Sir Gromer, 
though Gromer claims he imposes this trial because the king had already 
broken an obligation to him. Arthur then agrees with Ragnelle upon a second 
compact which will enable him to escape the first, though its fulfilment 
depends entirely upon Gawain's compliance. Gawain then agrees to the terms 
of the second compact, thereby obligating himself to Arthur and to Ragnelle. 
Ragnelle fulfils her promise, providing Arthur with the knowledge that puts 
him out of Gromer's control (and puts Gromer in danger from Arthur and the 
court); Gawain fulfils his promise, marrying Ragnelle in a public ceremony 
and then agreeing to consummate the marriage. When Gawain, faced with 
what seems an impossible choice concerning Ragnelle's transformation, 
agrees to allow her to decide, he unwittingly fulfils the terms for setting her 
free from her enchantment. This outcome not only unites Ragnelle to Gawain, 
but to the king and queen; she then uses this amity to bring Arthur and 
Gromer to reconciliation.437 
Gawain's vow is clearly an allegiance to the sovereignty embodied in the king, 
enforced by his relinquishment of sovereignty to Ragnelle as an extension of the 
437 Hahn op cit., p. 43. 
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marriage bond. But the fact that it is effectively made between three people, Arthur, 
Ragnelle and Gawain, complicates any easy resolution. Ragnelle bifurcates, in other 
words, loyalties at the court, while later effecting the resolution of the original claim 
by Gromer that Arthur had broken an existing bond of fealty with him. This 
reconciles Gromer to the court, as well as negating the claim of 'natural' sovereignty 
over the land for which he stands, while the more pressing matter of Ragnelle herself 
is determined by the relinquishment of sovereignty by Gawain, to the female, thus 
displacing the chaotic 'natural' woman in favour of a Christian courtly one. 
Overcoming the initial attempts to confound the enquiry into Sovereignty by the court 
allows the transformation of Ragnelle from symbolic animal, to beautiful lady. Only 
by recognising the importance of the reciprocal bonds between individuals can the 
plot find its resolution and each individual find satisfaction. The 'marriage group' of 
Chaucer's Canterbury Tales can be seen in this way, as a 'vowing' group, where the 
problem of individual freedom is that it is limited once bonds are made with other 
people. Sovereignty results in the sacred marriage vow itself in The Wife of Bath's 
Tale. In its prologue, Alison defers to a pagan authority, Ptolemy, to assert that men 
need domination by women, in order to maximise her own freedon1 at a personal 
level. The interesting thing from the point of view of the reader is that the wife is 
preoccupied with the idea of personal experience as 'auctoritee' (WBP 1 ). Ragnelle's 
unbending refusal to explain her meaning as anything other than 'I am no qued' 
(WBP 279) and Alison's constant refusal to start her tale, seen in the recurrent 
occupazio of 'now wol I telle forth my tale' (WBT 193), block any progression from 
the literal level of the narrative. Alison and Ragnelle are unwilling to loose to others 
the sovereignty of their own debate and terms. Failure to accept that true authority is 
not 'my will' but 'Thy will' at this level contests Christ's example, it instead being 
echoed in Gawain's courtesy toward Ragnelle. Gawain, like Christ, does not con1e to 
command, but to be subject to the conditions he finds in the world. 
As a consequence, while Ragnelle as other 'testing' poems, questions the integrity of 
Arthurian excellence it does so not like the Awentyrs, 'on the exalted level of 
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personal honour, political justice, chivalric service of women, and charity, but on the 
antithetical and ridiculous level of such things as bonding and furtive breaches of 
contract. ' 438 
4. 2 (b) Whate is your meanyng? 
In Ragnelle these conventions are enacted within a hostile context whose modulation 
to the level of oaths and impossible choices is dependent upon the figure of Ragnelle 
herself. The convention of testing, magnified by the exploration of the meaning and 
confines of the oath, are initially translated to the world of the wood, the 'straunge 
contrey' where the honour, justice and chivalry of the court may not be recognised 
and are therefore arbitrary. But the oaths resolve with the fulfilment of the terms 
which set Ragnelle free from her enchantment, and end with everyone established in 
her or his 'proper' place, and with courtesy restored to Arthur's court's customary 
consolidation and hierarchy. 
What is initially incongruous in the character of Ragnelle is her ugliness and profound 
ambiguity, for which there seems to be no immediate need: surely a 'normal' woman 
would suffice, and the unity of the plot be maintained? Ragnelle's femaleness is an 
important element in the text. While Catherine Belsey argues that the human subject 
is under constant construction in the early modem period, but that this process does 
not include women,439 Dorothy Yamamoto suggests otherwise, and that this 
'construction' of identity is far earlier, though no less involved in the definition of 
patriarchy. She observes that wild-women such as Saint Mary of Egypt go against 
normative versions of the courtly woman, and that indeed gender difference and 
identification are constituted by the acquiescent courtly woman who conforms to a 
male ideal. 'The desirable woman of the romances has a white, soft body, its smooth, 
438 Shepherd op cit., p. 379. 
439 Catherine Belsey, The Subject of Tragedy: an Anthology of Political Writing in Stuart England 
(New York: Methuen, 1985) p. ix. 
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caressable surface a metaphor for its uncontested appropriation by the hero. When 
that surface is broken, the result is not wildness, or the irruption of animal features, 
but a loss of specularity- the woman no longer reflects back these qualities which 
both sign her femaleness and substantiate male identity. ' 44° For Y amamoto, the wild 
female has to be reconstructed by another male- a chivalric male identity- before 
she can be established in a 'right' relationship. Female wildness is, therefore, 
constrained by the bias of both gendered representations, while concurrently defining 
the human- an intermediary between culture and nature. 
Aguirre has suggested that the beautiful woman figure is a representation of 
sovereignty itself, and acts as a justification of the righteousness of kingship. From 
the perspective of an Irish analogue, Silva Gadelica, he argues that the figure of the 
'natural' woman or loathly lady represents the land, who moves with cycles and 
seasons and must consort and have sexual liaison in order to renew, and at the same 
time be rejuvenated by Truth. 441 She is the bestower of royal power, her 'hand' 
guaranteeing the kingdom, which in Ragnelle would be at the expense of Gron1er. In 
this way the natural is appropriated into the realm of the court. In the Silva Gadelica, 
the Irish woman changes form to a loathly woman when without her proper or correct 
spouse as a symbol for a land which, in turmoil, has lost its fruitfulness and 
prosperity according to its gain or loss of a true and rightful king.442 By this reading, 
sovereignty in Ragnelle is in the balance because of the challenge from natural law, 
as laid down by Gromer. Only once sovereignty has been established as Arthur's by 
the fulfilment of the vow and the acquiescence of domestic sovereignty to Ragnelle 
by Gawain, may the land be relinquished to Arthur' s authority and the realm of the 
courtly. In this way the rule of mankind's natural, animalistic tendencies are negated 
by a divinely appointed temporal sovereignty, mirrored in turn by sovereignty as the 
domestic rule within marriage. Thus Middle English descendant 'versions' of the 
Silva Gadelica, such as Ragnelle, take the figure of woman 'out of the field of land-
symbolism and relegated to the (more literal) domestic sphere: Sovereignty over land 
440 Dorothy Yamamoto 2000 op cit., pp. 199-200. 
441 Silva Gadelica, ed. and trans. by Standish 0' Grady (London: William & Norgate, 1892) pp. 
368 - 73) cited by Aquirre pp. 272- 279. 
442 Aguirre op cit., p. 274 
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is being displaced in favour of Sovereignty in love' and the land issue ascribed to the 
d h 443 court, an Art ur. 
Of course, Ragnelle can successfully be read in these terms, though there is an 
obvious departure in the way the encounter with strangeness is accentuated in a 
particularly visually way, and the description of Ragnelle clearly something more 
than Aguirre's analogue would suggest. Why is so much hyperbole effected tn 
descriptions of her- so much time spent on the specific detail of her appearance?: 
Her face was red, her nose snotyde withalle, 
Her mowithe wyde, her tethe yalowe overe alle, 
With bleryd eyen gretter then a balle. 
Her mowithe was nott to lak: 
Her tethe hyng overe her lyppes, 
Her chekys syde as wemens hippes 
A lute she bare upon her bak; 
Her nek long and therto greatt; 
Her here cloteryd on an hepe; 
In the sholders she was a yard brode. 
Hangyng pappys to be an hors lode, 
And lyke a barele she was made. 
And to reherse the fowlnesse of that Lady, 
Ther is no tung may telle, securly; 
Of lothynesse inowghe she had. 
(Rag. 231-245). 
Her very existence is a contradiction. As the puella senilis of E. R. Curtius she is 
young and old, fair and loathly, a being standing outside the categories of human 
reality. Like the personification of Philosophy who appears to Boethius as a dignified 
matron, full of vitality, though ancient, and on a supernatural level, Ragnelle 
443 Aguirre op cif., p. 279. 
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personifies the animal aspects of a human being. But also like Curtius' puella senilis 
who could be a projection of the unconscious, Ragnelle represents the animal Other 
who has always to come from the self, being at once recognisably the same though 
distinctly different.
444 
In this sense one thing exists only by virtue of its opposite. A 
de-humanised human, she is hunch-backed with matted hair over-sized breasts and is 
' 
shaped like a barrel- a picture of 'lothynesse'. But she is also richly arrayed with 
gold and precious stones which make her an incongruous 'unsemely syghte' (246). 
The collocation of the two aspects of her appearance combine to produce a character 
who is deeply ambiguous, in that it is uncertain how she should be treated. 
While Arthur maintains courtesy toward her and addresses her as 'lady' she also 
demonstrates that she is not, in her pre-transformed state, any such thing: 'And ther 
he [Arthur] met with a Lady. I She was as ungoodly a creature I As ever man sawe' 
(Rag. 227 - 229). Though unusual her signification seems clear: we should read 
Ragnelle and be prepared to be moved by her as both a human woman and, 
metaphorically, as an animal. The image is all important here for verbal, rational 
discourse is diluted by the optical, and in the process we must interpret rather than 
evaluate its meaning at a merely social level. In fact she is a woman who quite 
literally embodies the most animalistic characteristics of humankind, her 
uncontrollable tendencies manifesting a disregard for the value placed on courteous 
and demure demeanour by the court. The text makes it clear that Ragnelle is 
Christian, attending mass and 'Churche' (Rag. 587), so she is not wholly animal, 
being in possession of Christian reason and having the capacity of the spiritual, albeit 
contained within a carnal, deathly body.445 There is clearly a distinction to be made 
here in that Ragnelle is not in actuality an animal, nor merely a literal sense 
444 Curt ius op cit., pp. 101 - 105. 
445 Cf, 'Infelix ego homo! Quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?' [0 wretched man that I am! 
Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?] (Rom. 7.24). The idea that the Jews, for example, 
were thought to be animals because they could not understand, or would not accept, the idea of the 
trinity and could not, therefore, use reason, is expounded by Peter A be lard (1 079 - 1142?) in his 
Dialogue Between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian. In his discussion with the Christian, the 
philosopher is allowed to insult the Jews twice, as 'sensual' 'animals' who believe on the basis of 
'external' miracles and signs rather that 'reasons' [ 154, 157] and the Christian compares the Jew to 'an 
illiterate person' [358] who attends to the literal rather than the mystical or allegorical sense of 
scripture. Peter Abelard, Ethical Writings: Ethics and Dialogue Between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a 
Christian, trans. by Paul Vincent Spade (Indiana: Hacket Publishing Co. Inc., 1995). 
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exposition of the taxonomic, symbolic meaning of an animal type. This would 
present a didactic natural sign, but go little further to explaining her role within the 
economy of the tale. Rather, in being compared to an animal, a hybridised monster 
who defies category, it is the carnal tendencies and attributes of the human body 
which suggest its animality, that are to be criticised. David Williams notes that: 
'As Isidore perceived, the most useful model for a taxonomy of the monster is 
the human body ... the human body through its symbolic extensions as well as 
its physical structure, provides the most complete paradigm for order and thus 
for the disorder that has precedence and priority in the monstrous 
configuration of reality. ' 446 
In this way the animal image is an attack on human animal tendencies. While she is a 
woman, she is also a monstrous version of one who threatens to break from her 
human boundaries. Like the fear of hybridisation inherent in De proprietatibus 
rerum's wonder animals, the figure ofRagnelle, metaphorically speaking, presents a 
hybrid human whose animal characteristics are inherently human ones. 
Ragnelle is not described as an animal in any generic sense, however, but specifically 
as a carnivorous predator and a boar, whose 'tethe hyng overe her lyppes' (Rag. 235). 
Drawing on Bakhtin's analysis of the body as metaphor in Rabelais and his World, 
Dorothy Y amamoto has suggested that different sorts of bodies presuppose different 
sorts of demeanour vis-a-vis the world. The hallmark of knightliness is mesure, 
inward restraint, imposed by individual reason, which results in a virtuous life. The 
'uncourtly other' on the other hand has a lack of self-control, rudeness and 
churlishness, against which chivalric courtliness is 'pitched' .447 The sow I boar image 
is developed explicitly throughout the text, though most vividly at Gawain and 
Ragnelle' s first tneeting, suggesting that we should see her through the eyes of the 
man who must marry her, and who hin1selftypifies this mesure: 
446 David Williams, Deformed Discourse: The Function of the Monster in Medieval Thought and 
Literature (London: University of Exeter Press, 1996) p. 108. 
447 Yamamoto 2000 op cit., p. 171. 
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She had two tethe on every syde 
As borys tuskes, I wolle nott hyde, 
Of lengthe a large hand full e. 
The one tusk went up and the other doun. 
(Rag. 548 - 551 ). 
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At a taxonomic level, the description of Ragnelle as a boar, though remarkable, is 
complicated by her clothing which in itself does not detract from her figurative 
representation as an animal. But in addition to clothing she is adorned with jewels. At 
Arthur' s first meeting with Ragnelle the description of her precious stones and gold is 
striking: 
With gold besett and many a precious stone 
Ther was an unseemly syghte: 
So fowlle a creature without mesure 
To ryde so gayly, I you ensure, 
Ytt was no reason ne ryghte. 
(Rag. 24 7 - 252). 
The poet-narrator considers it neither proper nor right that she rides 'gayly' and is 
apparently unaware of how incongruous she looks. To stress the point the description 
of her finery is repeated at the wedding scene: 'Her arayment was worthe thre 
thowsand mark I Of good red nobles, styff and stark' (Rag. 592 - 593) with the 
addition of its n1onetary value being stated. This is juxtaposed with her being 
described similarity to a 'so we': 
For alle her rayment, she bare the belle 
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Of fowlnesse, that evere I hard telle -
So fowlle a sowe sawe nevere man. 
(Rag. 595). 
Like the Boethian taxonomy in which animals are classified by the character traits, 
and which also correspond to mankind's morally reprehensible traits, the text's literal 
sense provides the instantly recognisable human type whose correlative is the pig and 
its lust, or as Boethius describes it 'wallowing in foul and impure lusts ... occupied by 
the filthy pleasures of a sow.' But the additional description of the golden array, 
suggests that beneath this outward splendour is a typological correlation with the 
biblical proverb that 'circulus aureus in naribus suis mulier pulchra et fatua' (Prov. 
11. 22). As a gold ring in a snout, we are told, so is a fair woman who is without 
discretion.448 While the proverbial similitude between women without discretion and 
swine sits comfortably within Ragnelle 's thematic imagery it also appears as a 
common topos when addressing the topic of female lechery and its associative 
correspondence with carnal lust. In both Chaucer's The W(fe of Bath's Prologue and 
The Parson's Tale the proverb serves to provide a direct analogy between swine and 
lecherous humanity. Jankyn, lecturing Alison declares that' "A fair womman, but she 
be chaast also, Is lyke a gold ryng in a sowes nose" ' (WBP 784 - 785). The Parson, 
quotes the same proverb of Solomon, 'a fair womman that is a fool of hire body lyk to 
a ryng of gold that were in the groyn of a soughe, ... for right as a soughe wroteth in 
everich ordure, so wroteth she hire beautee in the stynkynge ordure of syne (ParsT 
155 - 156). Reversion to thoughtless acts of sex, motivated by 'animal' lusts, the 
proverb instructs, will result in the animal within dominating the life of the Christian 
subject. In this sense Ragnelle's similitude to the boar or sow presents to the court a 
mirror of the lustful animal reality beneath the trappings of its noble appearance-
which is transcendable only by virtue: 'Mulierem forte m quis inveniet? procul et de 
ultimis.finibus pretium eius', the price of a virtuous woman cannot be counted in 
jewels, says the proverb (Prov. 31. 1 0). 
448 Solomon is a particularly apt example because he typologically pre-empts Christ as a Judge who 
shows mercy in the temporal context, thus mirroring the ontological parallel in heaven: justice and 
mercy on earth imitate the divine plan. 
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There is also an ecclesiastical and theological connection between hunting and the 
boar. Boar hunting, as described in Gawain and the Green Knight, was a royal if 
dangerous sport. In both the context of the hunt and in terms of her ambiguous 
ontological origin, Ragnelle may be seen as a dangerously demonic or possessed 
figure, especially as she is as she is by the enchantment of her stepmother. Regarded 
as the most unclean and the most abhorred of all animals [Lev. 11. 7; Isa. 65. 4; 66. 3; 
65. 17; Luke 15. 15] swine get a poor deal in The Bible. Christ exorcises demons 
which possess a man, forcing them into a herd of swine: 'exierunt ergo daemonia ab 
homine, et intraverunt in porcos; et impetu abiit grex per praeceps in stagnum, et 
suffocatus est' [Then went the devils out of the man, and entered into the swine: and 
the herd ran violently down a steep place into the lake, and were drowned] (Luke 8. 
33). If this is not immediately striking as an analogue, Beryl Rowland provides a link 
when she observes the popular image of a hunting churchman. 'Early in English 
sculpture the hunter as priest is seen in pursuit of the boar. ' 449 Given the dependence 
on these scriptural images and meanings the irony that we should note is, of course, 
that this is unambiguously prohibited by scripture: 'sus quoque, quoniam dividit 
ungulam et non rumina!, inmunda erit: carnibus eorum non vescemini, et cadavera 
non tangetis', Also the swine is unclean for you, says the book of Deuteronomy, 
because it has cloven hooves, yet does not chew the cud (Deut. 14. 8). The hunt, then, 
may be seen as the prelude to exorcising and transforming Ragnelle, who embodies an 
'unclean' form, by bringing her within the bounds of the court by the acts of a worthy 
Christian subject. 
Like the boar too, Ragnelle's gluttony brands her as an outsider at court who is at 
least of low estate, if not wildly monstrous: 'She ete as moche as six that ther wore' 
(Rag. 605). Taxonomically, the swinish gluttony of her 'animal' type thus enforces 
this similitude with lecherous humanity in that she is a sexual predator. 'Shewe me 
your cortesy in bed' (Rag. 630), she says to Gawain on their wedding night. Ragnelle, 
as a 'Lady', is aligned with the animal in the two sets of antithesis employed here: 
449 See Beryl Row land, Blind Beasts: Chaucer 's Animal World, (Toronto: Kent State University 
Press, 1971) p. 98. 
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man I woman, and man I animal. Gawain has to deal conjugally with her as a woman 
and wife, while satisfying a human lust deployed and symbolised in animalistic form. 
Dante in the Inferno (XXX, 22 - 34) compares Gianni Schicchi to a hog which 
attacks Capocchio; it is not the wild boar or demonical swine but the domesticated 
hog which when liberated from the sty, seizes upon anything which may satisfy its 
desire. In the same way the sense of desire and expectation displayed by Ragnelle's 
animal appetite creates tension and anxiety about the wedding night, after which 
Arthur poses to his court what is both a serious question (given her unnatural, 
'unknown' nature) and a humorous one: ' "Syrs," quod the Kyng, "lett us go and 
asaye I Yf sir Gawen be on lyve." ' (Rag. 722 - 723). In this sense the question of 
what women most desire, and the very use of the word 'desire', underpins the 
question with a sexual subtext and emerges as part of the answer: 'Also we love to 
have lust in bed' (Rag. 411 ). But the moral and all encompassing answer, that women 
most desire 'sovereynte' over men (Rag. 423, 425, 429, 468) would seem to both 
confirm Ragnelle's sexually predatory nature, and the uncontrollable nature of human 
sexual relations. It is not just Ragnelle, who has a predatory, animal element as one 
aspect of her nature, but all humankind, necessarily involved as it is with its animal 
nature. Once re-embodied as a courtly beauty, and no longer in the semblance of an 
animal, Ragnelle's predation is no longer visibly open to scrutiny. In this way 
Sovereignty in Ragnelle takes on the meaning of sexual dominion, in its n1ost animal 
sense, and transfigures it to become dominion in love, thus neutralising 'lust' by 
placing it in the court as visible evidence of the power of civility to transform the 
other. Courtly fictions demonstrate this movement as an operation in which the other 
is incorporated into the service of chivalric sovereignty and courtesy by reorienting 
and suppressing its desires. 
It is essential that the accretive animal imagery which surrounds the figure of 
Ragnelle is consistently visible and that she be always seen as a woman.450 This 
450 The animal imagery and beastly behaviour which we come to associate with Ragnelle is both 
accretive and allegorical. She is always a woman; but like all human beings she is always an animal 
too. In addition to the poet-narrator's emphasis on the boarish aspects of her personality, in referring to 
herself as a lady and emphasising the importance of a name, another set of allusion are evoked. 
"now farewelle," sayd the Kyng, "Lady." 
"Ye, Sir," she sayd, "ther is a byrd men calle an owlle ... 
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allows the animal I human comparison to highlight lust as a potential pitfall to the 
court's integrity. The animal in man should be repressed, but can only be so once 
allowed to emerge. Once evident it is against the animal that the ideology of the 
courtly may .be defined. While this seems to set human and animal in antithesis, 
human nature is not in itself antithetical. Rather, human animality must always 
remain a lower term, must constantly be negated and suppressed. To borrow the 
psychoanalytic use of the term, this means that the animal is brought to the surface of 
the text's 'social consciousness' as exemplified by the court, only to be repudiated. 
Guinever' s attempt to bridle Ragnelle away from view and acknowledgement are 
seen in her request that the marriage be a private affair. 
The Queen prayed Dame Ragnelle sekerly -
"To be maryed in the morning erl y, 
As pryvaly as ye may." 
(Rag. 569 - 571 ). 
Ragnelle refuses. The bond made with Arthur is a public affair, and tnust be openly 
acknowledged and. enacted by the proper ceremony. The shame of the court and 
humiliation of Gawain anticipates the way in which the significance of the oath has 
been misunderstood, as has Ragnelle. Arthur's questions 'What mean you, Lady?' 
(Rag. 270) and 'Whate is your meanyng? (Rag. 275) anticipate Gawain's question to 
Ragnelle 'what ar ye?' (Rag. 644) at his astonished witnessing of her transformation, 
And yett a Lady I am." (Rag. 315 - 317) 
Evidently aware that there may be some confusion about the identity of what she is, she clarifies for 
Arthur that she is indeed a 'Lady', though this is only an elements of what she means. In the process 
she also points out that even an owl has a mate '"No force, Sir Kyng, thoughe I be foulle: Choyce for 
make hathe an owlle" ' (Rag. 309- 31 0) thereby drawing a comparison which has negative 
connotations from death and evil, to stupidity and sloth. There is sense in which the thematic focus on 
sovereignty is maintained by this allusion. The owl is identified with the Jews who prefer the darkness 
of ignorance to the light brought by Christ, saying 'We have no king but Caesar, we know not who this 
man is' (John 19. 15). For a full discussion see Mariko Miyazaki, 'Misericord Owls and Medieval 
Anti-semitism' In Debra Hassig, ed., The Mark of the Beast, The Medieval Bestial)' in Art, Life, and 
literature (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999) p. 27. Hugh of Fouilloy's De avibus, according 
to Miyazaki, reverses this symbolism, and 'compares the bird's habit of shunning the light to Christ, 
who desires to convert sinners' (Miyazaki 27). The allusion to the owl then, would emphasise 
Ragnelle's role as.tester and revealer. Bartholomaeus Anglicus' literal sense exposition of De babone 
provides an interesting analogue. The Owl is a sinful bird and bad portend who is full of'sloup': 'he 
bodep yuel, for pey tellep pat 3if pe owle is iset in a citee hit bodep destroccioun and waast,' in 
addition the 'crienge ofpe owle by ny3te bodep dep, as dyuynours conectip and gessip'. DPR, 12. 6. 
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which itself echoes the 'whate [do] wemen desyren most' of line 406. Gawain, faced 
with the question of whether he wants Ragnelle to be fair by day and ugly by night or 
vice versa, or in fact, an animal for one part of the day and a woman for the rest, is 
perplexed, and responds that he can only act according to the wedding bond as he now 
belongs to Ragnelle. 
Lose me when ye lyst, for I am bond; 
I putt the choyse in you. 
Bothe body and goodes, hartt, and every dele, 
Y s alle your oun, for to by and se le -
That make I God avowe! 
(Rag. 681 - 685). 
But it is Ragnelle's observation that unless he had fulfilled his bond she would have 
been otherwise understood, which enables any retrospection on the nature of the bond 
and its importance in rising above a merely animal nature to the courtly and its 
spiritual aspiration. Gawain could easily have opted for the beautiful-by-night option, 
and she would always have been publicly understood as the animalistic version of her 
self: 
I shold have bene oderwyse understand, 
Evyn tylle the best of Englond 
Had wedyd me verament, 
And also shold give me the sovereynte 
Of all his body and goodes, sycurly. 
(Rag. 694- 698, my emphasis). 
Until married and given total sovereignty over him, thus fulfilling the oath to Arthur 
and the bond of marriage, she would always have been understood as the other of her 
real self. Truth to the bond, right thought and right action, repress animal 
characteristics and negate the magic by which Ragnelle was transformed and the 
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animal revealed. Thus Ragnelle's similitude with the animal can be seen as a didactic 
expression of the post-lapsarian descent toward the animal, which is resisted by 
aspiring to be like God, typified in the chivalric ideals of the court.451 The text, in 
other words, is deeply engaged with the production of a disruptive, animal other who 
tests courtly values in order to assert the superiority of the court. This disruption, 
always within, was evoked to create a series of problems in order to effect their 
resolution. 
Gawain's vow to wed Ragnelle out of friendship and fealty to Arthur give precedence 
to the motive of chivalric loyalty over romantic personal love. But in Ragnelle the 
woman serves as an intermediate term in the bonds between chivalric men: 'Arthur's 
request to Gawain was not valid; on the other hand, Gromer's lands are effectively 
taken from him by his sister Ragnelle, and lawfully assigned by her to Gawain as a 
result of his marriage pledge. In a significantly obscured way, she is indeed 
Sovereignty, the power that dispenses territorial rule' .452 This rule is legitimate only 
by virtue of Gawain' s Christian virtue in keeping a vow which is an approved, 
prescribed antidote to the carnal, and which in the process allows Ragnelle to 
transcend her own ill-fitting reality and enter the realm of the courtly ideal. 
Adherence to the codes of chivalric virtues and significantly, the marriage itself, is 
clearly a remedy against lechery.453 Gawain explains to Arthur: 'Lo, this is my 
repayre!' (Rag. 744) which is not just his rest, but his repayment for the virtue of 
keeping the bond between Arthur and Ragnelle, whatever the cost: 'for I am bond; I I 
putt the choyce in you.' (Rag. 680 - 681 ). 'The force of civility and courtesy prevails, 
451 Though in essentials, spiritually and morally, Ragnelle is no different, her visual transformation 
into a beautiful lady and the marriage vow Gawain and she have made seem to negate any criticism of 
desire, allowing the resolution of the final scenario in which their marriage is consummated. If the 
proverbs which seem to underpin the tale are to be taken seriously, though, the ending may not be 
entirely positive. 'But it has happened to them according to the true proverb: 'Contigit enim eis illud 
veri proverbii: Canis reversus as suum vomitum, et: Sus Iota in volutabro /uti' ["A dog returns to his 
own vomit" and, a sow having washed, to her wallowing in the mire'] of II Peter 2. 22, which draws on 
Proverbs 26. 11, 'Sicut can is qui revertitur ad vomitum suum, sic imprudens qui iterat stultitiam suam' 
[As a dog returneth to his vomit, so a fool returneth to his folly] might suggest that 'animal' desire is 
never really overcome, and may only be made legitimate by the marriage vow and the aspiration to 
marriage as a spiritual ideal. Gawain, purified by his truth to the oath, and Ragnelle, made 'clean' of 
her animal appearance and sexual predation, may now indulge the carnal act within the Christian 'state' 
of marriage. 
45 ' A . . 279 - gUirre op crt., p. . 
453 Cf, marriage as a remedy against lechery in Chaucer's The Parson's Tale, 917- 43. 
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and the challenge of the wild is answered within the safe precincts of bedroom and 
court at the conclusion. ' 454 
4. 2 (c) summary 
The reward for courtesy can be read in the presentation to Gawain of an ideal woman: 
but there is a sense in which he maintains his moral hegemony over his own animal 
self and in the process breaks the spell ofRagnelle's alternative self. In this way what 
is represented in Ragnelle is a hermeneutic perspective of cyclical interpretation: each 
analysis of the animal discovers what the beginning perspective demands; in this case 
the innate ideological values laid out in the text demand a statement of what courtly 
individuals are not (/am like that, but it is not what I aspire to). Gawain neutralises 
the supernatural aspects of the tale which allow the test to occur. Disruptive female 
desire, allegorically embodied in Ragnelle as both animal, sexual predator, and 
subject of enchantment, is repressed by Gawain's innate courtesy. The repressed 
animal erupts, threatens, is suppressed, precisely because the dominant ideological 
position cannot be undermined or subverted- only revealed in the practice of 
upholding its dominance by showing what it is not. At a didactic level, the figure of 
Ragnelle draws on a specific animal typologically, authorised by allusion to scripture 
which highlights the dangers of digressing from reason: 'he who abandons goodness 
and ceases to be a man cannot rise to the status of God, and so is transformed into an 
animal' says Boethius, without n1aking the distinction that at the literal level at least, 
he already is. 




This thesis has examined the way the animal in fictive medieval texts is used as a 
moral arbiter, yet is displaced from moral consideration by early Christianity. The 
fundamental difference between the theology and literature, is clearly literature's 
availability to theorise positions established in Christian doctrine. Methodologically, 
the thesis opens up a discourse concerning consistent theological attitudes and 
patterns, which devalue the importance of the animal in western, and more 
specifically Christian, thought. In particular, the way that doctrinal interpretation 
displaces rigorous examination of the animal to the fictional text, is evident in a broad 
range of material. This pattern of displacement begins with conflicting readings of 
creation, characterised by Porphyry's On Abstinence from Animal Food. Porphyry is 
an important figure whose philosophy is integral to Christianity's appropriation of 
Hellenic reason. His non-dualistic and anti-Gnostic thought, has considerable parity 
with Christian doctrine, yet his concern that animals have inherent value as subjects of 
the creator, also embodying His attributes, is devalued in Christian thought. Porphyry 
highlights conflicting stylistic differences in the way the world and the text may be 
interpreted, and reveals the way that thought about the position of the animal in 
creation is developed through an ideology predisposed to reject a theocentric 
understanding of creation, in which God is present, and imminently revealed through 
all his animals. 
It is too big an 'if to say that, were his thought on animals canonical, western 
attitudes to the animal would be different. But the exclusion of his animal philosophy 
from Christian thought leaves a noticeable gap in theology, which is only really 
addressed with the advent of Darwinism. This noticeable imbalance is, to some 
extent, redressed by literary explorations of the animal, where man is defined against 
it, and where it becomes important as a sign, understood in abstraction, though never 
251 
CONCLUSION 
really granted moral status or consideration. The animal, rather, is forced to conform 
to what man says it is. 
The second c_hapter's focus on Bartholomaeus Anglicus' DPR reveals the difference 
between the outward looking Neoplatonic position of Porphyry, and the closed matrix 
of interpretation of early scholastic thought on the animal. The animal is subject to the 
predetermined answers supplied by Christian doctrine. Animals are a utility, not 
merely in their material usage, but in the way that they are used as literary signs. The 
examination of the way that Aristotelian structures and Christian hierarchies are 
synthesised demonstrates the way in which the animal is anomalously placed, and 
impossible to read from a single perspective. Aristotle's universals, as a mode of 
physiological categorisation, tend to be negated when particular Christian meanings 
are bestowed upon the animals as metaphysical expressions of ontological truth. The 
reality of a particular animal ceases to have primary importance in relation to the 
potential truth that it speaks about its Creator. The 'idea' that the animal is said to 
embody, is placed above the animal itself, the realm of potential being placed higher 
than the realm of the actual. Indeed, in Augustine's thought the animal, as a material 
sign, is devalued as a literal and material thing. Rather, priority is given to spiritual 
metaphors which open up new angles of vision. Such logocentricity prioritises 
mankind in such a way that the moral 'meaning' of an animal may only exist in 
abstraction from the material, where Christian conceptions of their significance 
bestow importance upon them, though in turn, such importance only exists in relation 
to what they can offer to man's own knowledge of himself, and God. 
The focus on Augustine's sign theory in the third chapter developed the notion that 
material things are fallen signs, yet demonstrates that this is also inherently 
problematic for Christian thought. Augustine sees the totality of creation as fallen, so 
that man is dependent upon faith and the logos which allows him to see through the 
corrupted things of the world. But there is also a sense in which the created totality 
remains intact, while human perspectives, because of human free-will and moral 
agency, are fallen. 
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This is most immediately evident in the way that Aquinas rethinks the way that the 
animal had a purpose, a design which it maintains, and which allows man to utilise it, 
and learn from it. His argument from design is complementary to, and compatible 
with, the way that he sees creation as being in a sense fallen within man. 
At the 'divine' level of interpretation the crucial question is, how far such scholastic 
theories may properly be described as theocentric? Ultimately, of course they are. A 
God of all beings is, by definition, the centre of the universe and present in all its 
things; anagogically, nothing has existence outside his essence. This constitutes the 
most ineluctable difference between Christian theory and Muslim theories. In any 
comparative consideration 'theocentricity' stands on the distinctive side of the 
equations. Langland's idealised vision of the earth as a theocentric one, presents the 
animal as having an important ontological significance. This is clearly influenced by 
Augustinian thought, where on the one hand God is present in the world, but on the 
other, all material things are fallen and corrupted. The two are not incompatible, but 
require us to understand that there are two distinct levels of interpretation: the 
contingent perspective, in-which God's presence in the world is vaguely signified, and 
the absolute perspective, in which a logocentric illumination operates through faith. 
Augustine, of course, privileges the later, and devalues the animal. 
Henryson's fables highlight the condition of man as an animal in the corporeal 
context, by highlighting the similarity between the two to illustrate the moral 
problems that arise from man's existence in his corporeal context. This generates 
considerable irony, of which Henry son seems unaware. He educates 'be figure of ane 
uther thing.' 'figure', rhetorically, means that he uses figures of speech to suggest 
ideas. In the Moral/ Fabillis he makes beasts appear to speak and understand. Because 
they share the animal part of our soul, but do not share the higher, rational component 
reserved for humanity, they provide ideal analogies to the human state. Henryson's 
teaching method unequivocally involves the representation of animals behaving, as 
some humans, in elevated or noble ways, and with the benefit of self knowledge and 
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awareness. Ultimately Henryson's animals are nothing more than the mobilisation of 
a set of rhetorical devices, or in his own words 'Fein3eit fabilis' which 'Ane 
sillogisme pro pone.' (Prologue, 1, 3, 46) But as such, these rhetorical animals inhabit 
many borders; of imaginative art where the actual animal is irrelevant compared to its 
potential symbolic counterpart, as well as the borders of the human, and the rational. 
At the indistinct limits of doctrinal thought, the animal finds its habitat, serving to 
express in a practical context what the 'official' texts of Augustine and Aquinas n1ay 
not. It urges man to understand that the humanity of their animality, as distinct from 
the beast of the literal, is a far more deadly beast involving as it does their fallenness 
and subsequent personal choice. Ironically, though, and despite such constant 
comparisons in which the human is asked to empathise with the state of being animal, 
the purpose of the fable is primarily to turn man from his animal nature, and from the 
animal per se. Doctrinally, the comparison is made, and worked- out in a literary 
context, which suggest that what is learnt should be taken out and practised in the 
world. In this sense animals provide an arbiter for man's reflection upon himself, 
though then ironically, he distances it, and depreciates its importance. 
In the final chapter such representations can be seen to be inverted. While fables make 
animals behave like men, human characters in romances behave like animals. Such 
literary examinations of the animality of man are set against Christian ideals in a 
courtly context, which prescribe how man may transcend his animality. The reward 
for Gawain's courtesy, for example, is the presentation to him of an ideal woman-
not a bestial one. Throughout Ragnelle, there is a sense in which, having recognised 
it, he maintains his moral hegemony over his own animal self, and in the process 
breaks the spell of Ragnelle' s altemati ve, animal self. It is clearly an allegorised 
version of the doctrinal commonplace of comparing man and animal, though in such 
allegories, the beast within threatens to emerge if the prescribed ideals of Christian 
aspiration are not closely adhered to. In this way what is represented in Ragnelle, is a 
hermeneutic perspective of cyclical interpretation: each analysis of the animal 
discovers what the beginning perspective demands; in this case the innate ideological 
values laid out in the text demand a statement of what courtly individuals are not (/ 
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am like that, but it is not what I aspire to). The repressed animal erupts and is 
suppressed, precisely because the dominant ideological position cannot be 
undermined or subverted. It may only be revealed in the practice of upholding its 
dominance by showing what it is not. 
The strength of the thesis lies in the way it observes that generally speaking, medieval 
men were very good at informing their audience what to believe. They were very 
confident about their knowledge; but they rarely question the validity of that 
knowledge. From a modem perspective human beings are privileged to be able to see 
animals against a much wider background. They may, if they chose, challenge the 
mistaken supposition that the animal does not really matter, and understand that our 
attitudes to it come from confused outlooks and inherited truisms. I set out to show 
that what we understand by the medieval view of scripture and doctrine, sounds 
suspiciously like the interpretation of two men - namely Augustine and Aquinas. 
Clearly, their interpretations constitute a discourse of exclusion- often on tenuous 
scriptural evidence. 
Medieval thought is far too comprehensive convincingly to close off the moral 
questions which the animal presents to it. Doctrine may prescribe simplistic solutions, 
but again, doctrine is interpretative. In contrast to the notion of dominion God's 
covenants confound the idea of a world created solely for the benefit of man. Such 
theocentricity sits uncomfortably with the idea of dominion. While the covenant 
tradition encon1passes all of God's creation, the testaments, gospels and injunctions 
that litter Christian scripture, are ignored, or repressed, and remain uncited by 
theologians and clerics. So often writers, commentators, and laymen, base their 
arguments on the supposition that 'God gave us dominion'. Such a statement must be 
modified, and seen in relation to scripture as a larger body of spiritual wisdom. If we 
are going to insist on such literalism, we must include the injunction to open our 
mouths for the dumb, for all those appointed to destruction, and that God brings 
salvation to man and animal alike. He remembers the covenant which is between 
Himself and man and every living creature of all flesh not to bring further retribution 
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after the flood. But He promises all animals that he will abolish slaughter, bring 
safety, and bring them to Him. The fact is that the real significance of God's covenant 
and relationship with the animal has been either actively dismissed and censored in 
the interests of promoting human interests, or is merely overlooked as irrelevant to 
Christian thought. 
In the literary use of animals in medieval literature, exposition of man's relationship 
to the beast complicates rather than simplifies the way the animal is understood. 
Characteristically, medieval literary theory provides a comprehensive hermeneutic 
system of reading, where all things may be explained at one or more levels of thought. 
Despite such a sophisticated approach to understanding the things of the world, the 
animal is outstandingly difficult to define and place, unless it is over-simplistically 
used as a defining Other to human selves. 
The model of the world which forms western thought and attitudes to the animal is 
open to question, and we should constantly scrutinise the platitudes about animals that 
we have received from the medieval paradigm. This thesis has shown that it is no 
longer acceptable that we believe the one or two truisms, extracted from the plethora 
of conflicting material, which have defined the animal over the last two millennia. 
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CONST ANTINE'S SPONSORSHIP OF CHRISTIANITY 
The historical context of the synthesis of Christianity with Rome strongly suggests 
that what is, in part at least, a vegetarian religion is forced to conform to the sacrificial 
meat- eating empire into which it is assimilated.389 The formation of the biblical 
canon has been seen by many critics as a politically expedient act of censorship and 
control, reflecting the way in which early Christianity was manipulated, and 
shoehomed into existing cultural practices. The most recent work to discuss the 
effects of the fusion of Christianity with Rome is Charles Freeman's The Closing of 
the Western Mind. Freeman examines the way in which Hellenistic reason is 
suppressed, as Christianity becomes a state religion, and emphasises the way in which 
unauthorised interpretations of early Christianity become heretical after scriptural 
canon formation at the first council ofNicaea. On the one hand, this may be seen as 
the result of religious toleration and a free- market in which Rome's commercial 
attitudes to buying citizenship, slave labour, and justice extends to the 
commodification of the Christian product: 
... the religions of the Graeco-Roman world were primarily, and traditionally 
civic; this is to say that the Gods were the gods who were recognised by the 
state -either the Roman state or the local city state. The priesthoods were 
reserved, in most instances, for the more prominent citizens, and at Rome the 
emperor himself expressed his religious function in the role of pontifex 
Maximus.390 
389 For a discussion on early Christian vegetarian sects and their directives, see Ron Cameron, The 
Other Gospels: Non-Canonical Gospel Texts (Guildford: Lutterworth Press, 1982) p. 104 ff. 




There is also a sense in which Christianity comes to prominence as a means of 
establishing power, control, and political unification. In the first and second centuries, 
the Roman Empire was a cauldron of religious belief in which Christians vied for 
position wit~ Hellenic religious groups such as Neoplatonism. In AD 250, the 
Emperor Decius launched a persecution of Christians, in part because 'the Christians 
refused to worship the emperor, met in secret, and so seemed to an empire undergoing 
civil wars, invasions, and other calamities to be practically subversive. ' 391 Christians 
are seen as dissident to the officially sanctioned religion, embodied in the Roman 
Emperor as Pontifex Maximus. By 312 Constantine, who was emperor in the East, 
decided to take total control of the empire by defeating Maxentius, emperor in the 
West and who was seen to have presided over the decline and 'misfortunes of the 
empire. '
392 
After crossing the Alps with a small army, he reached the outskirts of 
Rome, apparently having seen a vision of the cross standing above the sun (which he 
reported himself, therefore mythologising a self-fulfilling prophesy). 'On the cross 
were the words "by this conquer." Christ appeared to him and told him to place this 
icon on a military standard. ' 393 Ironically this later proved problematic for 
Constantine who, assuming a militaristic aspect to Christianity which did not exist, 
had then to promote images of Christ as a conquering soldier, though as Charles 
Freeman points out the image itself was particularly inappropriate given that Christ 
was crucified by Roman soldiers as an enemy of Rome. Such military and pseudo 
doctrinal propaganda has, of course, no foundation in scripture and is a tool of state. 
In contrast the plethora of apocryphal material in which Christ is explicitly sent to 
abolish sacrifice is repressed, burnt, or seen as heretical.394 Such historical 
occurrences are not only defined by an arbitrary event, but instantly become a 
material icon: the intersection of a multiple of factors are solidified in the historical 
moment. The chance emergence of these events is not calculated, but rather facilitates 
one discourse: that of Constantine's move to seize a political power and 'become' 
deified. It just happened that he had chosen to favour one god above others from 
391 N. Downs, ed., Basic Documents in Medieval History (Toronto: Princeton University Press, 
1959) p. 13. 
392 A. H. M. Jones, Constantine and the conversion of Europe (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 
1948) p. 3. . 
393 R. M. Grant, Augustus to Constantine: The Trust of the Christian Movement into the Roman 
World (London: Coli ins, 1971) p. 266. 
394 Freeman op cit., pp. 178- 180. 
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whom he sought patronage in the hope of securing a favourable outcome to his 
campaign. On October 2ih 312 after the battle of the Milvian Bridge Rome welcomed 
Constantine who claimed to be restoring the Roman senate and people to freedom: 
'He was sole ruler in the west, while Licinius, now his ally, ruled eastern Europe. His 
victory had been due to the power of Christ'. 395 In what sense it was due to the power 
of Christ has never been in question for the Catholic Church, though recent appraisals 
see Constantine's vision as remarkably convenient. From a modem critical 
perspective Claire Colebrook states that 'stories, as much as weapons, can become the 
physical acts which enable acts of power to take place. Stories circulate and enable a 
culture to represent itself as legitimate, moral, valuable and authoritative. ' 396 
Politically, Constantine was clearly using Christianity as a means of unification. 
Before encountering the enemy, a prayer for use by the troops was agreed by the two 
emperors, and was presented in epistolary form. The Summus Deus commended the 
imperial cause to God and requested divine aid. It would also appear that Constantine 
had urged Licinas, in his forthcoming campaign against Maximin, 'to place his armies 
under the protection of that heavenly power which had granted his own armies victory 
over Masantius. ' 397 Composed by the two emperors to 'the advantage and security of 
the state' 398 it reveals a defining moment for the hoped unification, not only of 
political and heavenly power but also of a highly eclectic selection of religious beliefs 
and practices. Licinas entered Nicomedia in triumph, and issued the following 
constitution to the governor of Bithynia: 
When both I, Constantine Augustus, and also I, Licinas Augustus, had 
happily met at Milan, and debated all measures which pertained to the 
interests and security of the state, we considered that among other 
matters which we saw would benefit a large number of persons, the 
very first that required regulation was that wherein was comprised 
respect for divinity; that we should give both to the Christians and to 
take all others free power of following whatever religion each 
395 Grant ibid., p. 266. 
396 Colebrook op cit., p. 215. 
397 A. H. M. Jones op cit., p. 89. 
398 Grant 1971 op cit., p. 266. 
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individual wished, in order that whatever Divinity there be in the 
heavenly seat can be appeased and propitious to us and to all who are 
placed under our rule. 399 
This constitution would ensure Divine favour for the state by its commendation to 
worship the 'Summa Divinitas', the very use of the term suggesting that Constantine 
wished to present the idea of religious plurality and appeal to as many Neoplatonists 
as possible. Loyalty and incentive would be elicited by the return of previously 
confiscated church properties. 400 The commendation further assumed a united body of 
Christians as its subjects, and concluded by granting religious toleration ostensibly to 
Christians being followed in 313 by the Edict of Milan, which officially terminated 
the persecution of Christians. Organised Christianity was a vehicle for a controlling 
power defined by its imperial, military activity. By accident, his choice to pay homage 
to the Christian God had given Constantine the ultimate earthly power of the Roman 
Empire. Though the empire and Christianity had no shared ideological or spiritual 
objective, Constantine forged the crucial link by becoming a Christian, his new 
religion unifying a hitherto weakened empire. As a new convert to the faith, he 
realised that a stable empire could not be built upon hundreds of conflicting 
interpretations and multiple texts about Christ and His identity. This, together with the 
fact that he was 'rewarded' with victory, made Constantine believe that his power had 
been appointed by God. The first general council of the Christian church, was 
convoked by Constantine in 324 CE from May 20th to August 25th of 325. He ordered 
bishops and theologians to meet at Nicaea to decide once and for all what had been 
done and said by Christ, and to standardise it in a text. However, this was not truly an 
act of faith for there was considerable pressure to provide Constantine with the 
doctrines that he had requested. Constantine forced an agreement of opinion, without 
which he would withdraw his support for the new church.401 Despite the fact that 
those who signed their names to the creed apparently did not understand it, it seemed 
to solve questions of whether Christ was human or divine. It established 'some 
399Extracted in A. H. M. Jones op cit., p. 85. 
40° For an in-depth discussion see Freeman op cit., pp. 157- 180. 
401 See N. Douglas - Klotz, The Hidden Gospel: Decoding the Spiritual Message of the Aramaic 
Jesus (Oxford: The Theosophical Publishing House, 1999) Douglas- Klotz points out the massive 
compromises which were made to appease Constantine 'since the sun-god was very popular in Roman 
culture, the council declared the Roman "Sun" day to be the Christian Sabbath.' p. 13. 
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version of what is called the Trinity- a belief in God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit-
as an orthodox doctrine of the Western Christian Church. ' 402 
Constantine maintained the title Pontifex Maximus. Despite what the New Catholic 
Encyclopaedia says about Constantine being 'captivated by Christianity' and giving it 
the protection of the state, he had rather captured Christianity within the confines of 
state control. Constantine saw himself as Pontifex Maximus of Christianity - or its 
bishop in matters external - with title rights of supervision and control over religion. 
While he called upon the Christian God for Divine aid he 'knew and cared nothing for 
the metaphysical and ethical teaching of Christianity when he became a devotee of the 
Christian God: he simply wished to enlist on his side a powerful divinity who had, he 
believed, spontaneously offered him a sign. ' 403 His conversion was clearly due to a 
dreamt meteorological phenomenon, which he had happened to witnesses at a crucial 
point in his career. Luckily, and perhaps only luckily for Christianity, Constantine 
looked at the skies, read the political signs, and founded a Christian state which was 
to mutual advantage: '[i]mperial favour was crucial to the success of Christianity. ' 404 
His conversion moved the church from a position of illegality to favour, from 
interloper to governor, within a Holy Roman Empire. Along with the conversion of a 
military dictatorship its non- Christian subjects were rapidly converted. By 361 the 
Council of Constantinople issued the Nicene - Constantinople creed, officially stating 
that the Holy Spirit proceeded from the Father and from the son.405 After fifty years of 
divisive controversy over whether Jesus was the same as God or an aspect of God, 
Basil of Caesarea (d. 3 79) provided the acceptable solution that there is one Godhead, 
though the Godhead has three distinct personalities. Ironically, as already observed, 
the idea is taken from the Enneads, and is purely Neoplatonic. In its Christian guise, 
the concept unifies the church, and makes orthodox Christianity the religion of the 
402 Douglas- Klotz. Ibid., p. 14. 
403 A. H. M. Jones op cit., p. 102. 
404 Lynch op cit., p. 10. 
405 Lynch ibid., p. 165. Eleven years after winning the battle at the Milvian Bridge Constantine 
murdered his already vanquished rival Licinius, former Emperor of the East and killed his wife, boiling 
her alive in her bath. These don't seem to be the actions of a follower of Jesus. In fact only at his death 
was he baptised, renouncing forever the purple of his imperial rank. At the Council ofNicaea 
Constantine had his father Constantius deified, and would be accorded the same honour after his own 
death, thereby taking equal deity with Jesus in the divine hierarchy. Constantine's late baptism perhaps 
signifies a realisation of something fundamental to Christian thought: that nothing material, especially 
taken by force, cannot be taken away again. His baptism and the relinquishing of the material trappings 
of empire was most likely an insurance policy. 
280 
APPENDIX A 
Roman State, giving it the most privileged position in Roman society. In an attempt to 
delimit the meaning of Christian scripture, patterns of enunciating power operate 
through constitutions of rigid exclusion. The council at Nicaea banned all versions 
and writings on the Gospels except those of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, Burning 
or hiding the rest. 406 
What is clear is that the Christianity which is absorbed into Rome's militaristic, 
sacrificial culture, is severely compromised, but must compromise in order to promote 
itself and survive. Nevertheless, the mode of its sponsorship and subsequent synthesis 
by this culture is one of expedient and political convenience. Constantine makes a 
typically imperious statement that 'We have received from the Divine Providence the 
supreme favour of being relieved from all error' ,407 never really seeing himself as 
anything but a god, though all the time represented as a champion of Christianity by 
his biographer Eusebius. H. A. Drake's recent study points to a pragmatic and ruthless 
Constantine who would do anything to support his political rule, creating a 'neutral 
public sphere' to produce a stable coalition between religions.408 Constantine's 
'vision' at the battle of Milvian Bridge is, under these terms, a point of realisation that 
a reported vision underpinning a victory could gain him the support of Christianity. 
Charles Freeman emphasises that this was not Constantine's first encounter with 
deity, and that he had been keen on several occasions to legitimate his reign with 
support from the gods: 'By 310, when he asserted his descent from Claudius 
Gothicus, he claimed that Apollo had appeared to him in a vision (clearly 
Constantine's favoured method of receiving divine messages), offering him a laurel 
wreath and promising that he would rule for thirty years. ' 409 Constantine's real 
concern with the Christian church was as a stabilising force to his regime. 
Subsequently, any chance that the Hellenic thought of a philosopher such as Porphyry 
should be canonical or disseminated was, for the time being at least, repressed under 
the new ideology of Christian revelation. 
406 Douglas- Klotz. op cit., p. 14. 
407 Cited by Freeman, op cit., p. 156. 
408 H. A. Drake 'Constantine and Consensus', in Church History, vol. 64 ( 1995) p. 7, also cited by 
Freeman, op cit., p. 157. 




WHY IS A COW BELOW A LETTUCE? THE ANOMALOUS PLACEMENT OF 
THE ANIMAL IN BARTHOLOMAEUS ANGLICUS' DE PROPRIETATIBUS 
RERUM 
Turning animals into texts forces physical bodies to conform to the notion of creation 
as an ordered formation. As an early encyclopaedia, Bartholomaeus Anglicus' De 
proprietatibus rerum places the animal within an easily accessible, logical structure. 
This structure is defined both pedagogically, in relation to recognised authorities, and 
logically, being one of the first alphabetised reference books. Technically, the form of 
the work may be seen as twofold (duplex). Firstly, the structure (jorma tractatus) is 
compiled from the perspective (modus agendi) of human science. Typically logical, 
this operates at the level of each chapter and is generally alphabetised: 'for kyndes and 
propertes of bestes bep descryued in generalle ... in singuler and in special and pat by 
the ordre of a. b. c.' (DP R 1. 1 ). Secondly, the form of treatment (jorma tractandi) is 
organised in accordance with clear definition (modus definitivus) where each entry 
consists of the opinions of a range of authorities. 
While the DP R offers an apparently uncomplicated commentary upon creation with 
God at the top of a descending hierarchy, the placement of the animal in the structure 
of the work as a whole seems puzzlingly inconsistent. There are generally accepted 
endorsements that the internal hierarchallogic of the DPR is provided by Aristotelian 
thought,410 but unlike Aristotle Bartholomaeus apparently 'displaces' the animals of 
chapter eighteen (De animalibus) by situating them above the final book (nineteen: 
colours, liquids, odours etc.) though below all other things.411 
410 When Bartholomaeus quotes authoritative commentaries on Aristotle, they tend to be taken from 
earlier translations of Historium animalium. However, the majority of 'direct' references to Aristotle 
are taken from Michael Scot's complete translation, and Avicenna's contemporary translation and 
commentary upon De animalibus. See Seymour, op cit., p. 209 ff. 
411 D. C. Greetham op cit., discusses the peculiarly generic organisation of the DPR but does not 
engage with structural anomalies. The most comprehensive single study, though which again does not 
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Bartholomaeus' observations, often beginning with the etymological explicatio 
associated with Isidore of Seville, highlight this inconsistency. We are told that 
'Letuse hatte lactuca and hap pat name of plente of humour, as Isider seip, oper for it 
makep ofte mylk in wommen pat norriship and feedip children ... ' (DP R 17. 92). This 
is a straightforward statement whose focus on the significance of words as signs 
characterises the literal sense of the text. However, the statement also begs a question: 
how can a lettuce, here introduced by highlighting the root of its Latin name and its 
semantic association with lactation, be logically hierarchised above a cow in an 
Aristotelian scheme in which we would expect to find animals above vegetation and 
below man? Indeed, where we might expect a direct concordance between the 
structural methodology of Aristotle's De animalibus and Bartholomaeus' DPR this is 
not immediately apparent.412 
This is less a structural anomaly, than a problem of textual interpretation. The text's 
Christian version of Aristotle's hierarchy takes an essentially biological knowledge 
system and extends it to the realm of 'insensibles.' Accordingly, we expect and find a 
creation with God at the top of descending or hierarchical version of natural order. 
Such an effortless general framework of speculum naturale though, operates on 
principles that have inadequately sharp and over-simplified boundaries, producing a 
moment of undecidability between Christian and Aristotelian interpretative 
. 413 strategies. 
Indeed, this apparently simplistic configuration obscures another principle of 
categorisation. In Bartholon1aeus' initial dejinitio, where science is delimited and the 
discuss the structure, is Elizabeth Brockhurst's 'Bartholomaeus Anglicus "De Proprietatibus Rerum" ', 
unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (University of London, 1952). 
412 While the placement ofthe animal is different, the nineteen books of the DPR evoke the 
nineteen books of Aristotle's De animalibus (Parts of Animals) and its Libra i, in which Aristotle 
defines a hierarchy or laddering of animal existence. In Libra i, Aristotle defines an upward movement 
from the lowest animals. What Bartholomaeus calls 'dyuers[ite] of vertu' refers to the way Aristotle 
defines animal reproduction by blood and semen; as some animals have more blood and are warmer 
blooded, they are considered higher. 
413 D. C. Greetham addresses some inconsistencies caused by the appropriation of classical fable 
material, as well as the other influences which seem to dictate Bartholomaeus' textual structure: 
'Isidore's theory, with its sense of a real, as well as metaphorical, link between two areas of experience 
(the world itself and the words used to describe that world), is, of course, very attractive to 
Bartholomaeus and provides him not only with much incidental material but also with a further 
justification for the rationale of his own work.' Greetham op cit., p. 674 (n). 
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subject area defined, he specifies that 'pe propirtees of pinges folewyth pe 
substaunce.' (Pro h. 41 ). The aim of the work is to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of 'things', which means first defining their 'substance' as universals 
(the title is not about things- De rebus- but about the properties of things). 
Consequently, the animal is distinctly defined as an inhabitant of corporeal substance 
alone, and placed within the four elements that are the delineating and defining 
principle according to which books ten to eighteen are organised. From this 
perspective, the chapter on animals is clearly not at the bottom of the scheme. Rather, 
it takes the highest place in an earthly hierarchy whose lowest point is the Earth at 
book fourteen (tractat de terra et eius partibus) and from which point the progression 
're-ascends' to the bestiary. Though man inhabits the corporeal context and its four 
elements, he also straddles both corporeal and incorporeal contexts, and has been 
dealt with accordingly in book three as a mixed substance. Being understood as a 
microcosmic circle, however, the created world manifests the four elements of the 
cosmos: 
... pe world is iclepid alle pinges pat bep contaeyned in pe roundenes of 
hevene, as heven in pe whiche pe sterre[s] schinep, andfore pat litip all 
pinge, ayer by pe whiche alle ping pat hap lif brepep and pryvep, water pat 
biclippip pe sides of perpe, er the pat susteynep and holdep vp and fidip al 
pis lowe pingis.' [DPR 8. 1, my emphasis]. 
In this context Bartholomaeus draws on the authority of Boethius, who states that 
such imperfect matter moves around the perfect immaterial: the created soul around 
the uncreated mind of God. Fire, air, water and earth represent a corporeal and 
concrete nature, moved by God. And it is in this sense that animals are an extension of 
God's creation and are clearly understood as corporeal signs in terms of biblical 
sapience and Boethian logic. Eternity is the complete, simultaneous and perfect 
possession of everlasting life, made clear by the comparison with creatures that exist 
in tin1e, or 'lnvisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sun/ intellecta 
con5piciuntur' (Rom. 1. 20). They are separate; though significantly, suggest 
similitude to the spiritual world. 
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The corporeal world and its elements, then, constitute a structure symmetrical to the 
incorporeal. After the spiritual substances of books one to three (the creator, spiritual 
creation and the angels) and the mixed substances of books four to nine (man's 
spiritual and corporeal contexts), book ten is the first engagement with the exclusively 
corporeal forms of the material. Books ten to eighteen represent corporeal substance 
in relation to the delineation of the four elements surrounding earthly existence, or in 
Aristotelian terms the matter of perceptible bodies of fire, air, water, earth, and their 
natural manifestations. From fire at the highest point, discussion descends through the 
elements of air and water, and includes the things of those elements: birds, flying 
insects, and fish. The logical, downward Progression to the earth provides a 
foundation for the discussion to re-ascend through the things of the earth (mountains, 
countries, metals, plant life) of which animals are the highest group. 
The reality to which the text conforms is a specifically literary one where Christian 
thought based on scripture- as a long static exposition- engages with Aristotle's 
'natural' hierarchy. This constitutes a 'vertical' intersection, which problematises the 
narrative conduct of the text and its Christian exegesis, and in which the perfectly 
logical structural use of the four elements is at first sight obscure to modern 
readership. The Christian notion of hierarchy, in this sense, overrides an Aristotelian 
conception of the world to displace the animal to the bottom of the order of things, 
while never questioning this displacement. 
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THE PLACEMENT AND DISPLACEMENT OF THE FEMININE IN 
BARTHOLOMAEUS ANGLICUS' DE PROPRIETATIBUS RERUJvf 14 
This appendix observes the unexpected inclusion of 'the feminine' in the book on 
animals in Bartholomaeus Anglicus' DPR. As the text is a compilation (Compilatio) of 
extracts the reader may expect - and will find - no commentary to explain this 
placement. But by way of explanation this appendix outlines some Aristotelian 
elements underpinning the De animalibus - book eighteen - of the DP R which result in 
the female being ordered in accordance with a peculiarly 'generic' organisation. 
The first chapter of book eighteen of the DP R offers an overview 'in general' of 
Aristotle's definition of what the 'animal' is, while the proceeding chapters deal 'in 
special' with the essential determining characteristics of each beast. Bartholomaeus' 
aim is to report all the particular things known about what Trevisa translates as 
'animal, a beste' .415 Included in the alphabetically ordered chapters is 'De femina', or 
the feminine. If there was a masculine equivalent, De mare, we might suppose that the 
two would serve to offer comparison and distinctions between the male and female of 
any chosen species. But as there is no equivalent 'male' chapter this inclusion is 
extraordinary, presenting an apparent anomaly. 
Explanation may begin by the observation that the De femina does not apply to human 
females in particular but to the female of any species, as the etymological explication 
illustrates: 'The femel hatte femina and hap pat name of femur, pat is 'pe pies', for in 
these part yes bitween pe pyesis distinctioun and dyuersite betwene male and femele.' 
This at once presents a possible solution to the anomaly, in that the Aristotelian 
principle of the text's organisation prescribes definitions which are determined as 
414 A version of this appendix was printed as a note entitled 'The placement and displacement of 
the feminine in John Trevisa's translation of Bartholomaeus Anglicus' De proprietatibus rerum' in 
Notes and Queries vol. 50, issue. I, March 2003, pp. 11 - 13. 
415 Unless otherwise indicated quotations are taken from 'Defemina', 18. 49 ofthe DPR. 
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universals. The aim of the encyclopaedia as stated I·n the h · c. • 
, pro em1um or pre1ace, Is to 
understand the properties of 'things' by first defining their 'substance' as universals. 
For Aristotle only the universal or secondary substance is scientifically knowable: 
'animal' and ·~an' are secondary substances and knowable, 'Mary' is a first substance 
and is not. In terms of mankind, who is an animal before anything else, the definition 
of the female must also begin with the most basic denominator, or beast-like 'parts' of 
the species of animal that man is. Mankind's primarily animal existence, and the 
reproductive animality of his humanity, provides this primary scientific definition. 
In a previous book, the 'animal' part of the human (Humo) is said to be of'pe erpe'. But 
man is 'Antropos' or 'arered vp' (DPR 3. 1) to face his god, evidently glossing 
Aristotle's Parts of Animals.
416 
The female of any species is more closely associated 
with the process of reproduction, with earthy and earthly animal acts, than is the male. 
But as mankind has reason, he 'schal seche heven and nou3t putte his pou3t in pertpe 
and be obedient to pe wombe as a best.' (DPR 3. 1). In Aristotle's biology the female 
of any species is primarily defined, then, by the corporeal animal state and while the 
male also inhabits this state, in the process of generation he is the informing clause, or 
soul, who can be seen to bring nothing immediately material to the biological process 
of generation. 
This is explained when we are told that mother means 'matiere' or matter, to which the 
male gives his form in the process of regeneration: 'Aristotil seip pat in gendrynge of 
brood pe femel is as it were matiere and the mate is forme and schappe. And of hope 
comep semen and of medlyng perof comep pe creature. And perfore I say pat mal and 
femel ben as it were pricipalte of genercioun, and pe mate is a[s] forme and schap and 
pe female as matiere.' The soul is the form of the body (anima est forma corporis) 
which by informing matter gives the principle of bodily structure, sensation and 
thought to produce the concrete entity comprising both 'form' and 'matter.' While form 
is embodied in individuals it is separate from material production and pre-existent to 
the act of generation: 'The producing agent was pre-existent ... the process of the 
child's formation is what it is because the parent was a man ... semen is the source of 
. d ,417 things that are generate . 
416 Parts 656 a., 10- 15. 
417 Parts 640 a. 25 ff 
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In this way Aristotle explains the character of a biological individual not by recourse 
to species essences defined per genus et differentium, but by the effect of the father's 
form upon the mother. The imprint, interjected into the materia of the maternal body, 
is the realm of the father, suggesting his function as both a site of origin and a 
disembodied delivery system. The role of the maternal body, on the other hand, is 
functional, destined as it is to become an embodied or corporeal delivery system 
producing a genital outcome. 
In the corporeal context existence and experience by a soul depends upon its infusion 
into a corporeal body, biological function being prerequisite to the soul's earthly 
existence. In order to facilitate earthly existence bodies must be reproduced. Thus the 
desire to reproduce is in itself an animal act, separate from the aspirations of the soul. 
The De femina informs us that the female 'desirep more pan pe male', and it is this 
desire to reproduce which accordingly manifests itself in the most actively material 
sex, the prime 'principle of generation' in the corporeal context- the female. 
This being so, the placement of the feminine in the bestiary is a quidditative one. This 
is to say that the defining factor of the universal 'animal' is its ability to regenerate, 
resulting in the inclusion of the female, whose essentials as principle of generation are 
explained at the 'scientific' or biological level of the text. Mankind, having quiddity as 
an animal, is also defined by generation. Even at this biological level an essentially 
corporeal mankind is understood to be 'arered vp' to face God. Outside of the 
delimitation of the De animalibus the animal, in other words, is always explained in 
relation to its highest point of definition - that of mankind and a superior intellect. But 
within De animalibus the inclusion of De femina is not an anomalous placement. 
Rather, it defines the animal by female reproductivity at its most instinctive and 




DE PROPRIETATIBUS RERUM: LECTJO AS CONTEXT 
There is no in depth criticism or appraisal of the structure, purpose, and potential 
textual anomalies presented by the DPR. Indeed, so vast a work presents a range of 
potential readings. To delimit the encyclopaedia to its scholastic context, and to see it 
as a lectio text, is to understand it as a work of utility that is preoccupied with logic 
and order. Lectio was not just the reading out of a scholastic summa, but involved 
careful selection and explanation of the subject matter. As a lecturer (Lector) of texts, 
Bartholomaeus would have rehearsed logic to a scholastic audience. The scholastic 
lectio is distinctly different from its monastic counterpart, requiring a different kind of 
textual presentation for academic readers and listeners. While the modus of the lector 
in both contexts was to educate students to the truth through definition, analysis and 
deduction in the 'lesser sciences' than scripture, monastic lectio was 'a spiritual 
exercise which involved steady reading to oneself, interspersed by prayer, and 
pausing for rumination on the text. ' 418 However, the scholastic lectio offered a 
different textual presentation, containing extracts from works of respected auctors. It 
was a process of study involving a formal, logical reasoning process- a ratiocinative 
scrutiny of the text- illustrating modes of interpreting authoritative knowledge or in 
Bartholomaeus' words, 'to vnderstonde redels and menynges ... derkliche ihid'. 
(Proh. 41) It was mediated by a master who read books word by word to his students. 
During the course of the lectio words were defined, general points highlighted and 
obscurities clarified. Questions arising from the reading would be resolved by the 
further technique of quaestio involving oral argument (disputatio). So there is a sense 
in which the DP R should be seen as a pragmatically persuasive work rather than just a 
work of utility. 
418 Parkes op cit., p. 115. 
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The growth of an international student population at Paris in the early thirteenth 
century saw textual presentations change to accommodate the new focus on science 
' 
and the rise of the school. Consequently, works copied and produced in and before the 
twelfth century 'were better organised in copies produced in the thirteenth century. ' 41 9 
Accordingly, the DP R displays the practical unity of a compilatio of things and 
auctoritates designed as a readily accessible source for students, which is not 
available in similar works such as Isidore of Seville's earlier Etymologies (c. 620) or 
the Dominican Thomas de Cantimpre's De natura rerum. Isidore's Etymologiae, for 
example, have no logical structure, his twelfth book, De animalibus, relying on eight 
arbitrarily placed chapters on different types of animai.420 
Reading the DP R as a lectio text allows us to see that logical ordering is one aspect of 
the text's design and purpose. It is both comprehensive and authoritative, and has 
logical indexing and systematic ordering. The overall scheme works from high to low, 
as stated in the opening line 'pe propirtees ofpinges folewyth pe substaunce' (Proh. 1 
- 4) which we are told is necessary in order to understand individual things.421 Each 
book is divided into chapters, which represent topics (tituli) of which De animalibus 
is book eighteen, containing one hundred and seventeen chapters or 'capitulum'. 
Bartholomaeus instructs his reader to expect 'pe ordre of a. b. c.' (DPR 12. 1). Where 
a logical progression, such as book five on the human body arranges its chapters in 
order from head to toe, book eighteen's animals have no natural order and are 
artificially, though logically, alphabetised.422 To appreciate this point is to see the 
419 M. B. Parkes 'The influence of the concepts of ordinatio and compilatio on the development of 
the book.' In Alexander. J. J. G., & Gibson. M. T., eds., Medieval Learning and Literature: Essays 
Presented to Richard Wil/iam Hunt (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1976) p. 115. 
420 De natura rerum has the same purpose as Bartholomaeus' work, but while the ordo of the 
nineteen books is logical, it suffers from a lack of obvious progression from book to book. It is also 
much less comprehensive, most noticeable in the separation of the four elements from their physical 
manifestations. 
421 1: God. 2: Angels. 3: The reasonable soul. 4: The bodily substance and its humours. 5: Man's 
body. 6: 'ages'. 7: Sickness and venoms. 7: The world and the bodies ofheaven. 8: Time and parts of 
time. 9: Matter and form. 10: Air. 11: Birds and fowl. 12: Different bodies of water and the fish which 
inhabit them. 13: The Earth. 14: Provinces. 15: Stones and metals. 16: Herbs and plants. 17: 'Bestes'. 
18: 'Of accidents,' colours, flavours, etc. 
422 Before this time Distinctio and questio would be inserted by the rhubicator in the gloss, in the 
margin. The stages in the argument were 'carefully indicated by means of litterae notabiliores and 
paraph marks.' Bartholomaeus also employs a recently fashionable technique for scribes and 
rubricators - the running title. Parkes also draws attention to another device, which became utilised in 
the mid twelfth century, 'the analytical table of contents as a guide to the ordinatio and to facilitate the 
readers access to component parts of the work' -a striking feature of the DPR as compilatio. 'In the 
thirteenth century this led to the development of the notion of compilatio but as a form of writing and 
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necessity of understanding the generic status of the lectio text, because this facilitates 
our ability to understand it as literal and scientific. As such, there is no intended 
'hidden' or allegorical meaning to the structural placement of animals that would 
complicate the logic of the structure. Bartholomaeus aspires to objectivity, and to 
show facts directly. 
As a Paris lector Bartholomaeus would have been familiar with Peter A be lard's Sic et 
non ( 1122). Its preface includes a definition of Scholastic lectio and advocates the 
' 
reconciliation of discrepancies found between different authorities. At the most 
elementary level of the DP R this is evident in the four chapters which present 
differing authoritative accounts of the elephant according to Isidore, Pliny, Aristotle 
and Avicenne, and Solinus. Abelard states: 
Quid itaque mirum si absente nobis spirito ipso, per quem ea et scripta 
sunt et dictata atque ipso quoque scriptoribus intimata, ipsorum nobis 
des it intelligentia? Ad quam nos maxi me pervenire impedit insusitatus 
locutionis modus ac plerumque earundem vocum sign(ficatio diver sa, cum 
modo in hac modo in ilia significatione vox eadem sit posita.423 
In his prologue, Abelard argues that apparent contradictions can be resolved by modes 
of examination without undermining the authority of inconsistent texts. Indeed the Sic 
et non brings relevant views together 'in such a way as to reveal their apparent 
divergence and even contradictoriness. ' 424 As a method of critical analysis, the 
scholastic Lectio n1inin1ises areas of intellectual conflict by distinguishing different 
types of validity in argument. It raises difficulties for discursive comparison, and 
harn1onisation by a synthesis of human reason and Aristotelian logic. With this 
as a means of making material easily accessible ... what was new was the amount of thought and 
industry that was put into it, and the refinement that this thought and industry produced. The 
transmission of these refinements on the page led to greater sophistication in the presentation of texts.' 
In this sense, the DPR had a rapid international circulation due to its success as a coherently organised 
compilatio for theological study. Parkes op cit., pp. 121 - 127. 
423 'So is it any wonder that, in the absence of the spirit itself through whom these were written, 
dictated and also directly imparted to their writers, we fail to understand them? An unfamiliar way of 
speaking and semantic variation in a good many expressions, which may be used now with this, now 
with that signification, combine to make their comprehension extremely difficult.' See Sic et Non: A 
Critical Edition ed. by Blanche B. Boyer and Richard McKeon (London: University Of Chicago Press, 
1976.) Fasci. i, p. 89, L I 0- 14. 
424 Minnis & Scott op cit., p. 67. 
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intention, Bartholomaeus' conflicting versions of animals are included to be 
understood by one or more modes of reading. While the differing accounts of the 
elephant are apparently contradictory, variance of description is resolved by 
proximate tex~ual comparisons, which aim to offer complementary perspectives. 
In this way, Bartholomaeus is neither controversial nor critical. He does not question 
the authorities he uses, and relies on their 'objective' observation and commentary, 
enumerating the component parts of nature 'according to the principle "The more the 
better." ' 425 He places authorities side by side for comparison; he does not question 
what they have to say in the text, but leaves this to those who use the text. Authorities 
may conflict, but ultimately discord must be rationalised, rather than questioned. So 
while authoritative accounts of things may be consciously compiled to offer 
conflicting opinions for debate and study this same material, though divergent, could 
in turn be used to rationalise contradictions. There is clearly a desire to be logical in an 
Aristotelian sense, seen in the hierarchical index, books and chapters. While the lector 
would use the index for quick reference, the actual placement of things and animals 
might be irrelevant to him because he would not necessarily read the work in a linear 
fashion. Rather, his mode would be comparative, and his purpose would be to make 
selections from the Christian authorities on offer. 
425 Curtius op cif., pp. 92- 93 
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